

An INTERVIEW With  
Genmaj Otto REMER



THE 20 JUL 44 PLOT

EUCOM : HD : OMB

Copy 2

MIS-209919 (CPM)

DECLASSIFIED AND APPROVED  
FOR RELEASE BEST COPY  
BY THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AVAILABLE  
AGENCY

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
HISTORICAL DIVISION  
SPECIAL STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY  
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

12 July 1949

Note to: ETHER 63

By: Kenneth W. Hochler  
Major, Infantry (Res)

No record in German was made at the time of this oral interview, inasmuch as Lt. Verriam took notes in English on the remarks of General Bemer as they were translated by the interpreter. Lt. Verriam then used his English notes as the basis for this report which he prepared after the completion of the oral interview.

This was the only oral or written interview which Lt. Verriam had concerning matters other than the Ardennes Offensive. From previous readings on the 20 July 1944 plot, Lt. Verriam was particularly interested in collecting details on this affair, with the possible hope that he might later publish a book or magazine article devoted to the German story behind this plot.

(The first paragraph of the above is based on a general knowledge of the way in which Lt. Verriam operated; the second paragraph is based on what Lt. Verriam told me personally.)

EXHIBIT 63 - ( )

Title : 1st Lt. Col. W. H. H. H.  
Source : General (then Capt) Hagen, Otto  
Position : Capt, Third Regt. "Teufelkuehn"  
Date : 15 Aug 45  
Place : PW Camp # 24, Third US Army  
Interviewer : 1st Lt Robert A. Ferris  
Interpreter : S/S Walter E. Baker, IF. Team # 116

1951 I 8 AM

RECEIVED  
FBI  
WASHINGTON - D. C.  
JAN 15 1951  
*[Handwritten signature]*

THIS IS A COPY OF THE INFORMATION CONTAINED  
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/20/2001 BY 60322  
UCBAW/KRM/STP

FORM NO. 1

1. After five years of fighting with the Div "Grosdeutschland," in France, the Balkans, and Russia, I was brought back to Berlin for a rest, and was given command of the Honor Battalion guarding the Government headquarters. Prior to this command, I had been action commander of a panzer grenadier company in the Div "Grosdeutschland." This Battalion (Grenadiers), besides having the mission of protecting the Government, also represented the Army in Berlin.

2. When I came to command of the Battalion, my previous command was not to be on guard because on September 1st, 1943 (exact date not known), a plot had been attempted against the Government but had been repelled in the end. My predecessor further advised that this plot had never been disclosed, not even to Goebbels, because it was thought it would be better not to disclose the incident by letting it be known that an attempt had been made to overthrow the Government. I found out later that the person who had been responsible, according to what I heard, was at that time in contact with a military foreign officer in Berlin, and that, if any revolution did start, that person would be a very great menace.

3. In general, I speak for the defense of the world's peace, and for the mobilization of the people's power, and of which involves the use of the influence and force of Berlin. I am not speaking for the overthrow of either the Government or the Government of the world, but for the revolution of the people's power, and of which involves the use of the force of the people's power. "Overthrow" is not a revolution, but a revolution.

4. About 1500 on 29 Jul 44, I received a telephone call giving the code word "Onzeisau." This call came from the Office of the Military Commander in Berlin, Gen von Hassa; I was ordered to report to him immediately. I arrived at the Commander's office and found a number of general officers and other high personages already assembled there. When I entered the room, I noticed that the G-3 (ID: not further identified) appeared very pale and that apparently a note by the name of Maj von Hagen had replaced him. The atmosphere was very tense. I was told that the Fuehrer had died by accident, that a revolution had broken out, that the executive power had passed to the Army, and that I was to block off a certain number of the Government buildings so that no one could get in or out.

5. This statement, coincided with the beginning of the air attack and the starting of the confusion and disorder in the city. To all eyes, including myself, it was clear that the following questions were:

- (1) Is the Fuehrer dead?
- (2) What is the revolution? I am sure we will see your headquarters dropping.
- (3) Are we revolutionaries? Are we traitors?
- (4) The high executive power passed to the Army - what does this mean? (Straight?)
- (5) What are the measures to be taken?
- (6) Who has signed the orders? Who is in control of the city?

