

CTR-Mode Encryption

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
What is CTR Mode?

- * The simplest correct way to encrypt using a block cipher
- * An old mode, dating to DH79, but omitted from earlier FIPS
- * A Vernam cipher (like a one-time pad), but no state is maintained by the sender

Why the renewed interest?


- * Because CTR mode is fully parallelizable, making it much more efficient, in many contemporary usage scenarios, than modes like CBC.

CTR Mode Encryption



The ciphertext is $C[1] C[2] C[3]$ and something adequate to recover ctr

CTR Mode Decryption



The plaintext is $M = M[1] M[2] M[3]$

Where does the **ctr** come from?

- * It is supplied on the encrypting side (like the IV in CBC mode)
- * It is **crucial** that no **ctr+i** value be repeated - repeating such a value is like reusing a one-time pad.
- * Recommended way of making **ctr** :

ctr = **nonce** || 0000 ... 0000

..64 bits 64 zero bits ...

Advantages

- * Faster SW speed on modern processors (Itanium, Alpha, AltiVec, etc.)
- * Essentially unlimited HW speed
- * Provably secure (Same bounds as CBC MAC, same assumption [BDJR])
- * Random access to the "middle" of the ciphertext
- * Preprocessing possible
- * Arbitrary message lengths
- * No need to implement E^{-1}
- * Completely patent-free

Complaint

Answer

No integrity

Right. Just like all the other conventional modes. For integrity, use a

No error propagation

So what.

Sender needs state or \$

Right. True of any secure enc scheme

Sensitive to usage errors

Some validity. Be clear : *do not reuse a*
! Counter/nonce distinction helps

encryption

MAC sec bound authenticated-encryption mode.

Interaction with weak

Use with strong block cipher

ciphers

Like other modes; n=128 makes OK

ctr value