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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IRONBAR

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Preliminary Comments on an article from the ~~SECRET~~  
Version of Military Thought [redacted]

1. This article is from the ~~SECRET~~ version of a Military Thought issue which went to press on 25 August 1961. It is a very comprehensive description of NATO maneuvers with particular emphasis on "FALLEX 60", which was held in late September 1960.

2. A previous article dealing with these maneuvers appeared in the ~~TOP SECRET~~ version of Military Thought [redacted]. Both of these articles reveal a thorough knowledge of NATO maneuver plans and combat strength. The present article appears to be directed toward a wider dissemination of this knowledge in the Soviet armed forces.

3. The author makes a few revealing comments on the Soviet view of NATO planning. He says the exercises show that the American-British bloc is preparing "not for a local war so much as for a world war" and will make maximum use of all available nuclear forces and weapons in the shortest possible time against targets "above all in the Soviet Union." He writes,

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however, that NATO is incorrect in believing that it has enough troops and nuclear weapons in Central Europe to defend successfully against a Warsaw Pact offensive. The author concludes that the NATO Command is paying "serious attention to problems of organizing and conducting the first operations in the initial period of war . . . ." This apparently is a reminder to Soviet commanders at intermediate levels to face up to the realities of modern war.

[Redacted]

(RAY S. CLINE  
Deputy Director (Intelligence))

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "Some  
Conclusions Concerning NATO Armed  
Forces Maneuvers", by Colonel I.  
Milevskiy

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article from the SECRET Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of division commander.

2. For convenience of reference by USIB agencies, the codeword IRONBARK has been assigned to this series of TOP SECRET CSDI reports containing documentary Soviet material. The word IRONBARK is classified CONFIDENTIAL and is to be used only among persons authorized to read and handle this material.

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*Richard Helms*

Richard Helms  
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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**Original: The Director of Central Intelligence**

**cc: Military Representative of the President**

**Special Assistant to the President for  
National Security Affairs**

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "Some  
Conclusions Concerning NATO Armed  
Forces Maneuvers", by Colonel I.  
Milevskiy

DATE OF INFO : August 1961

APPRAISAL OF  
CONTENT : Documentary

SOURCE : A reliable source (B).

Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "Some Conclusions Concerning NATO Armed Forces Maneuvers", which was written by Colonel I. Milevskiy.

This article appeared in Issue 5 (60) of 1961 of a special version of the Soviet journal Military Thought which is classified SECRET by the Soviets and is published irregularly. Issue 5 (60) was sent to press on 25 August 1961. [redacted] contained the Table of Contents for this issue.

[redacted] Comment: Military Thought is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthly since 1937, while the other two versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960. By the end of 1961, 61 issues of the SECRET version had been published, 6 of them during 1961.

-1-

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FOREIGN ARMED FORCES SURVEY

Some Conclusions Concerning NATO Armed Forces

Maneuvers

by

Colonel I. Milevskiy

In the NATO Command's system of military measures, a prominent place is occupied by operational-tactical training for the combined armed forces of the bloc, overall direction of which is carried out by the Supreme High Commands in Europe and on the Atlantic, as well as by the principal commands in the theaters of military operations. One of the most important forms of such training is exercises and maneuvers.

What distinguishing features can be noted in the operational training of NATO's Armed Forces?

First of all, large-scale exercises and maneuvers are carried out in the context of the initial stage of a war which, in the opinion of the NATO Command, will decisively influence the further course of the war and, possibly, the outcome of the war altogether. The goals of the exercises are to examine and work out problems in organizing and conducting combined operations of all branches of the armed forces and of the individual branches as well, to check on possible variations in operational-strategic war plans, and to increase the overall combat readiness of all troops. In this connection, special attention is devoted to the problems of conducting nuclear operations, which are considered to be of primary importance.

-2-

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The exercises and maneuvers carried out are combined and multi-staged. Participating in them are commands and staffs, from the level of divisions and separate units of combined ground troops and an air wing, and of corresponding levels of command of naval forces, up to the staff of the Supreme High Command in a theater of war. Such exercises are considered the most typical for combat conditions and permit the working out of coordination between the branches of armed forces, the arms of troops, and the various command levels.

