



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

SECRET *Mr. Lindsay*
S/P

JCSM-730-61
16 October 1961

Smith file

(Handwritten initials)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Negotiations on European Security (U)

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have made a preliminary review of four of the seven negotiating proposals. More comprehensive studies as requested in your memorandum of 10 October 1961, will be forwarded on 10 December 1961. The following preliminary views are forwarded:

The four proposals might be acceptable under certain conditions and circumstances. The Joint Chiefs of Staff cannot endorse them as being universally valid. Each proposition might enhance European security to some degree if appropriately and effectively employed. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the political situation today, which finds the United States under duress and harassment by the Soviets, does not lend itself to these proposals in isolation from concurrent efforts to resolve outstanding European political issues. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that advancement of proposals for inspection zone, non-transfer of nuclear weapons, a non-aggression pact and an East-West commission should either await settlement of the many outstanding political issues attendant on the Berlin situation or should be considered for implementation only in conjunction with settlement of broader European political issues.

2. A detailed discussion of each of the four proposals is contained in the Appendices hereto.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Signed

G. H. DECKER
Chief of Staff, US Army

Attachment

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APPENDIX A

INSPECTION ZONE

A European inspection zone could involve exchange of in- 1
formation on military forces and installations, mobile and fixed- 2
post ground inspection, aerial inspection and overlapping radars. 3
In addition the size of the area could vary greatly. 4

ADVANTAGES

1. Would indicate to a limited degree that the nation's invol- 5
ved were not preparing a massive ground surprise attack. 6
2. Could tend to reduce tensions that are attributable to 7
secrecy. 8
3. Would break down secrecy barrier and thereby tend to create 9
more open societies. 10
4. Would provide another source of intelligence. 11

DISADVANTAGES

1. The range of modern instruments of attack are such that 12
limited inspection zones offer little protection against the 13
mounting of a long range nuclear surprise attack. 14
2. An agreed and operating limited inspection zone could 15
lead to a false sense of security. 16
3. Offers to negotiate inspection zones may lead to Soviet 17
counterproposals for "demilitarization", "troop withdrawal", 18
"denuclearization" or "neutralization", for the express purpose 19
of breaking up Free World collective security arrangements. 20
4. Unlikelihood of establishing adequate inspection machinery 21
in collaboration with the Communists as witness the effort in 22
Korea. 23

ANALYSIS

1. In developing an inspection scheme, all facets of inspec- 24
tion techniques should be included, lest use of one technique, 25
e.g. aerial inspection, develop unwarranted and dangerous 26

dependence on the system. With specific regard to the concept 1
of overlapping radars, such system is not considered worthwhile 2
if used alone, but should be included only as a part of an inte- 3
grated system using other surveillance and inspection techniques. 4

2. The size of the inspection area is also directly related 5
to the value of the scheme. Obviously the most desirable in- 6
spection areas would include, among others, the US, USSR and 7
Communist China. As the area to be inspected decreases, so do 8
the direct benefits (intelligence, early warning, secrecy break- 9
down, etc.) that will result from such a scheme. As a minimum, 10
a European inspection area should include the area set forth in 11
the Norstad plan. 12

CONCLUSION. The institution of an inspection plan in Europe 13
might offer some military advantages to the West provided it 14
takes cognizance of the foregoing guidelines and does not leave 15
us at a net military disadvantage. 16

APPENDIX B

NO NUCLEAR TRANSFERS

PROBLEM - To consider a proposal for a treaty or a group of 1
reciprocal unilateral declarations that states owning nuclear 2
weapons shall not relinquish control of such weapons to any 3
nation not owning them and shall not transmit to any such 4
nation information or material necessary for their manufacture; 5
that states not owning nuclear weapons shall not manufacture 6
such weapons, attempt to obtain control of such weapons 7
belonging to other states, or seek to receive information on 8
materials necessary for their manufacture. This might be 9
considered for NATO-Warsaw Pact nations as a specific case, as 10
well as for wider application. (Compare US Program for GCD, 11
Stage I, paragraph C (e).) 12

DISADVANTAGES

1. This would be an unenforceable declaration fully subject 13
to clandestine evasion which would undermine the traditional 14
US position on effective verification and inspection. 15

2. It would constitute a moral commitment which presumably 16
would be honored only by the Free World, therefore would impose 17
limitations upon efforts to provide for individual and collec- 18
tive security. 19

3. Because this proposal addresses European security it 20
apparently does not include all militarily significant states, 21
i.e., Communist China. 22

4. The proposal does not contain safeguards of any sort. 23

ANALYSIS

1. It appears that the proposal as written, would not inter- 24
fere with the present arrangements for furnishing nuclear 25
weapons to our NATO allies and might provide more control over 26
the use of nuclear weapons by the US. 27

