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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AUTHORITY

N.I.A. DIRECTIVE NO. 8

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS - CHINA

INTRODUCTION

1. In order to fulfill the National Intelligence mission, as given to the National Intelligence Authority by the President, it is necessary to announce and maintain the current essentials of National Intelligence desired, and a list of intelligence objectives from which those essentials may be produced. These statements as a group will hereafter be known as National Intelligence Requirements, and will form the broad basis for coordinated production of intelligence.

2. It has been decided initially to evolve the operating procedures and the mechanics of interagency coordination necessary to the production of intelligence based on a formulation of National Intelligence Requirements by publishing these requirements for one particular area, i.e., the China area, basing their contents on that intelligence currently regarded the most essential. For this purpose, these requirements will obtain until circumstances demand their revision. In any event, they will be reviewed quarterly.

3. Accordingly, the National Intelligence Requirements - China are published herewith in two parts as follows:

- A. Current Essentials of National Intelligence.
- B. National Intelligence Objectives.

4. The Central Intelligence Group will issue such coordinating requests for intelligence to various agencies as are necessary, and will recommend in three months from date of publication any changes in methods and procedures which should be applied as standing operating procedures for publication of national requirements.



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A. CURRENT ESSENTIALS OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE

1. The Current Essentials of National Intelligence consist of that foreign intelligence which is currently essential to the National Government in making sound decisions, developing foreign policy, conducting foreign relations, avoiding surprise, and otherwise planning for and maintaining the national security.

2. The following current essentials of National Intelligence for the China area are announced, and constitute the basis for the production of national intelligence on that area:

a. What are the developments in the China area*

to show increased activity by the USSR to:

- (1) Split-off territory from China?
- (2) Support the Chinese Communist Party?
- (3) Secure unilateral political or economic influence in China?
- (4) Discredit U. S. Forces and aims in China?

b. What is the current Nationalist policy as it affects:

- (1) Cessation of hostilities?
- (2) Coalition?
- (3) Foreign relations, particularly with the USSR, U.S.?
- (4) Economic and agrarian development?

c. What are the capabilities and probable intentions of the Chinese Communist Party in political, economic and military spheres?

B. NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVES

1. The National Intelligence Objectives are announced as a guide to the production of intelligence pertaining to the China area which, when met, would fully satisfy the Current

* China (including Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, Sinkiang) and Outer Mongolia, and Korea.

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Essentials of National Intelligence. These objectives are to be regarded as the basis upon which all phases of intelligence production can be fully coordinated among the appropriate offices of C.I.G. and the intelligence agencies. The specific formulations in this section are designed to elicit intelligence which will aid in judging the success of or threats to U.S. - China policy in respect to the goals of Chinese peace, unity, democracy and rehabilitation, non-intervention, and foreign trade.

a. Trends in policy of the National Government with respect to:

(1) Coalition, the Constitution, structure of government and locus of power, civil liberties, education and labor.

(2) Industrialization including the integration into China proper of Manchurian industry, state control and private enterprise, government finance, agrarian reform, foreign business in China, and Chinese foreign trade.

b. Trends in policy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with respect to terms for participation in coalition government, reorganization of their armies and control by the National Government, relinquishment to a coalition government of centralized controls over the administration of Communist-dominated areas.

c. Relations between the Chinese Communists and the USSR, with special emphasis on high-level liaison, or on signs of cleavage between the CCP and USSR in policy toward the National Government, contiguous territories, the U. S., and domestic Chinese issues.

d. Soviet military strength and disposition in China, including Manchuria, and in North Korea,

Mongolia and Soviet Siberia, including details of air, ground and naval forces; evidences of stockpiling; construction or improvement in air facilities and construction or improvement in all communications networks.

e. Soviet military aid to Chinese Communists with details, and evidences of any increase or decrease; information on traffic of military significance between Communist-controlled Shantung, Manchuria, and North Korea, or trans-Mongolian traffic.

f. Activities of Soviet agencies in Kuomintang and Communist China, and effectiveness of Soviet propaganda in China and classes which are influenced or reached by it.

g. Current political conditions in Manchuria, with special emphasis on the attitudes of the local peoples toward the Chinese Communists, National Government, other political groups, USSR, and USA.

h. Strength, composition, organization and leadership of Chinese minority parties; attitude toward National Government, Communists, USSR, USA; freedom of function under National Government.

i. The development of Chinese industry, particularly iron and steel, shipping, electric power, textiles, petroleum, and light metals.

j. Crop conditions and food reserves in the areas controlled by the National Government and the Chinese Communists.

k. Communist military potential, in comparison with that of the National Government, including reserves, equipment, capabilities of both air and ground forces, and ability to provide logistic support.