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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

31 May 78

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John N. McMahon  
Deputy Director for Operations


SUBJECT : MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR): Certain  
Reconnaissance Problems in the Preparation  
of an Initial Front Offensive Operation

1. The enclosed Intelligence Information Special Report is part of a series now in preparation based on the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". Two authors have written separate articles consisting of their comments and criticisms of a previously published article on the same topic. One feels that effective and timely reconnaissance for an initial front offensive operation can be provided by earth-orbiting satellites, specially-equipped high-altitude aircraft, rockets, and balloons, and by employing long-range reconnaissance groups in the enemy rear. The other stresses the employment of agents and long-range reconnaissance groups in the enemy rear, plus more effective use of border guard troops for providing reconnaissance information in the vicinity of state borders. This article appeared in Issue No. 3 (64) for 1962.

2. Because the source of this report is extremely sensitive, this document should be handled on a strict need-to-know basis within recipient agencies. For ease of reference, reports from this publication have been assigned

John N. McMahon

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Distribution:

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
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
U. S. Air Force


Director, National Security Agency

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

Director of the National Foreign Assessment Center

Director of Strategic Research





# Intelligence Information Special Report

Page 3 of 17 Pages

COUNTRY USSR



DATE OF INFO. Mid-1962

DATE 31 May 1978

SUBJECT

**MILITARY THOUGHT (USSR):** Certain Reconnaissance Problems in the Preparation of an Initial Front Offensive Operation



SOURCE Documentary Summary:

The following report is a translation from Russian of an article which appeared in Issue No. 3 (64) for 1962 of the SECRET USSR Ministry of Defense publication Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought". Two authors, Colonel V. Tumas and Colonel S. Tsvetkov, have written separate articles consisting of their comments and criticisms of a previously published article on the same topic. Tumas feels that effective and timely reconnaissance for an initial front offensive operation can be provided by earth-orbiting satellites, specially-equipped high-altitude aircraft, rockets, and balloons, and by employing long-range reconnaissance groups in the enemy rear. Tsvetkov stresses the employment of agents and long-range reconnaissance groups in the enemy rear, plus more effective use of border guard troops for providing reconnaissance information in the vicinity of state borders.


End of Summary

 Comment:

After 1962 the SECRET version of Military Thought was published three times annually and was distributed down to the level of division commander. It reportedly ceased publication at the end of 1970.

 The article to which it refers was disseminated as 





Certain Reconnaissance Problems in the Preparation  
of an Initial Front Offensive Operation

by  
Colonel V. TUMAS  
Colonel A. TSVETKOV


The questions raised in the article of Colonel R. SIMONYAN\* are extremely topical and require careful and thorough consideration.



We share the viewpoint of the author who feels that reconnaissance in support of an initial front offensive operation must still be conducted in advance during peacetime and especially in the period of threat, so that even before the initiation of combat actions the troops will have specific reconnaissance data at their disposal which will enable them to successfully conduct the initial operations.

Of course, on the eve of the unleashing of a war, in order to achieve surprise, the enemy will strive to maximally limit and carefully conceal the implementation of preparatory measures. However, modern means and capabilities of various types of reconnaissance permit the discovery of his immediate preparation for unleashing combat actions.

In this regard we should point out that the questions raised by the author of utilizing various means, including aerial reconnaissance, before the initiation of combat actions are very well taken. We must mention that the reconnaissance means existing in the inventory of reconnaissance aviation are limited and do not fully satisfy modern requirements. Therefore, it is desirable that work be conducted more intensively and that reconnaissance units be equipped more rapidly with unmanned means of aerial reconnaissance and reconnaissance missiles.

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\* Collection of Articles of the Journal "Military Thought", No. 1 (62), 1962.





We know that the US military command even now is making use of satellites for reconnaissance purposes and is carrying out intensive development of new means of space reconnaissance.

We feel that with the aid of artificial earth reconnaissance satellites it is possible to effectively conduct infrared, radiotechnical, television, and photographic reconnaissance.


