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THE KOREAN WAR

General Dodd's capture and subsequent release, General Colson's acquiescence to prisoner demands, and other matters related to the latest Koje disorders have become the focal point of comment related to the war. Moscow, Peking and Pyongyang show an alacrity and coordination in exploiting the events which suggest anticipation of some such development,

Despite its relegation to a secondary position, DW remains a consistent element of Communist propaganda. Moscow sustains the campaign at a slightly higher level than either Peking or Pyongyang and has introduced a new confession by an American airman not yet reported by the North Korean or Chinese radio.

The prisoner issue remains virtually the sole topic of discussion related to the truce negotiations. There are insistent reminders that the Communists have made their "last concession," and that continued U.S. intransigence indicates the lack of a desire for peace. Such statements, however, are paralleled by declarations that agreement on the terms of an armistice is "within arm's reach" and can be obtained at once if the Americans will reconsider their illogical stand.

Koje Incident Reveals True Essence of "Voluntary Repatriation": Demonstrating a measure of coordination which suggests foreknowledge that some such attempt was to be made, Moscow, Peking and Pyongyang reacted quickly and violently to the capture of General Dodd. General Colson's subsequent acquiescence to the prisoners' demands was seized upon promptly by all three transmitters and the general pattern of denunciation has since developed along parallel lines with a consistency exceeding that which characterized the BW campaign. A further indication that the assault on General Dodd or something equivalent was contemplated may be gleaned from the fact that Chinese propaganda immediately preceding the incident predicted that further prisoner demonstrations would reveal the falsity of American claims concerning prisoner resistance to repatriation.

Communist negotiator Nam II, in assailing the U.N. command, declared that the prisoners at Koje revealed to the world "the true essence of the so-called voluntary repatriation." Colson's acceptance of the prisoners' conditions for the release of Dodd, he added, shows further that American screening is nothing but a conspiracy "to forcibly retain our captured personnel for cannon fodder." Attendant comment attacks the Americans for their flagrant disregard of international covenants concerning the treatment and disposition of prisoners, while accusing them of a wide variety of indignities and tortures inflicted upon the prisoners to force them to reject repatriation.

The Koje riots, Pyongyang declares, have shown the prisoners' unanimous desire for repatriation, and Peking adds that the prisoners, who "defied American assault troops and flame-throwing tanks to unveil to the world a glimpse of the grim picture of bloodshed and violence on the island," have shown up Ridgway and Truman's "humanitarian and moral considerations" for POWs as a colossal lie.

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<u>Colson's Concessions Cannot be Repudiated</u>: General Clark's statement that the agreement which effected General Dodd's release was obtained under duress and was thus invalid was quickly assailed as completely unacceptable. Colson, as head of the camp, was said to be the official representative of the U.N. command, the American army and the U.S. Defense Department. Any agreements he made with the prisoners, according to Peking, Moscow and Pyongyang, are binding and cannot be repudiated. Clark's rejection is said to be an augury of even more violent persecution of POWs in the future.

In declaring that the <u>people throughout the world</u> will not tolerate any retaliation or persecution of the prisoners, Peking specifically avoids the implication that <u>the Chinese</u> will not tolerate such reprisals. In thus failing to commit itself to any counteraction in the event of U.N. exemplary punishment of the prisoners who captured Dodd, Peking reveals a sensitivity which was not apparent in the vehement denunciation of the British and French for their actions in Hong Kong and Indochina, and of the United States for its Japanese policy. This restraint serves somewhat to mitigate the generally ominous tone of most of the Koje Island comment.

<u>Germans, Italians, Japanese Weren't Asked If They Wanted To Go Home</u>: An original note is struck by Moscow in quoting a letter ostensibly addressed to the NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE. The letter, according to Moscow, declares that we "never asked the Germans, Italians or Japanese whether they wished to go back where they had come from. Why then do we put this question to the North Koreans and the Chinese?" Neither Peking nor Pyongyang has yet exploited this line.

<u>U.S. Fliers Bomb POW Camps to Prevent New BW Revelations</u>: Despite its present relegation as a topic secondary to the Koje incident, germ warfare remains a major staple of Korean war propaganda. In addition to a revival of protests from political, intellectual and social groups, an interrogation of the American fliers Enoch and Quinn by Chinese pressmen and specialists which does little more than reiterate material previously broadcast in their confessions is widely reported. Peking reports that the interrogation, undertaken at the behest of the North Korean and Chinese peace committees, has been filmed and recorded and will be presented as evidence some time in the future. All three major transmitters have in the past few weeks, however, decreased the number of specific references to the trial or punishment of the BW criminals.

Peking reports that the Americans were thrown into a panic by the Enoch/ Quinn confessions and that American airmen have recently been ordered to attack Korean POW camps as a means of terrorizing the inmates in a desperate gamble to prevent further confessions. Peking follows Moscow's lead in reporting recent joint American-Canadian investigation of the possibility of waging BW in Asia and the Middle East.

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<u>U.S. Flier Admits Participation in BW in Korea and Germany</u>: In a dispatch ostensibly provided by its correspondent in Pyongyang, Moscow reports that Robert Gilarol, an American flier, has admitted his participation in BW following an extensive period of training. Gilarol also admitted, according to Moscow, that he had previously engaged in the campaign to destroy East German crops by disseminating colorado beetles. This is a rare attempt to link up the present BW campaign with the charges that were given heavy play in 1950. Neither Pyongyang nor Peking has yet reported this new confession.