The commands, staffs and troops which participate in the maneuvers operate primarily on those lines and operational axes on which it is assumed combat operations will be conducted. A complex operational-strategic situation is created for the exercises.

The combined method is usually used in conducting exercises, i.e., combining command-staff and troop exercises. Formations and large units of ground troops down to a division and a separate unit subordinate to a corps and army usually use the command-staff method. Their units of nuclear artillery, guided missiles, and free rockets participate in the exercises with limited personnel. Troop exercises are sometimes conducted along some of the operational axes. The exercises include not only the staffs of large units and formations from the combined air forces, but also aviation units which work out practical flight assignments. In this connection, the air forces conduct exercises using the method of two opposing sides. In this method the aviation PVO units, together with the other PVO forces and means, represent the "defending" side, while the tactical, strategic and aircraft carrier aviation act as the "attacking" side, delivering strikes against simulated targets on the territory of NATO member countries. Naval forces use approximately the same methods in conducting exercises as the air forces.

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-3-

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The majority of these exercises are characterized by a combined and comprehensive study and working out of the problems relating to the organization and conduct of strategic operations and armed combat in general.

In the opinion of the NATO Command, modern warfare embraces all aspects of military and civilian life. In this connection, not only commands and staffs participate in exercises, but also numerous quasi-military (poluvoyenny) and civilian organizations which are directly or indirectly involved in military planning and in procurement for the armed forces. Among these are military-territorial organs, para-military organizations (for example, the heimvern in Denmark and Norway), central and provincial communications organs, health departments, surface, air, river and sea transport, economic and interior affairs ministries, etc.

During the exercises, considerable attention is devoted to working out such problems as bringing the armed forces to a state of combat readiness in accordance with the system of alerts now existing in NATO; the use of nuclear weapons; the organization of reliable control over all levels, all types of intelligence, antinuclear and antiair defense; and materiel, technical and medical supply.

During recent years, it has been noted that operational-strategic exercises and maneuvers of the NATO Armed Forces have been highly intensified. Army multi-stage exercises are usually held twice a year and last 3 to 5 days each, while combined, multi-stage exercises involving army groups and combined tactical air commands are held once or twice a year, and last 4 to 6 days each. Once or twice a year a multi-stage exercise is held involving the armed forces of a theater of military operations and a theater of war and lasts 5 to 6 days, while every three years comprehensive maneuvers are held

-4-

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of the combined armed forces of the entire bloc and last 10 to 12 days.

Along with this, a large number of specialized exercises are also held. Among these are exercises on supplying ammunition and other items to nuclear weapons units, communications exercises, aerial reconnaissance exercises, exercises on the evacuation of non-combat personnel of the armed forces, and a number of other so-called standard (tipovoy) exercises.

The content and goals of operational preparation are particularly evident in the NATO combined armed forces maneuvers designated "FALLEX 60" which were held from 20 September to 1 October 1960 simultaneously in all European Theaters of Military Operations and in the Eastern Atlantic, including the English Channel.

During the 12 years of NATO's existence, two such maneuvers have been held, in 1953 and 1957. However, the "FALLEX 60" maneuvers exceeded all previous maneuvers with respect to the composition of the participating staffs, formations and large units of ground, air, and naval forces and of civilian organs; and with respect to its scope and particularly the goals and nature of the tasks that were to be carried out. Also, they were the largest in NATO's history. They culminated the training of commands and staffs at all levels, and also checked the combat readiness of the bloc as a whole.

The maneuver area, north to south, extended from the North Cape in Northern Norway to the Island of Malta in the Mediterranean, more than 4,000 kilometers; and east-west from the eastern boundary of Turkey to the Island of Madeira in the Atlantic, about 6,400 kilometers. These figures show that the American-British bloc is preparing not for a local war so much as for a world war.

