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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

2792

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "The Fundamentals of a Defensive Operation of a Group of Armies and the Utilization in It of Nuclear Weapons in the Initial Period of a War" (According to the views of the U. S. command), by Colonel P. Ogorodov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article from the SECRET Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of division commander.

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*Richard Helms*

Richard Helms  
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure

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11 September 1962

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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (SECRET): "The Fundamentals of a Defensive Operation of a Group of Armies and the Utilization in It of Nuclear Weapons in the Initial Period of a War" (According to the views of the U.S. command) by Colonel P. Ogorodov

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article entitled "The Fundamentals of a Defensive Operation of a Group of Armies and the Utilization in It of Nuclear Weapons in the Initial Period of a War", (According to the views of the U.S. command), which was written by Colonel P. Ogorodov

This article appeared in Issue 5 (60) of 1961 of a special edition of the Soviet journal Military Thought which is classified SECRET by the Soviets and is published irregularly. Issue 5 (60) was sent to press on 25 August 1961. [redacted] contained the Table of Contents for this issue.

[redacted] Comment: Military Thought is published by the USSR Minister of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthly since 1937, while the other two versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960. By the end of 1961, 61 issues of the SECRET version had been published, 6 of them during 1961.

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IN FOREIGN ARMIES

The Fundamentals of a Defensive Operation of a Group of  
Armies and the Utilization in It of Nuclear Weapons in the  
Initial Period of a War (According to the views of the U.S.  
command)

by

Colonel P. Ogorodov

In the U.S. Army, defense is regarded as a type of armed combat, the basic goal of which is the creation of favorable conditions for going over to the offensive. Defensive operations can be conducted while the war is in progress, as well as at the beginning of it. The destruction or weakening of the enemy's advancing groupings is considered the principal task of defense. In circumstances where weapons of mass destruction are utilized, the goal and tasks of the defense will be achieved with fewer forces and in shorter periods of time, according to American views.

In the initial period of a war, especially during the first operations, the Americans assume that troops can switch to the defensive as a result of an unsuccessful nuclear attack, when the enemy commands a significant superiority in forces and weapons, occupies a more favorable operational-strategic position, has a higher degree of preparedness for offensive operations, or when the enemy, using nuclear weapons, is able to inflict forestalling blows on troops which are preparing for an offensive and force them to go over to the defensive.

During the course of a war or of subsequent operations in its initial period, troops can organize a defense when an offensive has been arrested as a result of some unfavorable circumstances or when the goal of the offensive has been achieved, as well as in a case where it becomes necessary to cut back on forces and weapons

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on a given axis in favor of another, more important axis of a theater of military operations (TVD).

In the opinion of the U.S. command, in modern warfare, defensive operations will assume their most vigorous and intensive character--especially in its initial period--when military operations develop under conditions of sharp changes in the situation, in the absence of a solid front and with frequent transition from defensive to other types of armed combat action and back again. The basis of defense is wide maneuvers of forces and weapons, massive use of nuclear weapons and delivery of counterblows for the purpose of routing the enemy's advancing groupings.

American military specialists categorize defense into strategic and tactical, depending on its scale.

Strategic defense is defense on a grand scale. It is organized by formations ranging from a group of armies and up, with the goal of retaining vitally important areas of a country or theater of military operations. This type of defense, in their opinion, will occur most frequently during the initial period of a war, when it is necessary to gain time, to liquidate the enemy's superiority in ground troops, and to create the conditions necessary for transition to the counter-offensive. Withdrawal of troops is allowed for in the course of strategic defense if the situation requires it. Troop withdrawal to a depth of 100-150 kilometers was executed during exercises and maneuvers of U.S. and NATO troops carried out in the last two or three years.

It is considered that in the more important theaters of military operations, such as the Central European, a group of armies can act as a component of the ground troops of that theater and go over to the defensive in conjunction with all the forces of the theater. This will take place most often when the enemy's superior forces forestall military actions on the ground.

A group of armies can conduct defensive operations independently in the secondary theaters of military operation or along individual strategic axes.

