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HEADQUARTERS
BERLIN BRIGADE
Office of the AC of S, G-2
APO 742 US Forces

G2 DIVISION, BERLIN BRIGADE
INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY
Period Ending 212400 Dec 61
(ISUM #3a) (U)

1. (S) (NOFORN) SOVIET FORCES:

a. (C) While not supported by rail information it is now believed that at least 50 percent of the normal annual recruit requirements for GSPG have already arrived in the zone while a relatively small percentage of 3-year men have departed. This represents a temporary increase in strength that probably will be adjusted to previous levels when the recruits are integrated into existing units and 3-year men are returned to USSR. Rotation of 3-year men probably will take place during January and February 62. Integrating recruits into existing units before releasing 3-year men permits GSPG to maintain peak efficiency throughout the year and particularly during present period of tension.

b. (S) Soviet bridging column observed lined up and ready to move outside barracks at Krampnitz (UU 6614) on 21 Dec 61.

G2 COMMENT: This unit was used on 13 August to bridge the Havel at Kaputh (UU 6313) prior to deployment of 10th Guards Tank Division to form part of southern cordon around Berlin.

c. (C) Training activity continued at low-level at and near home stations. Level of training similar to same period last year, except for absence of rotation of tank and artillery firing details to major training areas. Majority of activity reported consisted of driver school convoys.

d. (SECRET NOFORN) A surface-to-air missile site in the southeastern corner of Magdeburg, East Germany, was reported by a completely reliable source on 3 December. The site, a rectangular area, is enclosed by a solid security fence with guard towers at the four corners. Two of the six launch revetments inside the area contain a sheet-covered missile on the launcher. The remaining four probably are so occupied, as all launch revetments appear to be complete. The center guidance revetment is partially camouflaged and is apparently occupied by electronic equipment.

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BY AUTHORITY OF:

Gerald W. Barnitz
GERALD W. BARNITZ, Maj, GS
Acting ACofS, G-2

AG BCA 915-61
Cy 14 of 16 Cys.

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SECRET

SECRET

G2 DIVISION, BERLIN BRIGADE, ISUM #4a, Period Ending 212400 Dec 61

COMMENT: This new facility at Magdeburg will provide the Soviets with further protection for their military and logistic installations within East Germany.

2. (C) EAST GERMAN ARMY FORCES:

a. Several recent reports indicate EGA has received large quantity 4 x 4 amphibious scout cars since Sep 61. Units reportedly possessing equipment are 2d Motorized Rifle Regiment and 1st Recon Battalion, 1st Motorized Rifle Division; 23rd Motorized Rifle Regiment and 4th Recon Battalion, 4th Motorized Rifle Division; 8th Engineer Battalion, 8th Motorized R Regt; and 7th Engineer Battalion, 7th Tank Division. Probable that all reconnaissance and engineer units in EGA replacing BTR-40's with amphibious scout cars.

b. Ref ISUM #3, para 2a: Recon of this installation during the past week gives no indication that an EGA Guard Regiment has been transferred to this installation.

G2 COMMENT: Installation 4101 contains 5 buildings of such dimensions that it is doubtful if they could accommodate an entire regiment

c. See para 15 (Misc) for possible movement of the 4th Motorized Rifle Division to Berlin.

3. (C) GARRISON SECURITY FORCES:

a. Unidentified tank observed in Installation 4082 Berlin/Adlershof. Unknown whether tanks recently issued to Security Guard Police (SGP) Regiment this installation or if tank belongs to unidentified unit. Since SGP personnel have been used along East-West Sector Border during critical periods, such as recent construction of cement slab walls, possible tanks have been issued to SGP to increase their combat capability against Western armor.

b. A series of defector reports indicates the following employment of the 1st Security Alert Police (SAP) Motorized Berlin Border Brigade CP's and border responsibilities:

(1) Brigade Headquarters, Installation 4631.

(2) 1st Battalion CP Installation 4631, border responsibility from the intersection sector/zonal and sector/sector border on the north to Wollank Str.

(3) 2nd Battalion CP Installation 4225. Border responsibility from Wollank Str south to Nord Bahnhof.