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Participating in the maneuvers were all the commands and staffs in the European Theaters of Military Operations in the Eastern Atlantic and English Channel area, important air and naval forces, and several large units and units of NATO ground troops, principally nuclear weapons units. Also present from all European NATO countries, with the exception of Portugal and Iceland, were the general staffs and the main staffs of the branches of the armed forces, PVO staffs and units, and a large number of diverse military and civilian agencies engaged in military planning problems.

The basic goal of the maneuvers was to check the work of commands, staffs and national organs, to work out operations of NATO combined armed forces (principally air, naval and missile units) in conducting joint operations, particularly nuclear, during the initial stage in the European Theater of War, and to raise the overall combat readiness of the armed forces.

The "FALLEX 60" maneuvers consisted of 20 exercises, conducted according to a single strategic concept in two stages. The first stage, from 20 to 24 September, covered the period from D1 to D4, i.e., basically the first four days of war; the second stage, from 26 to 30 September, covered the operational period D11 to D15 inclusively.

What did the first stage of the maneuvers look like, and what were the basic conclusions to be derived from its concept, its progress while under way, and its results?

Eleven exercises were carried out during the first stage, the most important of which were "FLASH BACK-1" and "SWORD THRUST-1".

The "FLASH BACK-1" Exercise was carried out mainly in the Central European, including the territory of Great Britain, and the South European Theaters of Military Operations. It covered the period D1 to D3,

-6-

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an elapsed time of about 60 hours from the start of military operations.

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During the exercise, commands and staffs worked out operations for carrying out a nuclear attack in the first 72 hours of war and for organizing and conducting anti-air defense and ground operations in the Central European and Southern European Theaters of Military Operations. Particular attention was paid to instructing commands and staffs in the methods of controlling subordinate troops, large units and formations while carrying out tasks under the complex conditions which can arise at the beginning of a nuclear/missile war; checking the effectiveness of the communications system; working out coordination between the types of armed forces, the arms of troops, as well as between the command levels of NATO and national military and civilian organizations. Also afforded considerable attention were problems in organizing antinuclear defense, including studying the effect of enemy nuclear strikes on the conduct of operations and the progress of armed combat in general, and the organization of materiel and technical supply, including the replacement of personnel losses.

The exercise "SWORD THRUST-1", carried out in the Norwegian Sea, was the largest and most important of all the naval exercises in the "FALLEX-60" maneuvers. About 90 combat and auxiliary vessels of the U.S., British, Canadian, Dutch and Norwegian navies participated, including four strike carriers (two U.S. and two British), with about 260 aircraft and helicopters, a heavy ASW carrier, and two cruisers armed with surface-to-surface guided missiles (URS) and surface-to-air guided missiles (ZURS).

This exercise represented an operation of the NATO strike fleet in coordination with an overall nuclear attack in the European Theater of War.

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During the exercise, naval operations were worked out for carrying out nuclear strikes against previously designated objectives, a check was made of the fleet's effectiveness against attacks by enemy submarines, bomber aircraft, and missile-carrying surface vessels, and problems were worked out for resupplying the vessels in an area of combat operations.

Let us examine the basic elements of the initial situation and the concept of the maneuvers, particularly its most important part, the "FLASH BACK-1" exercise.

The commencement of military operations between the NATO countries ("Blue") and the Warsaw Pact countries ("Orange") was preceded by a period of gradually deteriorating international relations, especially between the respective leading countries of the two coalitions. As a result of several covert undertakings of a precautionary nature by both sides, international relations became even more aggravated. Then began a threatening period during which both sides, under the pretext of conducting various exercises, began to carry out the necessary minimal measures in preparing for war and bringing the armed forces from a peacetime to a wartime footing.

The basic concept of the maneuvers anticipated that at the beginning of military operations the "Orange" would concentrate large groupings of air, ground and missile troops on the strategic and most important operational axes of the Central and Southern European Theaters of Military Operations (TVD) and that on the morning of 21 September (D-Day) they would assume the offensive on land and in the air, in coastal areas with naval forces.

