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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

23 November 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

FROM : John H. Stein
Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : [] Report

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John H. Stein

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Intelligence Information Special Report

COUNTRY Poland

FIRDB 312/03453-81

DATE OF INFO. 1981

DATE 23 Nov 1981

SUBJECT

Possible Radical Military Measures
Against Polish Strikes and Protests

SOURCE Documentary

Summary:

This report is a translation of a Polish document entitled "Report Presented by the Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces at a Meeting of the National Defense Committee on 13 September 1981" and classified SECRET OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE. If SOLIDARITY strikes and other protests in Poland continue or new ones begin, these can be dealt with radically in either of two possible ways. The military can introduce increased combat readiness of the armed forces and Ministry of Internal Affairs forces in a determined and conspicuously overt manner. This action might cause extremist elements to draw back. The second possible way would be secret preparations for introduction of martial law with an element of surprise. If this latter procedure is implemented, anticipated public reaction is unknown, but the PAF General Staff hopes that only extremist elements would oppose the move and that most of the population would support the state authorities.

End of Summary

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SECRET OF SPECIAL IMPORTANCE

REPORT

Presented by the Chief of the General Staff
of the Polish Armed Forces at a Meeting of the
National Defense Committee on 13 September 1981

Comrade First Secretary,

Comrade Premier,

Comrades,

The General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces agrees with the evaluation, presented by Comrade Major General Cz. KISZCZAK, of the current state of security and order in the country, including an assessment of the opponent's intentions. We are increasingly aware* that in the new test of strength, which is presently being advocated by radicals from Solidarity and other hostile groups, political means and selective escalation of administrative punitive measures alone will no longer be able to stop the adverse course of events in the direction of a counter-revolutionary change of the sociopolitical system and a takeover of the government by forces hostile to socialism.

* or: "We are in agreement on the point that..." continue as in text (depending on General KISZCZAK's suggestion.)

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From the beginning of the conflict we have invariably been of the opinion that the introduction of martial law should be the last resort. Therefore we are all the more disturbed by the course, consistently followed by extremists, of intensifying confrontation, which is leading toward their ultimate goal, a takeover of the government.

Recent events empower us to state that we are faced with the need for a radical opposition to hostile actions; we are clearly nearing the moment when it will be necessary to make the grave decision to introduce martial law.

In the event of an announcement by the Solidarity National Consultative Committee of a strike readiness or a press, radio, and television strike, probably connected with the continuation of current, or start of new, local and regional forms of protest, including strikes, a possibly overt increase of combat readiness of the armed forces, Ministry of Internal Affairs forces, as well as general readiness of certain central and local organs of state administration may be initiated to indicate the government's determination to radically oppose further disintegration.

According to the law on the general obligation to defend the PPR, the organ authorized to issue an order in this matter is the National Defense Committee.

In the event this order is put into effect, the PPR Armed Forces, while remaining in areas of permanent disposition (basing), would carry out operational tasks established by Ministry of National Defense directive no 001/op., increasing their readiness to perform planned activities. Among other things, the following would take place:

- retention in units of reservists in training and equipment requisitioned from the national economy;

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- suspending the release of servicemen who have completed basic military service together with induction of new recruits;
- recall of servicemen from leaves and work on behalf of the national economy and Ministry of National Defense;
- introduction of continuous operational alert duty in command organs;
- selective augmentation of personnel in units scheduled to be sent first into operation;
- comprehensive test of the mobilization system;
- deployment and maintenance in constant readiness of the field communications system for the needs of the military system for governing the State.

In addition to this, the armed forces could proceed to perform, in consultation and coordination with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, special tasks involving confrontation with the civilian population. I particularly have in mind:

- increased patrol of garrisons, among other things, using armored vehicles, separately, jointly with Ministry of Internal Affairs forces, and in the area of garrisons in which Soviet units are stationed, jointly with soldiers from these units;
- expansion of protection of the most important installations of the economic and defense infrastructure with a possible takeover for protection by the military of radio and television installations, or conspicuous preparation for such a takeover.

In this variant the Ministry of Internal Affairs could conduct additional mobilizational expansion of its forces and, with increased support from the armed forces, undertake intensive operations on behalf of public safety and order in the country. The remaining ministries, units of socialized economy, and local organs of state administration could perform a number of preparatory tasks, in particular:

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- initiation of constant alert duty;
- preparation and initiation of courier and messenger service;
- test of the readiness of enterprises, especially transportation, to form units for the needs of the armed forces;
- preparation and initiation of transferring means of transportation, machines, and equipment for the use of the armed forces and organizational units of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Conspicuously overt and determined preparations for the defense of state security may bring about a withdrawal on the part of the extreme element or a temporary mitigation of its pressure, and a start of a search for solutions acceptable to the authorities.


This variant creates a fleeting chance for overcoming the impasse without using force. Its basic weakness lies in the fact that it waives the element of surprise.

From the point of view of the effectiveness of actions of organs and forces implementing the provisions of martial law, particularly extremely important special operations, earlier disclosure of preparations is not advisable. Therefore, the second variant, which is considered to be basic by the General Staff and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, assumes:

- first--full secrecy of preparations;
- second--a choice of the moment for introduction of martial law, which would assure the greatest surprise, as well as cause a great shock in society.

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With this in mind, and in accordance with National Defense Committee decisions, intensive work has been conducted for several months to thoroughly prepare the country for such a variant of action. As of today, with the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces and the Ministry of Internal Affairs playing the coordinating role, the planning stage at the central level and in main executive centers has been basically concluded.

