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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

17 June 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Urgent Problems
of Local and Civil Defense

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". This article examines the local and civil defense structures of military and civilian installations in the Transcaucasus Military District, and the new requirements brought about by the advent of nuclear weapons. Local defense contingents should be organized for each shift with an independent group for control, and backup staffs set up with adequate radio communications means. The author describes the civil defense training of military units and command personnel, as well as the measures planned for evacuation and dispersal of personnel working at the installations and the construction of shelters. This article appeared in Issue No. 2 (81) for 1967.

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2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

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William W. Wells

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
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Intelligence Information Special Report

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COUNTRY USSR

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DATE 17 June 1976

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Urgent Problems of Local Defense

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (81) for 1967 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". The author of this article is General-Leytenant I. Katyshkin. This article examines the local and civil defense structures of military and civilian installations in the Transcaucasus Military District, and the new requirements brought about by the advent of nuclear weapons. Local defense contingents should be organized for each shift with an independent group for control, and backup staffs set up with adequate radio communications means. The author describes the civil defense training of military units and command personnel, as well as the measures planned for evacuation and dispersal of personnel working at the installations and the construction of shelters.

End of Summary

[REDACTED] Comment:

The author was Chief of Staff of the Transcaucasus Military District from 1965 to 1967. He also contributed to "Combat Against Enemy Radioelectronic Means" in Issue No. 3 (79) for 1966 [REDACTED], which summarizes the electronic warfare experience of that district. The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970. [REDACTED]

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Urgent Problems of Local Defense
by
General-Leytenant I. Katyshkin

Troop combat operations to a large extent depend on the normal functioning of numerous rear installations that are not immediately affiliated with the area adjacent to the front, such as permanent supply and repair bases, military depots, hospital bases, military garrisons, and other facilities. The organization of reliable protection of them under the conditions of a nuclear war is an extremely complex problem that so far has not been adequately explored. The guides, instructions, and different manuals on this subject mainly enumerate protective measures against weapons of mass destruction and almost never contain recommendations on the organization of this work and procedures for carrying it out during wartime.

In the past the protection of all the above installations was the responsibility of the local air defense system, the organizational structure of which was based on requirements of a limited nature since an installation, using its own forces, could to a considerable extent eliminate the aftereffects of an air strike. Now, however, with the employment of nuclear means an enormous territory (a large city with all the military-industrial installations located within its limits) can be turned into a continuous center of destruction. Then, of course, it will be impossible to carry out rescue operations without joint, coordinated efforts of military units and of the local and civil defense contingents of different types operating in the grouping of forces of the given operational axis.

An examination of the structure of the local defense of important installations of the military district from this standpoint leads one to conclude that it requires some reviving and developing.

In our opinion, its main shortcoming is that local defense contingents and their system of control are formed without regard for the shift system either in the production process or in the

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conduct of rescue operations in a contaminated area. As a result, when personnel are dispersed, subunits appear to split into two parts and virtually lose their combat effectiveness. The control of contingents becomes impossible since the combat crews of the control posts can provide immediate guidance from only one post. The situation is aggravated still further by the fact that the numbers of people at some installations do not always permit the establishment of reserve contingents even though many workers and employees are not included in the local defense teams.

We believe that the way out of this situation is to establish more flexible, organizationally complete contingents that conform to the actual conditions of the installation.

As the experience of the work of the Transcaucasus Military District demonstrates, when organizing the civil defense of rear installations, it is essential to enlist in the contingents everyone who is working other than those registered for mobilization, the elderly, and women with young children. The authorization of the contingents should conform to the number of persons enlisted in them. Installations that convert to two-shift work during the "Special Period" should have contingents established for each shift.

In small installations, specialized teams and groups capable of removing obstructions, creating passages for vehicles and persons, evacuating casualties, and carrying out other work may be appointed. The advisability of establishing such teams has been borne out by the experience of the work of a number of installations in the military district.

The proposed procedure for contingents also requires a partial reorganization of the system of control.

It seems advisable to us that each working shift have an independent group for the control of local defense, which should include among its personnel shift supervisors of production, shift chiefs, foremen, brigade leaders, and other senior specialists.

