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USSR SURVEY 18 OCTOBER 1951

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## THE FAR EAST

## KOREAN WAR: Little Change in Propaganda

Comment on the war usually reflects the real situation in Korea, and currently there is little change in that comment. The volume rises from the low of three weeks ago but remains constant in the two weeks covered in this SURVEY. The substance of the comment also remains constant, and Moscow continues to avoid any concerted discussion of the issues involved in the stalemate. It raises certain related issues, including the appropriateness of the 38th Parallel as a demarcation line, and makes a point of charging that Japanese troops are participating in Korea; but it does not elaborate any of these issues into a significantly-large propaganda theme.

Major Characteristics: The two primary characteristics of Moscow's attention to the war are the propaganda for Korean and American audiences. The propaganda for Koreans suggests concern over possible wavering, for it stresses the strength of the Communist world, recalls the World War II heroism of the Soviets, and underscores the correctness of refusing to resume the negotiations in the face of American provocations. Propaganda for American audiences continues to reflect the attempt to arouse American public opposition to the war; Moscow distorts the reasons for which the war is being fought, and elaborates in emotional terms on the great losses being suffered by American families.

A third characteristic is the attempt to weaken world-wide support of the American position. Moscow attempts to divide the United Nations camp by recounting evidences of American racism, by charging that American officers sacrifice non-American troops, and by reminding non-American audiences that it is the United States which obstructs the negotiations. It also challenges American sincerity.

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