

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~FAR EAST SURVEY  
2 JULY 1953

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## THE KOREAN WAR

Pyongyang Rejects Clark Proposal: Departing from customary practice, Radio Pyongyang broadcast a prompt but unofficial rejection of Clark's 29 June proposal regarding an immediate armistice. The retort impugns Clark's lack of sincerity and his failure to guarantee against a recurrence of South Korean obstruction. Neither Peking nor Pyongyang has reported any further reaction--official or unofficial--to the Clark letter, although there has been no apparent diminution of attention--which equals previous propaganda peaks--to the general Korean situation. It would appear that Pyongyang's apparently hasty broadcast reflects North Korea's serious concern with South Korean actions and potentialities, a concern which has, however, been largely subordinated to the line established first in Peking broadcasts. Previous indications of confusion, at least insofar as immediate propaganda coordination between Peking and Pyongyang is concerned, were revealed by Pyongyang's unusual failure to provide any endorsement of Peking's suggestion that Korean unification be the primary objective of the post-truce political talks.\*

Peking Condemns Lack of Progress in Seoul Talks: In wide comment on the Clark-Robertson conferences with Syngman Rhee, Peking has demonstrated increased impatience at the failure of the United States to take effective measures to assure a successful implementation of an armistice agreement. NCMA correspondent Kiang Nan noted that the conferences have produced no tangible evidence of a change in the South Korean position and warned that these talks are being regarded with "increased suspicion." Broadcasts warn again of the dangers posed by Rhee's threat to withdraw ROK forces from the U.N. Command in the event of an armistice and by his threat to take belligerent action against representatives of the Neutral Nations Commission should they enter South Korea. There is belated comment on the 20 June "kidnapping" of Chinese POWs by Rhee forces "in collusion with" Kuomintang agents, and Peking repeats its warning that the Americans will be held responsible for "any incidents" taking place in prison camps.

Peking reports without comment alleged Indian Foreign Office consideration of the transfer outside Korea of prisoners to be turned over to the neutral commission; this to avoid possible Rhee-inspired sabotage of the task of the commission. Peking does not clarify whether this transfer would include those Korean prisoners already released. Prime Minister Nehru's support for an early session of the United Nations to consider Korean developments is also reported without comment.

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\* See SURVEY OF USSR BROADCASTS, 25 June 1953, for a fuller discussion of propaganda coordination on war objectives.

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Sino-Korean Unity Defeats Aggression in Korea: Peking and Pyongyang comment on the third anniversary of the Korean war, which treats the war largely as a completed phase, draws the following conclusions:

1. the U.S. policy of aggression has been a failure and the independence of North Korea has been preserved.
2. the record of the war proves that international disputes can be solved only through peaceful negotiations.
3. the successful outcome of the war has been brought about by the close-knit friendship and unity of the Korean and Chinese people and armies who share a common cause and a blood bond.

To this latter point Peking for the first time ties the necessity for a continuation and strengthening of the Sino-Korean alliance in the post-war period in order to guard against the threat of an American-inspired Pacific alliance which might at any time initiate new aggressive actions. As is customary in anniversary comment, deference is paid the moral and material aid of the People's Democracies, led by the Soviet Union. However, the large measure of praise accorded Stalin in last year's Pyongyang anniversary comment is not carried over to Malenkov who receives only one mention this year, that in connection with a message addressed to him from the Pyongyang anniversary meeting. Soviet attention to the third anniversary of the Korean war is limited to marginal news items only. This virtual avoidance is in marked contrast to the wide attention accorded previous anniversary dates and is an extreme manifestation of Moscow's general dissociation from Korean developments since April of this year.

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C O N T E N T S

S O U T H K O R E A

Seoul and Pusan continue to reflect intransigence on the main issues of unification and a truce. The SEOUL SINMUN, reflecting general South Korean comment, states that the United States and South Korea are in basic agreement on objectives, and that present differences largely concern the means necessary to achieve unification. The paper expresses a lack of faith in the efficacy of negotiations in dealing with Communists, and cites as an example the failure of the 1946 U.S.-USSR joint commission to reach any settlement of the Korean problem. The only solution possible is the absolute destruction of Communist power through a "northward march," the daily declares. Comment on the third anniversary of the war similarly stresses the need for unification at any cost.

The 24 June announcement concerning the formation of a "National Defense Committee" apparently marks the first step towards the formation of a command structure independent of the U.N. Command. The Committee is composed of Cabinet and Armed Forces representatives, but provides for the participation of Assemblymen only by invitation. Broadcasts of 30 June report the appointment of Vice Admiral Son Won Il as Minister of National Defense.

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