
SNIE 2-5-61
14 September 1961

SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

SOVIET REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE IN FULL



NOTE: This is the final version of the estimate and additional text will not be circulated.

Central Intelligence Agency

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Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Central Intelligence Agency and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and The Joint Staff.

Concurred in by the UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE BOARD

on 14 September 1961. Concurring were the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army; the Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Intelligence), Department of the Navy; the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF; the Director for Intelligence, Joint Staff; the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations; and the Director of the National Security Agency. The Atomic Energy Commission Representative to the USIB and the Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, abstained, the subject being outside of their jurisdiction.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

14 September 1961

SUBJECT: SNIE 2-5-61: SOVIET REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION

THE PROBLEM

To estimate Soviet reactions to a US decision, in the near future, to mobilize four National Guard divisions, and to dispatch several regular divisions to Europe.

THE ESTIMATE

1. Dispatch of substantial additional US troopsunits to Europe, and the callup of a force on the scale of one-fourth of the entire present US divisional strength, would be seen by the Soviets as another in a series of moves intended to impress them with American firmness on the Berlin issue and to bolster US calls on its allies for strengthening their forces for the same

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purpose. At the same time, they would recognize that these measures substantially augmented conventional military strength in Western Europe.

- 2. The Soviets in their response would seek to dispel any notion that they could be intimidated by such Western measures, and to prove that they could match or overmatch them. A number of steps to this end would be open to them. They might dispatch substantial reinforcements to the Soviet forces in East Germany, and publicly announce the fact. The Soviets might also announce a partial callup of reserves. They might selectively reveal important strengths in the Soviet forces, such as medium range ballistic missiles within range of Western Europe.
- 3. The Soviets would interpret the American mobilization and reinforcement primarily as an attempt to impress them with US will and determination in the Berlin crisis. And we believe that the Soviets would in fact raise their estimate of such US determination. They might conclude from the augmentation of conventional forces that the US, at least, was more willing than they had previously estimated to engage in limited military conflict in defense of the Western position in Berlin, and to run the risk of subsequent escalation, if necessary, into nuclear

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war. However, we cannot exclude the possibility that they might conclude from an augmentation of nonnuclear strength that the US would limit itself to actions short of nuclear war. Their judgment would be affected by other US steps, both political and additional military measures designed to enhance our strategic nuclear capability. No matter which conclusion they reached, however, we doubt that they would respond to this action by changing their overt position on Berlin, or by displaying a more forthcoming attitude toward negotiations. On the contrary, with Soviet prestige already heavily committed, they would fear that such a reaction to the US reinforcement would appear as a sign of weakness. In any case, the Soviets would take this consideration into account in deciding how to respond to a Western initiative on negotiations at this time.

4. Furthermore, in the absence of other indications to the contrary, they would probably conclude that their chances for making progress toward their objective via early negotiations had diminished. Thus the immediate effect might be to strengthen the present tendency of the Soviets to rely on unilateral actions to move toward their objectives in Berlin.

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the need for caution in determining which actions could be undertaken without undue risk.

5. The USSR's general position on the Berlin issue will, of course, continue to be the product of calculations combining its own minimum and ultimate objectives, assessment of its own strong and weak points and tactical opportunities, and estimates of Western resolve and capability. The posited US move would be only one of many developments which are constantly affecting these calculations. In this connection, the Soviets would be alert to note whether the US's NATO allies followed suit with corresponding increases in strength.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY]

13 September 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE LOARD

SUBJECT: Release of SNIE 2-5-61, "SOVIET REACTIONS TO CERTAIN US COURSES OF ACTION" to Certain Foreign Governments

- 1. The Moard of National Estimates notes that this estimate was prepared to meet a sensitive US policy requirement.

 Under the circumstances the Moard recommends this estimate

 not be released to any foreign government.
- 2. We therefore do not propose to place the question of the release of SNIE 2-5-61 on the USIB agenda unless specifically requested by a USIB member.

