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27 FEBRUARY 1953

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## B W A N D T H E K O R E A N W A R

New life has been infused into the quiescent bacteriological warfare campaign by charges made on 20 February that germ-warfare activity over Korea and Northeast China continues unabated, and by the release of the "confessions" of two field-grade American Marine officers attesting to their direction of various phases of the campaign. The following considerations derive from this latest development:

- a. The present revival is in many ways reminiscent of the short-term spurt of mid-September 1952 occasioned by the issuance of the International Scientific Commission's detailed brief on American BW criminality and the confessions of Lieutenants Kniss and O'Neal. However, essential differences in content and methods of exploitation suggest that the present phase may have a more specific scope and direction.
- b. Although the new confessions go into considerable detail concerning names, places, dates and policy implementation, they lack the precise attention to minutiae and the insight into American psychology which endowed the Kniss-O'Neal revelations with the veneer of extreme objectivity.
- c. Other elements which seem primarily intended to buttress fundamental Communist propaganda lines further detract from the credibility of the charges.
- d. Although the revival of mid-September 1952 did not have the expected bearing on U.N. sessions and other major events that immediately followed because of its extremely short-term duration, there are firm indications that the present resurgence is related to the resumption of the U.N. sessions.

Germ Warfare over Northeast China, Korea Continues Unabated: A major revival of the EW campaign seems in the offing as a result of new charges that American planes during the last quarter of 1952 have repeatedly waged germ warfare over Northeast China, and the release of the purported confessions of two field-grade Marine officers attesting to their direction of various phases of the biological warfare operations. The confessions, that of First Marine Division Chief of Staff Colonel Frank Schwable and of Ordnance Officer Major Roy Bley, have been widely broadcast.

The pattern of simultaneous exploitation of various new elements is in many ways reminiscent of that noted in the short-term revival of the BW campaign after the 14 September 1952 issuance of the International Scientific Commission's detailed brief on American germ-warfare criminality and the "confessions" of Lieutenants Kniss and O'Neal. Then as now there was an

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accompanying rash of peripheral allusions to BW not related to the major new items of evidence. In the present instance, Peking has reported that:

- a. Research operations in West Germany have led to an epidemic of typhus among the German people;
- b. General VanFleet during his tenure in Tokyo admitted to a member of the Belgian mission that bacteriological warfare operations were taking place in Korea;
- c. American support operations in Japan for the BW campaign are an open secret in Tokyo, where corpses of infected persons are used to develop more virulent strains.

Absence of Precise Detail Affects Objectivity: Although the "confessions" go into considerable detail concerning names, places, dates, code designations, specialized jargon, and considerations concerning policy implementation, they lack the attention to minutiae and the insight into normal American psychology which endowed the Kniss and O'Neal confessions with a veneer of objectivity.

Some of the difference may be laid to the basic dissimilarities between actions at the working level and at levels concerned primarily with giving and interpreting orders. Since Schwable and Bley were allegedly concerned with the implementation of directives from higher authority but not with the actual operations of dissemination, the extent to which they could discuss operations in precise detail is probably limited; conversely, since Kniss and O'Neal were not privy to the high-policy decisions which put the operations into effect, their confessions might necessarily be limited to the recital of minute details concerning the actual operation.

Although such considerations may have been taken into account in the attempt to create the illusion of truth, the studied avoidance of other elements that would have logically appeared at the command level would seem to indicate (a) a faulty knowledge of American psychology, or (b) the sacrifice of objectivity in the interest of exploiting basic Communist lines.

Credibility Impaired by Attempt to Support Communist Lines: The following elements provide the major indices of this possibly unintentional distortion:

- a. The stress upon the fact that the Americans knew the campaign was ineffectual.
- b. The frequent allusions to the officers' distaste for germ-warfare operations, and their realization that it was morally reprehensible.
- c. The implication that no attempt was ever made to provide a rationale for the use of biological weapons other than the fact that it was ordered by the highest levels--the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- d. The unrealistic insistence that there had been no slackening of the campaign or a reassessment of its value despite the clamor raised by the Communist charges, and the general world-wide acceptance of their reliability.
- e. The inordinate stress upon the fact that maximum security was maintained at all times to prevent non-involved military personnel from learning of the campaign.

Because Communist media have consistently maintained that the campaign served no purpose and completely failed to affect Sino-North Korean battle capabilities, Peking apparently felt called upon to have the confessions stress that the results of the campaign had not been "worth a damn." The parallel insistence that all the officers called upon to put the Joint Chiefs' directive into action realized its moral impermissibility echoes Communist contentions given wide currency during the height of the denunciatory campaign and is rendered especially suspect by the failure of the confessions to make any allusion to an attempt to rationalize the need for such a weapon. Thus, while Peking attempts to lend added conviction to its indictment of American high-level bestiality by noting a recognition of that depravity even among American officers, it implies that those who originally formulated the policy were so infected that they were unconscious of the effect it would have on the subordinate personnel and the need to find a plausible excuse for its implementation.

