

~~TOP SECRET~~

4988

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

10 May 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : William W. Wells
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): A Troop
Offensive from Permanent Deployment Areas


1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. This article examines methods of preparing and conducting a front operation with troops deploying and going over to the offensive directly from permanent deployment areas, based on the experience of the Southern Group of Forces. Among the topics treated are bringing troops to combat readiness quickly, organizing the participation of rocket troops in the initial nuclear strike, the deployment of front air defense forces and means, and the actions of front aviation. This article appeared in Issue No. 2 (78) for 1966.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

William W. Wells

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~



Distribution:

- The Director of Central Intelligence
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff
- The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
- The Assistant to the Chief of Staff for Intelligence
Department of the Army
- The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence
U. S. Air Force
- Director, National Security Agency
- Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
- Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence
for National Intelligence Officers
- Deputy Director for Intelligence
- Director of Strategic Research

~~TOP SECRET~~



~~TOP SECRET~~



Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 12 Pages

COUNTRY USSR

DATE OF INFO. Mid-1966

DATE 10 May 1977

SUBJECT

MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): A Troop Offensive from Permanent Deployment Areas

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 2 (78) for 1966 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal 'Military Thought'. The authors of this article are General-Mayor F. Marushchak and Colonel K. Arsenyev. This article examines methods of preparing and conducting a front operation with troops deploying and going over to the offensive directly from permanent deployment areas, based on the experience of the Southern Group of Forces. Among the topics treated are bringing troops to combat readiness quickly, organizing the participation of rocket troops in the initial nuclear strike, the deployment of front air defense forces and means, and the actions of front aviation. Also discussed are the planning, control and support of the movement forward and deployment of troops, the conduct of reconnaissance, rear services support, and the special features of combat actions under conditions of the Southwestern Theater of Military Operations.

End of Summary

Comment:

General-Mayor F. K. Marushchak was identified as having once served as Chief of Staff of the Southern Group of Forces. The SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 4 of 12 Pages

A Troop Offensive from Permanent Deployment Areas

by

General-Mayor F. Marushchak

Colonel K. Arsenyev

During 1964-1965, in the Southern Group of Forces, much attention was devoted to studying and mastering the methods of preparing and conducting a front operation with troops deploying and going over to the offensive directly from permanent deployment areas. The experience gained permits us to put forth certain proposals and recommendations on this matter.

In assessing the situation which may have taken shape by the moment of the unleashing of a future war by an aggressor, it may be assumed that, for groups of forces and border military districts, an offensive from permanent deployment areas will be the most characteristic method of actions at the beginning of a war.

The success of such actions of the troops of a front will depend primarily on the time required for bringing them to full combat readiness. It is well known that shortening the time for this requires, first of all, organizing rapid warning of the troops by a combat alert signal. For this purpose, in the troops of the Group there has been introduced a collective-call system for transmitting the warning signals by the radio means on alert, which ensures their rapid and simultaneous transmission down to and including a regiment. For warning by wire communications means, special control panels have been set up in the staffs of the Group, and in the large units and units. In addition, in units and subunits, selective circuit communications and electric bell signalling have been installed. This warning system ensures the transmission of signals from the field headquarters of the Group to subunits within five to six minutes and, with the proper organization of assembly of personnel, allows moving the regiments out of military casernes in the prescribed times.

To further reduce the time needed to bring troops to combat readiness, in our opinion, it is necessary to equip staffs with industrially produced automatic control panels; to arrange technical equipment efficiently in parks, having equipped them with devices for recharging tank batteries with low currents and for wintertime fueling of engines (of motor vehicles, armored personnel carriers, armored reconnaissance patrol vehicles, and

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 5 of 12 Pages

prime movers); to organize the efficient fulfilment of the tasks of removing technical equipment from short-term storage; to prepare routes for moving the subunits out from military casernes, having the necessary alternate exits from parks; and to maximally expand the scale and mechanize the loading of mobile reserves, having provided for their storage directly on motor vehicles, prime movers, and trailers.

Deployment of rocket troops. During an offensive directly from permanent deployment areas, a very complex problem is the organization of the participation of the missile large units and units of the front in the initial nuclear strike. This is explained by the limited time they will have at their disposal and also by the difference in the degree of their readiness in comparison with strategic means.

The experience of exercises shows that moving forward and deploying rocket troops in positions and bringing them to full combat readiness must be carried out earlier than for combined-arms large units, and it must be done at a precise time and under the guise of exercises. For this purpose, their movement routes and siting areas must be secretly prepared already in peacetime. The latter must ensure the launch of missiles to the maximum depth. In individual cases, launching positions may be designated near (within 10 to 15 kilometers of) the permanent deployment areas of the rocket troops so that, having ensured the participation of the missile units in the initial nuclear strike, they can then be relocated forward to deliver strikes during the operation.