RODEAT L. HEWITT

acting Deputy Assistant Director

National Estimates

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14 September 1961

Washington

Dear

I am writing my part of the answer to your letter while here to discuss the programs with which your letter is concerned. While I may not follow your letter point by point in this response, I believe all items requested of me will be covered in the following categories into which this letter is organized:

- a. The Intelligence Scene in Berlin
- b. CA Programs in Berlin
- c. Reorientation of the Berlin Base to Meet New Situation and Tasks

I. The Intelligence Scene in Berlin

' The border between East and West Berlin has been converted into a Communist-style international border across which traffic in either direction is rigidly controlled. The unique asset of Berlin is, therefore, a thing of the past. But it is essential to bear two points in mind: traffic is still crossing the border in both directions, including West Berliners, West Germans, East Berliners, and almost any nationality you wish to name. Crossings number hundreds--total East and West, counting a round trip as two crossings -- daily; and the unique nature of the Sector Border prior to 13 August means that there is no substitute for it in West Germany (or elsewhere) as a means of achieving access to East Germany. The border between the Federal Republic and East Germany is tightened up as part of the measures launched 13 August to (in our assessment) accomplish the division of Germany, and in another week or so a restricted zone will have been established along the entire FedRep-East German border to a depth of perhaps 25 to 35 miles, in addition to the erection of physical barriers at points judged by the East most vulnerable to black crossings.

While the border between West Berlin and East Germany is being converted into a plowed strip - barbed wire - watch towers - patrolled border, the border between East Berlin and East Germany is now virtually uncontrolled - a change of the past few days. In short: A West Berliner can visit East Berlin, with appropriate excuse (this varies but East-West traders, newsmen, students, and a few compassionate travelers are getting passes). Once in East Berlin, a suitably outfitted agent can presumably cache his West documents, and on East German documentation and suitable cover story travel into East Germany. We have been waiting for just such pattern to emerge from the chaotic and unpredictable administration of

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border controls which has obtained until very recently, and will now begin to test in practice this presumed operational potential.

Refugees are still reaching West Berlin at a rate in excess of 30 or 10 a day. By contrast, only a little over 100 reached Bavaria in the period 13 to 31 August.

while not denying that there is a role for the agent to play in collection of imminence indicators, I believe we should not overemphasize this.

So the intelligence problem is still very much one of gathering political intelligence showing intentions too. This by way of lead-in to my conception of the intelligence collection missions of BOB:

- a. Reactivate agents now out of touch with us. This involves courier missions to some agents; courier missions to deaddrop communications material and instructions; resupply missions to agents with S/H commo and pads. Our more than 100 agents in East Berlin and East Germany are probably a greater asset than anything-we will ever be able to build up inside East Germany through new recruitments. They must be preserved, recontacted securely, in some cases reoriented (many, especially two of the may have great potential as U/W assets if we can get radios to them). Some of our West Berlin assets may be usable for resupply missions, and we will need to recruit support agents in West Berlin for contact, caching, and observation missions.
- b. Recruit new sources for East German coverage. Opportunities appear to lie in East-West traders in touch with East German officials; in the contacts of West Berlin students with East Berlin students (taking due note of inherent political dangers and existing prohibitions on student operations); in non-Germans, especially nationals of the developing areas

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(who may be recruited in West Berlin and elsewhere) for their contacts with East Berliners (they currently have fairly easy access to East Berlin) or even as long-term agents for legal infiltration into East Germany probably as students; recruitment of East Berliners who visit West Berlin (at the moment a small and pretty hopeless category largely party faithful and railroaders but one which may expand); and CE operations (Chief of LfV Berlin told me 12 September his double agent operations are proceeding unhindered by the border changes.

- c. Support operations by providing leads, case officers for recruitments, and commo support from Berlin to recruits who return to East Germany.
- d. Greatly expand our contacts among West Berlin newspaper, business, and professional circles for (a) reports on West Berlin morale and suggestions for possible CA operations to counteract bad morale; (b) leads to persons having contacts in the East; and (c) for their own eastern contacts. A few sources on West Berlin morale—we won't overdo it—will not bring us into conflict with State, and will provide us coverage now not available; the principal purpose of West Berlin contacts, though, will be as avenues to sources in the East.

