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23 September 1961

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## CENTRAL

# INTELLIGENCE

### BULLETIN



State Dept. review completed

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#### CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

23 September 1961

#### DAILY BRIEF

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\*USSR-Berlin: The position Khrushchev outlined in his statements on Germany and Berlin to Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak was more flexible than any he has adopted since he intensified the Berlin crisis after the Vienna meeting with President Kennedy. According to Spaak's report to the NATO council, the Soviet premier contended that he understood Western views on Germany and Berlin and had no desire to impose the Soviet position that a treaty should be signed with both German states. Khrushchev said he was prepared for what he called a "compromise"—the signing of two treaties which would contain some common clauses, including recognition of present German frontiers, an accord on Berlin, and some provision for subsequent study by the two Germanys of formulas for unification.

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Khrushchev ruled out any discussion of the

Khrushchev ruled out any discussion of the status of East Berlin. He also maintained that the West must reach an agreement with East Germany over access arrangements, but said at the same time that "Berlin was not too important." He said that the USSR would guarantee East German execution of any agreement on Berlin, and added that the four powers could work out a Berlin agreement prior to negotiations on the peace treaty. He made it clear that such a four-power agreement would then be incorporated in both peace treaties, or in a separate East German peace treaty concluded by the bloc alone. He claimed that in this way Moscow would guarantee?

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	the East German As to timing, and mentioned no drawn out" discus	Khrushchev indicated no sense of u final date, provided there were no ssions on Berlin.	rgency "long,	
25X1	ity of "compromi the Western allia tions as early as Khrushchev's 16 S	presentation, and his focus on the se," seem tailored to appeal to thos nce who, like Spaak, favor formal npossible. In keeping with this gene september letter to Nehru, released	e within legotia- ral line, l yester-	
	"any time, any pl	that the USSR was prepared for nego ace, and at any level," and attempted ssion that the West opposed "serious	ed to	25X1
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