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The purpose of a defensive operation in the initial period of war is "the gaining of time in order to mobilize fully and deploy one's forces for the offensive"<sup>1</sup>, the support of the conduct of a so-called "counter-atomic offensive", the inflicting of maximum possible losses on the enemy or the routing of his main grouping, and creating the conditions for going over to a counteroffensive or general offensive. Similar goals were set by the U.S. and NATO commands for maneuvers when defensive operations were conducted, as a rule, against the background of the initial period of a war.

Among such exercises and maneuvers are notably "Black Lion" (1957), "Maximum Tension" (1959), "War Game-60" (1960), "FALLEX-60" (1960), and others. A complex situation was usually created for the maneuvers in which the enemy's superior forces forestalled the NATO troops from deploying and commencing active operations. The concept of the maneuvers envisaged the liquidation of the advancing enemy's superiority in ground troops during the course of a defensive engagement by the utilization on a large scale of weapons of mass destruction and the resulting creation of favorable conditions for going over to a counteroffensive.

Ground troops, in cooperation with the air forces, were given the following basic tasks:

--inflict major losses on the enemy's ground troops by mass utilization of nuclear weapons, change the balance of forces to one's own advantage and force the enemy to give up his offensive, or temporarily arrest it;

--gain air superiority and seize the "nuclear initiative", and thus create freedom of action for one's own troops;

--paralyze the enemy's communication lines, prohibit the transfer of reserves from the deep rear and destroy reserves of material, especially reserves of nuclear warheads, in the enemy's operational rear;

--hold a line, provided for in the plan of the operation, which is favorable for going over to a counteroffensive, by delaying operations

1. Field Service Regulations of the U.S. Army, Large Units FM 100-15

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for the purpose of wearing down the enemy, inflicting heavy losses on him and gaining the time necessary to concentrate and deploy in the zone a group of armies of the reserves from the depth.

The west bank of the Rhine was considered such a line until 1956. At the present time, the forward defensive line (the terminal line for holding actions) is being moved closer to the eastern boundary of the Federal German Republic, 100 kilometers and more from the boundary separating the Federal German Republic from the countries of the Socialist Camp.

During the "FALLEX-60" maneuvers [3 or 4 words missing] to support the execution of a nuclear offensive by firm defense of lines as close as possible to the boundaries of the Warsaw Pact countries. In an unfavorable situation, it is anticipated that they will conduct delaying operations designed to inflict major losses on the enemy, arrest his advance and create conditions permitting a transition to the counter-offensive by one's own forces.

It should be emphasized that the term "counteroffensive" is widely used by the U.S. command in its military-political sense to disguise aggressive intentions. Preparing for a sudden attack on the countries of the Socialist Camp by transition to strategic offensive in the air, on land, and at sea, the U.S. command alleges that it is preparing for a counteroffensive. For this purpose, many NATO troop exercises started with a simulated withdrawal to a specified position, from which subsequent transition to the counteroffensive was envisaged. But the exercises actually were concerned with working out problems of going over to a strategic offensive in the initial period of a war from the terminal position of the holding actions, to which the NATO troops allegedly withdrew as a result of a sudden transition to the offensive by the enemy's superior forces. Thus, the counteroffensive was only a conventional phase of the offensive operations, which was worked out in the exercises. The main problem was actually the transition to a strategic offensive under more favorable territorial and military-political conditions.

In going over to the defense in the initial period of a war, a U.S. group of armies can have a varying combat complement, depending, obviously, upon the importance of its axis, the goals and tasks of the

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defense, the forces and nature of enemy operations and the availability of U.S. forces and weapons in the theater of military operations at the beginning of military operations.

From the actual availability of U.S. and NATO forces and weapons in Europe, it can be assumed that a group of armies in a defensive posture will include two or three field armies and a certain quantity of means of reinforcement. Thus, the NATO central group of armies (TsGA) is composed of the 7th American<sup>1</sup> and 2nd French Armies, the 2nd and 3rd West German Army Corps (14 divisions in all), 4 tank groups, 5 separate regiments, 2 groups of "Redstone" guided missiles, 6 battalions of "Corporal" guided missiles, 5 battalions of "Honest John" free rockets, and 15 battalions of 203.2mm howitzers and 280mm guns.