(4) 3rd Battalion CP Installation 4154. Border responsibility from Nord Bahnhof south to Stresemann Str.

(5) 4th Battalion CP Installation 4223. Border responsibility from Stresemann Str south to Schilling Bridge.

(6) 5th Battalion CP Installation 4222. Border responsibility from Schilling Bridge south to Kollnische Heide Str.

(7) 6th Battalion CP Installation 4227. Border responsibility from Kollnische Heide Str south to sector/zonal border.

SECRET

SECRET

G2 DIVISION, BERLIN BRIGADE, ISUM #4a, Period Ending 212400 Dec 61

(8) 7th Battalion CP Installation 4631. This is a support battalion. Equipment unknown. Total strength of the Brigade is estimated at 5,600 officers and men.

4. (C) ACCESS SITUATION:

a. Railways:

During this reporting period there have been several instances of the duty trains being delayed by the late arrival of switch engines or the actual breakdown in East German Reichsbahn equipment.

COMMENT: There is no indication that this is deliberate harassment but does indicate an indifferent attitude on the part of the Soviets and East Germans towards maintaining our duty train schedules.

b. Air Corridors:

During this period there were no incidents involving Allied access to the air corridors leading to West Berlin.

c. Autobahn:

(1) Approximately 25 I Beams, extending 5 feet above the surface have been sunk vertically into the center strip of the autobahn, from the East exit of the Soviet Checkpoint at Marionborn East about 50 yards.

COMMENT: Position of I Beams indicates no intention to interfere with normal traffic but merely to prevent illegal crossing of center strip.

(2) No Significant developments of incidents at sector/sector borders in Berlin or along the autobahn. US Company moving to West Germany for training 18 Dec cleared both checkpoints without incident.

COMMENTS: Communist continue to express their objections to US troop movements by written protests rather than actual interference. It appears they will not, at this time, take action on explosive issues such as Allied Access to West Berlin. More probable East German Communists will attempt to gain gradual De Facto Recognition by declaring sector/sector and zonal borders national frontiers. A preliminary step would be demand that West Germans visiting East Berlin follow same procedure as West Germans visiting East Germany, namely, awaiting invitation and residence permit from person to be visited and then presentation of Ausweis and permit at zonal border. East Berlin Communists have already complained that since 13 August the number of West Germans traveling to East Berlin unduly increased. New restrictions may well be forthcoming under pretext of securing East Berlin against influx of undesirable element. East Germans probably no longer fear cancellation of interzonal trade agreement as retaliation for such moves. Leading West German politician recently stated publicly that such a measure is not practicable because it would entail automatic cessation of commercial goods traffic between East Germany and West Berlin. This would be equivalent to a blockade of West Berlin.

Page 3 of 8 pages.

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

SECRET

G2 DIVISION, BERLIN BRIGADE, ISUM #4a, Period Ending 212400 Dec 61

(3) On 19 December the Berlin Brigade Assistant Provost Marshal met with a Soviet representative at the Babelsburg Checkpoint. The Assistant Provost Marshal was informed that the East German crews are busy renovating the signs located at the autobahn turn-offs. He was also informed that the job would be completed within a week and that US authorities would be able to inspect the signs when completed.

d. East Berlin:

(1) During the reporting period there were no incidents involving detention or vandalism by East German personnel to US Military vehicles traveling in East Berlin. One vehicle reported being tailed for one hour and 20 minutes by 2 VOPOs in uniform driving a VOPO sedan.

(2) At 1035 hours, 21 December, a US State Department vehicle occupied by one uniformed driver and three persons in civilian clothes was denied entry to East Berlin at the Friedrich Strasse Checkpoint.

COMMENT: This action indicates no modification of existing restrictions placed on US personnel attempting to enter East Berlin in civilian clothes.

(3) Staff visits to East Berlin have noticed many people in the Berlin Mitte area apparently shopping. Patrols have received friendly waves and no threatening gestures.

5. (C) HOSTILE RECONNAISSANCE:

Hostile reconnaissance patrols continue to maintain surveillance of installations in the American Sector of West Berlin. In retaliation to the tailing of a US vehicle in the Soviet Sector, Soviet vehicles have been tailed for a corresponding period by US Military Police patrols.