In this Peking seems to have become a victim of its own dichotomous view of the world, in which the Americans act without deviation in accordance with the unalloyed black picture of them presented to the world. In this case Peking was either unaware of the lack of credibility involved in making Americans talk like Communists, or was willing to sacrifice this contribution to objectivity in its disinclination to suggest that any mitigating considerations impelled the Americans to use such a weapon.

Similarly in attempting to picture the Americans as beasts unrestrained and unrepentant in the face of world opprobrium, the fliers are made to provide no indication that the world-wide attention and credibility accorded the campaign caused a slackening or re-evaluation of the BW program. To prevent any distortion of the picture of the Americans unregenerated depravity, Peking seems little concerned that had the charges been true, the tremendous clamor raised by the campaign should have given the Americans pause, at least until the hue and cry had subsided. To intimate, too, that the campaign is being maintained without respite to this very moment in the face of categorical U.S. and U.N. denials that BW was ever perpetrated seems to indicate that the Communists ascribe to the Americans their own willingness to assume the psychological burden of being caught in an obvious fabrication.

The repeated allusions to the maximum security that was maintained at all times to prevent public realization that germ weapons were being used seem primarily intended to explain the fact that the troops in Korea generally have no knowledge of the campaign. The weakness of this contention is apparent in view of the parallel allegations that support operations for the campaign in Tokyo and in Germany are an "open secret" with little attempt at concealment.

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Present Phase Seems Related to U.N. Sessions: The simultaneous release of the International Scientific Commission's report and the Kniss-O'Neal confessions on 14 September 1952 evoked speculation that the revival of the campaign at that time had a possible bearing on three approaching events: the opening of the Asian Peace Conference in Peking on 2 October, the scheduled reconvening of the U.N. on 14 October, and the 25 October anniversary of Chinese participation in the war. The extremely short-term nature of that phase of the campaign--within 10 days allusions had dropped to barely one percent of all items from Peking--seemed effectively to gainsay the existence of any such relationship. Therefore it seems possible that the expansion of the campaign at that moment was intended to place the report "on the record" rather than to create a peg for further exploitation in connection with a specific event. In the present case, the indications seem considerably firmer that the present revival of the campaign is specifically linked to the resumption of the U.N. sessions. The following elements appear pertinent:

- a. Peking and Moscow know that BW will be discussed at this session in connection with the U.S.-sponsored probe of the charges. The new charges and confessions may be intended to burden the Americans with new contentions to refute while providing them with little time to prepare a comprehensive rebuttal.
- b. Both PRAVDA and the Peking PEOPLE'S DAILY have called for immediate U.N. action to halt the "monstrous American crimes," and have woven the various "evidences" of American inhumanity into a summary indictment of the United States as a basis for the demand that the U.S. be forced to sign the Geneva Convention outlawing BW.
- c. Moscow has given considerable publicity to the new confessions; in contrast Soviet broadcasts have consistently deemphasized those of Kniss and O'Neal.
- d. Accompanying Moscow comment has been extremely pointed and widely broadcast. In contrast, the ISC report was given only piece-meal distribution by both Peking and Moscow after the original announcement, and seemed primarily intended to place the information "on the record" for subsequent use rather than to provide a propaganda device to dissipate the doubts of the skeptical.

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## N O R T H K O R E A

Pyongyang Report Reviews Atrocity Charges: Pyongyang's own contribution to the upsurge in atrocity charges appears in the form of a "Fifth Communique on Atrocities Committed by the American Aggressors and the Syngman Rhee Gang." The communique, also broadcast by Moscow and Peking, reviews the record of U.S. atrocities, listing them in the following categories: destruction of urban and rural areas through bombing; use of weapons for wholesale massacre; i.e., poison gas and BW; and the destruction of cultural and social installations, again through wanton bombing. A long compilation of alleged incidents is used to document each charge. Although no appeal is made to the U.N. for condemnation of these atrocities, Pyongyang once again calls for a "people's trial" of the responsible criminals.

Appeal to Korean Residents Warns of Rhee-Yoshida Agreement: Concern over the possibility of Japanese participation in the Korean struggle, both actively and through the coercion of Korean residents in Japan, is voiced in an appeal from the Committee for the Attainment of Unification of the Fatherland addressed to Korean residents in Japan. The message elaborates on the charges voiced at the time of the January visit of Syngman Rhee to Tokyo, alleging that a secret agreement was made at that time calling for the dispatch of Japanese mercenaries to Korea and the "forcible repatriation" of the 600,000 Koreans in Japan, with Rhee in return promising Japan the right to fish in Korean waters, to deprive Koreans domiciled in Japan of their property, and to claim property in South Korea.

