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5. Preparations for renewal of offensive in Korea: *Kat*

CINCFE Tokyo
6, 7 May 51
ACORN

US Navy
7 May 51
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Preliminary field analysis of enemy messages indicates that the enemy is planning to begin the next attack of his "Fifth Phase Offensive" sometime after 12 May. This conclusion is based, in part, on an order from Supreme Headquarters to the Artillery Officer at Combined Headquarters (Advanced) to station two antiaircraft battalions at Pyongyang airfield by 13 May and to report the completion of preparations by 15 May; on two North Korean messages suggesting that North Korean Army and Air Force cryptographic systems may be changed on 13 May; and on a message from the North Korean I Corps which stated that ammunition "will be urgently required by 20 May." Additional evidence is seen in a message sent to the North Korean V Corps ordering that unit to neutralize its own and UN mine fields and to repair roads from the corps sector to the east coast.

6. Report of Chinese Communist loan to the North Korean Air Force corrected: *China*

On 4 May, the Current Intelligence Bulletin, in commenting on indications that the Communists would continue their offensive in Korea, cited a preliminary field translation of a North Korean message which stated that the North Korean Air Force had borrowed 3,000,000 gallons of gasoline from the Chinese Communists. Retranslation in the field now shows that the amount of gasoline referred to was actually only 15,000 gallons.

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
7. Chinese Communists reportedly concerned over Korean venture:

*Ch 100
Korea*



The Finnish Minister to Communist China (and concurrently to India) has informed the French Ambassador in New Delhi that Chinese Communist officials in Peiping were "much concerned at the cost to them of the Korean adventure and that they were only pursuing hostilities under Soviet pressure."

Comment: There have been many reports of the Chinese Communists' concern over, and resentment against, the burdens they are carrying in Korea. However, the present extent of Sino-Soviet friction is conjectural, as is the degree to which Soviet "pressure" is responsible for the Chinese commitment.



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