



23 Jul 51
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~~TOP SECRET~~



"B" KOREA. Enemy Capable of Attacking with Little or No Additional Warning.
As long as the present tactical situation remains unchanged, the immediate pre-offensive indications which in the past have provided an accurate basis for estimating the probable date of attack, may not be evident, according to US Eighth Army. The enemy is afforded sufficient front line intelligence, through generally close contact, to permit momentary offensive action without noticeable change in current counter-reconnaissance patrolling and probing activity. Recent enemy artillery activity tends to confirm deployment of artillery in forward areas reducing if not eliminating the necessity for last minute displacement and registration. No increase in deserters and stragglers is expected because of the deterrent effect of the enemy's almost continuous outpost line. Moreover, current weather conditions can and probably have enabled the enemy to displace troops and supplies into forward areas without detection. Further, the combat effectiveness of practically all enemy units in contact increases the probability of their offensive employment. The enemy's capability of moving his reserves to attack positions 24 hours prior to the attack further reduces the opportunity to obtain prior warning of attack. Eighth Army warns that even this movement might be accomplished without detection under present weather conditions. ([redacted] 23 July 51).



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
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY


OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DAILY DIGEST OF SIGNIFICANT S/S CABLES

23 July 1951

SECTION 2 (EASTERN)



NR



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