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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

28 May 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Review of the Results of Political Training in the Ground Forces

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. This article extols the role and responsibility of political directorates and departments of the Soviet armed forces, citing by name those officers who have done most to increase the ideological steadfastness of personnel and to strengthen discipline, one-man command and the combat readiness of the troops. There is also criticism of efforts in the political sphere and the successful experience of certain units in raising the vigilance and combat readiness of their troops is offered as a challenge to units in which political shortcomings still exist. This article appeared in Issue No. 1 (89) for 1970.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies.

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William E. Nelson
Deputy Director for Operations


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
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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

DATE OF
INFO. Early 1970

DATE 28 May 1974

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Combat Readiness--The Main Thing in Party-Political Work (On the basis of the work of the political organs in the Ground Forces)

SOURCE Documentary
Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 1 (89) for 1970 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The authors of this article are Colonel P. Chegodar and Colonel F. Yakovlev. This article extols the role and responsibility of political directorates and departments of the Soviet armed forces, citing by name those officers who have done most to increase the ideological steadfastness of personnel and to strengthen discipline, one-man command and the combat readiness of the troops. There is also criticism of efforts in the political sphere and the successful experience of certain units in raising the vigilance and combat readiness of their troops is offered as a challenge to units in which political shortcomings still exist.

End of Summary

Comment:

Col. Chegodar, a former air defense missile unit commander, wrote an article on training in Voyenny Vestnik, January 1968. Col. Yakovlev wrote an article about the work of a political section for Kommunist Vooruzhennykh Sil, No. 6, 1972. The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.

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Combat Readiness--The Main Thing in Party-Political Work
(On the basis of the work of the political organs in the
Ground Forces)

by
Colonel P. Chegodar and Colonel F. Yakovlev
Inspectors of the Political Directorate of the Ground Forces

Thanks to the care of the Communist Party, the Soviet Government and our entire people, the armed forces of the USSR are equipped with everything necessary for the conduct of modern warfare. For example, the combat capabilities of the Ground Forces have increased greatly. Operational-tactical rocket large units and units have become their main force. The general types of weapons of the Ground Forces have been improved also; they now possess the best tanks in the world, new automatic infantry weapons, powerful artillery, completely modern motor vehicles and armored personnel carriers, highly efficient engineer vehicles, and other equipment. Considerable changes have taken place in the organizational structure. The Ground Forces are now capable of conducting aggressive, highly mobile combat actions at high rates of speed to a great operational depth.

However, the strength of the army and navy does not consist of combat equipment alone. The main foundation of combat might consists of men educated and hardened by the Party, utterly devoted to the motherland and the Communist cause, ideologically steadfast, and thoroughly trained militarily. Working with the men is made the responsibility of commanders, political organs and Party organizations of the army.

The very existence of the armed forces is unthinkable without active, vigorous Party-political work; this fact has been repeatedly taken notice of by the Party and by its organizer and leader, V. I. Lenin. Way back in 1919, in the letter "Party Work in the Red Army", the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolshevik) explained "...in order that the Red Army be truly socialistic it is necessary that it should be not only of class composition, but also that its personnel should clearly and correctly realize their class interests. And for this, Party work is needed in its midst".* During the period of the Civil War, Lenin had been emphasizing the fact that "where political work is conducted among the troops with the most care...there there is no slackness in the army, there its order and its spirit are better, there there are more victories" (The Complete Collection of Works, Volume 39, page 56).

* The CPSU and the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, the State Publishing House, 1969, page 106.

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The importance of Party-political work is increasing especially now, in connection with the aggravation of the international situation, the complexity of the struggle on the ideological front, the development of military affairs, and the growth of the general educational, technical, and cultural level of the soldiers. The Central Committee of the CPSU in its decree of 21 January 1967 indicated that its overall improvement represents the most important condition for the accomplishment of the problems that are faced by the Soviet Armed Forces.