6. (C) REFUGEES:

During this period, an approximate average of 30 refugees per day was processed at the Marienfelde Refugee Center; this is a slight decrease since the last reporting period.

7. (C) POPULATION ATTITUDES:

a. During this period there has been no significant change in the population attitude over that which was reported in this paragraph, ISUM #3.

b. A recent report from a "western" scientist attending a scientific symposium in Dresden, to which the majority of visitors were Soviet bloc countries, indicates the border closure and its accompanying internal security measures have not had a stifling effect upon the DDR scientific world. Rather, the attitude appears to be one of increased determination to succeed despite the difficulties. Also, during the symposium, there was a noticeable coolness between the DDR host scientists and their Soviet visitors. The two groups had little apparent desire for social intercourse and went their separate ways during free time and at social functions.

Page 4 of 8 pages.

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

SECRET

G2 DIVISION, BERLIN BRIGADE, ISUM #4a, Period Ending 212400 Dec 61

Source speculated that every effort would be made to maintain the scientific level of the DDR, but their reluctance to "turn everything over to the Soviets" now almost borders on sabotage of their own projects.

8. (C) PROPAGANDA:

Under the heading "Important NATO Maneuver in the Outpost City", NATIONAL ZEITUNG quoted the "U.S. occupation power" in West Berlin as announcing extensive war-drillings for 22 December. "Some 1,500 U.S. occupation soldiers are to participate in the demonstrative military action in all city boroughs. According to information by the U.S. Army, the soldiers are members of the 1st Battle Group under the command of NATO, which was transferred from West Germany to West Berlin some days ago."

The remainder of East German propaganda attacks against the US during this period were the usual charges of "provocations" and "illegal use of the Autobahn."

9. (U) OBSTACLES AND BARRIERS:

a. On 20 December 1961, one officer and ten men, dressed in VOPO uniform, climbed the wall at the Brandenburg Gate at 1630 hours. This party proceeded to remove the barbed wire and pickets erected on 13 August 1961. Working party was covered by three armed VOPO's from atop the wall. Work was completed at 1745 hours. Wire and pickets loaded onto 5 x 3 ton vehicles which drove off.

b. East Germans continue to construct watch towers along the sector/sector and sector/zonal borders. At the present time there are 34 such towers opposite the US Sector.

COMMENT: It appears that the entire border preparations are identical with those preparations previously made along the East/West German border.

c. There are no further indications that the East Germans will completely seal off the sector/sector border, but will continue to allow only uniformed personnel to continue through to East Berlin.

10. (C) NEW MATERIAL IDENTIFICATION:

During this reporting period there were no new material identifications made.

11. (C) NEW UNIT IDENTIFICATION:

See para 1d, above.

12. (C) STATISTICAL SUMMARY OF INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS:

During this reporting period, there were 22 ground reconnaissance patrols dispatched to East Berlin; 44 Staff Tours were made in East Berlin; 6 helicopter flights were made over the sector/sector and sector/zonal borders; 1 C-47 flight in the 20-mile ring; 2 helicopter flights to Stein-stucken; 21 ground reconnaissance patrols were made of the sector/sector border from the American side; and 14 ground reconnaissance patrols were made along the sector/zonal border.

CONFIDENTIAL SECRET

SECRET

G2 DIVISION, BERLIN BRIGADE, ISUM #4a, Period Ending 212400 Dec 61

13. (C) SECURITY/COUNTERINTELLIGENCE:

A recent breakdown of the arrest of twenty (20) persons for treasonable acts in West Berlin revealed they were targeted for various missions i.e., three persons assigned against US Military Installations, while 17 persons were assigned to make observations and surveillance against US personnel stationed in West Berlin. Of the 20 persons arrested, 18 were assigned their targets by East German Intelligence. Considered to be one of these was a part-time caddy at the WANNSEE Golf Course, assigned by the East German Ministry of Security in 1956. He was required to furnish the MfS information about all employees, US personnel and patrons at the golf course, especially American and British golfers and visitors. However, in 1961, this mission becoming involved with others proved his downfall. Arrested, he is presently incarcerated in a West Berlin prison.

