
## DP SECRET SUEDE

TOP SECRET SUEDE



## SECTION 1 (SOVIET)

1.

DATE: 20-Mar-2010

USSR. Soviet radio link with North Korea possibly transmits Moscow's instructions on truce talks: Traffic analysis indicates that a Soviet military mission in Korea may be receiving directives from Moscow in connection with the Kaesong truce talks.

During August, radio messages were originated in volume by this mission and transmitted on a radio net linking it with the headquarters of the Maritime Military District at Voroshilov. These were the first messages intercepted from the mission since April.

It is believed that the absence of such messages during the period April-August was due to the fact that they were transmitted by an alternate means of communication, probably by landline. It now appears that the load placed on landline communications as a result of the truce talks was excessive enough to force this traffic onto radio.

The Voroshilov terminal of the radio link serves also as a relay point for messages passing between Moscow and the military mission, and it has been noted that most of the messages received by the mission have been originated in Moscow. Moreover, other evidence suggests a change at Moscow in the direction of the mission, and that the content of the messages could be largely diplomatic. (SUEDE, RU-TIB 1422, 23 Aug 51).

<u>Comment</u>: The volume of messages apparently passed between this mission and Moscow during August may well indicate a direct connection with the Kaesong truce talks. If so, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Moscow may be using the mission as a means of transmitting instructions to the North Korean delegates.

Observers at the conference, reporting a difference in attitude between the Chinese Communist and North Korean negotiators, have commented on the More uncompromising position of the latter. It appears likely, therefore,

28 Aug 51

הת

55

TOP SECRET SUEDE

TOP SE€RET SUEDE APPROVED FOR RELEASE

## TOP SECRET SUEDE

TOP SECRET SUEDE

that the position taken by Nam II may, in the final analysis, prove to be a more correct reflection of Soviet policy than that of the Chinese Communist delegates, who have maintained direct contact with Peiping.

TOP SECRET SUIDE

TOP SECRET SUEDE

28 Aug 51

NR