During the working shift, control group personnel can simultaneously attend to their immediate duties of supervising

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production. However, in the dispersal area and when engaged in rescue work, the control group has to carry out its functional duties, like the combat crew of a control post.

The chief of local defense of an installation, his deputy, the chief engineer, and the chief of the staff must direct the local defense of both shifts. The place where they are situated will depend on the specific situation.

This control structure ensures flexible and efficient direction both of the production process and of the conduct of local defense, and has already been adopted by the civil defense organizations of installations located within our military district.

In small garrisons and in installations with limited personnel, and where there is one working shift, backup control organs have proven of value. In the military district, the best-prepared local defense staffs of individual installations that are less likely to suffer strikes are designated the backup local defense staffs of the garrisons.

When we speak of backup staffs, we have in mind not merely their formal designation, but, principally, their systematic training. In the military district garrisons, the backup staffs train by studying combat documents prepared by the local defense staffs of the garrisons and installations that are to have backups; by having backup personnel participate as players in all staff training practices and exercises; and by taking part in training exercises at main and temporary control posts. It must be emphasized that backup control organs are able to carry out their functions successfully only if they are supplied with radio communications means. During garrison exercises, we tested a radio communications scheme that included all control posts, including backup control posts. It was again confirmed that unless the backup posts are included in a unified radio communications net, it is almost impossible to quickly switch control over to them. Therefore each main and backup control post of the installations should have two radio sets operating on the garrison and installation radio nets, respectively. For control based on the two-shift principle, it will be necessary to allocate two more radio sets to each installation so that the local defense chief of the off-duty (non-urban) shift can keep in

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contact with the garrison chief and with the civil defense chief of the appropriate city sector, whose staff will also be located in the non-urban zone.

We base the planning of the action of local and civil defense forces and means on the assumption that it will be possible to essentially complete personnel dispersal before the war begins. In this case, efforts will be directed mainly toward rescuing working shifts sheltered on the grounds of an installation. With a surprise attack the picture changes -- both the working and the off-duty shifts will be exposed to the strike. Even if some forces remain at the installations, it will hardly be possible to count on their aid since they themselves will have to be rescued. Under these conditions, the main burden of rescue operations will fall on the contingents of rural raions and cities not affiliated with civil defense groups. The forces of local military garrisons that are located within the raion or the oblast will also be involved in these tasks.

In the given case, actions involving civil defense organs must be coordinated with exceptional precision. We have presented such a variant of actions in the appropriate plans for the cooperation of civil defense organizations and the garrisons. Specifically, shift civil defense contingents have been designated for each military installation, and departure areas within the appropriate operational axes, as well as contact points, have been assigned them. Military units have been assigned to help local and civil defense organizations to eliminate the aftereffects of an enemy attack.

However, the practical aspect of this effort involves the training of all these forces, and especially of military units, for joint operations to eliminate the aftereffects of an enemy attack.

Of course, this work should not affect the combat readiness of the units or their performance of basic tasks during either peacetime or wartime. Nevertheless, each military unit should be prepared to carry out a certain amount of rescue work to protect the population.

We already have some experience in the training of units and institutions allocated to aid civil and local defense

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organizations. They are trained within the system of regular training, using the combined method and in conformity with a specially developed program. For example, a company will work out its special program during a tactical exercise. Simultaneously, against the same background, operations will be conducted to rescue persons from obstructions, shelters, and burning homes; passages will be made in obstructions; etc. In order that staffs of military units may acquire practical skills, they are periodically required to participate in joint local and civil defense exercises. A specific example of this is provided by the command-staff civil defense exercise of the city of Tbilisi, in which the local defense staff of the garrison, operations groups from a motorized rifle division, from an artillery school, from a military construction detachment, and from a military hospital, participated. The following problems were worked out during the exercise: the organization of the maintenance of civil order, the preparation and use of roads and areas where units are to be accommodated, the support of mobilization measures, and the mutual use of civil defense units and contingents when eliminating the aftereffects of an enemy attack.

We would like to point out, however, that at the present time the training of military units, joint exercises, and other civil defense measures are planned mainly at the initiative of the staffs of the military districts. It appears that the time has come to include in troop combat training programs a minimum number of problems pertaining to the conduct of rescue and urgent emergency restoration operations in the city and the factory (enterprise), particularly since this work differs from similar troop activities in a center of destruction under wartime conditions.

