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20 SEP 1982

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "The Question of the Organizational Structure of Missile Troops of Operational-Tactical Designation", by Major-General of Artillery M. Glushkov

1. Enclosed is a verbatim translation of an article which appeared in the TOP SECRET Special Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought" ("Voyennaya Mysl") published by the Ministry of Defense, USSR, and distributed down to the level of Army Commander.

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Richard Helms

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Richard Helms
Deputy Director (Plans)

Enclosure




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
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- Original: The Acting Director of Central Intelligence
- cc: The Director of Intelligence and Research,
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COUNTRY : USSR

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (TOP SECRET): "The Question of the Organizational Structure of Missile Troops of Operational-Tactical Designation ", by Major-General of Artillery M. Glushkov

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Following is a verbatim translation of an article titled "The Question of the Organizational Structure of Missile Troops of Operational-Tactical Designation ", by Major-General of Artillery M. Glushkov.

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Headquarters Comment: Military Thought is published by the USSR Ministry of Defense in three versions, classified RESTRICTED, SECRET, and TOP SECRET. The RESTRICTED version has been issued monthly since 1937, while the other two versions are issued irregularly. The TOP SECRET version was initiated in early 1960. By the end of 1961, 61 issues of the SECRET version had been published, 6 of them during 1961.

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The Question of the Organizational Structure
of Missile Troops of Operational-Tactical Designation

by


Major-General of Artillery M. Glushkov

The experience of a number of operational and tactical exercises in recent years has greatly enriched the knowledge of our army's generals and officers in the field of operational and combat utilization of nuclear/missile weapons. At the same time, the exercises have revealed significant shortcomings in the organization and delivery of mass and group nuclear/missile strikes, both in the beginning and in the course of an operation. And such strikes are the very basis for achieving the goals of an operation.

One of the essential reasons for these shortcomings can be found in the imperfect organization of missile troops in the ground forces and the resulting difficulties of control over them by the chief of missile troops and artillery of a front (army).

At first glance it would appear that the currently accepted "harmonious" organization of missile troops in the ground forces, wherein missile units (large units) are included organizationally at all levels from division to front, should assure their most efficient combat utilization. However, in reality this is not quite so.

Under the conditions which have evolved in the organization of missile troops of the ground forces, the apparatus of the chief of missile troops and artillery has been charged not only with the tasks of preparing, planning and directing the operational and combat utilization of missile troops and artillery,


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their combat and missile-technical support, but also of their fire control (nuclear/missile strikes).

In preparing and conducting an operation, the headquarters of the chief of missile troops and artillery of an operational formation (headquarters and service of missile-artillery armament) is so loaded down with the solving of operational problems that it is in no condition to supervise directly the preparation and implementation of nuclear/missile strikes and work on the whole complex of problems of controlling missile troops and artillery to the degree necessary.

As a result of this, the chiefs of missile troops and artillery, during a number of exercises, coped inadequately with the control of missile troops, especially during the course of the operation. But can it generally be otherwise with the existing or-ganization of missile troops? Experience from a number of exercises shows that it cannot.

Apparently we assert in vain that the functions of a chief of missile troops and artillery have become altered to such an extent that he now controls his subordinate units and large units directly. It seems to us that the experience from the exercises objectively refutes this.

One cannot combine in the same control organ (in this instance, the headquarters of missile troops and artillery) the performance of both operational and firing tasks, including the uninterrupted control of missile units during the course of the entire operation. The modest number of personnel which headquarters of missile troops and artillery possess is capable of performing only part of the operational tasks relating to the preparation of documents for planning an operation and for the operational control of missile troops and artillery during the course of an operation, while carrying an abnormally heavy workload. The headquarters


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of missile troops and artillery works under the direction of a combined-arms headquarters and in cooperation with it and with the headquarters of other arms of troops and aviation in support of the operation as a whole. This is the only correct method of work, enriched by the experience of warfare, and especially by the experience of World War II.