2. In any proposal of this nature, preferably all countries 28
should be included; at a minimum, the "most likely" countries 29
should be parties. From the standpoint of the US, one of the most 30

likely countries to achieve an independent nuclear capability 1
is Communist China. Any arrangement which did not provide 2
for non-production by Communist China and adequate verification 3
thereof would not be in the interest of the United States. 4

3. The United States is committed to a program which 5
provides nuclear materials to other countries for peaceful 6
purposes. The proposal does not provide safeguards which would 7
prevent the use of nuclear materials for weapons purposes. 8
There is no known detection system that could detect evasion 9
of such an agreement. 10

4. A literal interpretation of that portion of the proposed 11
paragraph which reads: ".....states owning nuclear weapons 12
shall not relinquish control of such weapons to a nation not 13
owning them....." would not require changes in present US 14
procedures, whereby the United States maintains control of all 15
nuclear weapons, even though intended for use by non-US forces. 16
However, adoption of such a proposal would commit the United 17
States to perpetuation of the present procedures even though 18
modifications to these procedures might be desirable in the 19
future. 20

5. If the United Kingdom and France are both nuclear powers, 21
i.e., both possess nuclear weapons, Germany's aspirations for 22
equivalent standing would not be satisfied. It is not likely 23
that Germany would be content to remain a non-nuclear power, 24
and still be asked to carry a major load in NATO ground strength. 25

CONCLUSION - This proposal is militarily unacceptable during 26
the present era of crisis. This proposal might be acceptable 27
if implemented under favorable circumstances, e.g. relaxation 28
of the present German crisis and increased international 29
stability along with adequate inspection provisions. 30

APPENDIX C

EAST-WEST COMMISSION

PROBLEM - To consider the arguments for and against the 1
establishment of an East-West Commission which would examine 2
measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war by accident, 3
miscalculation, or failure of communication. Considerations 4
should include a comparison of such a commission discussed 5
in negotiations concerning European Security (Western Peace 6
Plan of 1959) and Declaration on Disarmament (CCD) dated 7
September 1961. 8

STATEMENT OF THE PROPOSALS TO BE COMPARED 9

1. Western Peace Plan (Stage II, paragraph 16). "Measures 10
of inspection and observation against surprise attack, 11
helped by such technical devices as overlapping radar 12
system, could be undertaken in such geographical areas 13
throughout the world as may be agreed by the Four Powers 14
and other states concerned." 15

NOTE: There is no specific reference to the establishment 16
of a commission though it is implied. 17

2. Declaration on Disarmament (Stage I, paragraph F). 18

"(d) An international commission shall be established 19
immediately within the International Disarmament Organization 20
(IDO) to examine and make recommendations on the possibility 21
of further measures to reduce the risks of nuclear war by 22
accident, miscalculation or failure of communication." 23

DISCUSSION - It should be noted that the first proposal was 24
made in the context of an European Security measure while the 25
second was put forth in a plan for General and Complete 26
Disarmament. Though the problems of disarmament and European 27
Security are closely related, "measures to safeguard against 28
surprise attack" are oriented more on security than on dis- 29
armament. In fact such measures seek to improve the 30
deterrence not to degrade it. 31

ADVANTAGES OF A COMMISSION

1. Western Peace Plan Provisions 1
 - a. Detailed negotiations required to set up the commission 2
would immediately create a channel of communication regard- 3
ing the intentions of the Soviets. 4
 - b. Establishment of the commission would not necessarily 5
be linked to a detailed treaty on disarmament. Though the 6
proposals in the peace plan were regarded as an "inseparable 7
whole" the peace plan itself related only to a general 8
settlement of the problems at issue. The issue of European 9
security can be approached more directly by a commission 10
set up under the broad terms of reference in a peace plan 11
than one set up under a disarmament plan. 12
 - c. Provides the opportunity to study, together with the 13
USSR, various measures to safeguard against surprise 14
attack. It is possible that these discussions could result 15
in the agreement on measures which would improve the 16
military posture of the United States. 17
2. Declaration on Disarmament (GCD) 18
 - a. The advantages of an international channel of communi- 19
cation, joint exploration of measures and tensions lessening 20
assurance discussed under the peace plan type of proposal 21
also accrue to the proposal under GCD. 22
 - b. The more detailed GCD plan includes specific agreed 23
measures to reduce the risk of war by accident, mis- 24
calculation or failure of communications world wide. This 25
enables the commission, once established, to begin its 26
work at once while studying additional measures to reduce 27
the risks. 28

- c. The commission would be established in the first stage 1
of the GCD plan thus enabling immediate operation. 2
- d. Organizationally, it would be part of the IDO which 3
could assist the commission not only technically but admin- 4
istratively. 5
- e. The commission's role is clearly stated - to study 6
further measures to reduce the risk, etc.. It will not be 7
burdened with the broader problems of European Security and 8
the related crash arms control problems. 9