The composition of a group of armies is somewhat larger, according to the experience of the last NATO troop exercises. Thus, during the "War Game-60" exercise, the Central Group of Armies (TsGA) contained the 7th Field Army (PA) and 1st Army (French) totaling 15 divisions, including 10 infantry divisions (motorized infantry divisions), 4 armored divisions (tank divisions), and one airborne division. In addition, it also included 2 armored cavalry regiments, 4 tank groups, 6 groups of "Redstone" guided missiles, 10 battalions of "Corporal" guided missiles, 9 battalions of "Lacrosse" guided missiles, 26 battalions of "Honest John" free rockets, and 4 battalions of "Little John" free rockets, as well as other reinforcement means.

Thus, it is foreseen that in the initial period of a war there will be available a group of armies composed of a coalition composition, including two or three field armies (up to 15 divisions) and the required quantity of reinforcements from the High Command Reserves (RGK), including up to 230 guided missiles and free rocket launchers and up to 530 pieces of nuclear tube artillery, a total of about 800 units, capable of firing nuclear munitions. Of these, only 42 launchers have a range of 125-130 kilometers, while the rest have a maximum range of up to 30 kms. Consequently, mainly aircraft will be used as the means to deliver nuclear munitions to targets for destruction of objectives at great depth.

A group of armies cooperates with a tactical air army. The combat composition of a tactical air army in a defensive posture can include 5 or 6 wings of the F-100 and F-105 tactical fighters (360-432 aircraft), 2 or 3 wings of F-102 and F-106 all-weather fighters (150-225 aircraft),

1. At the present time, the 7th U.S. Field Army has been renamed the 7th NATO Field Army, composed of the 5th and 7th Army Corps (U.S.) and 2nd and 3rd Army Corps (West German)

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3 wings of F-101 and B-66 reconnaissance planes (215 aircraft), one wing of "matador" or "Mace" cruise missiles, composed of 2 or 3 groups (240-360 cruise missiles). Tactical fighters and cruise missiles can be used as the means to deliver nuclear munitions to the target in support of the troops of a group of armies. In addition, strategic bombers and intermediate-range missiles can be brought in.

It is anticipated that 180-200 or more nuclear weapons of varying yields will be issued to a group of armies for the conduct of defensive actions. In arriving at the numbers of these weapons, the U.S. command is guided by its evaluation of the role and place of the formation in the operational organization of the troops in the theater of military operations, and the importance of the individual operational axes and the theater as a whole, as well as the availability of nuclear weapons.

It should be emphasized that the creation of low-yield weapons and the accumulation of significant reserves of them permitted the U.S. command to augment the quantity of nuclear warheads assigned to formations and large units in recent years. Thus, a group of armies was assigned 250 nuclear weapons for the conduct of a defensive operation of the initial period of a war at one of the exercises.

Moreover, it is characteristic that 40-70 percent of them were composed of weapons in the 1 to 10 kiloton class, the main part of which was put at the disposal of commanders of armies, and by the latter at the disposal of commanders of army corps. Consequently, the overwhelming majority of nuclear warheads assigned to the group of armies are of low yield. This is explained by the following.

According to U.S. test result data, it has been established that each thousand tons of TNT equivalent in nuclear weapons of up to 10 kilotons inflicts on the average more destruction by a ratio of 1.3, 1.6, and 2.7 times than nuclear charges with corresponding yields of 20, 40, and 200 kilotons. Thus, from the following table, it is apparent that 22 nuclear weapons of one kiloton each are equivalent in effectiveness to one charge with a yield of 100 kilotons. But it should be emphasized that, in practice, a single nuclear strike is delivered more quickly than twenty-two. Therefore, in firing one kiloton nuclear warheads, it is necessary to have a large quantity of means to deliver the weapons to the target in order to avoid lowering the rate of fire.