Infrared reconnaissance equipment installed in an artificial earth satellite will permit the detection by infrared (thermal) radiation not only of the launch (fire) positions of surface-to-surface means of delivering nuclear weapons and the initiation of a missile launch, but also of underground launching pads for intercontinental missiles.


For conducting photographic reconnaissance with artificial earth satellites, it is necessary to equip them with a device enabling photographs to be taken of installations on a scale of 1:10,000 to 1:20,000. This scale, after interpretation of the photographs, permits us to disclose the important enemy installations and their purpose, including launching pads for strategic missiles, airfields, and nuclear weapons bases.

For conducting aerial reconnaissance in peacetime in any meteorological situation, both day and night, it is necessary to have manned high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft and also special reconnaissance rocket aircraft, which can make several turns around the Earth at an altitude of 60 kilometers and more. For conducting operational reconnaissance it is necessary to develop a manned reconnaissance aircraft with a flight range of 2,000 to 3,000 kilometers and a ceiling of about 30,000 meters, as well as an unmanned reconnaissance aircraft with an operating range to a depth of two front operations (up to 1,500 to 1,600 kilometers) and a flight ceiling of at least 30,000 meters.

For the purpose of conducting tactical aerial reconnaissance it is desirable to have low-altitude manned and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft with vertical take-off and landing capability, a flight range to a depth of 1.5 to two front operations, and a ceiling of 300 to 400 meters.

It is also necessary to have cameras on board the above-mentioned reconnaissance aircraft which permit aerial





photographs to be taken day and night at a scale of 1:2,000 to 1:3,000.

Interpreting the pictures at the above scale makes it possible to disclose the fire (launch) positions of all means for delivering nuclear weapons (except small-sized weapons), special weapons depots and points, and other important enemy installations.


Television reconnaissance equipment should be installed in reconnaissance aircraft designated for conducting operational reconnaissance to make it possible to simultaneously scan the terrain in the operational zone of two to three large units and immediately transmit the image to the command posts of the front (army). It is desirable to have television equipment in reconnaissance aircraft designated for conducting tactical reconnaissance. This equipment will allow us to conduct more detailed reconnaissance but, of course, in a considerably smaller zone.


It is important to have radar reconnaissance means in each airborne reconnaissance platform.

Automatic air balloons equipped with the appropriate cameras can also be employed for conducting aerial reconnaissance during the period when an initial front offensive operation is being prepared. Air balloons flying at great altitudes and making use of previously studied flowing air currents can photograph enemy areas and installations which are of interest to us.

In Colonel SIMONYAN's article the question was aptly posed about seeking more expedient methods of making use of the aerial reconnaissance existing in a front for an initial front offensive operation. For this purpose, we feel it is necessary to take into account the experience of employing reconnaissance aviation which was gained in combined-arms and command-staff exercises.

Some comrades consider it unwise to employ reconnaissance aviation in modern operations to photograph terrain or individual installations, ostensibly for the reason that aerial photographs cannot be successfully processed in time. In our opinion, we should not negate aerial photography in general, but rather we should seek a method for processing photographic materials in







short time limits directly in the aircraft and then very rapidly relaying them to the appropriate staffs and means of destruction.

In the period of threat, for example in those cases where time permits, it is possible to employ the method of interpreting from wet film. We know that from the moment the US strategic aviation takes off from the forward air bases in Europe and North Africa until its appearance over the installations of our territory, it takes three to four hours. Consequently, when a massive flight of enemy aircraft toward the Soviet Union or another country of the socialist camp is detected, it is necessary to quickly set tasks for reconnaissance aviation, including photographing very important individual areas for a final reconnaissance of installations (targets) for delivering our nuclear strikes. The tasks for aerial photography must be set specifically according to areas or installations, without endeavoring to cover large sections with strip photography. Photography of large sections requires a great deal of time for processing the photographic materials, due to which the reconnaissance data loses its value and, in addition to this, leads to a reduction in the scale of the photographs and makes interpretation of them more difficult.

Taking into consideration that in the period of threat aerial reconnaissance by flying over the state border cannot be conducted with a large number of aircraft, it is advisable to direct its efforts towards carrying out the most important tasks, first of all, final reconnaissance of previously detected installations against which our nuclear strikes will be delivered.

