TOP SECRET

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	the Chinese Communist Fifth		
the Chinese Co	mmunists in August 1951 orgs		
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TOP SECRET

Comment: There	have been many previous unconfirmed reports of the
formation of a Chine	se Communist Fifth Field Army, organized with Soviet
assistance and advice	
	d under Soviet guidance in the spring of 1951, its
	rom the North China Military Area Special Army Group,
	th Field Army. While subsequent reports have alleged
	s of the Fifth Field Army in Korea under Nich Jung-che
	f the NCMASAG, no such Soviet-equipped units have been
ncountered in comba	₹.
OREA. Food shorter	e in North Korea not seen as acute:
ordere Look prot one.	
	while indi-
ations point to a	less than normal yield in the current crop harvest
n North Korea, there	less than normal yield in the current orop harvest e is currently no acute food shortage in the area.
n North Korea, there t is probable, howe	less than normal yield in the current crop harvest e is currently no acute food shortage in the area. ver, that the civilian population will experience
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Comment: It has been generally indicated that the coming winter will work a severe hardship on the North Korean civilian population. Factors, in addition to food, contributing to this suffering will be the acute lack of housing and a probable shortage of consumer goods, particularly textiles.

anything except the complete support of Communist military forces.

No firm conclusions regarding the stability or instability of the North Korean regime can be drawn from current evidence. There are indications, however, pointing to increasing administratibe problems being encountered in the lower levels of government. The disorganization following UN occupation last winter, the considerable loss of effective administrative personnel by death, defection or conscription, and the previously observed sharp lowering of living standards must all be considered in assessing the degree of success achieved by the North Korean regime in reimposing its previously tight control system.

TOP SECRET

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Steps taken to alleviate refugee problem in ROK: The ROK Minister of Social Affairs issued a statement November 1 concerning the dispersion of 15,000 refugees from North Korea concentrated in the Secul region "into warm southern areas." This action is part of a "winter preparations" plan which includes the designation of November as the "month for refugees entry arrangements" and an appeal for "the public to make preparations for the approaching winter season." (R FBID Ticker, 1 Nov 51)

Comment: With 1,500 other refugees arriving in Seoul and its environs each week from all Korea and a conservatively estimated four million refugees throughout South Korea, the immensity of the task confronting ROK officials is manifest. Nevertheless, it is encouraging to note that definite, even though inadequate, steps are being taken to cope with this critical problem.

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10