6. I received no satisfactory answer to these questions.

However, I returned to my Battalion and immediately called a conference of officers at which I ordered a ring placed around the Government buildings, and gave instructions that no one was to accept any orders unless they were given by me personally. The entire situation looked suspicious to me, but I did not know what was going on.

7. Although the ring was placed around the Government buildings, it was not complete because the subway had not been cut off, nor had communications been cut. The Army Headquarters had been told that an Obstlt Wolter would be down to assist me in these technical matters. When this officer arrived, he immediately said that I need not be afraid of him, that he was not a spy. This made me extremely suspicious because I could not understand why he would think I would regard him as a spy unless something unusual was going on.

8. After the meeting of my officers, one of my lieutenants, named Haren, called me aside and said that he wished to report what he had seen Genfldt von Bruchitoch in the streets. He expressed concern as to why at this as Von Bruchitoch had been retired for some time and was not often seen in Berlin. The lieutenant suggested that he contact a man for whom he worked prior to his entrance into the Army. He said this man was not one of the "Master race" and might be able to give some suggestions on the situation. I sent him to see this former employer of his.

9. After we formed the ring around the Government buildings, I was ordered to watch particularly the section near the railroad station, which was where the security police were located. A short time later, as I was moving through the streets, I spotted an Oast Schaefer, whom I

The following information was obtained from a review of the records of the Bureau of Prisons, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., and the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., in connection with the activities of the Communist Party, U. S. A., and the National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C., in the city of New York, New York, during the period from January 1, 1943, to January 1, 1945.

The following information was obtained from a review of the records of the Bureau of Prisons, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., and the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., in connection with the activities of the Communist Party, U. S. A., and the National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C., in the city of New York, New York, during the period from January 1, 1943, to January 1, 1945.

The following information was obtained from a review of the records of the Bureau of Prisons, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., and the records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice, Washington, D. C., in connection with the activities of the Communist Party, U. S. A., and the National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C., in the city of New York, New York, during the period from January 1, 1943, to January 1, 1945.



superior, I finally decided that I should go to see him despite the fact that Von Hesse had refused my request.

13. I went to Goebbels' office and was immediately ushered in to see him. Before I had gone in, I had told a group of my men I had brought with me that if I were not back in 20 minutes they should come up to get me. I did this because I did not fully trust Goebbels and wanted to make sure that he was not also involved.

14. I was immediately admitted to Goebbels' office and the first question that he asked me was, "Are you a Nazi officer?" I told him that I had taken my oath to the Fuehrer and that I intended to keep it even if he were dead. Goebbels then said, "What do you know about the situation?" I told him what I had previously heard, and he said that this could not be true because he had talked to the Fuehrer over the telephone. I then asked Goebbels if he were behind the situation; he said he did not know and I told him that he was a liar and that he was not behind it. I told him that I had done and would do such as I thought it was desirable to do; I was still not absolutely sure in that Goebbels was loyal. I told him that I wanted to talk with the Fuehrer to ascertain for myself that he was still alive. He said this could be arranged in three minutes from talking with the Fuehrer. He said to me, "Do you have the original and submitters of the Western Front. Only the officers are involved and we will eliminate the rest of the work. It is a plan for a historic position. You are responsible to use your best. The Fuehrer is waiting until Hitler arrives to take over the replacement duty. Do you understand me?"

At the end of the conversation, Goering, who was present, asked me what the Fuehrer had said and I related the conversation in substance. I also told Goering that I had immediately confirmed the actual situation to the Admiral (S) moving toward Berlin and that I would inform General von Bismarck of the situation and do everything I could to prevent unnecessary bloodshed.