To hasten the receipt of reconnaissance data from aerial reconnaissance, it is expedient to equip the aircraft of operational reconnaissance with S-5 systems, with the aid of which the coordinates of a visible target can be determined and transmitted in 10 to 15 minutes. We must also not forget about the already tested method of obtaining reconnaissance data from aerial reconnaissance, such as tuning its radio means to the frequency of the radio receivers located in the command posts of the front staff and missile large units (units). For this purpose it is desirable to use R-313 radio receivers.






The author is entirely correct in pointing out the importance of agent and radio and radiotechnical reconnaissance. In the border zone serious attention must be devoted to the discovery of enemy radar sites, the reconnaissance of which can be conducted both by forces and means operating in the rear of the enemy and by aerial reconnaissance from our territory.

In particular, aircraft equipped with radiotechnical equipment are capable of detecting the work of and determining the locations of enemy radar sites which are 300 to 400 kilometers from the aircraft. This makes it possible to conduct systematic aerial reconnaissance even in peacetime by means of reconnaissance aircraft flights along a state border without violating it, and also by means of flights over neutral waters.


The actions of reconnaissance groups infiltrated into the enemy rear from the complement of special-purpose subunits of the front and armies are an extremely effective method of conducting reconnaissance in a border zone while preparing an initial front offensive operation.

The actions of these groups supplement other types of reconnaissance, and in a number of cases they are the most effective means for obtaining reconnaissance information about important enemy installations, primarily about his nuclear weapons and control posts.




Groups infiltrated into the enemy rear from special-purpose subunits (or, as they have come to be called, long-range reconnaissance groups) are, unlike agent reconnaissance groups, designated for obtaining information about the enemy not only by observation, but also by aggressive actions -- by capturing individual military personnel, in particular from subunits of missile units and from nuclear warhead depots. But the purpose of these actions is to obtain reconnaissance information (in the given case by interrogation) and not to carry out sabotage, as this is the purpose of sabotage and reconnaissance groups.

When communications are well organized, long-range reconnaissance groups not only can obtain reliable data about important enemy installations, but they can also call for fire to destroy them at the initiation of combat actions, as well as to guide our aviation to targets in the enemy rear.









The chief of intelligence of the front (army) must personally set tasks for the long-range reconnaissance groups. In so doing, it is advisable to specify no more than two to three tasks for each group, one of which is the main task (usually the discovery of nuclear weapons of the enemy in a specific area), and one to two supplementary tasks (reconnaissance of other important installations). A reconnaissance target is usually specified for each group. In those cases where there are no specific data about the exact disposition of the enemy installations, the area of their supposed disposition is designated. The size of the area for reconnaissance in exercises conducted in a number of military districts fluctuates within limits of 15 to 25 square kilometers depending on the situation, the size of the target located in it, and the size of the group.

*too small*  
When planning to employ long-range reconnaissance groups, it is first of all necessary to take into consideration the capabilities of infiltrating them into the enemy rear and maintaining communications with them. The depth to which the above groups are infiltrated before the initiation of combat actions, according to the current opinion, may reach: up to 250 kilometers for army groups, and up to 500 kilometers for front groups. But this does not mean that it is necessary in all cases to strive to send them the maximum distance. We must keep in mind that the most important enemy installations subject to destruction by the initial nuclear strikes of front means will usually be situated at a distance of 50 to 250 kilometers from the state border. The reconnaissance of these installations will interest the front commander and his staff first.

It is more advantageous to infiltrate reconnaissance groups in aircraft before the initiation of combat actions. But, in exceptional cases, mainly at night or in inclement weather, helicopters may be employed for this.

When setting tasks for long-range reconnaissance groups we must take into consideration that, as a rule, these groups in the rear of the enemy are to travel on foot, so that a considerable amount of time is needed for moving to the target, and also for reconnaissance of the designated area. A certain amount of time is necessary, for example, to orient themselves and adapt to the local conditions. Therefore, as experience shows, the initial data from reconnaissance groups is forthcoming no sooner than






several hours after, and in a number of cases, on the second or third day after the groups have been sent out.