The basic task of the "Orange" was to destroy the "Blue's" nuclear potential and materiel and technical reserves by delivering mass nuclear strikes with missiles and aircraft against missile bases, airfields, troop supply centers and other important objectives,

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thus depriving the "Blue" commanders of the possibility of executing their planned operations.

Simultaneously with the launching of nuclear/missile operations, the "Orange" were to undertake offensive operations on the land and on the sea with the following immediate goals:

-- to destroy the main forces of the "Blue's" first strategic echelon in the Central European Theater of Military Operations, to seize the Ruhr and Rhine-Palatinate industrial regions, to take possession of beachheads on the west bank of the Rhine for a subsequent development of the attack into the Netherlands, Belgium and France;

-- to take over Denmark and establish control over the Danish Straits, thus assuring an outlet to the Atlantic so that the navy could operate on the Atlantic line of communications;

-- to seize the most important strategic areas in the Southern European Theaters of Military Operations, the northeastern part of Italy, northern Greece, the Dardenelles and Bosphorus, and the eastern areas of Turkey;

-- to destroy the "Blue's" merchant fleet, to disrupt his maritime communications, and to cut off the transport of troops, combat equipment and strategic goods from the US to Europe and between the European countries.

The "Blue" Command envisaged taking immediate retaliatory action against the "Orange" by conducting a nuclear offensive with all available forces and weapons for the purpose of gaining nuclear and air superiority, and to deprive the "Orange" of the opportunity of conducting offensive operations on the land, sea, and air. As a result of this, the "Blue" expected to seize the strategic initiative

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-9-

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and go over to a general counteroffensive with ground forces in the Central European, and the principal axes of the Southern European Theaters of Military Operations.

Without dwelling on the course of the first stage of the "FALLEX 60" maneuvers, we shall try to draw several conclusions.

Above all, these maneuvers demonstrate that, in order to solve the strategic problems in the initial period of war, the NATO Command intends to conduct a global nuclear attack with maximum use of all available forces and weapons for the mass delivery of nuclear weapons in the shortest possible time against targets and objectives in the theaters of military operations, as well as against all vitally important centers in the countries of the Socialist Camp, above all the Soviet Union.

The goal of the nuclear offensive is to destroy the strategic nuclear/missile means and to inflict major casualties on the enemy's armed forces in the theaters of military operations, as well as to disorganize control; to disrupt the mobilization and deployment of the armed forces; and to undermine the military and economic potential and morale of Socialist Camp nations, and in this way create a sharp turning point in the strategic situation in favor of the U.S.-British bloc.

To carry out these tasks, it is intended to use the maximum possible number of forces and means capable of utilizing nuclear weapons. Among such forces and means the Americans give primary consideration to strategic, tactical and carrier aircraft, long-range and medium-range missiles, tactical cruise-missiles, missile-carrying submarines and surface ships, and missile units of the ground troops.

An analysis of the exercises and particularly the "FALLEX 60" maneuvers permit one to conclude

-10-

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that a total nuclear attack presupposes coordinated, independent strategic air operations (strategic aviation and missiles) against the deep interior of Socialist Camp countries.

Thus, simultaneously with and against the operational-strategic background of the "FALLEX 60" maneuvers, the U.S. Air Force Command carried out an exercise designated "SEPTEMBER-1" during 20-23 September over U.S. continental territory. The participating Strategic Air Command staffs and units worked out problems of conducting an independent air operation during the initial period of war, i.e., the participation of strategic means in a total nuclear attack, executed jointly with the combined Armed Forces of NATO.

The general concept and course in the first stage of the "FALLEX 60" maneuvers show that the main consideration of the initial strategic operation of combined NATO Armed Forces is a nuclear attack in the European Theater of War as the most important aspect in a global nuclear attack. It was carried out in a centralized manner under the direction of the Supreme High Commanders of the combined Armed Forces of NATO in Europe (the "FLASH BACK-1" Exercise) and on the Atlantic (the "SWORD THRUST-1" Exercise) with use made of all available forces and means.

The goal of the nuclear attack carried out within the European Theater of War was to quickly gain nuclear superiority and supremacy in the air and to seize the strategic initiative from the very beginning of military operations. The achievement of this goal presupposed the simultaneous solution of a number of the most important tasks which in the aggregate constitute the content of a nuclear attack.