15. By this time, a tank formation had been alerted and was assembling in the Berliner Platz. Although this group thought that I was with the revolution, I was able to get in touch with them just in time to prevent any bloodshed. I then assumed command of the tanks and used them to help prevent any shots being fired. Six officers to whom I spoke believed me when I said Hitler was alive and that I knew what to do. I called on the replacement Army to send additional troops. Previously, Goering had said he was going to call out the SA, but I told him that the SA were not to be called out. That it was to be the Army and they were to be in the Berliner Platz.

16. At this time, there was a report of some shooting and I was ordered to check the sector where the bombing of the palace was supposed to be. Although the new government had placed troops from a regular unit and of this unit, I was able to call out the SA in order to effect their withdrawal. When I went to the area where shooting which had been reported by Goering, I saw Gen. Bismarck (S) (Colonel Paul von Bismarck) of the replacement Army. I said to him, "I am here to see you at the Berliner Platz. What are your orders for the new situation?" He answered me, "Chief of the Gestapo (S) probably Paul von Bismarck."

Kaltenbrunner, Chief of Security Police and Security Service), also came and shortly thereafter Hitler arrived; the crisis had passed.

17. I will not relate to you the happenings at the Hindenburg, which I have heard only from people who were there. Count von Stauffenberg, who had placed the bomb in Hitler's headquarters, which was in Eastenburg at that time, believed that Hitler was dead because he had successfully placed the bomb, heard the explosion, and gotten away. Von Stauffenberg returned to Berlin by airplane, but, typical of the mentality of the plotters, had neglected to arrange for a car to meet him at the airport. As a result, he had to wait an hour for transportation into town.

18. Von Stauffenberg went to the Hindenburg, where, with Colonel Hagen and others, he tried to play it revolution. At this time, General Fromm tried to arrest Stauffenberg, but instead was arrested himself by the Military Police. (It is this officer who is identified as General Friedrich Fromm, General Guderian's superior at his arrest, that follows in the transcript. General Fromm was executed in 1948 for his participation in the plot, it can only be assumed that either he was executed for a crime of which he was innocent or, seeing that the plot was doomed to failure, decided to try to save himself by turning on his fellow conspirators.) At this point, Fromm requested Von Brauchitsch to come to the Hindenburg. Von Brauchitsch had been asked to participate in the attack, but he was not interested and had returned to his home. The former ruler of Lithuania III, General von Hertefeld, was also invited to participate, and was arrested when he refused to take part.

19. The entire thing was very naive. Telephones were broken and neither the population nor the Army was against Hitler. If the plot had been successful, Hitler and the Nazis would have been a great success. It is clear that with the Dutch they had no effect.

20. General Fortschlager was a private of the Dutch Army. He was a soldier, he was a soldier, and he was a soldier and other things about the plot. For some reason, it attracted the attention of some general officers on the front lines, and their officers or their friends and their friends had been in the plot and they had been in the plot, for they had been in the plot and they had been in the plot. Some officers were also in the plot and they were in the plot and they were in the plot. Some officers were also in the plot and they were in the plot and they were in the plot. Some officers were also in the plot and they were in the plot and they were in the plot. Some officers were also in the plot and they were in the plot and they were in the plot.

21. During the time the brains of the Dutch roots with Count von Hatzfeldt.

020441  
1 H  
1 C  
1 A

SECRET

SECRET

ORIG: 3rd Third US Army  
DATE: 30 August 1945  
REF: A 001

HEADQUARTERS  
THIRD UNITED STATES ARMY  
Interrogation Center (Provisional)

INTERROGATION REPORT No 74

Source: ROSE, Otto, General Pilot, AIC 1372 30 August 1945

CONTENTS

I. COVER AND DECEPTION PRIOR TO THE ARDENNES OFFENSIVE

(Based on USMC Interrogation Brief No 3,  
dated 13 July 1945)

MIS-204419 (CPM)

Dist-1

CPM-2

4 ml - 1

Route

Lab

26 OCT 1945

SECRET

S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No 34

I. Cover and Deception Prior to the ARDENNES Offensive

This report was prepared in answer to USNET Interrogation Brief No 3, dated 13 July 1945.