All this increases the role and the responsibility of political directorates and departments as the leadership organs of the CPSU in the army and navy in the field of Party-political work, which always were and remain the true champions of Party policy. V. I. Lenin believed that the political organs have the mission of increasing the combat effectiveness of the troops, and firmly and steadfastly carrying out the directives and the policy of the Party among the masses, through their organizational work. Now, as never before, they must be influential, must work in close unity with commanders and chiefs of all grades. Their duty is to increase in any conceivable way the ideological steadfastness of the personnel, and to strengthen discipline, one-man command, and the combat readiness of the troops.

The political organs are constantly concerning themselves with the problems of vigilance and combat readiness. It is here where mindfulness of Party principles, implacability toward shortcomings and derelictions, and a feeling of responsibility towards the State, have the most importance. This is understandable because combat readiness means the capability of troops to immediately start decisive actions for the purpose of destroying the enemy in any situation, regardless of how complex and dangerous it may be. Combat readiness means the training of men, trouble-free combat equipment, firm discipline, precise organization of service, an excellent ability to fully mobilize units, the skill of command personnel in troop control, etc. The degree of combat readiness is now measured not by the number of days, and in a number of cases not even by hours, but by numbered minutes.

Commanders, political organs and the Party organizations of the Ground Forces, using various forms and methods of Party-political work, are, by their joint harmonious efforts persistently solving the problems of further raising the vigilance and combat and mobilizational readiness of large units and units. At present, this diversified work is being conducted within the framework of the appropriate celebration of the 100th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birthday. The Communists and Komsomol members are influencing their colleagues mainly by personal example. In many units and large units, the majority of members and candidate-members of the

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Party, who are serving directly in subunits, have been given excellent or good ratings.

In a recent inspection, the Communists of a large unit commanded by General-Mayor A. Kumilov and in which Lieutenant Colonel I. Vasilyev is Chief of the Political Department, demonstrated high achievements in weapon firing training. The large unit completed the past training year with high marks and is one of the best.

Men of many large units have achieved good marks in training, in mastering equipment and weapons. The field training of the troops and their teamwork in all types of combat activities have improved. The number of outstanding units and subunits has increased and so has the number of outstanding soldiers and rated specialists. Fruitful work is being carried out in training second driver-mechanics for tanks, armored personnel carriers, and motor vehicles.

Improved training has been displayed by many ground forces large units in the operational-strategic exercises VESENNIY GROM, SHUMAVA, NEMAN, VOSTOK, ZAPAD, and others. Together with the units of the fraternal armies, by their decisive actions they thwarted the insidious plans of the enemies in Czechoslovakia and demonstrated high morale-political qualities, ideological conviction, and adherence to the principles of internationalism. Infinite devotion to the Party and motherland, heroism and bravery have been displayed by soldiers in combat operations while repulsing the armed raids of the Chinese invaders on the Soviet-Chinese border.

In 1969 alone, about 5,000 soldiers, non-commissioned officers and officers of the Ground Forces were awarded orders and medals of the Soviet Union for excellent fulfilment of assignments issued by the command, for high marks in combat and political training, and for mastering new weapons and equipment.

In all this, the services of the political organs, the commanders, and the Party and Komsomol organizations were considerable. They are persistently striving, with harmonious efforts, to fulfil the requirements of the XXIIIrd Party Congress, the decree of the Central Committee of the CPSU of 21 January 1967, the directive of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the Chief Political Directorate, No. D-058, and orders for increasing the vigilance, and combat and mobilizational readiness of the troops, and for improvement of the field training of personnel.

Much can be learned from the activity of the Political Directorate and the political organs of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Here it has become the practice to conduct exercises each month on working out

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functional duties in bringing the troops to various degrees of combat readiness. Military-scientific conferences are held periodically. For example, interesting conferences were conducted with the theme: "Ways and methods of reducing the time periods for bringing units and subunits to combat readiness". At these conferences, officers share their experience in striving to reduce the time needed for the transition of troops to increased and full readiness and in searching for new possibilities to accomplish this, make critical comments, and submit proposals for making improvements. This contributes to raising the combat readiness of the troops.