An analysis of available and constantly updated planning and executory documents enables us to report that from the standpoint of organization it is now possible in a very short time to reach for this measure for defense of the State. Its main purpose is to neutralize the antisocialist forces, restore the normal work rhythm and public law and order, and ensure the possibility of efficient functioning of the authorities, state administration, and economy.

In the event a final political decision in this matter is made, the introduction of martial law can take place by way of an appropriate resolution and decrees* issued by the Council of State in accordance with article 33, subsection 2 of the PPR Constitution. The decrees of the Council of State will define the consequences of the introduction of martial law. In the area of rights and duties of citizens there will be a restriction on the freedom of movement, suspension of activities of trade unions and social organizations, suspension of the right to strike, introduction of a general obligation to perform work, and tightening of criminal liability, including emergency procedures in military courts.

* The nature of all already prepared normative legal martial law documents, will be presented by the Secretary of the National Defense Committee, Comrade General of Arms T. TUCZAPSKI.

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The remaining executive provisions of the Council of Ministers, National Defense Committee, and individual ministries will be put into force on the basis of the provisions of the Council of State decree on martial law.

It is assumed that the moment martial law is introduced, basic functions of governing the State will pass to the National Defense Committee and to Provincial Defense Committees as appropriate. In connection with this, National Defense Committee personnel strength can be expanded as needed, based on a decision of the National Defense Committee chairman. At the same time, a National Defense Committee Operational Staff will be established, made up of designated representatives of the PUWP Central Committee and leading ministries. The nucleus of this staff (DYSOR) is already functioning, while in regional centers the status of Provincial Military Headquarters was raised to a higher level. The chiefs of these headquarters are already acting as deputy chairmen of the Provincial Defense Committees.


According to operational plans which are prepared and deposited in the General Staff, at a set H-hour, simultaneously with an announcement by all press media of the Council of State resolution and decrees concerning the introduction of martial law in Poland, the main, central, and local organs of administration will make publicly known all consequences of this state of martial law and responsibilities of citizens while it is in force.

In particular areas of State activities the following main measures are planned:

In the field of propaganda, a massive public campaign is to be initiated, aimed at convincing citizens that introduction of martial law is necessary in order to avoid national catastrophe, and laying the blame for this step on hostile, reactionary organizations and elements. The responsibilities of citizens during the period of martial law are to be explained. In order to ensure normal functioning of at least one radio and television program and publication of the dailies Trybuna Ludu and Zolnierz Wolnosci, maintenance of a military editorial office and technical radio, television, and printing crews is planned.

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In the diplomatic field, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to hand notes verbales on the introduction of martial law to the chiefs of missions. At a session of the United Nations the Secretary General of the UN is to be informed of the situation by the chairman of the Polish delegation. The chiefs of Polish diplomatic missions will receive encoded instructions concerning introduction of increased readiness at the missions.

In the economic field, executive actions of martial law are to be initiated immediately, strikes are to be counteracted or caused to stop. A regulated system for provisioning the population is to be introduced, and sale of liquid fuel for private use is to be suspended. Protection is to be provided for main food and POL warehouses and depots.

In order to ensure the functioning of the transportation and communications systems, designated installations are to be militarized and placed under the protection of the armed forces.

The facilities of the national power system are to be kept in operation by militarization of basic services and takeover of designated installations for protection by the armed forces. Delivery of electric energy and solid fuels on a priority basis and selective power shutdowns in accordance with special provisions are to be introduced.

In the military field, measures needed to heighten the constant availability of command organs and units scheduled to be sent first into operation are already being implemented.

All tasks for the military for the period of martial law have been brought up to the executive level on the basis of operational planning, checked and selectively tested in practice. According to the plan of operation the following is to take place with the introduction of martial law:

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- immediate takeover for military protection of 400 special installations for which 10,000 servicemen are assigned;
- expansion of the emergency system of concealed and open radio and radiorelay communications for the needs of the armed forces command and state government by allocation of about 100 medium-power radio stations and 150 radio relays at the operational and tactical level;
- improvement of the operational situation of the majority of ground forces tactical large units and expansion of the blockade of areas of special importance in WARSAW and other agglomerations;
- seizure of all civilian airfields and takeover of all civil aviation aircraft;
- suspension of air traffic within Polish territory and taking over full control thereof;
- sealing off the national maritime border and reinforcement of the combat alert duty system of the National Air Defense Forces;
- establishment and deployment of additional military courts and prosecutors' offices.

In my report I have presented only an outline of possible action by the State in the event martial law is introduced. It is extremely difficult and complex. Just the fact that the authorities would use this measure to defend the State may result in varied, hitherto unknown social reactions. Moreover, we have the right to assume that only the extreme element can actively oppose the decision of the authorities, while the majority of society, which gravely feels the discomfort of the present situation, will act with restraint and follow with support for the authorities. In the opinion of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces there is a great chance that we will solve the problem by ourselves. In order to achieve this a decidedly aggressive and precisely coordinated action of all forces at the disposal of the state is necessary.

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I am reporting that the military cadre unequivocally condemns the irresponsible, hostile actions of political opponents. We notice irritation and even frequent demands for active opposition to the antisocialist excesses in word and action of the enemies of our country. I think that this very important element should be taken into consideration when evaluating the situation upon making the decision concerning the introduction of martial law. We cannot allow the force at our disposal to lose the momentum for a fight with the enemy, to become psychologically rundown.

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