Reducing the time for bringing rocket troops to full combat readiness can be achieved by maintaining directly in the units a constant reserve of delivery missiles, and in the mobile missile technical bases -- warheads in readiness to be switched to Special Readiness No. 3 (without carrying out the checking cycle) in the minimum number necessary for the participation of the rocket troops in the initial nuclear strike and for the fulfilment of the immediate task of the front. In addition, the rapid delivery of warheads from the mobile missile technical bases to the missile units and the organization of their mating to the delivery systems in place must be carefully planned.

In order to repulse the raids of enemy aviation and cover our own attack groupings from the air, it is necessary to deploy the forces and means of the air defense of the front on the axes of actions of these groupings simultaneously with the rocket troops. For this, the movement routes and positions of the surface-to-air missile units should also be prepared secretly in peacetime. The radar companies of the radiotechnical

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 6 of 12 Pages

units deployed near the state border prior to the beginning of immediate enemy preparation for unleashing a war must be kept concealed so that, with the beginning of combat actions, they make up a second line of radar observation and detection. It is advisable to set up the first line by using the subunits of separate radiotechnical battalions moving forward from areas of permanent deployment in front of the combined-arms large units.

It is advisable that the preparation of the surface-to-air guided missiles, which are maintained in a state of intermediate readiness, begin at the moment the troops are raised by a combat alert signal, for which it is necessary to deploy the fueling equipment of the technological group of one technical battery immediately in the place of permanent deployment or near it, and to move the technical battalion (minus a battery) forward to the deployment area of the surface-to-air missile regiment in order to guarantee the preparation of missiles at the field missile assembly area. It becomes necessary to distribute reserves of surface-to-air missiles and propellant components beforehand to the probable deployment areas of the troop groupings of the front, utilizing for this the storage facilities of the large units and units located on these axes.

Actions of front aviation. The aviation of the front must be brought to full combat readiness simultaneously with the rocket troops and the air defense means. If there is time, the aircraft must be secretly rebased to field airfields before the beginning of combat actions. Under conditions of acute aggravation of the situation, an initial sortie of aircraft is possible from permanent airfields, with their subsequent landing on dispersal airfields. Therefore, the latter must be maintained in readiness to support the combat operation of the aviation.

As the experience of exercises shows, to support the combat actions of aviation from dispersal airfields, it is necessary to introduce into the T/O of the air army of a front two or three radio aid and illumination battalions and also airfield technical support subunits. Fighter aircraft must be equipped with means that ensure the sure intercept of air targets at low altitudes, in clouds, and at night, and fighter bombers -- with means ensuring their getting to small mobile targets. For control and guidance of fighter aviation it is necessary to deploy, right behind the advancing troops, mobile control posts not attached to airfields.

Some questions of planning, controlling, and supporting the movement forward and deployment of troops. The practice of operational training confirms that during the preparation of the offensive operation being

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 7 of 12 Pages

examined it is necessary to work out a special plan of the movement forward and deployment of the troops. The significance of this plan grows especially when the main forces and means of the front are located and deployed on the territory of an allied country. In this case, it is necessary to coordinate the indicated plan with the general staff of this country. In the plan of the movement forward and deployment, special attention must be given to the efficient organization of the provost and traffic control service.

The assigning (refining) of tasks for the troops during an offensive from permanent deployment areas should be done upon their being alerted by a combat alert signal and no later than their movement out to areas for forming up into the appropriate columns. Under all conditions, the commanders of large units and units must here be given the routes and starting times of movement, the movement phase control lines and deployment lines, and the times of arrival at them; the combat task may be assigned (refined) during the march in order to transmit it to the units and subunits on the approach to the line of deployment.

Of very important significance in providing stable control of troops in the period of their movement forward will be the prior organization of communications on the axes of deployment of the attack groupings, with broad utilization for this purpose of the available state stationary communications centers and lines. There is a pressing demand to reinforce the communications units (subunits) of the front and large units (especially of the rocket troops and artillery) with more powerful anti-jamming means, secure communications equipment for telephone conversations and telegraph transmissions, and coding machines.

Experience in operating the existing secure communications equipment shows that it needs further improvement and simplification in construction. This equipment must provide rapid collective-call transmission of instructions (information) to the troops from a single telegraph device. For controlling supporting aviation, the staffs of combined-arms large units must have the appropriate communications means installed in motor vehicles (armored personnel carriers) with cross-country capability.