For example, in order to reduce the time for bringing to full combat readiness a rocket brigade which is commanded by Colonel L. Razryvin and whose Chief of the Political Department is Lieutenant Colonel A. Strukov, non-organic crews from the ranks of servicemen having related specialties were trained in the erection and fueling of the missiles. This made it possible to prepare the initial nuclear strike within a reduced period of time in carrying out exercises with an antiaircraft missile battalion.

Great initiative in reducing the time periods for achieving combat readiness has been shown by the Political Department of the antiaircraft missile brigade in which the chief of the department is Lieutenant Colonel G. Zayka. He and the commander of the brigade have supported and introduced the method of assembling missiles in the technical battery right on the 9T25 transport vehicles, which was developed by Communists V. Popov, N. Artamonov, V. Khromov and V. Pisarev. In this manner, the combat work was reduced by 40 to 50 percent. On the initiative of the Communists, the method of cross-connecting the cable harness of the automatic fire control system was used, which made it possible to reduce the time for setting up the system by 7 minutes, and the time for tearing it down, by 17 minutes.

The political organs of the Ground Forces, together with the commanders, are persistently searching for possibilities for reducing the time for bringing large units and units to combat readiness. The problems of this matter are thoroughly examined and decided upon at the assemblies and seminars of commanders and political personnel, and are discussed at military-scientific conferences.

The experiment of the Political Department headed by Colonel A. Chvarkov (Carpathian Military District) deserves approval. Here the Communists acted as initiators of the improvement of the warning system during an alert, which was not effective enough: three men had to spend a minimum of 5 to 7 minutes in transmitting the signal. A meeting of the Party militants was held in the division. The comrades made constructive proposals which were then consolidated and put into practice. After this,

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a methodological conference was held for commanders, their deputies, chiefs of staffs, secretaries of Party committee and members of Party bureaus, at which an automated system was demonstrated. The new warning procedure provides a more effective control of units during alert and assembly in an alert, during departure from points of permanent deployment, and during movement into concentration areas. As a result, on the division-regiment level the warning takes up to one to two minutes, and in garrisons this time is reduced by 12 to 20 percent. Similar work has also been carried out in other large units of this district.

Of decisive significance in reducing the time for bringing large units and units to full combat readiness is a precise procedure for storing material means in depots and for their loading and removal during an alert. In a large unit where Colonel I. Bogatskiy is the Chief of the Political Department, useful experience is available. Much has been done in accumulating this experience by rationalizers and inventors whose undertakings were supported in every way by the staff and the Political Department. One day the officers of the Political Department familiarized themselves in the artillery unit with the rationalizers' proposals for improving the storage procedure and the mechanization of loading of clothing and equipment, and they talked about this at a meeting of the Party militants of the large unit. Later, the information was presented at a conference of unit commanders and secretaries of Party organizations by the deputy commander for rear services of the artillery regiment. The large unit commander ordered that the proposals of the artillerymen be introduced into all units.

The experience of the artillerymen was improved upon, container devices and racks for loading and reloading ammunition, clothing and equipment, and rations were developed. The command of the Carpathian Military District supported this innovation, and now it has been widely introduced in the troops. The results may be judged by the following indicators: the saving in motor transport has increased 1.5 to 2.5 times, the standard load capacity of the GAZ-51 vehicle has increased by 50 to 70 percent, and the loading time for one vehicle has been reduced sixfold. Now all the supplies are loaded within one hour, and the numerical strength of the loading crews has been sharply reduced; basically, the work is fulfilled by the non-commissioned officers in charge of the depot and the transport vehicle drivers.

For reduced-strength units, the task of removing equipment from the park in an alert is very complicated. By agreement with the command of the abovementioned large unit, the Political Department brought this problem up for discussion by the Party organizations. The Communists worked out a special technological network chart for the removal of two tanks from

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storage by a single mechanic-driver. The time for bringing two combat vehicles to full combat readiness was reduced by 20 to 25 minutes. Other proposals of the rationalizers have also been introduced: the cooling liquid is now stored in special containers in the tanks; an attachment for filling the oil tanks of a tank and a device for charging batteries with low current right inside the vehicles have been developed; a system of diverting exhaust gases from parks has been prepared for use, etc. The rationalizers have developed improved methods of preserving different types of arms and combat equipment by using inhibiting paper and wax paper, silica gel, various fabric solvents, and special films.

