



# Training & Software Security Engineering: CWE


# Knowing what could make software vulnerable to attack




Robert A. Martin 28 February 2011



## **Today Everything's Connected**




### **The Software Supply Chain**




\* "Scope of Supplier Expansion and Foreign Involvement" graphic in DACS <u>www.softwaretechnews.com</u> Secure Software Engineering, July 2005 article "Software Development Security: A Risk Management Perspective" synopsis of May 2004 GAO-04-678 report "Defense Acquisition: Knowledge of Software Suppliers Needed to Manage Risks" If the weaknesses in software were as easy to spot and their impact as obvious as...



## CVE 1999 to 2011




## Vulnerability Type Trends: A Look at the CVE List (2001 - 2007)



- -- XSS
- 🗕 buf
- 📥 sql-inject
- → dot
- --- infoleak
- --- dos-malform
- link
- format-string
- --- crypt
- --- priv
- 🔶 perm
- → metachar




## Removing and Preventing the Vulnerabilities Requires More Specific Definitions....CWEs



## Exploitable Software Weaknesses (a.k.a. Vulnerabilities)

Vulnerabilities can be the outcome of non-secure practices and/or malicious intent of someone in the development/support lifecycle.

The exploitation potential of a vulnerability is independent of the "intent" behind how it was introduced.



Intentional vulnerabilities are spyware & malicious logic deliberately imbedded (and might not be considered defects but they can make use of the same weakness patterns as unintentional mistakes)

## **Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)**

- dictionary of weaknesses
  - weaknesses that can lead to exploitable vulnerabilities (i.e. CVEs)
  - the things we don't want in our code, design, or architecture
  - web site with XML of content, sources of content, and process used
- structured views
  - provides multiple views into CWE dictionary content
  - supports alternate views developer/researcher/sub-views
- open community process
  - to facilitate common terms/ concepts/facts and understanding
  - allows for vendors, developers, system owners and acquirers to understand tool capabilities/ coverage and priorities
     utilize community expertise

Foundation for other DHS, NSA, OSD, NIST, OWASP, SANS, and OMG SwA Efforts

Making Security Measurable


Building Software only require a few skills and basic understanding... ...but sailing ships in the open ocean and building commerce and defense capabilities based upon them requires understanding...





...surface maps didn't capture the full set of threats and hazards – i.e. what was really going on...

...a more insightful depiction – one that shows what was going on under the surface – was needed...



....so "soundings" were made in important areas to identify and locate hidden hazards...

...and warning signals to help others avoid known hazards were erected along with...






...indicators showing safe ways to avoid the known hazards...








...but new types of threats and hazards can occur in unexpected places and in new ways and...




...some threats and hazards are unpredictable and dynamic...







## were out there trying to locate vulnerabilities and weaknesses in their technologies, processes, or bractices...




...and so they also had to deal with active and intelligent threats...





...with defensive and offensive security capabilities.




## Software [In]security: Cyber Warmongering and Influence Peddling




By Gary McGraw and Ivan Arce Nov 24, 2010 Article is provided courtesy of Addison-Wesley Professional


"For years in computer security, we have been attempting to protect the broken stuff from the bad people by placing a barrier between the bad people and the broken stuff. We have failed. Instead, we need to fix the broken stuff so that attacking it successfully takes far more resources and skill than is currently the case."




Making Security Measurable\*

mmm





## **CWE is Meant for People to Use**




## **CWE web site visitors by City**



## Some High-Level CWEs Are Now Part of the NVD CVE Information

automation of	Overview
vulnerability	overview
management, security measurement, and	SQL injection vulnerability in mods/banners/navlist.php in Clansphere 2007.4 allows remote
compliance (e.g. FISMA).	attackers to execute arbitrary SQL commands via the cat_id parameter to index.php in a
compliance (e.g. FISMA).	banners action.
Resource Status	
NVD contains:	Impact
26736 CVE Vulnerabilities	
114 <u>Checklists</u>	CVSS Severity (version 2.0):
91 US-CERT Alerts	CVSS v2 Base score: <u>7.5</u> (High) ( <u>AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:P/A:P</u> ) (legend) Impact Subscore: 6.4
1997 US-CERT Vuln Notes	Exploitability Subscore: 10.0
2966 OVAL Queries	
12410 Vulnerable Products	Access Vector: Network exploitable
Last updated: 09/26/07	Access Complexity: Low
CVE Publication rate:	Authentication: Not required to exploit
16 vulnerabilities / day	Impact Type: Provides unauthorized access, Allows partial confidentiality, integrity, and availability violation, Allows unauthorized disclosure of information, Allows disruption of
Email List	service
Email List	
Select the email list(s)	References to Advisories, Solutions, and Tools
you wish to join, enter	
your e-mail address and	External Source: BID (disclaimer)
press "Add" to receive	Name: 25770
NVD announcements or SCAP information.	Hyperlink: http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25770
NVD Announcements	
Contraction and the second	External Source: MILWORM (disclaimer) Name: 4443
SCAP Announcements	Name: 4443 Hyperlink: http://www.milw0rm.com/exploits/4443
SCAP Discussion List	rypermik. <u>http://www.nniworm.com/exploits/4445</u>
XCCDF Discussion List	Vulnerable software and versions
Add	
	Configuration 1
Workload Index	– Clansphere, Clansphere, 2007.4
Vulnerability Workload	
Index: 9.06	
About Us	Technical Details
NVD is a product of the	
NIST Computer Security	Vulnerability Type ( <u>View All</u> )
Division and is sponsored	SQL Injection ( <u>CWE-89</u> )
by the Department of	CVE Standard Vulnerability Entry:
Homeland Security's	http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-5061
National Cyber Security	
Division. It supports the	Common Diatform Enumoration