The experience accumulated in the troops of the Group shows that, to control allied troops which may enter the composition of the front (army) and to maintain cooperation with them, it is necessary to have in the appropriate staffs operations groups with means of communications. In the future, these staffs must be equipped with standardized means of communications and devices that provide security of conversations and their

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Page 8 of 12 Pages

automatic translation from one language to another.

Of great importance in the period of the movement forward and deployment of troops is reconnaissance. The experience of exercises shows that, to increase its capabilities, it is necessary to set up in staffs of combined-arms large units a unified reconnaissance control center in motor vehicles (on a UAZ-450 chassis) or BTR-50PU armored personnel carriers, where there should be radio means for communications with long-range reconnaissance groups, reconnaissance groups, with the commander of the reconnaissance battalion, the chiefs of intelligence of the regiments, and with reconnaissance aviation, and also a reserve radio set to operate in the net of the commander of the large unit and equipment to interpret aerial photographs; motorized rifle (tank) divisions must have a reconnaissance air squadron of their own which has two flights of aircraft and helicopters, and it is necessary to equip reconnaissance subunits with antitank guided missiles, antitank grenade launchers, and large-caliber machineguns (instead of Goryunov machineguns), and the existing radio direction finders must be replaced with more improved ones.

With the beginning of combat actions, there should be in the front at least one air regiment each of operational and tactical reconnaissance equipped with modern reconnaissance aircraft, a separate spotting-and-reconnaissance air regiment for conducting final reconnaissance of the targets of nuclear strikes, a separate OSNAZ radiotechnical battalion; at the disposal of the chief of intelligence of the front -- aircraft and helicopters for dropping special-purpose reconnaissance groups (detachments) into the enemy rear; and, in the staff of the air army -- a centralized point for the collection and processing of reconnaissance data.

Of the utmost importance for ensuring the deployment of the forces and means of the front are the protection of troops and installations of the rear from weapons of mass destruction and the rapid elimination of the aftereffects of their employment by the enemy.

Based on the experience in the exercises of the work of composite detachments to eliminate the aftereffects of enemy employment of weapons of mass destruction, it is advisable to have in a front two to three special battalions, in a division -- one special battalion, and in a regiment -- a company, having improved their structure and materiel-technical equipping so that they are more mobile and controllable and have greater capabilities.

~~TOP SECRET~~

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 9 of 12 Pages

In addition, at the command post of the front (army) it is necessary to have: a single center to collect the data from radiation and chemical reconnaissance, equipped with radio sets that provide for receiving these data directly from on board the helicopter; a developed system for simulating the various parameters of nuclear bursts, with radiotechnical units and subunits having been trained to plot their coordinates with the use of radars and also to determine the type and yield of bursts; and subunits and units of the provost and traffic control service with communications means and radiation and chemical reconnaissance devices.

During the movement forward and deployment of troops from areas of permanent deployment, an extremely important and complex task will be the dispersal of materiel reserves and deployment of the rear services. The accomplishment of this task will be especially complex when troops of allied countries enter the composition of the front and its rear services are deployed in the territory of these countries.

Based on the experience of exercises, we have come to the conclusion that, in peacetime, in the rear services of a group of forces (border military district) on the axes of deployment of the attack groupings, it is necessary to have the minimum necessary number of rear services units and facilities with reserves of materiel that provide for the fulfilment of at least the immediate task of the front. Carry-over reserves of materiel with the troops must be increased on the basis of satisfying their requirements for the first two or three days of combat actions. The medical-sanitary battalion of the division should be reinforced in order to make sure it can be divided and offer medical assistance in two or three centers of mass destruction simultaneously.

To maintain tanks in constant combat readiness in groups of forces and border military districts, there has to be a mileage reserve on the vehicles of no less than 3,000 kilometers till the next scheduled overhaul, and repair and recovery means must be maintained in an amount that ensures restoration with the beginning of combat actions of no less than 50 percent of the tanks from the possible average daily losses. To ensure simultaneous work on at least two axes, it is necessary to reinforce the separate missile technical base of the division with special vehicles, the combat engineer battalion -- with armored prime movers, and the missile units and subunits -- with repair and recovery means.

The plan of rear services support of the troops of a front deploying on the territory of an allied country, and also the plan of rear services preparation of a theater of military operations must be coordinated with

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 10 of 12 Pages

the appropriate organs of the Ministry of Defense and with other ministries of this country. It is necessary to support allied troops entering the complement of a front by drawing upon the national resources of their own country. In case of the resubordination of large units (units), they are transferred to the complement of the appropriate allied army with their organic rear services and reserves of materiel, drawing rations from this army according to their own norms with subsequent reimbursement.

