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FAR EAST SURVEY
27 AUGUST 1953

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K O R E A N W A R

Chou Endorses Soviet U.N. Position: Chou En-lai's 24 August endorsement of the Soviet proposals in the special General Assembly session, and a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the same date throw some additional light on the Communist tactics with respect to the coming political talks. Chinese Communist acceptance of the 11 nations proposed for conference participation by Vishinsky, and Chou's additional proposal that any nation with forces under the U.N. Command could be included in the talks, seem designed both to offset the threat of joint U.S.-South Korean "manipulation" of the conference and to take advantage of apparent Western disunity. The editorial makes a specific plea to the United Nations to make a fresh start and not to continue as the "tool" of U.S. aggression. However, Peking makes clear that despite broad representation at the conference, a virtual veto is to remain in Communist hands.

The fact that this veto is to be exercised by Peking and Pyongyang suggests that the Communists will attempt to limit conference discussions to Korean issues primarily, with the Asian Communists assigned the task of Orbit spokesmen, as in the Panmunjom talks. It seems likely that had the Communist bloc envisaged a broader agenda for the conference, with issues on which the USSR might have desired to assert its paramount interest, then the Soviet proposal would have contained provisions for a two-thirds vote similar to the Soviet resolution submitted at the 7th General Assembly session. Chou's specific endorsement of the agenda of the conference, as outlined in Article 60 of the armistice agreement, tends to confirm the Communist position. Chinese propaganda has thus far made no attempt to define what "other questions" might be discussed, and Peking continues to avoid any propaganda commitment beyond settlement of Korean issues.

Peking's apparent amenability is indicated by the mild reaction to the General Assembly's refusal to invite Communist Chinese and North Korean representatives to the special session. The present failure to exploit this situation is in marked contrast to Peking's past denunciations of the U.N. for rejecting Chinese Communist representation at U.N. discussions of Korea. Peking refused to accept the legality of U.N. decisions on Korea at the 7th General Assembly on the grounds that no Peking or Pyongyang representatives were present. In his latest pronouncements, Chou avoids completely any reference to Chinese Communist membership in the United Nations, despite recent demands for such a development voiced in other Soviet and Chinese Communist propaganda.

Denunciations of the Dulles-Rhee accord and the provisions of the mutual defense pact have now largely disappeared from Peking comment, although both Moscow and Pyongyang continue to attack U.S.-South Korean agreements as a threat to the political conference.

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U.N. Prisoners Oppose Direct Repatriation: A 24 August NCNA dispatch reports that the United Nations representative at Panmunjom was informed on 20 August that "about" 400 U.N. prisoners had indicated their opposition to direct repatriation, but that the Communist side was making efforts to persuade these men to change their minds. The dispatch contained no reference to the nationality of the men, nor did it claim that the announced number of men was definitive. The Communists have consistently denied screening U.N. prisoners but on 6 August NCNA reported that the prisoners had been informed of the provisions governing their repatriation, and that the U.N. would be notified if any prisoners opposed repatriation.

Peking has thus far not made any statement regarding the number of prisoners who are to be detained to serve out jail sentences for alleged crimes. However, on 13 August Peking upheld its right to retain such convicted prisoners under the provisions of the Geneva Convention, and ridiculed Secretary Dulles' position that the terms of the armistice agreement required all prisoners to be directly returned or handed over to the Neutral Nations Commission.

Peking Denounces Continuing Atrocities against Prisoners: The bulk of Peking broadcasts on the Korean armistice is apparently designed to make propaganda capital of the exchange of prisoners and the supervision of the armistice by neutral and Red Cross teams. Peking continues to place heavy emphasis on atrocities, past and present, allegedly committed against Chinese and Korean prisoners held by the United Nations. Heavy publicity is also given to protests over the alleged interference with the functions of Communist Red Cross teams, and to U.N. infractions of the armistice agreement. These charges are juxtaposed with reports that International Red Cross inspection of North Korean prison camps established "adequate" conditions there. Publicity of these charges and counter-charges is, however, almost wholly confined to Peking's international transmissions, and the broadcasts make no specific threats regarding continued implementation of the armistice.

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N O R T H K O R E A

Ideological Struggle Continues in North Korea: Pyongyang's sensitivity concerning the recent purge of Labor Party members, as reflected in the cautious and limited reportage of pertinent events, is apparently continuing. The sole Pyongyang mention of the Lee Sung Yop trial is contained in a brief 19 August report of a popular resolution "unanimously supporting the just decision of the Pyongyang City Special Military Tribunal against the vicious gang." (Both Peking and Moscow had previously reported details of the trial, but refrained from mentioning the material in their Korean-language broadcasts.) Nor has anything further been reported of Pak Hun Yong who according to an 11 August broadcast from Pyongyang was expelled from the Party and ordered to stand trial. However, repeated emphasis on the need for vigilance suggests that the purge is actually continuing. A striking example of this campaign is contained in Pak Chong Ae's address to the National Conference of Teachers. Pak reports that "at present a sharp, sensitive struggle is taking place on the ideological front" and exhorts the teachers to heighten their vigilance against the "poison of bourgeois ideology" and against the presence of saboteurs in the ranks of the educators.

Education Keys New Program to Industrialization: The speeches and reports of the National Conference of Teachers held in Pyongyang on 21-22 August provide clear evidence of the emphasis to be given industrialization in post-war North Korea. The training of national cadres capable of converting North Korea into an industrialized nation and rehabilitating the nation's destroyed economy is established as the primary post-war task of North Korean education. Kim Il Sung is reported to have advocated that 70 percent of all university students be assigned to the "technological and natural sciences fields." State plans to take over the rehabilitation of educational facilities "in certain industrial districts" seem to bolster the emphasis on technical training. Recognition of the role to be played by Soviet aid and experience is also reflected in comment emanating from the conference. The generous Soviet aid to Korea is to be utilized to install the latest machinery and supplies, and stress is placed on the need for prompt translation of the Soviet manuals and textbooks required in the training program. The teachers conference, in a message to Kim Il Sung, specifically pledges to utilize Soviet experience in improving the curricula and teaching program.

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