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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

17 July 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence
FROM : John H. Stein
Deputy Director for Operations
SUBJECT : [] Report

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[]
John H. Stein

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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY Poland

FIRDB-312/02143-81

DATE OF INFO. May 1981

DATE 17 July 1981

SUBJECT

General Staff Plans in Preparation for Martial Law

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

This report is a translation of a Polish document classified SECRET OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE, entitled "Memorandum of the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Peoples Army on Measures Taken by the Ministry of National Defense Related to the Guarantee of National Security." The memorandum outlines plans and actions to be taken by the Polish Armed Forces in the event that martial law is declared. An Operational Staff of the National Defense Committee is to be established, which will incorporate the Operational Watch Service of the Premier, and which will operate around the clock.

Also of particular note is the fact that in order to weaken the influence of regional Solidarity organizations on conscripts, the new recruits are being assigned to military units outside their home regions.

End of Summary

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SECRET OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE

MEMORANDUM

of the Chief of the General Staff of the
Polish Armed Forces on Measures taken by
the Ministry of National Defense related
to the Guarantee of National Security

Since August of last year the political adversary has been endeavoring to take over the government in our country. Taking advantage of extensive civil liberties guaranteed in the Constitution, he is attacking the party on a broad front, he is weakening the people's government, and he is undermining the structural foundations of our socialist nation.

In this state of affairs, in transmitting the party's determination "to defend socialism in our country as one would defend the independence of Poland," into strategic defensive planning, the National Defense Ministry virtually from the very beginning of the crisis undertook a wide sweep of activities, with the cooperation of appropriate offices of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers Party, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Council of Ministers Planning Commission, as well as with officials of other ministries, in connection with comprehensive government preparation for the possible introduction of a state of martial law. As a result of work on this problem up to the present, its testing in the course of special interministerial war games, and also of allied consultations carried out at the beginning of April of this year, the principal stage of conceptual planning work has been concluded. The solutions that have been accepted have been included in documentation, prepared by and deposited with the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, that in reference to the central level includes the following:

- the central concept;
- the central action plan of political organs, as well as organs of state authority and administration, and

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- appended to the plan, separate compilations of planning and implementation documents bearing on all principal areas of government activity.

The central concept gives an ideological outline of conditions, objectives, and the process of introducing a state of martial law, describes the essence of changes in the structure of governmental functions and the governing of the country during the state of martial law, and spells out in precise terms the concept for the functioning of the state during the period of preparation and after the introduction of this state.

The central plan lists the most important measures that should be taken in the field of politics, diplomacy, defense financing, security, and military affairs before, in the course of introducing, and after the introduction of martial law.


Compilations of planning and implementation documents consist principally of legislative and normative acts of the Council of State of the Polish Peoples Republic, executive documents of the Council of Ministers and the National Defense Committee, proposed texts of proclamations of the Chairman of the Council of State of the PPR, Council of State and Council of Ministers declarations, pronouncements of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, and others*, as well as outline action plans for specific ministries, local administrative organs and other executive agencies.

Assignments for the armed forces foreseen for the period of martial law are concentrated on the maintenance of a high state of readiness to counter--within the framework of the coalitional system of defense--every attempt at aggression, and also to give direct support to actions of the PUWP leadership, the PPR government, and the forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in their efforts to restore the disrupted constitutional order in the country.

* At this point I must report that all propaganda materials enumerated above are merely in a state of preliminary editing and require basic rewriting.

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The roster of planned support activities includes the following:


- placing under armed forces protection of selected special installations, among them mass media facilities, communications, state supply reserve depots, airfields, industrial establishments, and others;
- regrouping and concentrating operational troops in the vicinity of major urban and industrial centers*;
- securing selected areas of WARSAW and other large centers, anticipating the blockade of certain areas, and operating motor patrols and mobile fire points;
- protecting transportation networks, making arrangements to this end for the use of military railroad, road, and bridge units;
- taking over by the military of the organs of civilian air traffic service, or military supervision over such traffic.



In the category of auxiliary operations, by order of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers the chiefs of the provincial military HQ were appointed deputy chairmen of the Provincial Defense Committees and provisions were made for the following actions, among others:

- the deployment of an emergency radio and radiorelay communications system serving the staffs of the military districts, armed forces branches and the provinces;

* 4th Mech and 16th Armd Div in the area West of WARSAW; 7th Sea Landing and 8th Mech Div in the Southwest area of TRICITY (GDYNIA-SOPOT-GDANSK); 10th Armd Div in the area of the Upper Silesian Industrial Region; 11th Armd Div in the WROCLAW area; 5th Armd Div in the POZNAN area; 20th Armd Div in the area of BYDGOSZCZ, and the 1st, 2d, 3d, 9th, 12th, 15th Mech Div and the 6th Airborne Div basically in the vicinity of permanent deployment areas for these units.

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
- the accelerated procurement of special production items manufactured by selected industrial plants, including the stockpiling of arms, ammunition, explosives, and military equipment manufactured by end-production plants and by defense industry subcontractors.

Tasks arising from armed forces operational plans were relayed to actual implementing agencies. The familiarity with these tasks on the part of these agencies is being reviewed on a systematic basis and practical spot checks are being made of their performance. Numerous drills have been conducted in setting up the emergency communications system. During periods of heightened social tensions practical exercises have been conducted to test the functioning of the system for accelerated procurement of special production items from selected plants.