The committee calls upon the Koreans in Japan to oppose their "forcible repatriation" as well as Japanese intervention in the war and to establish a "firm understanding" with the peace-loving Japanese people. Use of the term "forcible repatriation" in connection with a civilian population is in direct contrast with Peking's insistence in its comment on the return of Japanese civilians now in China that "repatriation" only applies to prisoners.

KPA Relies on Red Army Tactics and Experience: Pyongyang devotes considerable attention to the 35th anniversary of the Soviet Red Army, emphasizing the dependence of the Korean People's Army on advanced Soviet-Stalinist military science and experience, a stress also noted in allusions to the fifth anniversary of the Korean People's Army on 8 February. Particular attention is paid to the Stalingrad phase of the Second World War. Moscow, too, has recently directed a series of commentaries on the Stalingrad campaign to the Korean audience, apparently to provide encouragement and inspiration in the face of anticipated U.N. offensive action.

This greater stress on adoption of Soviet military tactics is coupled with familiar reference to the Soviet peace policy. The MINJU CHOSUN, however, adds editorially the warning that "if anyone takes the Soviet peace policy as a sign of Soviet weakness or a lack of confidence in its might, he is committing a grave mistake, for the Soviet people cannot be frightened by armed threat, and if called upon to do so, the Soviet armed forces will attack any and all aggressors." There is no explicit coupling of this threat with the Korean war, however.

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KPA Anniversary Comment Slights Recent Air Operations: Continuing attention to the anniversary of the KPA includes attention to the air force, omitted in previous comment. Detailed exploits and heroization are used to describe North Korean air action during the opening phases of the war in 1950, but present air activity is given only superficial mention. Pyongyang also fails to mention Chinese participation in the air war, as has been true in reviews of ground action. The failure to elaborate on present air action and to mention Chinese participation may well indicate Pyongyang's sensitivity to failure of the air force to provide adequate protection against continued American bombing.

Greater Vigilance Is Needed to Combat Enemy Infiltration: Pyongyang continues to prod the North Korean population into greater vigilance, placing increasing emphasis on the dangers of infiltration by spies and saboteurs behind the lines. Reports of the capture of enemy agents generally attribute their apprehension to the vigilance of civil defense units and particularly of women participants in these units, reflecting an apparent continued lack of adequate security personnel to cope with the danger. The MINJU CHOSUN inveighs against "laxity and looseness" among the population which makes possible the enemy effort to utilize "malcontents" in its espionage and subversion.

Other criticism involves political propaganda workers who fail to arm themselves with Marxism-Leninism, public health workers who possess an "irresponsible attitude" toward the anti-epidemic drive now in progress, and cadres of the Ministry of Commerce with "formal and bureaucratic" attitudes who have failed to follow instructions and have compromised on disagreeable aspects of their work.

New Currency Will Increase Distress: The new currency reform in South Korea is cited as proof of the reports of the desperate straits of South Korean economic life. Pyongyang predicts that the new "hwan" will "intensify economic disorder" and indeed has already resulted in increased black-market activity, price rises, and a new police terror designed to impose confidence in the new currency. Other comment on South Korean life reports opposition to conscription, the "demoralization" of South Korean troops, and the popular and effective activity of the South Korean partisans.

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S O U T H K O R E A

Pusan Urges Public Confidence in New Currency: Pusan broadcasts explaining the new currency reform stress the Government intention to alleviate the effects of inflation on the South Korean economy and call for the trust and confidence of the people in the new "hwan." The prevalence of hoarding, misunderstanding, lack of public knowledge, and of attempts by merchants and black marketeers to take advantage of the interim period is acknowledged; however, Government action against these difficulties is promised and the establishment of relief stations and distribution of rice is announced. Pusan broadcasts indicate disagreement in the National Assembly over the technique of President Rhee in decreeing the change-over, but Assembly approval on 21 February is reported.

Rhee Asks Blockade, Mainland Attack: Syngman Rhee in two recent statements on 13 and 22 February has called respectively for a blockade of China and the use of Chiang Kai-shek troops in a campaign to recover the China mainland. Rhee claims that a blockade of China would not provoke the Soviets nor lead to a world war, and intimates that President Eisenhower is decided upon such a blockade and "will not change his mind." In his statement of 22 February President Rhee diplomatically reports that a general feeling exists that Nationalist troops should be used to recover the mainland and he reveals that he suggested that U.S. air support be provided to make this possible.

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