The success of actions of reconnaissance groups in the enemy rear depends largely on well-organized command of them by the chief of intelligence. The absence of flexible control of the groups will lead to a situation where in the course of a day and more, not having found the important target in the area specified for them, they will in effect be inactive, whereas they could rapidly redirect their reconnaissance toward important targets in a different area. Therefore, to maintain reliable and uninterrupted communications with reconnaissance groups, it is expedient to have the appropriate radio means for around-the-clock reception in the command post of the front (army).

In detecting signs of the immediate preparation by the imperialist states for unleashing a war, it is necessary for reconnaissance to extensively employ roadwatch agents who can play an important role in reconnaissance of the enemy. Thus, in the inter-academy operational game conducted in February 1961, the staff of the Eastern Front with the assistance of roadwatch agents opportunely discovered the approach and concentration of large units of the Western Front of the "enemy" in the border zone. In our opinion, roadwatch agents must be sent to a depth of up to 70 to 80 kilometers. This distance is conditioned by the possible concentration in the border zone of enemy attack groupings which are designated for conducting combat actions in an initial operation, and also by the disposition of the means for delivering nuclear weapons, of tactical aviation airfields, supply points for special weapons, control posts, radiotechnical stations for guiding aviation, and other installations of the enemy.

It is necessary to select those traffic routes for roadwatch agents which would pass through the areas of the most probable disposition of important installations. It is also desirable that the traffic routes to the enemy rear and the return routes do not coincide. In individual cases roadwatch agents should be provided with portable radio sets, so that they are capable of quickly transmitting especially important reconnaissance data immediately after they have been obtained.







We should point out that our probable enemies devote serious attention both to the organization and conduct of reconnaissance, and also to enemy sabotage-and-reconnaissance activity. Therefore, reconnaissance during the preparation of the initial operation is also the most important measure in the system of combating the reconnaissance and the sabotage-and-reconnaissance activity of the enemy.

The main tasks of reconnaissance of the border military district (front) in this matter are: discovering enemy intentions for the deployment of reconnaissance and sabotage-and-reconnaissance activity and determining the location and the capabilities of the forces designated for this, as well as the probable time for their parachute drop, areas (routes) of actions of reconnaissance and sabotage-and-reconnaissance groups (detachments); revealing their composition, armament, tasks, and methods of action; and seizing or destroying reconnaissance personnel and saboteurs.

Reconnaissance on the approaches to locations of missile large units (units) and close to troop dispositions and rear services facilities must be conducted in an especially careful manner. For this purpose, each large unit (unit) or rear services facility, wherever it is located, establishes a network of stationary and mobile observation posts, which ensure observation of their own disposition areas. In addition to this, in order to reconnoiter the disposition area and the adjacent terrain, from each division it is advisable to detail two to three individual reconnaissance patrols, each of which can conduct reconnaissance in a radius of 20 to 30 kilometers.

Finally, it is very important that in preparing the initial front offensive operation, the staff of the front should receive reconnaissance data obtained from the organs of the border guard in time. As we know, the latter conduct systematic reconnaissance of the opposing enemy by various methods, including interrogations of violators of the state border, and usually they have valuable information. However, in practice, reconnaissance data sent from them to the staff of the district (front) arrive very late. One of the reasons for this is that according to existing regulations, border guard troops come under the subordination of the command and staff of the border military district only with the initiation of combat actions. We feel it






is necessary to examine this situation and to subordinate them to the border military districts even before the beginning of the period of threat.


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The successful implementation of initial front operations requires that even in peacetime a unified system of reconnaissance of all types be set up, which must determine in advance the possibility of a surprise attack by the aggressor and establish when, where, and with what forces it can be carried out.