The first and principal task confronting the Armed Forces of NATO was to destroy nuclear/missile means and the forward air groupings of the Warsaw Pact countries, and to disrupt the control over missile

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units and aviation. In the fulfillment of this task, nuclear blows were "delivered" against missiles in firing positions and in missile-assembly areas, against nuclear weapon bases and depots, against air bases and airfields with the simultaneous destruction of aircraft based on them, against command posts and communication centers for missile units, against large units and formations of the air forces, and against radiotechnical means of detection and of guiding missiles and aviation to their targets.

The goal of the second task was to interdict the regrouping of troops, especially their transfer from the depths of the operational and strategic reserves, and to inflict heavy casualties on the reserves. At the same time, it was proposed to disrupt the transport of all types of supply into the zone of combat operations. This task was to be fulfilled by setting up barriers in the enemy's rear at great depth. The principal obstacles to be used were so-called barriers which could be set up at the most important natural lines of operational significance. In the Central European Theater of Military Operations, these lines were considered to be at the Oder, Neisse, Elbe and Saale Rivers and at the mountains of the Thuringian Forest, the Bohemian Forest and of Sumava. In the Southern European Theater of Military Operations, obstruction barriers were set up on the Danube and Maritsa Rivers and on the Ljubljana axis. This barrier is created by using nuclear means to destroy railroad and highway bridges, defiles and major junctions, and naval bases and ports in coastal areas.

And, finally, the third task which was carried out during the course of the nuclear attack was to use nuclear weapons to rout the main troop groupings of the enemy's first strategic echelon and to ensure successful combat operations by NATO ground troops. In carrying out this task, NATO troops were to carry out mass nuclear strikes against enemy troops in concentration areas, in their staging areas, and against the combat formations of large units and units

-12-

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leading the attack.

The nuclear attack was to begin after the Supreme High Commander gave the signal permitting the use of nuclear weapons. With the receipt of this signal, all units and large units which were to take part in the nuclear attack automatically and without further orders proceeded to deliver nuclear strikes against previously designated objectives.

Nuclear strikes were delivered against the most important stationary objectives without preliminary reconnaissance, but mobile targets and certain less important stationary targets were first subjected, as a rule, to preliminary reconnaissance with consideration being given to other tasks arising as a result of combat actions.

According to the concept of the maneuvers, the nuclear attack in the European Theater was carried out to a depth of 1,000 kilometers and more, and lasted about 7 days. However, in actuality, during the course of the maneuvers operations were worked out for the units, large units and formations in the nuclear attack only in the first 72 hours of military operations.

What means were called on to fulfil the tasks of a nuclear attack?

To carry out this task in the European Theater, the following means were used: about 200 U.S. and British strategic bombers, based in Europe and North Africa; 620 tactical and 200 carrier aircraft; 60 "Thor" ballistic missile installations in Great Britain, and 30 in West Germany; over 55 battalions of nuclear artillery, guided missiles and free rockets.

Thus, such forces and means as were actually available in the European Theaters of Military Operations at that time were used in the nuclear attack.

-13-

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The air forces were the basic means of carrying out the nuclear attack in these maneuvers. They were first called on to destroy the enemy's nuclear/missile means and aviation, to set up barriers and disrupt his communications thereby, and to rout his operational and strategic reserves. An important task of the air forces was to conduct aerial reconnaissance to ensure a successful nuclear assault. Only limited forces of tactical aviation were called upon for the direct support of ground troops.

The following number of combat operations for tactical aviation was planned for the first days of the war: first 24 hours, three sorties per plane; second 24 hours, 1.8 sorties per plane; third 24 hours, 1.2 sorties per plane.

Judging by the activity of the air forces in the course of the maneuvers, the allocation of tactical aircraft efforts for carrying out the basic tasks of a nuclear attack in the first days of combat operations might be about as follows:

-- 65 to 70 percent for the destruction of enemy nuclear/missile means and aviation, as well as for the neutralization of his missile control posts;

-- about 20 percent for the disruption of enemy communications and for combat against his operational and strategic reserves;

-- 10 to 15 percent for direct air support to ground troops.

