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		Commando in its 6 April raid on the east coast rail line near Songjin
		learned that the Communists were anticipating
		a UN amphibious landing and that two North Korean divisions with artillery were deployed in the Songjin area to repel any such attempt.
• •		stated that a Communist mrin supply route from Manchuria to Korea
		was from Hyesanjin (on the border due north of Hungnam) to Tanchon using
		secondary roads and that the Songjin to Tanchon coastal road had not been
		in use for a month. All young men in the area had been inducted into the
		North Korean Peoples Army and all civilians are mobilized for nightly
		repair work on roads and railroads.
		The reported abandonment of the Songjin to Tanchon coastal road as a
• .		main supply route, if true, bespeaks the effectiveness of UN naval
		bombardment.
	"An	Preparation for Air Activities Continues on the North Korean West
		<u>Coast</u> . 800 troops (possibly two battalions of the NK 5th Division) replaced civilian laborers on
· .		12 March in construction activities at Ongjong-ni airfield, west of
		Chinnampo and that supplies were received by rail two or three times a
		week from Chinnampo.
		North Korean air-ground recognition panels, established for
		use from November through February, are still in use.
		. <u>COMMENT</u> : These, and similar reports from other sources, con- tinue to indicate North Korean preparations for increased air activities
		by Communist air units. The utilization of air-ground recognition panels
		for as long a period as reported, however, would seem to indicate that
		active Communist air intervention was still not anticipated at the time
		of this report.
	w <u>A</u> #	
•	"A "	Reports on "International Volunteer Army" for Korea.
		states that a new Communist offensive will be launched in Korea
		in the latter part of April or early May. The offensive will be supported
		by air, some armor, and possibly submarines. Mongolian "Volunteers" will
		be sent due to their physical similarity with the Chinese and Koreans.
		<u>COMMENT</u> : This is the
		second intimation of Soviet plans for sending
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"Volunteers" into the Korean conflict.

While Mongolian troops have been the most frequently mentioned as designated for "Volunteer" roles, reinforcements potential is about 100-150,000 and that only 5 well-trained divisions could be formed. In view of the vast remaining manpower resources of China, such a manpower contribution would have no particularly advantageous effect on the Communist effort in Korea.

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