In connection with the information reported above, I would like to report that we are mindful of the need to continue working, under the direction of the National Defense Committee, both on the actual theory of overcoming threats to national security, and also on operational plans that would be put into effect in the event that it becomes necessary to declare martial law. Most of our questions and knowledge gaps concern eventual implementation of the plans. This is because all solutions that have been recommended are unprecedented in the history of a socialist state. Then again, the situation which our country is now faced with is equally exceptional.

This is why we are also of the opinion that a declaration of martial law by the PPR Council of State can and ought to be regarded as a last resort option to be exercised by the state--after having exhausted all feasible political resources and methods--in defense of the constitutional and socialist institutional foundations of the Polish People's Republic, and the sole objective of taking such action is to redress the damage done to the constitutional order, a goal whose realization involves primarily the restoration of general law and order, public tranquillity, normal work patterns, and also the flow of essential goods and services to the population.

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The present domestic situation in Poland is highly unstable; threats are constantly emerging. Bearing this in mind, the PAF General Staff sees an urgent need for continuous updating of the [contingency plans] that have been drawn up in all sectors of the national economy, and at all levels of state administration, and for maintaining total readiness to put these plans into effect.

* * *

Poland's overall internal situation is having an impact on the strength of the armed forces and, consequently, on their ability to carry out their assigned missions. The Ministry of National Defense is drawing appropriate conclusions from the realization of this fact.

In April of this year approximately 60,000 conscripts were called up to augment military units. More than 50 percent of those called up were members of Solidarity (compared to only 30 percent in the fall of 1980). Their present conduct gives us no cause for complaint. What is still unknown is how they might react in a crisis situation. In order to minimize the influence of the regional Solidarity organizations on unit personnel--starting with the spring 1981 draft--the principle of assigning new recruits to military units outside their home regions is being applied--to the full extent. We are taking this factor into account in other spheres of activity as well, e.g., shifting responsibility for carrying out some missions from territorial defense units to operational units of the regular armed forces, building up additional forces to perform certain kinds of protective-security duties, etc.

Exercises are one of the key factors contributing to greater troop discipline and to the enhancement of their ability to carry out their assigned missions. During the period since the conclusion of the interallied SOYUZ-81 exercise we have conducted a series of troop exercises, including mobilization exercises, most of which as originally scheduled were not supposed to be held until the second half of 1981.

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As part of our routine activities essential practical measures are being taken to enhance the constant availability of command/control organs and troops slated to go into action as first-echelon forces. The participation of operational forces in work on behalf of the national economy outside their permanent stationing areas has been reduced to a minimum. Numerous spot checks have been made and efforts have been initiated to conduct comprehensive performance evaluations of combat and mobilization readiness.

An additional five battalions have been deployed in operational units and in the Internal Defense Forces in order to provide interim reinforcements for military police subunits.

In connection with the recent civil disorders, reinforced joint patrols of Ministry of Internal Affairs troops and Citizens Militia officials have been organized in a number of garrisons; however, in garrisons where Soviet Army units are stationed similar joint patrols are being made by PAF and Soviet Army troops.

Even though this discussion of the issues affecting the strength of the armed forces and their ability to carry out the missions awaiting them is being kept as brief as possible, one cannot ignore the morale and political attitude of our troops, which in the final analysis may be of critical importance in determining the success of any operation. We are doing much to minimize the destructive influence of the mass communications media on the armed forces, and on the officers corps as well. I will not try to hide the fact that the first signs of trouble in this area are beginning to appear. By itself, the work that is being done by command organs and by the military party-political apparatus is not enough unless something is done to put an effective stop to the disinformation being fed to the public by our news media.

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As a final word on this note I would like to report that, in spite of difficulties of a moral and political nature, and problems of a material nature as well, since we are feeling the increasingly severe impact of material shortages, especially shortages of spare parts and certain materials such as aviation fuel for example, the armed forces are being maintained at a high level of combat readiness, and they are being kept in a posture of total availability and readiness for action under increasingly complex conditions.

* * *

The resolution of the XI Plenum of the PUWP Central Committee and the speech delivered at a recent session of the Sejm by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers referred in the starkest possible terms to the need to make a more resolute response to all incidents involving violations of public law and order, to aggressively oppose all anti-state demonstrations, and to take vigorous action aimed at combatting anti-Soviet attitudes and irresponsible excesses.

In the clearest possible terms this demonstrates the need to reexamine the activities, especially of our public information, law enforcement and justice organs, and the Ministry of Internal Affairs. In order to implement the policy line spelled out at the latest plenum of the PUWP Central Committee it will be necessary to exercise effective leadership and to respond in a resolute manner to all signs of hostile activity.

To this end, it appears essential that we should:

first--make a clear and unequivocal statement of the objectives and intentions behind the actions we are taking under present sociopolitical and economic conditions;

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secondly--establish, as a matter of the highest priority and by drawing on the membership of the National Defense Committee, a National Defense Committee Operations Staff to be headed by the vice premier, making provisions for the participation of authorized representatives of the PUWP Central Committee, the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers, the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the National Civil Defense Forces. The Premier's existing operational alert duty service would serve as an integral part of this Operations Staff. Working on an around-the-clock schedule, this organ would be able to prepare real-time situation studies and assessments and submit appropriate proposals and recommendations to the Chairman of the National Defense Committee concerning decisionmaking options, as well as proceed effectively to implement decisions that are made.

In order to enhance the operational effectiveness of the National Defense Committee executive organs it is recommended that autonomous operations staffs be established within the PUWP Central Committee, the Planning Commission of the Council of Ministers, government ministries and the National Civil Defense Inspectorate for the duration of the crisis.

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