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Yield of nuclear weapons KT	1	2	5	10	20	40	100	200
Percentage of effectiveness of action	100*	80	59	47	37	29	22	17

\* The effectiveness of the first kiloton is taken as 100 percent.

In addition, in the majority of instances, tactical targets do not have the form of a perfect circle but are stretched out in one direction or another, while the area of destruction of a nuclear charge has the form of a circle. Therefore the use of nuclear munitions of great yield against tactical targets results in a large part of the energy of the burst being expended pointlessly.

It should be noted that in the transition to defense after conducting holding actions, a U.S. group of armies may be significantly under strength in personnel and combat equipment as a consequence of losses suffered as a result of blows by the enemy.

The fact that a group of armies has coalition composition which includes various national troops with quite different degrees of combat readiness training, and outfitting with weapons and combat equipment, especially missile/nuclear weapons, is its weak aspect. These troops have many peculiarities in the way they are organized, and differences in their operational-tactical views. Moreover, in the armies belonging to NATO, there exist irreconcilable contradictions and traditional enmity, such as, for example, between the French and West German Armies, the Belgian and West German Armies, the U.S. Army and the armies of other NATO countries, etc.

All of this influences negatively the cohesiveness and combat effectiveness of the combined NATO armed forces and can create great

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difficulties for the U.S. command in the preparation and conduct of combat operations.

The combat composition of a group of armies will also basically determine its operational formation. In the initial period of a war, it is anticipated that there will be chiefly a single-echelon operational formation of the group of armies, with the allocation of an army corps to its reserve. This was reflected in the exercises carried out in recent years. Relatively strong reserves for a group of armies were created only toward the end of the defensive engagement, i.e., at the point of the transition to the counteroffensive; the reserves were composed of new large units.

The single-echelon operational formation of a group of armies is explained by the lack of forces and weapons in the initial period of a war and by the belief that the task of routing the enemy's advancing groupings and creating the conditions for the transition to the counteroffensive must be carried out mainly by the massed utilization of nuclear weapons and the conduct of vigorous offensive-defensive operations by the first echelon troops.

The defensive formation of a group of armies in the initial period of a war, especially during its first operations, will obviously differ in many ways from its formation during the progress of the war, and may be characterized by the following features.

In the first place, the forces and weapons of a group of armies will take up a defense in broader areas. According to the experience of exercises and maneuvers, a group of armies can defend an area with a width of 400-450 kilometers and more. During the exercise "Maximum Tension", the Central Group of Armies had a zone with a width of 400-450 kilometers, during "War Game-60" (1960) 430-450 kilometers, and in exercise "Side Step" (1959) as much as 475 kilometers.

In the second place, the terrain, as a rule, will have no engineer preparation for the conduct of the defense, or the preparation will be insignificant. Preparation of the terrain may be limited to the laying of a minefield, including nuclear land-mines, above all in the zone being covered and on the forward defensive line (terminal line of delaying operations).

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In the third place, the forms of defense and the elements of their makeup, especially in the first phase of the defensive operations, will not be sharply expressed.

The basic form of defense in the initial period of a war, according to the views of the U.S. command, will be so-called "offensive-defensive operations", during which the first echelon (in the zone of cover) will use the minimal quantity of forces necessary to delay the enemy's advance, force him to operate in less favorable areas, and block and arrest his further progress. The main forces are intended for routing the enemy by offensive actions at the most favorable time and place. It is considered that such a defense is the most vigorous and effective.

In the fourth place, the transition of the troops to a defensive posture will, as a rule, be necessitated by the results of the retaliatory or forestalling blows inflicted by the enemy, and consequently the defense will be organized hastily, under the pressure of the advancing troops of the enemy.

And finally, in the makeup of the defense and engineer preparation of the terrain in the zone of operations of a group of armies, great attention will obviously be paid to the creation of strong points and centers of resistance capable of all-around defense, which should be created in the first instance on the more important axes.