Interesting to note is that no agents of the Polish or Czechoslovakian Intelligence Services were included among those apprehended. Since both these countries have accredited Military Liaison Missions in West Berlin, their intelligence activities are difficult to monitor. However, with the border closings on 13 August, the border crossers were eliminated as a possible source of hostile intelligence activity, and the present low number of refugees escaping to West Berlin offers little chance for the infiltration of a hostile agent among this group. Therefore, it would not be illogical to assume that the activities of the Polish (who use B(erlin) 600/623 license plates) and Czechoslovakian Military Missions in West Berlin would be directed along intelligence lines more so than in the past.

It is very likely that the allegedly anti-communist message, recently handed to an officer on a Special Services tour of East Berlin, was in fact inspired by the MfS, and delivered by one of its agents. This type of intelligence-contact provocation follows a pattern evident in the activities of all SOVIET BLOC security services. EXAMPLES:

- a. Elaborately planned but apparently accidental contacts with US personnel in bars and restaurants;
- b. Notes placed in US vehicles and thrown over the wall at BE Compound offering "information of vital interest and importance to the US government", naming a time and place for a meeting in order to deliver the material;
- c. The "hit and run" approaches on streets and in other public places, offering papers with or without oral comment;
- d. Pleas for aid on "HUMANITARIAN" grounds to obtain medicines, assistance in fleeing the country (such as using the trunk of a US licenced vehicle in "kidnapping" an East Berliner).

The above are but a few of the techniques that are being used by the SOVIET BLOC intelligence services in their attempt to exploit and attempt to discredit the US Government for propaganda purposes.

COMMENT: It is entirely possible that the delivery of such material as the message given to a US officer mentioned above is the first

CONFIDENTIAL
SECRET

SECRET

G2 DIVISION, BERLIN BRIGADE, ISUM #4a, Period Ending 212400 Dec 61

step in an MfS operation which is designed to lead to "exposure" of the Special Services East Berlin bus tours, and to expose them as nothing less than a cover for US intelligence activities. It is recommended that all US personnel avoid contact with East Berliners/East Germans and be specifically instructed to refuse to accept any written matters while in the Soviet Sector of the city.

14. (C) (NOFORN) MISCELLANEOUS:

a. Logistics: Recent report indicated all freight cars requisitioned for EGA to conduct project "Liquidation Berlin".

COMMENT: Doubtful that "all" freight cars requisitioned because many types are not suitable for military purposes. Also, the quantity is too great for operations centered on Berlin area. If large numbers of freight cars were requisitioned for EGA purposes, reasons are unknown.

Non-USAREUR source reported a large freight station East Berlin/Schoneweide, (UU 9515), in East Berlin was ordered to pull all flat cars from traffic and dispatch them to Regional Railroad District (RBD) Erfurt in Mid-December. Cars are to be returned. Effective 20 December, all tracks and unloading facilities "should" be kept free to unload these cars. (B-6) Non-USAREUR agency commented the traffic situation in RBD Berlin has been difficult for weeks, with 57 trains composed of approximately 4000 freight cars above normal since 2 December. Immediate withdrawal of flat cars from this backlog can be explained partly by increased demand for flat cars in connection with various major East German railroad (DR) construction projects and also by military measures. Order to hold unloading and track facilities free, as well as proposed return of rolling stock, appear to point toward military measures.

G2 COMMENT: Erfurt is the location of the 4th EGA Motorized Rifle Division. Surveillance of the Schoneweide and other railyards in East Berlin have given no indications of the above. Although rail traffic is heavy, no movement of military equipment has been observed. G2, BB will continue to maintain surveillance of these areas during the holiday period.

b. Steinstucken Exclave: The status of services in the West Berlin exclave remains unchanged. A routine patrol relief of the US Army three-man patrol was conducted on 21 Dec 61 without incident.

15. (C) SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS:

- a. Possible actions against West Berlin (para 4c and 15a)
- b. New Soviet Missile Site (para 1d).

Gerald W. Barnitz
GERALD W. BARNITZ
Major, GS
Acting ACofS, G-2

Page 7 of 8 pages.

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

G2 DIVISION, BERLIN BRIGADE, ISUM #4a, Period Ending 212400 Dec 61

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Page 8 of 3 pages.
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