However, as the tasks connected with the nuclear attack were fulfilled, the number of tactical aircraft used in support of ground troops increased. Thus, during the period of nuclear assault of the "FLASH BACK-1" Exercise the 5th and 7th U.S. Army Corps made 110 requests for air support which were, in the main, satisfied; and while carrying out the offensive

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operation from the 13th to the 15th days of the war ("FLASH BACK-2") more than 260 requests were made and satisfied, or more than 2.3 times more than during the first days of the war.

The nature of operations of the NATO naval forces was quite varied. NATO naval strike fleets in the Atlantic and Southern European Theaters of Military Operations participated in the overall nuclear attack by carrying out tasks relating to the destruction of the enemy navy's nuclear/missile forces and means, primarily his submarine forces in bases and at sea, as well as other objectives.

The "FALLEX 60" maneuvers showed that NATO strike fleets continue to play a prominent part in modern strategic operations in the initial period of a war. This is evident just from the following data. Of the total number of simulated nuclear strikes delivered in the course of the nuclear attack, some 400 (about 25 percent) were delivered by carrier-based aviation of the NATO strike fleets in the Atlantic and the Southern European Theaters of Military Operations.

The part played by the NATO strike fleet in the Southern European Theater was also proportionately great. Of the total number of nuclear strikes delivered during the first 72 hours of war in this Theater of Military Operations, more than half (54 percent) were delivered by carrier-based aviation.

The task given the combined ground troops of NATO during the first stage of maneuvers was to repel or delay the enemy's advance at lines as near as possible to the national boundaries of the Warsaw Pact countries, thus assuring the successful execution of the nuclear attack. If the situation took an unfavorable turn, they were to go over to holding actions. In either of these two situations, the basic goal of ground forces operations was to inflict

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heavy losses on the enemy's advancing troops through the mass use of nuclear weapons and to create conditions for a subsequent transition to a counterattack along the most important strategic and operational axes.

The groupings of NATO ground troops adopted at the maneuvers basically corresponded to the groupings which exist in peacetime. Thus, in the Central European Theater at the beginning of the war, there were 25 divisions (two of which were simulated (ekvivalentnyy)), of which 21 were deployed in the first echelon and four were in the reserves of operational formations. The operational density of troops was 28 kilometers to a division. On some of the axes, for example, in the zone of the Central Group of Armies, the density was 35 kilometers to a division. Such a density, in our opinion, is inadequate for the successful execution of defensive operations, especially in view of the fact that the ratio of ground troops adopted for the maneuvers was about 1.8 to 1 in favor of the Warsaw Pact armed forces. This deficiency of ground troops was compensated for by the mass use of nuclear weapons which, according to the evaluation of the NATO Command, assured the successful fulfillment of assigned tasks.

In contrast to previous maneuvers, in the first 48 hours of war, combat operations in the Central European Theater were conducted mainly in a cover zone 25 to 80 kilometers deep. It was considered that only toward the end of the third day of the operation would the "Orange" troops succeed in achieving a few tactical successes and drive a wedge into NATO defenses to a depth of 15-25 kilometers.

It will be not without interest to examine briefly the nature and content of other exercises carried out during the first stage of the "FALLEX 60" maneuvers.

A two-sided exercise designated "HOLD FAST", in which West German, Danish, British and Canadian large

-16-

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units and units totaling over 45,000 men participated, was held in Schleswig-Holstein and Southern Jutland, or at the junction of the Northern European and Central European Theaters of Military Operations.

The problems of organizing and conducting a defense on a broad front with limited forces of West German and Danish ground troops supported by air and naval forces were worked out during this exercise.

This exercise was characterized by the formation for the first time of an "Allied Corps" composed of West German and Danish divisions and various units of reinforcement. The NATO Command gave it the task of defending Schleswig-Holstein and Southern Jutland, with the main line of defense along the Kiel Canal. Also noteworthy was the utilization on a broad scale of tactical airborne troops in diversionary and reconnaissance groups charged with carrying out various tasks in support of the advancing troops, destroying important objectives, conducting reconnaissance in the enemy's rear area.