Preamble. Generalmajor Otto Ernst REIMER, source for the answers to this questionnaire, is the Major REIMER, formerly in command of the Nachbataillon in BERLIN, who was instrumental in checking the military follow-through of the 20 July 1944 plot against HITLER's life. He assumed command of the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade (Brigade REIMER) shortly before the ARDENNES offensive.

The Fuehrer Begleit Brigade left BASTENBURG, Ostpreussen, about 25 November for DANN, (Hifel) (GSGS 4346/R 51/L 3577) and was first committed in the ST VITH area (GSGS 4042/G/P 83), whence it advanced towards LAROCHE (GSGS 4042/G/P 47). On 27 December Brigade REIMER was committed west of BASTOGNE (GSGS 4042/G/P 55) in order to secure German positions in this sector.

Brigade REIMER was composed of the following elements at the start of the ARDENNES offensive:

Flak Abteilung  
Grenadier Bataillon 1 (SPW)  
Grenadier Bataillon 2 (Mot)  
Grenadier Bataillon zbV 928 (later Grenadier Bataillon 3)  
Artillerie Abteilung  
Panzer Abteilung  
Heeres Sturgeschutz Abteilung 200  
Panzer Regiments Stab  
Nachrichten Abteilung  
Feld Ersatz Abteilung

Answers to the Questionnaire.

1. What security measures were adopted by German unit commanders between the time they received initial orders concerning the ARDENNES offensive and 16 December 1944?

a. Radio security. From the arrival of the Fuehrer Begleit Brigade in the west in early December 1944 until the commitment of the brigade on 18 December 1944, the unit kept a strict radio silence. There were no exercises with radio-communication sets. Even the use of private radio sets at lowest level was prohibited.

b. False radio traffic. Although the Brigade REIMER used no false radio traffic, some was employed by higher echelons.

c. Security of troop movements to avoid identification by aircraft. Before and during the offensive all troop movements were executed by night or in unfavorable flying weather.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No 34

I. Cover and Deception Prior to the ARDENNES Offensive  
(Continued)

In clear weather only single vehicles were permitted to travel on roads. An order was issued that convoys which had hauled supplies to the front during the night should travel during daylight in an eastward direction in order to deceive the enemy by feigning a withdrawal of troops from the front lines. Vehicles, particularly tracked armored vehicles, were parked in woods outside of towns. AA defenses were passive, and only in case of an air attack on military targets were they to open fire.

Special care was taken to enforce camouflage discipline in towns. Traces of activity were removed, and the assembly or marching of large bodies of men was prohibited. The use of road-markers and sign-posts by units in villages or on roads was prohibited; unit markers were not displayed on billets. Only during actual road searches could markers be posted, showing the names of commanding officers as unit identification. Road control by military police was very strict, and roads could be used by unit convoys only in accordance with a schedule. All vehicle bumper markings were painted over. During the transport of tanks on railway flatcars, camouflage had to conceal the vehicles in such a way that they could not be recognized from the air as tanks.

Supply dumps of all kinds were dispersed very skillfully in forests, especially pine woods. Roads leading to and from supply installations were widened to avoid traffic jams. RR trains near the zone of operations were kept in tunnels or in woods during daylight. The unloading of trains was spread over many small stations, and facilities were provided so that unloading could be done very quickly. Motor vehicles could drive only to within 10 km of the front. Artillery, ammunition, and bridge-building equipment was moved by horse-drawn vehicles the last 10 km.

At night, strict blackout discipline was maintained.