Unfortunately, in a number of other large units and units finding themselves in similar conditions and having the same or often even better capabilities, work on reduction of the combat readiness time is carried out without the needed intensity. Some political departments and Party organizations do not get deeply enough into the substance of the matter and are poorly utilizing the creative initiative of Communist and non-Party soldiers. Often the problems of combat readiness are still considered on "an overall level"; little attention is given to the mechanization of loading and unloading of equipment, ammunition, military stores, fuel and lubricants, etc., which has a negative effect on the state of combat readiness of large units.

Not all commanders, political organs and Party organizations draw the correct conclusions from the stepped-up requirements of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Minister of Defense concerning combat readiness. Some of them have not deeply studied the processes taking place in the life and activity of the units and subunits, and have not noticed the serious shortcomings in matters of combat readiness and training of personnel. Often Party-political work is organized without considering the applicable orders of the Minister of Defense, the directive of the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, and the instructions of the Political Directorate of the Ground Forces stemming from combat operations on Damanskiy Island.

Clearly, such things cannot be tolerated in the future. Political organs and Party organizations, together with the commanders, are called upon to be concerned constantly with problems of reducing the time of bringing large units and units to combat status, and to search for rational ways and methods to achieve this. Work with inventors and rationalizers should be improved; their creative thought should be directed toward increasing the combat readiness of the troops.

Political work during the period of the alert and the carrying out of the march to the concentration areas should be organized more purposefully

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and substantively. Experience shows that subunits often act in an unorganized way, without the necessary support measures. It is very important to establish the place and the tasks of political workers, and the role of Party and Komsomol militants, in organizing individual work with servicemen, especially with young soldiers, drivers, and soldiers with other specialties, during the taking of arms out of reserve storage and putting them in combat condition, and during the carrying out of the march.

Of great importance in ensuring the security of the country is combat tour of duty--an effective method of maintaining the combat readiness of the army and navy. Duty units and subunits are those troops which must at any minute repulse an aggressor's attack and bring down on him the entire might of their strike. This is precisely the reason why the problems of the combat tour of duty occupy a special place in the Party-political work both in the Ground Forces and in other branches of the armed forces.

Vigilant performance of the tour of duty depends to a great extent on the level of training of the officers of directorates and staffs at all levels, and of departments and services. Let me tell you about one of the anti-aircraft missile units (Commander Yu. Seleznev, Chief of the Political Department I. Petushkov). On the initiative of the Political Department, there are periodically organized here seminars, at which the experience of combat work is discussed, its positive aspects, shortcomings and derelictions are analyzed, and ways of eliminating them are pointed out. Also used are theoretical conferences on the problems of the actions of the troops. Discussed regularly at Party meetings and at the seminars of political workers and secretaries of Party organizations, are the tasks of Communists while performing combat service, and their work in educating personnel of the duty subunits.

Officers of the political department participate in assigning Communists and Komsomol members to duty shifts, make recommendations to Party bureaus, to the secretaries of them, and to Party and Komsomol organizers of the duty shifts, talk to the men about the military-political situation and about the shortcomings that occurred during the preceding tours of duty. This kind of concrete work helps to increase vigilance and strengthen responsibility.

Combat service in many units and subunits of the Ground Forces is organized in conformance with the requirements of the regulations and instructions.

However, unfortunately, Party-political work in duty units also has some substantial shortcomings. In organizing it, the specific features stemming from the deployment of the troops and the possible theaters of

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military operations, etc., are not always taken into consideration. There are also some units where the procedure laid down by regulations is not adhered to and political-educational work has been weakened, as a result of which incidents and gross violations of discipline and the rules for carrying out a tour of duty are frequent; instances occur of unauthorized abandonment of a post, drunkenness, and coloring the true state of affairs. Political organs tolerate flagrant outrages in order "not to wash dirty linen in public", are not fighting against indulgences, and tolerate unscrupulousness in evaluating incidents and liberalism toward those who commit misdemeanors and even crimes.