While the above is doubtless not exhaustive, it represents a fair scale of operational opportunity remaining in Berlin, which will continue until and unless eastern authorities completely seal the border and prevent any contact between East and West Berlin.

II. CA programs in Berlin.

I have had some reservations about various types of CA programs in Berlin which I have explained pretty fully to Let me say by way of introduction that I do believe there is a field for CA operations, but that we must eschew the "gimmick" type operation for which we became so famous - via our groups - in years past. I would see three basic types of CA operations:

- a. Operations to harass the East German regime;
- b. Operations to dramatize the Berlin issue worldwide;
- c. Operations to bolster or maintain West Berlin morale.

In the category of harassment of the East German regime I include operations to deter the East German border guards from shooting fleeing refugees; operations encouraging defection of border guards; operations to bring factual news to the East Germans and otherwise undermine the control of the regime over the populace.

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erecting billboards at the Sector border; of painting signs on buildings facing the East; and of setting up mobile projectors to project slogans and straight news (including facsimilies of West Berlin papers), on various types of screens. Screens may be buildings, or under some conditions the low cloud cover not unusual for Berlin at this time of year. I am having get information on projectors and plastic screen materials with the idea of building mobile projection trucks with the capability of projecting slides on a translucent plastic screen forming the side or back of the truck; such trucks would include a generator, and projection equipment to project on building sides, clouds, or billboards as well, and also could perhaps carry loudspeaker equipment. They could be used all around the border, including the West Berlin-East Germany border. The theme (other than straight news) most appealing to me at the moment is Willy Brandt's "Lass dich nicht zum Lumpen machen" as a message to the guards on the border, likely to be the only audience shortly after the truck arrives, since the authorities would certainly clear away any crowds in sight of such moving signs. Still, the border guards are a good target for campaigns such as the current one offering 10,000 marks for the identity of the murderer of the refugee who tried to swim the Teltow Canal. This program would be done by the Senat, as we see it, with our support.

The idea of a second TV channel is a good one, too. TV will reach East Berlin, because no special aerial will be needed at such close range.

More news signs like the one at Potsdamer Platz would be good, too, but will take a long time to construct and will probably be seen by very few East Berliners, since the Eastern authorities will clear out the people in range.

A somewhat minor point, but worth doing I think, would be transmitting some straight news and music program (perhaps VOA has one suitable) over AFN Berlin from OlOO (when AFN signs off) until 0300 or even until 0600 when AFN comes on again. State has recommended this recently, to counteract the current "pirating" of the frequency by Radio Moscow English language programs, which come in loud and clear on the AFN Berlin frequency as the "Star Spangled Banner" fades away. I suspect Radio Moscow is aiming at East German listaners to AFN as much as anything, and feel we should deprive them of this free ride.

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The plans for making Berlin a cultural center, for building up specialized industries, and even for establishing one or more technical commissions of the UN in Berlin (I would suggest the ECE, perhaps UNESCO, perhaps WHO) are all of great importance, although our own role as KUBARK in these may in some instances not be particularly large. Willy Brandt, partly for election impact and partly because it is needed has started a program asking for still further tax advantages to Berlin residents (among other provisions) to help induce people from the FedRep to move to West Berlin. The city will need to stop the previous outflow of approximately 20,000 to 25,000 annually of its working force (up to now replenished by refugees), and achieved an inflow resulting in a net gain in working force annually, to maintain vitality. Moreover, right now West Berlin critically needs over 20,000 workers to replace the East-West Grenzgaenger of whose services the city was suddenly deprived on 13 August. Thus the economic proposals face some formidable initial problems, but should be pursued. Mayor Brandt's plans include proposals startlingly similar to your Long Range Plan, which we shall certainly encourage. Perhaps now would be a good time to lay out the proposal to Shep Stone and ask him to pursue it with the Senat, keeping us informed and hollering for help if it were needed.