During the exercise "War Game-60", carried out against the background of the initial period of a war, the Central Group of Armies' defense was constructed as follows. A forward defensive line was created, 50-130 kilometers from the West German-Czechoslovakian border, passing through Bad-Bildungen, Bruekkenau, Hersbruck, Neumarkt, Landshut, and Kufstein. Beyond this line the zone of cover was created along the FRG-Czechoslovak border to a depth of 50-80 kilometers and more with the forward area through Lichtenau, Sontra, Neustadt, Ham, Passau, Salzburg.

For defense of the lines, the troops of a group of armies were distributed as follows:

--three divisions, three armored cavalry regiments and a motorized infantry regiment (about 28 percent of the troops of the Central Group of Armies) functioned in the zone of cover;

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--seven divisions (about 42 percent) were on the forward defense line;

--five divisions (30 percent) were in the reserve of the armies and army group, of which three divisions were in the reserve of the group of armies.

Such a formation of defense should be considered as one of the possible ones.

A defensive operation of a group of armies can be divided into two periods, according to the nature of operations: the preparatory period and the defensive engagement.

The preparation for defense, and, in particular, the conduct of the opening defensive operations, will already be executed in peacetime, especially along those axes of the theater of military operations where a transition to the defensive is anticipated with the outbreak of war.

The basic measures in preparation for defense which are carried out by all command-staff levels and troops in peacetime consist of working out the decision for defense, the creation of the grouping of forces and weapons in the defense, and the planning of the operation, including the utilization of nuclear weapons, while the preparation of counterblows consist of the combat support of the defense (intelligence on the enemy, the organization of antiair defense, antitank defense (PTO), protection from weapons of mass destruction, camouflage), the organization of material-technical and medical support, and the control of troops and communications.

The quantity and completeness of all measures for the organization of defense will depend mainly on the nature and duration of the period of direct preparation for war, or the period of threat.

The command of the U.S. group of armies will try to carry out these measures covertly, under the guise of exercises, miscellaneous refresher training and other innocuous-appearing pretexts, in order to ensure surprise in unleashing the war, and to prepare the troops to repel the enemy's retaliatory blows.

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But under modern conditions of high maneuverability in conducting combat operations, the transition to defense for a group of armies can be executed rapidly, without any sort of more or less lengthy preparatory period. The troops will be obliged to make a rapid transition to the defense, particularly during the initial period of a war, as a result of a sudden forestalling or quick retaliatory blow delivered by the enemy. Under such conditions, the command and troops of a U.S. group of armies can carry out the minimum measures for the organization of defense.

When there is a relatively lengthy period of threat, it is anticipated that all the measures necessary for defense will be carried out. The planning of the defensive operation, which can be carried out during peacetime, is considered one of the basic measures, while the plans can be refined during the period of threat or with the beginning of military operations.

The planning of a defensive engagement is carried out with consideration given to the enemy's assumed tasks and axes of activity. Along with this, much attention is given to fire support for troops in defense.

The plan for fire support includes the plan for nuclear support, the plan for artillery support, air support and other types of fire support. A prominent place is planned for the utilization of nuclear weapons and other means of mass destruction. Surprise and massing against the most important axes, and use against the most important objectives, in cooperation with conventional means of fire, are considered the basic principles in the utilization of nuclear weapons.

It is recommended that nuclear weapons be used in the defensive operation of a group of armies in order to isolate the area of combat operations by placing nuclear obstructive barriers to a depth of 150 kilometers, and for the direct support of troop combat operations.

It is anticipated that nuclear obstructive barriers will be created for the purpose of disrupting or interdicting major transfers of troops by the enemy, to interdict the movement of reserves to the area of combat operations, and the delivery of supplies by the destruction with nuclear strikes of large numbers of railroad and highway bridges, as well as the most important communication junctions in

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the operational depth of the enemy's troop deployment. It is proposed that tactical aircraft and guided missiles will be called upon to create nuclear obstructive barriers.