The task of the political organs is to categorically improve Party-political work during the period of performance of combat service, to mobilize the personnel for irreproachable performance of their functional duties during combat work, to search for possibilities of more effective use of arms, to improve control, to assure the vanguard role of Communists and Komsomol members in a combat tour of duty.

Nowadays the problems of military-technical training are approached in a different way, on a scientific basis, for without a firm knowledge of equipment, without practical skills in its use, there can be no thought of a high level of combat readiness. Success depends to a considerable degree on the level of operational-tactical and military-technical training of officers and generals, and on the improvement of the military knowledge of personnel. In one of the training large units (Commander General-Mayor G. Turshatov, Chief of the Political Department Colonel G. Komlev), wide use has been made of technical circles for the mastery of related specialties and for the study of physics, mathematics, and electronics. Technical conferences and meetings of rationalizers are also conducted, exhibits of the achievements of innovators are arranged, and technical councils are functioning. Officers who need it in connection with their service have a rated specialty. For the third year in a row, already the large unit has been turning out highly qualified junior commanders. The large unit has been awarded the Memorial Banner of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

This is not the only example of its kind, but there are also many dark aspects in this matter. As inspections and exercises show, not all political organs manifest interest in improving the operational-tactical knowledge of officers; some overlook the study of classified literature, multi-theme training sessions and periodic technical servicing. This explains the fact that military servicemen do not possess the necessary training and this has a negative effect on the quality of their service.

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Improvement of the military-technical training of the soldiers is one of the vital tasks of Party-political work among the troops. For this purpose, it is important to systematically organize lectures, reports, technical conferences, question-and-answer evenings, circles for the mastery of related specialties, and other measures.

The most important place in the general system of combat training belongs to the field training of the troops and tactical exercises. In them the commanders and staffs master advanced methods of troop control and improve their methodological skill, while the political organs master their forms of work under conditions close to those of combat.

This is how the Party-political work is organized in the tank large unit where the commander is General-Mayor P. Kirpichenko and the chief of the Political Department is Colonel A. Pustovalov. The Political Department plans its work in accordance with the stages of a tactical exercise, taking into account the special features and importance of the tasks being carried out by the units, the nature of the terrain, the climatic conditions, and the level of training of the various categories of personnel. We will give an example.

During the preparatory period, meetings of the Party and Komsomol militants were held in the large unit, and the same problem was discussed in the primary Party and Komsomol organizations. Special attention was concentrated on increasing the organizer's role, personal example, and the responsibility of each Communist and Komsomol member, which found its reflection in the plans of Party work. The tasks of the personnel were discussed in general meetings and separately in the meetings of officers and non-commissioned officers.

The Political Department conducted seminars, interviews, and individual briefings, and assigned tasks to political personnel, with consideration of the theme and special features of the exercises. Materials of classified collections were studied at seminars.

Officers of the Political Department helped the commanders, political workers, and the Party committees of the regiments in the planning work, in placing and instructing the militants, and in carrying out substantive measures. Meetings were held between the soldiers and veterans of the Great Fatherland War and Heroes of the Soviet Union. A military-theoretical conference was conducted with the commanders of the units and the officers of the staff of the large unit on the subject: "Moving forward a tank division over a long distance by the combined method, organizing a march and an attack from the march, the march and the meeting engagement; and going over to the defense". Officers familiarized

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themselves with the materials of exercise DNEPR, the subsequent large exercises, and the experience of combat operations in Vietnam.

Differentiated work was organized with various categories of specialists: driver-mechanics and chauffeurs. Soldiers who were to participate in the airborne assault met with those who had carried out such a task in the past and familiarized themselves with their experience. Not forgotten were traffic controllers, radiomen, intelligence personnel, chemical warfare personnel, and other specialists.