The above is by no means an exhaustive catalogue of actions most, if not all, of which would appear already to have policy approval. Let me urge, therefore, that indeed be sent to Berlin, because I cannot possibly run the base and a large CA program without any CA officer.

I is already well on his way to entrenching himself in Berlin, and will be just what we need there.

III. Reorientation of Berlin Base:

and I have spent all our spare moments on the dual questions of reorienting the BOB effort and selecting officers for assignment elsewhere in Germany. Morale is, as you note, admirably high in Berlin Base, and most (or all) the officers currently want to stay there. But I doubt that there will be enough opportunities to justify the current number of officers, nor that the best talents of many of the officers now on hand will be utilized under the current conditions. The result, in the near future, will be a drop in morale, I think, if some officers do not soon get new assignments. There is the usual aura of uncertainty hanging over the base, and I want to announce as soon as possible the nature of the tasks BOB will do, and the nature of other programs being established in light of the threatening situation, to which BOB officers will be assigned. Every sign gives me reason to think that all officers selected for the proposed "Task Force" will be enthusiastic about it.

of course, has the respect of every officer on the base, and beyond this the officers in Berlin Base now want to do something about the threat to Berlin, which this proposed assignment will provide them every opportunity of doing. Sending eight officers on TDY in the next week or so will avoid the occurrence of any stagnant period at the base (which, believe me, there has as yet not been) between the time of activating alternate communications with agents, the initial phase of which is now largely completed, and the decisions on further activities in Berlin and elsewhere.

I am thinking in terms of a base of about 75 people in Berlin. This will permit diversion of more than 20 case officers to other assignments, principally to the paramilitary and perhaps the black radio operations. Some officers will definitely be transferred from Berlin

will tackle the "Task Force" in TDY status at least initially. Some officers will definitely be selected for transfer out of Berlin; others can only be selected after decisions are made with respect to the plans is carrying back, and criteria can be established for selecting the officers.

My present plans also call for a simplification of Base structure. While tentative, plans now call for a CA branch of six or seven officers under a positive intelligence branch under (who will also be Deputy Chief of Base if leaves), and a CE Branch under Firm recommendations will be along in a matter of days. A small Coordination and Liaison Branch under , and an expanded Intelligence Support Staff under to exploit the numerous sources of useful information on Berlin aside from BOB agents, are the other main operational components. A case officer strength of around 30 can be achieved with the total strength figure of 75. Obviously, some personnel shifts are going to take a little diplomacy, but the urgency of the situation will obviate serious problems, I believe. I agree completely with comment that the necessity of change will be recognized.

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Finally to close what has become a rather long letter, let me state that all of us in Berlin, West Berliners, U.S. Army, and State Department alike, feel most strongly that no amount of propaganda, no clever deception operations, can make any real difference to the Berlin situation. Our policy stance will provide us the support of the West Berliners and the West Germans, or lose it. What is crucially important now is firm and unfaltering response. We must maintain uncontrolled air access. And unquestionably the greatest factor in maintaining West Berlin morale beyond the uncompromising maintenace of access is the presence of American troops in numbers sufficient to ensure that any attempt to take West Berlin by force, conventional or unconventional, must reckon with meeting and subduing American troops, with all the implications that entails. I do not think we have enough troops in Berlin yet; we cannot keep a very extensive level of patroling going with the forces at hand. I have suggested to General Watson every time he asks me (which is once a week at least) what more we can do in Berlin that the troops should be at the border, and more troops should be here. It's way out of my field, but I would suggest the Army rotate a combat group to Berlin every three weeks or so, and I do mean by road. That way an additional group would be in Berlin, and the soldiers would get valuable training. I suggest the Air Force, too, increase the flight of military aircraft to Berlin, even if they don't need to carry anything in or out just now. Increased flights would afford pilot training for 'Air Force officers who may soon be flying the route regularly, and would sound a note with the Berliners, valuable psychologically, of our determination -- a determination backed up by readiness.