As pointed out in the article of Colonel R. SIMONYAN, the most important role in carrying out this task, along with the reconnaissance of the General Staff, belongs to the reconnaissance of border military districts (groups of forces). This being the case, we must emphasize that the effectiveness of reconnaissance in preparing an initial front offensive operation can be raised not only by improving the technical equipping and organizational structure of reconnaissance units and subunits, which the author discusses, but also by raising the combat readiness of the forces and means of reconnaissance in peacetime. As the experience of exercises has shown, this can be ensured by the skilful implementation of a wide range of different measures: daily indoctrination of personnel in the spirit of Soviet patriotism, boundless devotion to the socialist homeland, the Communist Party, and the Soviet government; developing high fighting efficiency, morale, and skills in personnel so they can quickly adapt themselves to a complex situation; enlisting at least one-third [?] of the reconnaissance units and subunits of a district (group of forces) to fulfil tasks in reconnaissance of the enemy in peacetime, dispersing the disposition of forces and means of reconnaissance in areas of the enemy's supposed deployment in accordance with the plans of the initial operations, and systematically training reconnaissance units and subunits to come to an alert status and to deploy rapidly, and special-purpose units to move into the rear of the enemy.

Special attention should be given to the careful training of agents and the personnel of long-range reconnaissance groups for skilful actions in the enemy rear and also on terrain contaminated with radioactive substances, as well as in






withdrawing reconnaissance personnel from areas against which our troops are preparing to deliver strikes with nuclear and chemical weapons.



In view of the extremely limited time, it is advisable to covertly withdraw the agents and the long-range reconnaissance groups from threatened areas or redirect them to new installations a minimally safe distance away. In a number of cases the agents will have to change to legal status, although this, as a rule, is undesirable. Long-range reconnaissance groups must endeavor to seize transportation from the enemy in order to change position quickly and also to use small-sized flight equipment, since it will obviously be employed in the enemy rear in a future war on a wide scale.

A more difficult task is preparing the agents and personnel of long-range reconnaissance groups for actions in zones of radioactive contamination. The agents must know how to use the protective structures which are available to the enemy, and the remaining reconnaissance personnel, designated for actions in the enemy rear, must use special preparations which lower the effectiveness of the action of radioactive substances on the body. Recently, for example, it has been learned that preparations have been developed abroad which raise the resistance of the human body approximately twofold in regard to radiation sickness.

The matter of using reconnaissance information obtained from the border guard troops in preparing an initial front offensive operation was not fully resolved in the article. The fact of the matter is that border guard units and subunits, which are continuously guarding the state border, obtain data not only about intelligence and counterintelligence organs of the enemy, but also about his most important military installations which are located at a depth of 50 to 100 kilometers from the border. Therefore, obtaining regular reconnaissance information from the staffs of border guard troops should become one of the most important duties of combined-arms staffs in peacetime.

Moreover, we must keep in mind that according to existing regulations in the armed forces of the countries of the socialist camp, units and subunits of border guard troops in the special period (with the initiation of combat actions) are transferred to






the operational subordination of combined-arms formations. This means that, while continuing to guard the state border, border guard troops will, upon instructions of the front command, conduct reconnaissance of the enemy, combat his sabotage and reconnaissance activity in the border areas, act as border covering forces on individual axes, etc.


In order to know the capabilities of the border guard troops well, and to set feasible tasks for them in reconnoitering the enemy, we must point out that their agents, first of all the roadwatch agents, are capable of obtaining information about the most important enemy installations (targets) which are situated at a depth of 50 kilometers and more from the state border. Aircraft (helicopters) of the border guard aviation, while carrying out systematic patrol flights along the border without violating it, are in a position to conduct reconnaissance by visual observation and by employing radar and cameras with a range of operation of 25 to 30 kilometers and more.

Visual ground observation with the assistance of optical instruments (stereoscopic telescopes, binoculars) permit the detection of enemy installations to a depth of five to six kilometers. Besides this, in each border guard detachment two to three reconnaissance groups can be prepared in peacetime for conducting reconnaissance in the rear of the enemy, and in each outpost one to two reconnaissance posts can be prepared. On the seacoast, shore posts for technical observation and border guard vessels and aircraft can detect enemy ships at a distance of 30 to 80 kilometers from shore.