In the direct support of defending troops, it is planned to utilize nuclear weapons against the main enemy troop groupings, and particularly against units and subunits of nuclear tube artillery, guided missiles and free rockets, and nuclear munitions storage depots, as well as against organs of control and the rear area.

The plan for nuclear support is drafted by the operational and combat preparation department of the staff of a group of armies and is approved by the commander of the group of armies. The plan reflects the nature and item number of the targets, a brief description and their location; the distribution of the nuclear munitions among the large units (formations), targets and tasks; means for delivering the nuclear weapons to the target; time of delivery of the nuclear strikes; type of burst (air, surface, or underground); coordinates of the epicenter of the burst; maximum probable deviation of the burst; probable losses by the enemy from the nuclear weapon; assessment of the terrain and conditions in the area of the burst from the point of view of the possibility of its use by the enemy.

According to the experience gained from exercises and maneuvers, the distribution of nuclear munitions to the formation in planning nuclear support may be about as follows:



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Distribution of nuclear weapons	Yield of nuclear weapons in kilotons									Total of nuclear weapons	Total yield of nuclear weapons in kilotons
	1-3	3-10	12-17	25-30	45-60	70-100	150-200	300-350	3500		
1st Army	40	20	13	10	7	4	3	2	-	99	3150-1000
2nd Army	13	6	6	4	3	3	1	-	-	40	651-916
3rd Army	22	11	3	3	5	3	2	1	-	50	1300-1362
Reserve of the commander of the group of armies	10	5	3	2	1	3	1	-	2	27	8131-8281
<b>Total</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>223</b>	<b>10350-11000</b>

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From the table it is apparent that the overwhelming majority of nuclear munitions received by the group of armies has been distributed to the armies. Only 12-15 percent or more of the nuclear munitions remains in the reserve of the commander of the group of armies.

The field army distributes the greater part of the nuclear weapons it has received to the corps, on the basis of 30-40 percent of the nuclear weapons for corps operating on the enemy's main axis of attack, and 15-20 percent per corps defending secondary axes. About 15-20 percent of the nuclear munitions of varying yield remains in the field army reserve.

All nuclear weapons strikes are divided into planned strikes, which are delivered mainly during the period of the enemy's preparation for the offensive, and requested strikes which are carried out during the course of the defensive engagement.

From the beginning of the war, defensive operational plans drafted in peacetime can be subjected to modifications by augmenting or reducing the troop grouping of the group of armies, by changes in the quantity of nuclear warheads assigned to the defensive operation, refinement of the tasks and objectives for destruction with nuclear and other types of weapons, reinforcement of the system of barriers, primarily by laying nuclear land mines, refinement of the tasks, forces and means for combat supply and operational supply of troops, tasks of the supporting aircraft, plans for material-technical and medical support, etc.

Plans for defensive operations are verified and refined during the course of NATO troop maneuvers and exercises. Thus, the exercise "War Game-60" had as its goal to examine the various ways of the organization and conduct of the opening defensive operations by the troops available to the Central Group of Armies under the conditions of a sudden outbreak of war, as well as the study of the possibility for a transition to a counteroffensive after a successful nuclear offensive and reinforcement of the group of armies with new large units of ground troops. The main goal of the "FALLEX-60" maneuvers was to check the plans for carrying out the nuclear offensive and the first ground operations of the NATO ground troops.

Experience from the exercises and maneuvers showed that the defensive operation of a group of armies in the initial period of a war can commence

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with the conduct of delaying operations as a result of a situation developing unfavorably for NATO troops at the moment they start the war because of timely retaliatory blows by the enemy.

A defensive operation can also commence immediately with defensive operations designed to hold a specific line, where the enemy has superiority in forces and weapons and holds a more favorable position.

It is assumed that the delaying operations will be conducted in a zone of cover to a depth of 50-100 kilometers, up to an earlier prepared line, at which the NATO troops, according to their plan, must go over to a static defense.

It is assumed that in the course of conducting delaying operations and defending the terminal line, the troops of the group of armies will be constantly supported with nuclear weapons, conventional means of fire and aircraft in order to wear down the enemy, inflict losses on him, and create the conditions for the transition to a counteroffensive.