During the course of exercises the officers of the Political Department and political workers were present in the units and subunits. During the period of preparation and conduct of field firing by artillery and rocket units, special attention was paid to accurate preparation of initial data. After receiving the task to cross river lines, the political workers, together with the commanders, explained the situation and the duties of the crews to the tank men, and organized an inspection of the readiness of the men and equipment. Various forms of encouragement of those who distinguished themselves were widely used.

The carrying out of all these measures contributed to the fact that the large unit received a good rating.

However, not everywhere is work organized concretely. The most serious shortcoming in the majority of cases, in our view, is the fact that they don't differentiate it by stages (sounding the alert for units in an alert, on the march, in the meeting engagement, during the forced crossing of water obstacles, etc.), are not concerned with improving old forms and methods or seeking new forms and methods of political influence over the men during the most difficult periods of an exercise. All these problems undoubtedly require attention on the part of the political organs.

Indulgence, oversimplification, exhibitionism and showiness still remain the greatest evils, which harm education and training. Sometimes exercises are carried out in an outmoded way, without consideration of the changes which have taken place in military affairs; they are prepared on the basis of outdated plans, choosing the same areas over and over, are weak in instilling standards of staff work, and weaken the exacting attitude towards subordinates. The responsibility for these shortcomings rests not only with the one-man command commanders but also with the officers and generals of the political organs.

Party-political work in exercises is a special kind of activity; it requires a thoughtful approach and creative search, must be carried on constantly, and must inspire men to aggressive and skilful actions.

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The high combat readiness of a unit, a large unit, and a formation is made up of the skills, abilities and mastery of each soldier, sailor, non-commissioned officer, officer, and general. In other words, it depends on individual and collective efforts and actions. The combat qualities of a serviceman are formed in the process of training. There are no other ways of solving this problem. Because of this, the primary attention must still be paid to fulfilling the combat and political training plans at all levels among the troops and to carrying out each training period on a high level. However, it is precisely these seemingly copybook truths which, for some reason, are lost sight of by political organs. Checking and summary inspections testify to this. In a number of units and large units, political workers and Party and Komsomol organizations half-heartedly look into such important types of combat training as tactical, firing, and special training, close their eyes to the facts of unscrupulousness and irresponsibility on the part of some officers in carrying out their duties, and do not come up with a Party-minded appraisal of the fact that competition on tasks and norms remains on paper, that to the present day formalism and exhibitionism in place of painstaking everyday work still persist.

From all that has been said, it is necessary to draw practical conclusions: to devote great attention to the individual training of soldiers, and to the coordination and combat teamwork of small subunits; to cultivate in the soldiers skill in using foxholes, firing positions, trenches, and communication trenches; to appreciate the role of camouflaging combat dispositions, and increase its importance in artillery, intelligence engineer-combat engineer and communications subunits; and to scrupulously work out the task of artillery support of the operations of infantry and tanks. All measures must be taken to improve the operational-tactical training of command personnel, and first of all, of the young officers, to develop in them high qualities of command, initiative and creative thinking, resourcefulness and decisiveness, the ability to boldly make independent decisions and carry them out, and correctly use combat equipment and weapons, especially tanks, armored personnel carriers and infantry combat vehicles. All these are urgent problems requiring appropriate interpretation and concrete expression in the activities of political organs and Party organizations.

The high combat readiness of units depends to a considerable degree on the style of work and on the organization of staffs and command posts. Recently, the political organs have begun to pay more attention to those echelons, specifically, to the problems of improving the command training of officers and raising their ideological-political level, scrupulousness and efficiency, participation in military-technical propaganda, and creative attitude towards political work with the personnel. It is

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significant that where the political organs do not lose sight of the activity of the staff and directorate Party organizations and are leading them knowledgeably, there the combat readiness is higher.

Unfortunately, some political organs are still leading with the "by and large" approach, relying on the substantial service, life experience and the high position of officers and generals. However, he who gets a lot has a lot demanded of him. The interests of the service are above everything else. Educators must also be educated--this is a Party principle which is one of the basic principles in the organizing and political activities of political organs in their leadership of staff Party organizations.