The exercise "BONE DRY", which closely resembled the exercise "HOLD FAST" in concept and in the nature of the tasks carried out, was conducted in the Danish Straits. The West German and Danish naval forces participating in it worked out the problems of setting up a blockade in the Danish Straits in order to deny entry into the Atlantic to the navies of the Warsaw Pact countries and to conduct a defense against landings in the channel zone in coordination with ground and air forces.

The NATO Command, judging by the experience from the exercise, consider it unlikely that any significant forces of the Baltic Fleet will be able to break out into the Atlantic without having first captured the key areas in the channel zone. Along with this, the NATO Command believes that the retention of the Danish Straits by NATO Armed Forces

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will be of great importance for operations in the Atlantic.

The exercises "TIGER GRIS-1" and "FIRST WATCH", which were similar in the nature of their tasks and in the composition of their forces, were conducted in the southern part of the North Sea and English Channel, including the western approaches to this zone. These exercises checked the readiness of the combined NATO fleets and of certain national staffs and agencies in organizing the defense of the sea lanes during the first days of the war. The main concerns here were the problems of evacuating ports and dispersing vessels and merchant ships immediately before and in the initial days of war.

The naval forces exercise, under the designation "BLUE SHIELD", conducted in the vicinity of Iceland and the Faroe and Shetland Islands, was important in the "FALLEX 60" maneuvers. The combined operations of ships and aviation on the antisubmarine line of Iceland and the Faroe and Shetland Islands were worked out during this exercise for the purpose of preventing enemy submarines from breaking out of the Norwegian Sea into the Atlantic Ocean, i.e., onto NATO's sea communications lines.

Activity on the antisubmarine line during the exercise was mainly carried out by U.S. and British submarines, and by antisubmarine aviation operating from the airfields in Iceland and Scotland. The average depth of this line was 350 to 400 nautical miles.

The exercise "PROTECTION-1", held in the Mediterranean Theater of Military Operations, was participated in by all the armed forces staffs in this theater and by the numerous agencies of Italy, Greece, Turkey and France concerned with maritime transport problems, as well as by up to 320 ships and vessels and about 100 aircraft.

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This exercise checked and worked out operations of staffs, naval forces and agencies of NATO countries on the evacuation and dispersal of ships and vessels out of bases and major ports; on the defense of maritime communications and control over shipping lanes during the initial days of war; and on the organization of antisubmarine defense of the NATO strike fleet (which participated in the nuclear attack) in the Southern European Theater of Military Operations. During the course of the exercise, considerable attention was paid to working out measures for removing the effects of enemy nuclear strikes.

The exercise "BALLAST-1" was basically concerned with providing antisubmarine defense for convoys and individual vessels proceeding along the coast of the Iberian Peninsula, as well as combatting enemy submarines along the western approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar.

Thus, the first stage of the "FALLEX 60" maneuvers represented, so to speak, the first stage of an initial strategic operation, conducted jointly by all the branches of armed forces, and in essence encompassed the armed struggle in the European Theater of War.

No further military operations were worked out during the "FALLEX 60" maneuvers. However, the initial operational-strategic situation which had taken shape on D10 in the European Theater of War and which actually summarized the initial strategic operation of the combined NATO Armed Forces was drawn up for the second stage of the maneuvers.

This initial situation was based on the assumption that on the seventh day of the war the Armed Forces of NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries had completed their nuclear attack, including strategic nuclear operations, in accordance with plans which had been worked out in peacetime.

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According to the evaluation of the NATO Command, the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries suffered heavier losses from nuclear strikes than the Armed Forces of NATO. This gave the latter a certain advantage in the organization and conduct of subsequent operations on the ground, sea, and air.

