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[REDACTED]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

[REDACTED] CITE [REDACTED]

DIST 26 JULY 1968

COUNTRY WEST GERMANY/WEST BERLIN/USSR

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

DOI [REDACTED] 26 22 21z JUL 68

SUBJECT SOVIET [REDACTED] COMMENTS ON POSSIBILITY OF FORCEFUL INTER-
VENTION IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND CRITICISM OF THE EASTERN POLICIES
OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

ACQ [REDACTED]

SOURCE [REDACTED]

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] "REGRETTABLE THOUGH
IT MIGHT BE". IT IS ALTOGETHER CONCEIVABLE THAT THE SOVIETS

[REDACTED] (classification) [REDACTED] (dissem controls)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

Approved for Release 14 AUG 1998
Date _____

(classification)

(dissem controls)

MAY HAVE TO RESORT TO FORCE TO PREVENT THE CZECH SITUATION FROM "GETTING COMPLETELY OUT OF HAND."

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE CSSR CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THE "MEDDLESOME" EASTERN EUROPEAN POLICIES PRACTICED BY THE SPD. HE CONCEDED THAT SOVIET INTERVENTION WOULD BE WIDELY CONDEMNED BUT TERMED THIS A RISK THAT HAD TO BE TAKEN.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

2.

THE SOVIETS ARE NOT IN THE LEAST INTERESTED IN EXACERBATING THE BERLIN SITUATION AND THERE IS NO REASON WHY AN "EQUITABLE SOLUTION" THAT WOULD ASSURE PERPETUATION OF THE STATUS QUO COULD NOT BE ARRANGED.

3. ATTRIBUTED ANY IMPLICATION

OF A "HARDENING" OF SOVIET POLICY TO "EMINENTLY JUSTIFIABLE CONCERN" ABOUT THE SPD'S EFFORTS TOWARD THE "SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIZATION" OF EASTERN EUROPE.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

DESCRIBED FOREIGN MINISTER WILLY BRANDT'S MANIPULATIONS "SCHIKANEN" IN THE RENUNCIATION OF FORCE MATTER AS "TYPICAL SPD TACTICS". ASSERTED THAT AS A RESULT OF BRANDT'S EFFORTS, THE PRESS HAD

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(classification)

(dissem controls)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

IN

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] (classification) [REDACTED] (dissem controls)

COMPLETELY MISINTERPRETED SOVIET MOTIVES. RATHER THAN REJECTING THE RENUNCIATION OF FORCE CONCEPT, THE SOVIETS HAD MERELY WANTED TO POINT TO THEIR RECORD OF HAVING DELIBERATELY REFRAINED FROM RESORTING TO FORCE IN A NUMBER OF SITUATIONS WHEN THEY MIGHT WELL HAVE TAKEN SUCH A COURSE.

1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

4. [REDACTED] COMMENT: [REDACTED]

DURING THE JUNE BRANDT-ABRASIMOV MEETING, BRANDT WAS CRITICIZED BY AMBASSADOR ABRASIMOV FOR THE SPD'S PARTICIPATION IN A COALITION WITH THE CDU. THE PRESENT REPORT SHOWS THE SOVIET LINE FOR CDU AUDIENCES AND ILLUMINATES THE SOVIET TACTIC OF SEEKING TO DIVIDE THE PARTNERS IN THE GRAND COALITION.)

5. [REDACTED]

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1.5(c)
3.4(b)(1)

[REDACTED] (classification) [REDACTED] (dissem controls)