As is known, permanent combat readiness depends directly on the ideological conviction of the men, and their combat and morale-political qualities. Of great importance is the orientation of Party-political work, the ability to organize and carry it out. The political organs are constantly concerning themselves with improving the forms and methods for increasing the effectiveness of political and military education.

As an example, let us take the guards large unit where the commander is General-Mayor V. Korchits and the chief of the Political Department is Colonel A. Bridnya (Kiev Military District). For an entire ten days officers of the Political Department studied the status of Party-political work in the 304th Guards Tank Regiment for raising vigilance and combat readiness in light of the requirements of Directive No. D-058. It became clear that ideological work with the men was organized inadequately here, and that many servicemen had a poor knowledge of the requirements of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Minister of Defense on maintaining constant combat readiness of the troops. Some of the men had only a superficial conception of the successes of the USSR in building Communism and of the activities of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in carrying out Lenin's nationalities policy. There were serious shortcomings in the system of Marxist-Leninist training of officers and the political training periods with soldiers and non-commissioned officers.

Officers of the Political Department, not limiting themselves to exposing the shortcomings, helped to eliminate them. At a meeting of the Party committee, organized and conducted with the participation of the inspectors, the work of the Communists of this unit in educating the soldiers and strengthening combat readiness was reviewed. General meetings were held in all subunits with an agenda devoted to: "Problems of personnel in increasing vigilance and combat readiness".

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A few months later, the Political Department checked to see how its recommendations were being implemented. In the large unit, a seminar of the commanders of battalions, companies and batteries on the topic of forms and methods of political-educational work was held, and a conference of political workers and the secretaries of the Party bureaus of the units was held. A report was heard from the Deputy Commander for Political Affairs of the tank regiment on the work of Party and Komsomol organizations in further increasing the combat readiness of personnel.

The preparation for Lenin's 100th anniversary celebration is having a positive impact on the education of servicemen. The desire of personnel to learn about Lenin's heritage has risen. The Political Department and Party organizations are organizing theoretical conferences and interviews on topics concerning Lenin. Conducted regularly in this unit are readings of Lenin's works, to which are invited veterans of the revolution, old Bolsheviks, representatives of local Party organs and scholars. The readings are led by the most experienced propagandists. As the result of the measures taken, many of the shortcomings have been eliminated, the personnel are successfully fulfilling training tasks, and the regiment has become one of the best.

There are many such examples in this military district. The Political Directorate organizes instructional-propagandist groups which conduct propaganda work and instruct the Party and Komsomol militants. Enlisted in this work are the services of instructors of higher military educational institutions. Special lecture groups of scholars have gone out several times among the troops of the district. Other forms of work are also used. Jointly with civilian youth, demonstrations dedicated to historical dates are arranged, and walking tours of sites of combat and partisan glory are conducted. The groups of officers of the Political Directorate and staff of the district going out among the troops are headed by the Chief of the Political Directorate or his deputies.

Systematically conducted morale-political and psychological training of personnel for modern warfare is one of the most important elements in ensuring combat readiness. In the Kiev Military District this work has been noticeably improved. Let us take, for example, the formation in which the Member of the Military Council and Chief of the Political Department is General-Major N. Barkov. Here there was conducted a theoretical conference with the leadership personnel on the topic: "The psychological and pedagogical basis of education and training of soldiers". In the units there took place conferences on the significance of the revolution in military affairs, the role of psychological training of troops, etc. In a number of large units, methodological commissions attached to the political departments have been established; they consolidate the experience of

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psychological training and propaganda work. At a seminar of the chiefs of the political organs of the Political Directorate of the district, a discussion of papers on the problems of modern combat was organized.

Information sessions on materials from classified collections are conducted monthly for officers. In one of the large units, a special training area has been fitted out; in it mockups of American combat equipment have been set up, tactical-technical specifications are given, and the methods of use are explained. The soldiers study combat methods against tanks, missiles, antitank weapons, and other enemy means, and methods of protection from flame-throwing and incendiary means used in South Vietnam.