It was considered that on D11, as a result of the successfully executed nuclear attack, the combined Armed Forces of NATO had achieved a slight nuclear superiority and air supremacy, had arrested the advance of the enemy's ground troops in the Central European and Southern European (except for the north-eastern part of Italy) Theaters of Military Operations, and had considerably curtailed his ability to bring up reserves and supplies from his depth to the zone of military operations.

By this time, also according to the evaluation of the leadership of the maneuvers, the air forces of the Warsaw Pact and NATO countries had lost five-sixths of their original strength.

The advance of the Warsaw Pact troops along the basic axes of the Central European and Southern European Theaters of Military Operations and in Schleswig-Holstein had been arrested or significantly slowed down. In the Central European Theater of Military Operations, the advance of these troops had been stopped 130 to 160 kms east of the Rhine along the Ruhr axis, 40 to 80 kms east of the Rhine along the Frankfurt axis, and 130 to 160 kms east of the Rhine along the southern part of the Theater. In the Southern European Theater of Military Operations, the First Greek Army had halted the advance of the enemy along the line of the Struma River (60 km north-east of Salonika), while the First Turkish Army had halted the enemy's advance 100 kms west of the Bosphorus and 30 to 40 kms north of Gallipoli. Only in the northeastern areas of Italy had the enemy continued his advance, causing NATO troops to conduct a delaying action.

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Thus, in spite of the loss of several forward areas in the Central European and Southern European Theaters of Military Operations, NATO troops continued to hold lines which were important in an operational and strategic sense.

As a result of the mass utilization of nuclear weapons, losses of the combined NATO ground troops in the Central European Theater of Military Operations were 40 to 45 percent of their original strength. However, after the reinforcement of units with personnel and arms, at the beginning of D1D, the actual strength of the large units of the Central Group of Armies was brought up to 65 percent, and of the Northern Group of Armies up to 70 percent of T/O strength.

The NATO Command assumes that the combat effectiveness of the large units of ground forces will drop an average of 45 to 50 percent as a result of the first operation of the initial period of war, lasting about 10 days.

Along with this, significant losses were inflicted on materiel-technical supply facilities of the armed forces in the theaters of military operations, and serious destruction was caused to a large number of objectives in the NATO troop and operational rear.

The degree of destruction to rear area objectives and of losses to the materiel-technical means of the NATO ground troops in the Central European Theater of Military Operations by D11, can be judged by the following figures: 35 to 40 percent of the depots and various repair facilities of the NATO countries were destroyed in the zone of military operations and 25 to 30 percent along the lines of communications. The enormous destruction of NATO POL depots in this area of military operations resulted in a 50 to 60 percent drop in the supply of POL, and even more in a number of cases.

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NATO communications were significantly disrupted as a result of enemy nuclear strikes. Thus, of the 17 railroad and 26 highway bridges and over 60 ferry crossings over the Rhine River available before the beginning of military operations in the Central European Theater of Military Operations, only one railroad bridge, one highway bridge and 11 ferry crossings remained by D11. As a result of this, the railroad and highway network in the theater was divided into two parts: east of the Rhine River, where NATO ground troops were conducting combat operations; and west of the Rhine, where the larger part of materiel-technical means, hospitals and other objectives were located.

The traffic capacity of frontal railroads and highways along the line of the Seine River, and the cities of Dijon and Pontarlier, which divides the entire Central European Theater of Military Operations, was reduced by 40 percent. As a result of nuclear strikes by the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact countries, the main ports of the NATO countries were destroyed. Thus, of the 20 ports within the Central European Theater of Military Operations, one suffered 20 percent damage, 3 suffered 40 percent damage, 5 suffered 50 percent damage, 3 suffered 60 to 75 percent damage and 8 suffered 80 to 100 percent damage. This compelled the NATO Command and the national agencies to use medium and small-sized ports and unequipped beaches for unloading and servicing ships, which led to a sharp drop in the freight turnover.

The first stage of the "FALLEX 60" maneuvers shows that the NATO Command pays serious attention to problems of organizing and conducting the first operations in the initial period of war, and is striving to automate the work of staffs and troops in carrying out operational-strategic plans, especially in carrying out a nuclear attack.

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