The special features of the conduct of combat actions in the mountainous conditions of the Southwestern Theater of Military Operations. An assessment of the probable enemy in this theater leads to the conclusion that the grouping of his main forces will be moving forward from the depth. This will limit the possibilities of using the rocket troops of the front in the initial nuclear strike. In addition, it should be taken into consideration that, by the time this strike is to be delivered, part of the rocket troops of the front will still not be ready for launch. Under such conditions, the participation of the front in the initial nuclear strike may be limited to allocating mainly bomber aviation for it. Because of this, an especially important role is assumed by nuclear strikes of strategic means, for which the line of delivery must be brought as close as possible to the advancing troops and ensure reliable destruction of the most important enemy targets in the zone of the front. And, to hit the enemy in the tactical and immediate operational depth, it is necessary to more extensively allocate fighter-bomber aviation and chemical and conventional weapons.

The military actions of the troops in the border zone will be developed on separate, very accessible and advantageous axes. An important role in this must be assigned to the actions of tactical airborne landing forces and flanking detachments, which, in cooperation with the forward detachments, will seize and hold mountain passes, gaps, crossings and other key areas until the main forces arrive, and destroy enemy covering units and centers of resistance or block them.

The development of the offensive operation of the front will depend mainly on the defeat in a meeting engagement of the main enemy grouping moving forward from the depth. To this end, the command and staff of the front organize: deep and aggressive reconnaissance; the delivery against the main enemy grouping of preemptive massed strikes by rocket troops, aviation, and artillery employing nuclear, chemical, and conventional means of destruction; and the swift movement forward and deployment of combined-arms large units on advantageous axes in order to complete the defeat of the advancing grouping of the main enemy forces with decisive

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

Page 11 of 12 Pages

attacks from the flanks and the front.

It should be noted that carrying out maneuvering under the conditions of the Southwestern Theater will be made possible mainly by delivering strikes by rocket troops and aviation, by committing the second echelons (reserves) from the depth, and employing operational airborne landing forces. Maneuvering by combined-arms large units along the front will be possible only with limited forces on accessible axes. The troops must be trained for actions under mountainous conditions and have special equipment and the necessary means of reinforcement that will ensure the fulfillment of the assigned tasks.

Engineer support plays an important role in the offensive of troops on mountainous terrain. According to the experience of exercises, on each axis of actions of the troops it is necessary to establish the appropriate grouping of engineer forces and means. This will require reinforcing the troops by drawing upon the front combat engineer, road, and position preparation brigades. However, resubordinating the battalions of these brigades to commanders of combined-arms large units will lead to a weakening of the control and materiel-technical support of these battalions on the part of the staffs of the brigade. Therefore, in a front operating in mountainous conditions, it is advisable to have, instead of engineer brigades, separate engineer-road regiments made up of one or two combat engineer battalions, two engineer-road battalions, a position preparation company, and a bridge-building company. A regiment of this composition will be able to more successfully fulfil the tasks of engineer support of a grouping of troops operating on a separate axis. And, for building up efforts in a front (army), separate combat engineer, engineer-road, and bridge-building battalions (companies) are necessary.

The practice of combat training confirms that the assault crossing of large water obstacles by troops must be carried out, as a rule, from the march. For this purpose, ferry and amphibious crossings are organized. But, to negotiate wide rivers without reducing the rates of advance of a large unit, it is necessary to reinforce a pontoon bridge regiment with a park containing 2.5 bridge sets and an amphibious crossing battalion. In preparing crossings from these parks, it is advisable to put together ferries with a load capacity of 60 tons, in connection with which the number of powerboats in the pontoon bridge regiment should be increased to 40. In a troop crossing by the amphibious method, the combined use of amphibious crossing means must be organized, which will provide for the assault crossing of the river by subunits to be carried out within short time limits and on a broad front without disrupting their battle

~~TOP SECRET~~


~~TOP SECRET~~



Page 12 of 12 Pages

formations. The engineer reconnaissance subunits must be equipped with armored reconnaissance patrol vehicles and improved means of river bed reconnaissance. The assault crossing of rivers in zones of radioactive contamination of the terrain will require carrying out maneuvering by the crossing means and the relief of their crews in two shifts.

These, then, are a few proposals and recommendations regarding the actions of troops from areas of permanent deployment.



~~TOP SECRET~~