DISADVANTAGES OF A COMMISSION1. Western Peace Plan Proposal 10

a. The lack of world wide terms of reference, the time of 11
establishment (Stage II), the nebulous geographic areas to 12
be inspected detract from the proposal. 13

b. The possibility of faulty and nationally unsupportable 14
decisions made by the commission in the course of the studies 15
could be damaging, i.e. as was experienced in the recent 16
technical negotiations on nuclear test ban. 17

c. The USSR will undoubtedly object to any raising of its 18
security curtain for the commission. The US and other 19
nations will likewise have some reluctance in permitting 20
the USSR to share its secrets. 21

d. The technical nature of the measures and the require- 22
ment for highly qualified technical members for the commis- 23
sion will not be conducive to rapid results. The combined 24
development of arms could always stay one jump ahead of the 25
commission. 26

2. Declaration on Disarmament (GCD) 27

a. The disadvantages of faulty and nationally unsupport- 28
able decisions of the commission, the slow and expensive 29
nature of the technical studies and the relaxing of security 30
regulations discussed under the peace plan proposal are 31
likewise applicable to the proposal under GCD. 32

b. Since the commission is part of the IDO, its establishment cannot take place until the IDO is operational. This may be an unacceptable long delay.

c. The commission is limited to the examination of further measures to reduce the risk of war, etc., within the over-all objectives of GCD.

d. The commission is obligated to accept the specific measures agreed to in the GCD plan even though they are technically or otherwise uninspectable.

ANALYSIS

1. The establishment of a commission is desirable and acceptable under either proposal. There is some urgency created by the realization that there is no existing military program which provides enough security against attack by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications.

2. Measures to safeguard against attack by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications are really oriented to improve the security in Europe not primarily to achieve the goals of GCD. Such measures alone cannot provide the level of security desired in Europe. However, it is believed that the activities of a commission, established to study these measures, will reveal the international intent and provide the members the opportunity to reduce the risk of war.

CONCLUSIONS

1. The establishment of a commission to study measures to reduce the risk of war by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications is desirable under the conditions in paragraph below.

2. Either of the proposals compared, under the GCD or Western Peace Plan, would create a commission which would develop and/or improve the measures to safeguard against attack by accident, miscalculation or failure of communications.

3. A commission established under the peace plan concept 1
would be more likely to improve the security in Europe, which 2
is really the problem on which measures to safeguard against 3
such attacks is oriented. 4

4. The need for such a commission indicates that its estab- 5
lishment should receive priority consideration in conjunction 6
with security proposals to be implemented subsequent to the 7
settlement of the Berlin problem. 8

APPENDIX D
NON-AGGRESSION PACT

PROBLEM

Evaluation of a proposal that there be a non-aggression pact of some type as provided in the Western Peace Plan, with special consideration for such a pact between NATO and Warsaw Pact nations.

ADVANTAGES

1. Could be developed in such manner as to enhance support of the United Nations (Articles 1, 2, and 39 of the Charter).

2. Could have a favorable impact on world public opinion during negotiations, whether or not accepted by the USSR.

3. Acceptance of a non-aggression pact between NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Countries (Soviet memorandum of September 26, 1961) could, primarily as a propaganda tool, be made conditional upon a cessation of cold war tactics on the part of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Unless linked to meaningful and enforceable measures, a non-aggression pact would engender a false sense of security within any individual NATO country concerned, or the NATO alliance itself.

2. Would tend to weaken NATO alliance by creating divisive tendencies therein and providing individual members the excuse of contributing less than that required in funds, weapons and manpower.

3. Would tend to stigmatize and make hypocritical military security arrangements within NATO as acts of aggression (e.g. NATO military exercises) without affecting the Warsaw Pact.

4. Would probably increase the hazard of surprise Soviet attack by increasing complacency and thereby decreasing military readiness to act quickly and effectively.

5. Would be no more binding on the USSR than its previous non-aggression treaties with Poland, Finland and others which were violated, and would most probably be adhered to by the USSR only as long as it was tactically advantageous.

6. Would probably serve to perpetuate the present East-West conventional military imbalance.

ANALYSIS

1. In the past, the Soviets have not respected agreements or pacts beyond the point where it was to their tactical advantage in consonance with their unchanging aim of Communist world domination.

2. A non-aggression pact should not be proposed or entered into on the basis that it will be respected by the USSR but, rather, with the full knowledge that probably it will be violated the moment it stands in the way of furtherance of Communist objectives.

3. It would have little if any usefulness unless linked with settlement of other more fundamental issues.

CONCLUSIONS

1. A non-aggression pact negotiated in isolation as a pure arms control measure would be undesirable.

2. There probably would be no objection to a non-aggression pact if negotiated as a subsidiary measure to other sound and meaningful measures at some future time.