[Czechoslovakia: There are new signs of disap-proval from some of Prague's allies.

Parliamentary chief Smrkovksy told a party gath-ering on 8 August that he did not think the other delegations in Bratislava were persuaded that the Czechoslovak road is the right one. Hungarian sources have indicated that the Soviet and other Eastern European leaders who met in Bratislava now expect a political crisis in the Czechoslovak party by the time it convenes in extraordinary congress on 9 September. According to these sources, Dubcek's allies will expect him to handle such a crisis with a strong hand and to apply brakes on further liberal-ization.

The Hungarian party press said yesterday that there will be new consultations on Czechoslovakia "in the near future." This may indicate that there will be a new Communist summit meeting in Prague in connection with the party congress. Presumably the leaders inimical to Prague's reforms will attend in order to attempt to promote the election of a new party leadership in Czechoslovakia which would in-clude at least some orthodox Communists.

From the point of view of the Soviets and the Eastern Europeans, developments in Prague must ap-pear unsatisfactory. Tito is receiving a hero's welcome in Prague, conservatives are again being removed from party office, Dubcek is being attacked by liberals for his handling of the Prchlik affair, and some news media are showing little respect for the regime's appeal for voluntary restraint. In addition, the cabinet apparently is considering a new constitutional guarantee of the inviolability of private ownership, and has resolved to present to its CEMA partners a series of proposals for ex-panding trade in the West.]

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[There have even been renewed unofficial fore-
casts on the radio that diplomatic relations with
West Germany may come fairly soon. These develop-
ments are in effect tests of how far the Dubcek re-
gime is resolved to live up to its promises at Cierna
and a reconnoitering by liberals of permissible limits.

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