Americans Use Poison Ges. Contemplate Atomic War: Chinese broadcasts have now attained Moscow and Pyongyang's degree of denunciation of the United States for the use of poison gas in Korea. The NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY declares on 13 May that poison gas was used on five occasions between 22 and 25 April, and that poison gas of the asphyxiating type was disseminated on 24 different occasions during that month. There are also increased references to the contemplated use of atomic weapons. Chinese scientist Chao Chung-yao, who returned from the United States to China less than two years ago, is quoted as declaring that the Enoch/Quinn depositions "clearly revealed that American imperialism is intensifying its preparation for atomic war."

Lovett Condemnation of BW Called Ludicrous: Although Moscow, Peking and Pyongyang have concentrated their denunciation of U.S. and U.N. officials on the fact that they failed to condemn the use of germ warfare, Defense Secretary Lovett's statement on the criminal nature of such warfare was glossed over by Peking and passed unnoticed by Moscow and Pyongyang. Alan Winnington, in a dispatch from Panmunjom, said the statement was "stupid" and just one more "ludicrous antic" of the Americans to hide their guilt.

<u>Only American Retreat on POW Question Can Bring a Truce</u>: Communist adamancy concerning the repatriation of prisoners remains the common denominator of nearly all comment related to the truce negotiations. The vehemence of the contention that only an American return to reason on the POW question can save the talks from collapse increased following the latest Koje incident, and there has been no subsequent abatement.

The Americans must face the final and irrevocable fact, Peking declares, that the Korean and Chinese delegates took the last decisive step to break the deadlock on 2 May when they agreed that (1) the final figure for repatriation should be somewhere between 116,000 and 132,000; and (2) that prisoners resident in areas held by the enemy need not be repatriated but could go directly to their homes. This Communist agreement, which has been consistently presented as a major concession, has not been spelled out eince the Koje incident, although it was given detailed treatment in the week following its presentation.

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Moscow.Says American Stand Threatens Talks: Moscow, which has in the past been extremely reticent concerning the negotiations, has now joined Peking and Pyongyang in assailing the Americans and in declaring that the talks are threatened with collapse by U.S. intransigence. An article written for IZVESTIA by Vronsky says the talks have been placed in a "precarious position" by the Americans! "unreasonable and unacceptable" demands. Peking echoes both Moscow and Pyongyang in declaring that "unless the Americans withdraw their demand for a so-called integral solution, they will reap the bitter fruit of what they have sown in stalling and wrecking the negotiations." One Chinese correspondent declares that if the negotiations break down, "and they cannot continue like this," American responsibility is undeniable. The Communists, he adds, consider it impossible for one side to negotiate forever "in the face of the silent intransigence of the other." This statement would seem to be at variance with the Communist delegation's frequent declaration that the truce meetings would be continued until arbitrarily broken off by the U.N. command.

Americans Want War Profits. Not Peace: Reverting to a theme that has been vigorously pressed in the past, Peking and Moscow declare that "all fairminded people know that the United States has all along lacked any real feeling for the Korean armistice negotiations." The American aggressors have "overweening ambition but inadequate strength," it is familiarly contended, and therein lies their fundamental contradiction. The Americans' desperation concerning internal and external difficulties forced them to negotiate, but at the same time with an eye to war profits they want to continue to create tension at home and among their satellites. The perspective of a Korean armistice has already caused panic among the American monopoly capitalists, Peking avers, and PRAVDA says that U.S. ruling circles are "afraid of peace" and a subsequent cooling of International tempers.

<u>Provocations Intended to Forestall Armistice</u>: In a new rash of violation charges, Peking claims American fliers have bombed the truce area, have attacked delegation convoys and have resorted to a wide variety of provocations to frustrate the talks.

Korean Armistice Is Within Armis Reach: The truculence of Communist comment is somewhat mitigated by concomitant reminders that "the long-awaited Korean armistice is within arm's reach," and that a more reasonable attitude on the prisouer guestion will bring a truce almost immediately. Moscow echoes this contendion in a NEW TIMES article which declares that the path to a successful completion of the talks is not closed "if the American command understands that it will not get anything by methods of blackmail and provoastion."

<u>Gommunists Will Not Accept Prisoner "Re-screening"</u>: Peking has been especially adapant in declaring that the Communists will not accept nor participate in any post-armistice "re-screening" of prisoners no matter how impartial it may be. To accept, a priori, this principle of impartial "re-screening," it is said, would be tantamount to giving "de facto acceptance" to the discredited principle of voluntary repatriation by lending a facade of reasonableness and legality to the screening. No subsequent re-examination of prisoners can exonerate the Americans, Peking says, for their crimes have been exposed by the "heroic and just resistance put up by our captured personnel."

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No References to BW Campaign in Truce Talks: Although Western radios and press sources have indicated that Communist delegation chief Nam II had brought up the BW issue at the tolks, this reference apparently stems from a misinterpretation of Nam's remarks. No such reference has appeared in Peking, Moscow or Pyongyang's radio propaganda. Nam's sole reference to BW came in a listing of the concessions apparently made by General Colson to procure General Bodd's release, wherein the camp commander was said to have promised that no more prisoners would be used in BW experiments. References to the use of prisoners for BW experiments antedate the campaign charging the U.N. with the dissemination of germs in North Korea.

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