Consequently, by their skilful use, the reconnaissance forces and means of units and subunits of border guard troops can considerably raise the capabilities of the border military district (group of forces) in obtaining information about the most important enemy installations (targets) in peacetime and in the special period. Therefore, regular reconnaissance information submitted to the staffs of border military districts and armies should be given to the staffs of the border guard troops.

In accordance with the plans of the initial operations, it is advisable to work out detailed plans in the staffs of detachments (komendaturas) of border guard troops for agent and






combined-arms reconnaissance, which must be systematically refined depending on changes in the situation. This will make it possible for the border guard troops to more purposefully conduct reconnaissance of enemy installations, which by their nature and location differ considerably from the installations studied during the process of guarding the state border.


Experience shows that now the technical equipping of the reconnaissance forces and means of border guard troops and their organizational structure must be improved, and their combat readiness must be raised so that the border guard troops will be even more capable of reliably guarding the state border under conditions of increased enemy reconnaissance activity and of discovering on a timely basis his most important installations in support of successfully conducting initial front operations. In particular, it is advisable to equip the border guard outposts, positioned on the most probable axes where combat actions will develop, with lightweight portable radars, combined with thermal direction finders and optical devices for night vision, which ensure the detection of small mobile enemy installations five to six kilometers from the state border. All outposts should have more improved optical devices, mobile observation towers, signal systems, and amphibious transport vehicles (armored reconnaissance type vehicles). In addition to this, in border guard detachments it is necessary to prepare reconnaissance groups in advance for parachuting into the enemy rear, systematically enlisting personnel for special exercises.

In the inventory of the border guard aviation it is desirable to have aircraft and helicopters, equipped not only with panoramic radars, but also with television devices, as well as equipment for night photography.

In coastal areas it is advisable to set up more improved radars, while border guard ships should be equipped with radar and sonar reconnaissance equipment.

A great deal of attention is required for the selection, training, and indoctrination of the agents of border guard troops which, on the most important axes, must have a main and reserve net to a depth of 50 to 100 kilometers from the state border, reliable radio communications with its own staffs, and also portable equipment for tape recording, photography, etc. In our





opinion, it is especially necessary to improve the military training of the agents.

To improve reconnaissance information in the staffs of the border guard troops it is advisable, first, to improve the system of collecting, recording, processing, and transmitting reconnaissance information properly in peacetime and in the special period; second, to relay reconnaissance information to the combined-arms staffs in the most suitable form; third, to improve the system of communications of the staffs of border guard troops among themselves, with the territorial organs of state security, and with the combined-arms staffs both in permanent deployment areas and with temporary (operational) control posts deployed during the special period; and fourth, to improve the quality of reconnaissance training of officers of the border guards of all grades.

Matters of further improving reconnaissance information in the staff of the front when preparing the initial operation were not sufficiently reflected in the article.


The introduction into the troops of high-speed electronic computers, which are capable of rapidly carrying out functions in collecting, systematizing, analyzing, storing, and issuing reconnaissance information, must be considered a very long term solution to these problems. At the same time, we must not ignore the existing methods of information work and the extensive employment for this purpose of the means of minor mechanization and automation.

As the experience of a number of exercises shows, in order to speed up the processing of reconnaissance information, it is necessary to maximally reduce the time periods for studying and collating reconnaissance data; to decrease the quantity and improve the quality of information documents, first of all by simplifying them; to raise the stability of nets and links of reconnaissance communications so that it will be possible to report reconnaissance information simultaneously to all interested staffs, including through one to two command echelons.

In our opinion, a so-called "Center for the Collection and Processing of Reconnaissance Information" made up of officers of the operations and intelligence directorates, the staff of rocket







troops and artillery, and the staff of the air army could play a great role in preparing an operation. The main function of this center would be to rapidly collect, collate, and report to the formation commander data about the most important enemy installations (targets) for their destruction by missile/nuclear weapons.

There is also the need to improve the training of intelligence officers in matters concerning their information work. This training is needed not only in the troops, but also in military educational institutions and in courses and assemblies, where intelligence personnel could receive at least the minimum necessary information and skills in this field.