### NVD XML feeds also include CWE



The Security Development Lifecycle : MS08-078 and the SDL

http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/archive/2008/12/18/ms08-078-and-the-sdl.aspx

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### **Recent Posts**

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Security Vulnerability Research & Defense Visual Studio Code Analysis Blog

MSRC Ecosystem Strategy Team

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The Security Development Lifecycle (Howard and Lipner) Privacy Guidelines for Developing Software Products and Services

Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) – Portal

Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) – Process Guidance (Web) MS08-078 and the SDL \*\*\*\*\*

### Hi, Michael here.

Every bug is an opportunity to learn, and the security update that fixed the data binding bug that affected Internet Explorer users is no exception.

The Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) entry for this bug is CVE-2008-4844.

Before I get started, I want to explain the goals of the SDL and the security work here at Microsoft. The SDL is designed as a multi-layered process to help systemically reduce security vulnerabilities; if one component of the SDL process fails to prevent or catch a bug, then some other component should prevent or catch the bug. The SDL also mandates the use of security defenses whose impact will be reflected in the "mitigations" section of a security bulletin, because we know that no software development process will catch all security bugs. As we have said many times, the goal of the SDL is to "Reduce vulnerabilities, and reduce the severity of what's missed."

In this post, I want to focus on the SDL-required code analysis, code review, fuzzing and compiler and operating system defenses and how they fared.

### Background

The bug was an invalid pointer dereference in MSHTML.DLL when the code handles data binding. It's important to point out that there is no heap corruption and there is no heap-based buffer overrun!

When data binding is used, IE creates an object which contains an array of data binding objects. In the code in question, when a data binding object is released, the array length is not correctly updated leading to a function call into freed memory.

The vulnerable code looks a little like this (by the way, the real array name is \_aryPXfer, but I figured ArrayOfObjectsFromIE is a little more descriptive for people not in the Internet Explorer team.)

int MaxIdx = ArrayOfObjectsFromIE.Size()-1;

for (int i=0; i <= MaxIdx; i++) {

if (!ArrayOfObjectsFromIE[i])

continue;

ArrayOfObjectsFromIE[i]->TransferFromSource();

...

3

Here's how the vulnerability manifests itself: if there are two data transfers with the same identifier (so MaxIdx is 2), and the first transfer updates the length of the ArrayOfObjectsFromIE array when its work was done and releases its data binding object, the loop count would still be whatever MaxIdx was at the start of the loop, 2.

This is a time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) bug that led to code calling into a freed memory block. The Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) classification for this vulnerability is CWE-367.

Microsoft Security Development Lifecycle (SDL) – Process Guidance

September 2008 (5)

August 2008 (2)


July 2008 (8) June 2008 (4) he fix was to check the maximum iteration count on each loop iteration rather than once before the loop

### a time-of-check-time-of-use (TOCTOU) bug that led to code calling into a freed memory block. The on Weakness Enumeration (CWE) classification for this vulnerability is <u>CWE-367</u>.

TOU issues. We will update our training to address this.

Our static analysis tools don't find this because the tools would need to understand the re-entrant nature of the code.

Fuzz Testing






Table 27. Most common programming errors found in ICS code.

Weakness Classification	Vulnerability Type
CWE-19: Data Handling	CWE-228: Improper Handling of Syntactically Invalid Structure
	CWE-229: Improper Handling of Values
	CWE-230: Improper Handling of Missing Values
	CWE-20: Improper Input Validation
	CWE-116: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output
	CWE-195: Signed to Unsigned Conversion Error
	CWE-198: Use of Incorrect Byte Ordering
CWE-119: Failure to Constrain Operations within the Bounds of a	CWE-120: Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ("Classic Buffer Overflow")
Memory Buffer	CWE-121: Stack-based Buffer Overflow
	CWE-122: Heap-based Buffer Overflow
	CWE-125: Out-of-bounds Read
	CWE-129: Improper Validation of Array Index
	CWE-131: Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size
	CWE-170: Improper Null Termination
	CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound
	CWE-680: Integer Overflow to Buffer Overflow
CWE-398: Indicator of Poor Code	CWE-454: External Initialization of Trusted Variables or Data Stores
Quality	CWE-456: Missing Initialization
	CWE-457: Use of Uninitialized Variable
	CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference
	CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption ("Resource Exhaustion")
	CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value
	CWE-690: Unchecked Return Value to NULL Pointer Dereference
	CWE-772: Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime
CWE-442: Web Problems	CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ("Path Traversal")
	CWE-79: Failure to Preserve Web Page Structure ("Cross-site Scripting")
	CWE-89: Failure to Preserve SQL Query Structure ("SQL Injection")
CWE-703: Failure to Handle	CWE-431: Missing Handler
Exceptional Conditions	CWE-248: Uncaught Exception
	CWE-755: Improper Handling of Exceptional Conditions
	CWE-390: Detection of Error Condition Without Action

