



# Intelligence Information Report

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REPORT NO. FIRDB-312/ 01036-82

DATE DISTR. 13 MAY 1982

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
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
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FIRDB-312/ 01036-82

REPORT CLASS



COUNTRY

Poland/USSR

SUBJECT

Relationship Between the Soviet Military Representation to Poland and the Polish General Staff

(DOI: 1981)

SOURCE

A former Polish General Staff officer who made the following comments based on his considerable past experience and contacts. He has reported reliably in the past.

**COMMENT:** This report should be read in conjunction with ~~IRDB-312/01528-82~~, dated 25 January 1982, from the same Source. The information contained in the latter report, while on generally the same subject, was obtained from the Source at a different time. Hence, minor discrepancies between the two versions are evident.)

1. The officially established Soviet military presence with the Polish Armed Forces is limited to the "Representation of the Commander of the Combined Armed Forces with the Polish Armed Forces." This Soviet representation is headed by Soviet General of the Army Afanasiy Fedorovich ((SHCHEGLOV)), with a staff of about a dozen specialists for various concerns, such as air and air defense, rear services, communications, etc. Each of these specialists has one to three additional personnel as aides, translators, or clerical workers. General Shcheglov is considered a "hard-headed" individual and is often referred to by the Polish officers as "the governor general." He is disliked by Polish Minister of National Defense (MON) General Wojciech Jaruzelski. Shcheglov also commands little respect from most senior Soviet staff officers of the Combined Armed Forces, in particular Marshal Viktor Kulikov, its commander-in-chief, and General of the Army Anatoliy Ivanovich Gribkov, his

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chief of staff.

2. Since 1956 Soviet officers have not been present in Polish troop units or military district headquarters or even in the Polish General Staff. The office of the Soviet representation is housed in a separate building on Winnicka Street in Warsaw, apart from the Polish Ministry of National Defense Headquarters. This relative "isolation" of Soviet representatives in Poland contrasts sharply with the situation in the other Warsaw Pact national forces. (Source Comment: For example, there are Soviet representatives at all tactical levels of the East German army, and the Soviets "practically run" the Bulgarian army.)

3. Nevertheless, the members of this representation (the Poles do not refer to these Soviets as advisors, but rather as representatives) are expected to be comprehensively informed on the status of their special areas of concern in the Polish armed forces, such as air and air defense, rear services, etc. To this end they maintain close working relationships with counterparts on the Polish General Staff, among the chiefs of Polish arms and services, and among the various central institutions of the Polish armed forces. These Soviet specialists depend on such contacts for the substance of their periodic reports to Moscow. Although it is not within their authority to do so, these Soviets often exert pressure on their counterparts in the Polish General Staff for information.


4. Not all requests for information are complied with. There were standing orders not to discuss with Soviets the status of projects or problems still under consideration by the Polish MON. There were also instances of Soviet requests for detailed information on individual units that were referred to the Chief of the General Staff, Florian ((Siwicki)), where the matter usually "dried up". At the highest levels of the MON and General Staff, the Poles have procedures they employ when they want to resist a Soviet program or project, which amount to an escalating chain of refusals. This system gives the Poles a chance to determine how important an issue is to the Soviets, and forces the result that some matters are dropped rather than pressed by the Soviets.

5. While Soviet representatives have good access to information from their Polish General Staff counterparts at the Directorate level, they have little direct influence on this level. The prevailing attitude at the Directorate level is of only grudging cooperation in providing authorized information.

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6. The deputy to General Shcheglov, and his specialist for operational matters, was, until July 1981, Lieutenant General Fedor Pavlovich Kupriyanov. Once the Polish crisis began, Kupriyanov became responsible for daily reports on the situation in Poland, from all aspects, not just the armed forces. Kupriyanov was summarily recalled to Moscow in July 1981 and replaced by Major General Grigoriy A. Bessmertnyy, a former chief of operations in the Caucasus Military District. It was the opinion of General Waclaw ((Sklarski)) (Chief of the Operations Directorate of the Polish General Staff), who knew Kupriyanov well and regarded him as a man of some integrity who would report factually on the situation in Poland, that Kupriyanov must have reported things Moscow did not want to hear and thus fallen from favor. It was later learned that Kupriyanov had been replaced on the "unassigned personnel" list.