In order that headquarters of missile troops and artillery might control the fire of missile troops directly with success, their T/O structure must be drastically revised. But try to bring the number of personnel in the headquarters of missile troops and artillery chiefs to a level where they include the T/O control points, are supplied with the necessary equipment and personnel calculated for a minimum of two positions, and you will become convinced of the inadvisability of this. In such a case, the headquarters of missile troops and artillery of a front would comprise more than 150 men, and would possess a large quantity of special vehicles and other equipment. Encumbered to the limit, it would cease to represent a part of the front (army) field command. Consequently, this way of solving the problem under consideration is not practical.

World War II gives not a few examples of successful organization of centralized control of artillery on a front and army scale. We have in mind the creation of front and army artillery groups. Thus, for example, a front long-range artillery group (FADD) was created by order of the commander of troops of the Voronezh Front in September 1942, which comprised two gun artillery regiments (152-mm guns/howitzers) and one regiment of heavy guns (203-mm). The task of this group consisted of delivering fire strikes on the decision of the front commander for the purpose of destroying enemy artillery, infantry and tanks on the major axes, which made it possible to hold Voronezh. The group played a prominent part in routing the enemy, who was striking toward the east bank of the

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Voronezh River. The group's concentrated fire, ordered by decision of the front commander, made possible the fulfilment of tasks assigned to troops of the 40th and 60th armies.

But there were also great difficulties in creating a front artillery group. First of all, it was necessary to form hastily improvised control of the group, since at that time there still were no artillery large units, while the front artillery commander was unable to direct the fire of a front artillery group because of the necessity to fulfil a number of operational tasks and his direct, daily responsibilities.

A front artillery group, mainly as counterartillery, was also created on the Leningrad Front. The commander of the artillery corps, rather than the commander of front artillery, controlled its fire. This is already a higher level of organizational form for the control of attached artillery. There were similar examples on other fronts as well.


The control of fire of the artillery of an army was effected in a manner analogous to this. During the entire war, artillery was under the immediate subordination of the commander of artillery of the army, but its fire was not controlled by the commander of artillery himself and his staff, but by the commander of the army artillery group; a commander of an artillery large unit was usually appointed to this position.

It is perfectly obvious that such a system of control is the natural one, for a chief of missile troops and artillery of an operational formation cannot be transformed into the person actually controlling fire. Departing from this system of control, which has been tested by the experience of the war, we lose the chief of missile troops and artillery as a chief on an operational scale and in the majority of cases exclude his participation in the solution by the commander of


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troops of the front (army) of very important and constantly arising problems in the preparation of an operation and during the course of it.

In our opinion, the experience of a number of exercises in recent years has persistently revealed the necessity of improving the organizational structure of missile troops.

Instead of front and army missile large units and units, which, by their composition and the feasibility of controlling them, fail to provide the necessary combat efficiency and precision in the delivery of massed nuclear strikes in the most important periods of an operation, we propose having missile corps and missile divisions in the ground forces.

A missile corps must be of such a composition that, when integrated into the composition of a front, it can fully cope with tasks assigned to the missile troops of a front in an operation.

A missile division must have a composition which assures the performance of tasks in the operation of a front which is functioning on a secondary axis, or in an independent army operation (of a separate army).

Where major missile large units are available, the chief of missile troops and artillery of a front will effect fire control of missile troops through the commander of the missile corps (division), while he himself, with his apparatus, can more thoroughly resolve problems in the utilization of missile troops and control of them in an operation, working with his apparatus within the field command structure of the operational formation. A missile corps, in our opinion, can comprise the following:

-- 4 or 5 missile brigades with a range of fire up to 300 kms;


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-- 1 or 2 missile brigades with a range of fire up to 600 kms;

-- 1 or 2 missile brigades with a range of fire up to 1200 kms (all three types of brigade would consist of three battalions)

-- 1 or 2 regiments of cruise (krylataya) missiles (five-battery composition) with a range of fire up to 800 kms;

-- a missile-technical division containing 6 to 8 PRTB [mobile technical-repair bases] and two or three missile depot (parkovyy) battalions;

-- a regiment of pilotless reconnaissance means;

-- a regiment of radiotechnical intelligence;

-- a regiment of radiorelay and radio communications.

We propose such an organization of a missile corps as one of the possible variants. We base this only on the average possible conditions for the conduct of an operation in the West European Theater of Military Operations, and in keeping with this, on the possible tasks of the missile troops of a front.