Many of these security measures had been SOP in the Wehrmacht for some time. However, during the period in question special care was taken to insure strictest enforcement of these rules.

d. Issuance of detailed orders only to senior officers. All preparations for the offensive were carefully concealed from tactical commanders as well as from the troops. Rumors were spread intimating that the troop concentrations were necessary to hold off an expected Allied attack from north of the Eifel. Orientation was given to small groups of officers, scheduled according to the importance of each unit's mission, and held as shortly as possible before the start of the offensive. This schedule (Taktikalender) was approximately as follows: Briefing for Corps commanders, D minus eight days; for division commanders, D minus six days; for lower echelon unit commanders, D minus one day. Before the briefing, each officer was sworn to secrecy, and told that violation would be punished by death.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No 74

I. Cover and Deception Prior to the BRENNING Offensive  
(Continued)

REYER himself took part in two briefings and sandtable exercises. The first one took place at Corps headquarters approximately eight days before the start of the offensive. He does not remember which corps it was. Here he was informed about his mission for the first time. The second briefing was held at headquarters of General KRIEGER's XLVIII Corps.

The following problems were discussed: movement into assembly and jumping-off areas; artillery positions and ammunition supply; disposition of elements not taking part in the attack; movement of bridge-building equipment; method of attack for units taking part in the jump-off (shock troops treating for weak spots, etc); supply of reinforcements; dealing with pockets of resistance in overrun areas; supplies.

No notes could be taken during the briefing, and maps and orders used were collected again at the end of the meeting. Missions and problems which came up during the exercises could be referred to or employed only indirectly in discussions with other officers or in the training of troops. Orders, both written and verbal, maps, etc, could be handled only by a liaison officer especially assigned to this job. During troop movements or on the march into the assembly area, nothing could be disclosed to the men, and only one day before the commitment were they informed about their mission.

e. Censorship. Shortly before and during a move by rail, no letters or other communications could be sent by the troops, and censorship of mail in general was tightened before the start of the offensive. Troops were strictly forbidden to use the civilian postal system, or to telegraph, and only letters containing general information were passed by the censors. The civilian postal system was also placed under censorship.

f. Special security indoctrination of individuals. There was an officer in the GCO, and subject matter of the security lectures usually given to troops by their unit commanders; however, these lectures were given more frequently during the period before the start of the offensive. These sessions also were used, REYER states, for the deliberate spreading of false rumors.

2. Give details concerning the movement of troops immediately prior to the BRENNING offensive.

a. Time and place of departure. The Brigade REYER left the area of REYER, St. Piusen, by RR on 25 and 26 November 1944; it comprised only units of the Brigade stationed in the vicinity of REYER, RG.

S E C R E T



S E C R E T

INTERROGATION REPORT No 34

I. Cover and Deception Prior to the ARIENNES Offensive  
(Continued)

b. Time and place of arrival. The units mentioned in a. above arrived in the area of DUM (Lifel) (GSGS 4346/K 51/L 3577), on 29 and 30 November 1944. The following units arrived in the DUM area in the order listed below, during December, the last one arriving 15 December 1944:

Artillery Abteilung (newly activated)  
Heeres Sturmgeschuetz Abteilung  
Panzer Abteilung  
Panzer Regiments Stab

c. Method of transportation. Transportation was by rail, save for a few small motor convoys.

S-2:

THOMAS L KING  
Major, Infantry  
Commanding

DISTRIBUTION:

Third US Army Distributions "A" and "H" plus

	<u>Copies</u>
AC of S, G-2, Hq USEPT, APO 757, US Army	15
Theater Interrogation Center, APO 757, US Army	1
AC of S, G-2, Seventh US Army, APO 758, US Army	3
Seventh US Army Interrogation Center, APO 758, US Army	1
AC of S, G-2, Enclave Military District, APO 29, US Army	2
Enclave Military District Interrogation Center, APO 29, US Army	1
AC of S, G-2, Captured Personnel and Materiel Branch, US War Department, Pentagon Bldg, Washington 25, DC	4
OSS Mission for Germany (Attn CID), APO 655, US Army	5
BGS (I) 21 Army Group (Main) RLA	12
US Group Control Council, Intelligence Section, Attn: Maj US Eakin, APO 742, US Army	10
AC of S, G-2, US Hq Berlin District, APO 955, US Army	2
Berlin District Interrogation Center, APO 755, US Army	2
AC of S, G-2, US US Forces, Austria, APO 777, US Army	5

S E C R E T