7. As the Polish crisis deepened, Marshal Kulikov formed two additional staffs in Poland to deal with the crisis. One was a staff group of 80-100 officers formed at Legnica (Headquarters of the Soviet Northern Group of Forces) as the nucleus of a Warsaw Pact intervention planning staff, (Source Comment: Much as was done--also at Legnica--during the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968.) A second, but strictly Soviet staff group, composed of some 30 officers from the Soviet General Staff, was formed at Rembertow, near Warsaw. Kulikov spent considerable time at both staffs during the past year. Eighty percent of the Warsaw Pact staff group at Legnica was made up by Soviet officers, with only 20 percent from other Warsaw Pact nations. The Polish representative to this staff was General Stanislaw ((Antos)). (Source Comment: Antos is a "Russian in Polish uniform," who, although an officer in the Polish armed forces, is of strong Russian orientation and married to a Soviet. He works normally in Moscow as the Polish representative to the staff of the Combined Armed Forces.)

8. Members of these staffs visited units of the Polish army (including military district headquarters, divisions, and regiments) to attempt to evaluate the reliability of Polish armed forces, although under the pretext of evaluating combat readiness. At first these contacts were made directly with the unit commanders. When Jaruzelski learned such direct contacts were being made, he instructed all unit commanders to accept such Soviet visits only if accompanied by a representative of the Polish General Staff. On one occasion Siwicki accompanied Shcheglov on a visit to a mechanized infantry regiment near Warsaw. When Shcheglov asked the commander what he would do if

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he were ordered to break a strike, Siwicki intervened, saying such questions must be directed to the General Staff, not to individual commanders, and excused the commander from answering. (Source Comment: Later in 1981, Jaruzelski and Siwicki decided they were not able to prevent direct contacts between the Soviets and individual commanders and dropped the insistence on General Staff accompaniment.)

9. Shcheglov's staff also attempted to influence the Polish armed forces during the crisis. Members of his staff spoke strongly for the need for decisive action against Solidarity and for a time encouraged the Polish military to stage a coup against the regime of Kania and Jaruzelski, who were at the time both firmly opposed to martial law. This policy was reversed by a directive from Moscow after the Czechoslovak party congress in April 1981, and Soviet officers in Poland changed their line from criticism to support of the regime. Jaruzelski was aware of the coup urging of Shcheglov and his staff and feared it.

10. In the summer of 1981, Kulikov attempted to increase Shcheglov's staff by some 11 officers, to include, in a break with previous practice, the assignment of Soviet officers to work in place in offices of the Polish General Staff and directly in Polish military district headquarters. Jaruzelski accepted only three additional Soviet slots, all to remain in the Warsaw office. He totally rejected the idea of assigning Soviets directly to Polish staff or troop units. Jaruzelski and Kulikov exchanged very strong words on this subject in a personal meeting, which ended with Kulikov storming out and slamming the door.

11. At the end of 1980, the Soviets floated a proposed new concept that would alter the status of the official representations to all the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact armies. This proposal, as outlined at that time, would have raised the status of the Soviet representative to equate it to the rank of the Minister of National Defense and would have increased the access and influence of the Soviet representations. The concept would have given the Soviet representatives the right to participate in meetings of all the "collegial" bodies of the Ministry of National Defense (such as the Military Council, the Collegium of Vice Ministers, etc.) and on operational levels of the General Staff and military district headquarters. This proposal was floated unofficially, apparently to test the reaction of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries. The Poles rejected the concept as unacceptable. (Source Comment: Source opined that the other East European countries also must have had res-

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servations since the Soviets withdrew the document outlining the proposal. Source understood the concept was not dead, however, and expected it would eventually be raised at a future meeting of the Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Committee.)

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