The necessity for including reconnaissance means in the composition of the proposed missile large units is explained by the following. In order to perform tasks effectively with nuclear/missile weapons, i.e., exploit their possibilities to the utmost, one must know where, when and how best to deliver a strike. This is possible only when reconnaissance means are adequately represented in the composition of the missile corps.

But at the moment, a situation has developed wherein missile troops, which are the basic arm of troops utilizing nuclear weapons, receive only the

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coordinates of a strike and the order to fire (launch) in the vast majority of cases. Even the commander of a missile brigade does not know the target against which he is delivering a strike. This comes about because problems of reconnoitering targets (objectives) have been separated from problems of their destruction. Everyone is conducting intelligence collection in support of missile troops except the missile troops themselves, for they dispose of no intelligence collection means.

Such a situation cannot be considered normal, since the intelligence process must be organically linked with the process of carrying out a strike, and responsibility for the whole process must be placed on one specific person. At the moment, however, the credibility of intelligence data, continuity of intelligence collection, and its timeliness are not the responsibility of the element which carries out the strike. When this is so, that element cannot bear full responsibility for striking the targets.

Has one of the decisive arms of troops ever fought with closed eyes? No. It is all the more inadmissible to do this now.

In a future war, when events will develop with exceptional mobility, the coalescence of technical intelligence facilities with the means of destruction will become vitally necessary. That is why intelligence means of all types must be represented as fully as possible in the composition of a missile corps.

Sometimes it is considered that pilotless means of reconnaissance can be under immediate subordination of a chief of missile troops and artillery of a front, but the question of how and by whom these means will be supported technically remains open for the time being. This can be resolved with comparative ease within the framework of the proposed organizational


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structure of missile troops, to the extent that this question is most closely related to missile-technical supply.

The combat composition of the corps requires no special commentary: brigades with a range of fire up to 300kms will be utilized as a means of reinforcing armies, while brigades with great ranges of fire will be used on the basis of the front commander's decisions.

The necessity of having missile large units with a range of fire up to 1200 kms in the composition of the ground forces should be emphasized. This is occasioned by the fact that part of the important objectives marked for destruction in support of a front operation are located beyond the boundaries of its depth. Moreover, it should be kept in mind that conditions for the subsequent offensive operation should be prepared during the course of an operation. The presence of missile large units with a range of fire up to 1200 kms within the composition of troops of a front will greatly expand the possibility of maneuvering missile/nuclear fire, not only in the zone of operations of their own front, but also in the zone of adjacent units, as mutual fire support.

The regiments of cruise (krylataya) missiles which are proposed for the composition of a missile corps will carry out tasks of front significance, destroying objectives which are suitable for this type of missile.

It is especially necessary to consider missile-technical support, because this question cannot be considered apart from the fulfilment of combat tasks assigned to missile troops.

Taking into consideration the experience of a number of exercises with the practical assembly and delivery of missiles to launching positions inclusively,


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and also on the basis of technical requirements and the capabilities of modern missile-technical units and large units, we come to the conclusion that it is practical that a missile corps contain a missile-technical division with the required number of PRTB's and missile depot battalions.

In our opinion, the proposed organization of missile troops will lead to the correct resolution of all problems connected with comprehensive support of missile troops in an operation, and facilitate overall solution of the problems of reconnoitering objectives (targets). It will increase responsibility for timely readiness and the effectiveness of missile/nuclear strikes, free operational staffs and organs of supply from performing inappropriate functions; and simplify the organizational structure of field commands of operational formations (front, army).

We have no doubt that such an organization of missile troops will afford a significant economy of state funds. It will require a smaller number of units being activated, since it will permit the performance of tasks on various axes by maneuvering missile large units. The existing organization of missile troops leads to the unjustified holding of missile large units in passive sectors of military operations or in the composition of formations in reserve, in the process of being activated, etc.

We are not touching on the question of the organizational structure of tactical missiles at all, as it has been solved successfully, in our opinion. Only the organization of missile-technical support of tactical missiles gives rise to doubts. It can also be improved by creating an army PRTB of the appropriate composition.


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