We have dwelt upon a few of what, in our opinion, are the most typical problems successfully solved among the troops of the Kiev Military District.

Instructive experience in morale-psychological training has also been gained in other military districts, particularly the Moscow Military District, where, in the process of training and education of personnel, consideration is given to the specifics of training soldiers of various specialties. In motorized rifle units special attention is paid to the conduct of offensive operations following a nuclear strike and rapid crossing of contaminated areas; they teach hitting targets under complicated conditions and carrying heavy physical loads. In the 2nd Taman Guards Division, well-equipped training fields have been set up; the personnel undergo "being rolled over by tanks", learn how to combat napalm and conduct fire against low-flying aircraft, train in negotiating minefields, etc. "The conditions created in the classrooms and in training simulators are such," the soldiers say, "that one forgets that he is in a peacetime situation."

In the tank units of the district, there is being developed and put into practice a specific educational system directed towards assuring the necessary qualities among soldiers for overcoming fear during the period of driving combat vehicles underwater and when firing with a standard artillery round. In the rocket units, great attention is being given to reducing the time for preparation of rockets for launching and surpassing the norms. In multi-theme training sessions and during the period of preparation and launching of live rockets, beneficial work is carried out

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in the psychological hardening of men and in developing automatic action in crews carrying out operations on a control panel.


However, as inspections show, not all the political organs and Party organizations have drawn the necessary conclusions from the requirements of the XXIIIrd Party Congress, the plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU, and the instructions of the Central Committee of 21 January 1967 on the need for increasing vigilance and combat readiness and for improving all ideological work. In a number of large units, ideological work still does not respond to the increased problems; elements of formalism have not been eliminated from political and military training, and numerous measures are being carried out on a low ideological level and do not exert the necessary influence on the personnel.

Some political organs have been weak in explaining the decisions of the April and July plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU. In a number of units, the work on exposing bourgeois ideology is carried out without thorough argumentation. In political instruction periods and in propaganda lectures, the matter of educating men in the spirit of proletarian internationalism is omitted. The specific characteristics of troops deployed under varying conditions of a theater of military operations, the intensification of bourgeois propaganda against the USSR and the permeation of all sorts of enemy fabrications are not always being taken into consideration. Instances of complacency, carelessness, and violation of the regulations for handling classified documents are not always eliminated in time by the political organs, and the measures taken by them to close channels through which classified information may be leaking out are not always effective. In some large units of districts adjacent to the border, a number of soldiers and non-commissioned officers poorly understand their specific tasks in increasing vigilance and combat readiness under the conditions of direct contact with imperialist states. There have been cases of individual servicemen listening to anti-Soviet propaganda by using their service radio sets. Some of the soldiers, influenced by such broadcasts, praise the bourgeois way of life and run down Soviet reality.

Work in many large units on educating personnel in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, friendship among the peoples of the USSR, and proletarian internationalism still have not been brought up to the level of the requirements of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Individual propagandists unskilfully explain the successes of the Soviet people in the building of Communism, use the easiest method of a simple comparison of statistics on the development of the economies of the USSR and the United States, without offering any deep political explanation or class analysis and without pointing out the basic differences of the social-economic

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


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systems historically. As a result, men who are poorly trained politically swallow the bait of enemy propaganda and display pacifist attitudes.

The interests of combat readiness require that the political organs and Party organizations improve in every possible way ideological training among the troops, explain to the personnel the internal and external policies of the Party and the Government, the complexity of the international situation, and the tasks of the armed forces, and more fully use all the available opportunities for instilling in the soldiers high ideological-mindedness and implacability towards any manifestation of a hostile ideology.

The interests of the defense of the motherland and the countries of the socialist commonwealth call for exemplary fulfilment of the requirements of the Party and Government, and the orders and directives of the Minister of Defense and the Chief of the Political Directorate, to increase vigilance and combat readiness of troops, in order to exclude any possibility for the enemy to catch us off guard. These tasks must be at the center of attention of the political organs and be the main tasks in Party-political work.



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