Therefore, in this instance there will obviously be no nuclear, artillery and aircraft counterpreparation to be carried out in a definite period of time to disrupt or weaken the enemy offensive during the opening offensive operation of the initial period of a war, because the Americans assume that the enemy will be subjected to uninterrupted fire effect.

Moreover, the conduct of counterpreparation in the first defensive operation of the initial period of a war will be impossible, in our opinion, for the following reasons as well:

--Because of the suddenness of the war's outbreak and the rapidity of combat operations, especially at first with the defending side, there will obviously be no time or opportunity to prepare and conduct counterpreparation;

--in the first operations of the initial period of a war, the troops on the offensive probably will not be able to create groupings sufficiently dense to serve as favorable targets for destruction by a special system of prepared massed fire such as in counterpreparation; the Americans propose to rout the advancing enemy during this period with brief, rapidly prepared concentrations of fire as he appears and is discovered;

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--the broader defensive areas during the first operations, and the dispersed disposition of the defending troops and, consequently, their firepower, will not permit them to maneuver rapidly along the necessary axis to create the minimum fire density required for counterpreparation.

It is considered that because of the impossibility of conducting counterpreparation, especially nuclear, the effectiveness of nuclear support of the defensive troops must not diminish. Nuclear strikes will be carried out during the entire period of the enemy's preparation and advance and will be the basic means of breaking up or weakening his offensive.

According to the Americans, nuclear strikes against the enemy as he moves up and forms concentrations should be delivered only against advantageous objectives and targets as they appear, and a specific density of fire should be used which will depend on the size of the objective, the yield of the nuclear warhead, type of burst, wind direction, etc.

It is assumed that 3 to 5 nuclear weapons of 20 to 75 kilotons each will normally be expended on one of the enemy's divisions. It is considered that an average of four 20-kiloton weapons will be sufficient to break up an offensive of a division occupying a 90 to 100 square kilometer area of concentration. Such a blow can completely put out of commission more than 30 percent of the personnel and combat equipment, even when more than 50 percent are in shelters.

If the enemy breaches the tactical zone of defense or the forward defensive line occupied by the first echelon of the field armies and drives a wedge into the operational zone of defense (in the defense of the terminal line of delaying operation), a counterblow can be struck by the group of armies.

A counterblow by a group of armies should be delivered to a depth of 100 kms or more. Thus, during the exercises "Blue Lion" (1958), the counterblow of the Central Group of Armies was planned for a depth of up to 130 kms, while the counterblow of the Northern Group of Armies was to a depth of 80 kms. It was envisaged that the counterblow would subsequently be developed into a counteroffensive.

It is assumed that the counterblow will be supported by the actions of nuclear weapons, artillery and aviation, with the utilization of con-

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ventional and chemical projectiles and bombs. Thus, 55 nuclear weapons were used up in two days for the counterblow of the Central Group of Armies at the "Blue Lion" exercise. It is anticipated that nuclear weapon strikes will be delivered principally against the enemy's means for delivery of mass destruction weapons, against his main troop grouping which is breaking through into the defense, and against approaching reserves to a depth of up to 150 kms.

In case the enemy advances rapidly, breaks through the tactical defense zone, and successfully penetrates into the operational depth, a counterblow by the group of armies may not be delivered, according to American views. In such a case, reserves can be used to assume the defense on one of the defensive lines, or else all or part of the troops of the group of armies will be obliged to go over to delaying operations, in order to assume the defensive on a more favorable line in the depths of the defensive disposition.

Thus, a U.S. group of armies is a formation of ground troops in the theater of military operations, charged by the U.S. command with the defense not only of important operational, but also strategic, axes, while on secondary axes the group of armies can conduct defense for the entire theater of military operations.

It is anticipated that wide utilization of all modern means of defense will be used in the defensive operation of a group of armies. Nuclear weapons are considered the basic means for assuring the success of troops on the defensive.

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