As is known, the problems of evacuation and dispersal occupy an important place in the protection of installations. How did we solve them under the conditions in the military district?

First, with the participation of city civil defense staffs, installations were assigned dispersal areas. Here the following details are typical. Installations were assigned dispersal sites within the limits of the operational axes of the appropriate city areas to be cleared, where the civil defense contingents assigned to give aid to these installations were to be concentrated. This

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made it possible to better organize the cooperation of civil and local defense formations when they were moving out to the center of destruction and during their subsequent actions. In determining the distance of the dispersal areas from industrial centers, we endeavored to ensure that working shifts could go to and from their place of work with a minimum expenditure of time and to spare them the direct effects of the casualty-producing elements of a nuclear burst; this distance amounted to 35 to 50 kilometers. The prevailing wind direction was also taken into consideration to avoid sending personnel to a site that was certain to suffer radioactive contamination.

After the installations had been assigned dispersal areas, the reconnaissance groups carried out their work. They studied routes, determined the average rates of movement, and identified bypasses for sectors that were difficult to traverse. At the accommodation sites, they explored the possibilities of using public, administrative, and economic structures, power and water sources, and local communications centers to link the installation with the dispersal point.

The problems of dispersing people as the basic method of protecting the population against weapons of mass destruction must not, in our opinion, be considered in isolation from other protective measures, and, in particular, from engineer protection. Only if we have an adequate number of strong shelters can we quickly shelter the working shift and those persons who are not able to get out to a non-urban zone or who are forced by their official duties to stay in the city. It must be taken into consideration that in the event of a surprise attack, shelters will constitute the principal means of protecting the population. Because of this, the search for ways of using underground structures of the municipal services to protect the people has acquired grave importance. Some work has been done to adapt a number of military district facilities for use as shelters: air vents and shafts equipped with iron shutters made from scrap have been built, and wiring for telephone communications, radio broadcasting, and telegraphy has been installed.

Several garrisons have begun to make experimental models of very simple shelters built of reinforced concrete. Having carried out all this work, we nevertheless believe that all

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possible measures must be taken in peacetime to increase the stock of protective structures even if it means only building them for community and production needs and simultaneously designating them as shelters for people.

The level of training of command personnel plays an extremely important role in the basic improvement of local defense measures and the ensuring of the constant combat readiness of its forces and means. Unfortunately it does not yet fully meet modern requirements. Directors of facilities and chiefs of the local defense of installations have not yet acquired sufficient knowledge or ability to solve the problems of organizing and conducting rescue operations creatively, quickly, and with initiative, and are inadequately prepared to direct subordinate staffs, services, and contingents. This is why we believe it necessary that they be trained in local defense courses (at the time of the central "Vystrel" courses) as are the chiefs of the local defense staffs of installations, but with a reduced training period.

Of course, the chiefs of the services also need thorough special training, since they train subordinate personnel.

After studying and testing several variants of command personnel training, we came to the conclusion that in the future the training of this category of personnel should be organized at military district assemblies, using the resources of training centers, advanced training courses for doctors, chemical warfare training centers, and other district facilities and institutions.

The advisability of this academic training method is confirmed by the positive results of courses of instruction for chiefs of communications and warning and of the medical, chemical, engineer, and fire-fighting services. These courses were conducted under the direction of the chiefs of the directorates and departments of the military district.

Here we point out that the training of command personnel cannot, of course, be limited to short-term training in courses and assemblies. They should subsequently deepen and improve their knowledge and skills both independently and in the command training system. The value of individual assignments that are worked out in the district for each quarter and for all

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


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categories of personnel of local defense staffs and services is being increasingly demonstrated.

The successful training of contingents would be furthered by producing as soon as possible a number of valuable training and visual aids on the work of staffs, services and contingents and on the theory and actual conduct of local defense. This task can be accomplished through the joint efforts of the staffs of the military districts and the central directorates of the Ministry of Defense.

The above are some ideas that in our opinion will help to increase even more the readiness of facilities and institutions for protection against weapons of mass destruction.



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