## 16 July 2010

### A Human Capital Crisis in Cybersecurity

Technical Proficiency Matters

A White Paper of the CSIS Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency

COCHAIRS Representative James R. Langevin Representative Michael T. McCaul Scott Charney Lt. General Harry Raduege, USAF (ret.) based on a body of knowledge that represents the complete set of concepts, terms and activities that make up a professional domain. And absent such a body of knowledge there is little basis for supporting a certification program. Indeed it would be dangerous and misleading.

A complete body of knowledge covering the entire field of software engineering may be years away. However, the body of knowledge needed by professionals to create software free of common and critical security flaws has been developed, vetted widely and kept up to date. That is the foundation for a certification program in software assurance that can gain wide adoption. It was created in late 2008 by a consortium of national experts, sponsored by DHS and NSA, and was updated in late 2009. It contains ranked lists of the most common errors, explanations of why the errors are dangerous, examples of those errors in multiple languages, and ways of eliminating those errors. It can be found at <u>http://cwe.mitre.org/top25</u>.

Any programmer who writes code without being aware of those problems and is not capable of writing code free of those errors is a threat to his or her employers and to others who use computers connected to systems running his or her software.

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Makin Security Measurab Any programmer who writes code without being aware of those problems and is not capable of writing code free of those errors is a threat to his or her employers and to others who use computers connected to systems running his or her software.



#### Foreword

In 2008 the Software Assurance Forum for Excellence in Code (SAFECode) published the first version of this report in an effort to help others in the industry initiate or improve their own software assurance programs and encourage the industrywide adoption of what we believe to be the most fundamental secure development methods. This work remains our most in-demand paper and has been downloaded more than so.ooo times since its original release.

However, secure software development is not only a goal, it is also a process. In the nearly two and a half years since we first released this paper, the process of building secure software has continued to evolve and improve alongside innovations and advancements in the information and communications technology industry. Much has been learned not only through increased community collaboration. but also through the ongoing internal efforts of SAFECode's member companies. This 2nd Edition aims to help disseminate that new knowledge.

Just as with the original paper, this paper is not meant to be a comprehensive guide to all possible secure development practices. Rather, it is meant to provide a foundational set of secure development practices that have been effective in improving software security in real-world implementations by SAFECode members across their diverse development environments.

It is important to note that these are the "practiced practices" employed by SAFECode members, which we identified through an ongoing analysis of our members' individual software security efforts. By

bringing these methods together and sharing them with the larger community, SAFECode hopes to move the industry beyond defining theoretical best practices to describing sets of software engineering practices that have been shown to improve the security of software and are currently in use at leading software companies. Using this approach

enables SAFECode to encourage best practices that are proven and implementable even whe requirements and develop taken into account. Though expanded, ou key goa

remain-keep it concise, action What's New This edition of he paper prese undated security practices that during the Design, Programmir ties of the tware developme practices ave been shown to l diverse elopment environn also covered Training, R origina

Handling and Documentation n detailed treatment in SA giv and software integrity urity engineering trainin the global supply chain, and thus we have refined ur focus in this paper to ncentrate on the core areas of design, devel ment and testing

The paper also contains two important, additional sections for each listed practice that will further increases its value to implementers-Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) references and Verificatio guidance

SAFECode



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ample

**CWE** References

SAFECode

ration and communication related to the

ess. Some practitioners have hoped their Threat

eling process to the point where tools are used

tomate as much of it as possible, raising the

atability of the process and providing another

ation, integration with a threat database and

of support with standard diagramming.

cases, and execution of recurring tasks.

Much of CWE focuses on implementation issues, and Threat Modeling is a design-time event. There

## SAFECode 10001 Driving Security and Integrity

tive of the results of the Threat Model ac Threat Model itself will serve as a clear ro are available that support the Threat Modelocess with automated analysis of designs and enfication, containing enough informat each threat and mitigation can be verifie estions for possible mitigations, issue-tracking

> During verification, the Threat Model and mitigated threats, as well as the annotat tectural diagrams, should also be made a to testers in order to help define further and refine the verification process. A revi Threat Model and verification results sho made an integral part of the activities redeclare code complete.

An example of a portion of a test plan derived from a Threat Model could be:

rification plan is a dir

and Threat Modeling is a design-time event. There are, however, a number of CWEs that are applicable to the threat modeling process, including:	Threat Identified	Design Element(s)	Mitigation	Verification		
CWE-287: Improper authentication is an example of weakness that could be exploited by a Spoof- ing threat	Session Hijacking	GUI	Ensure ran- dom session identifiers of appropriate length	Collect session identifiers over a number of sessions and examine		
<ul> <li>CWE-264: Permissions, Privileges, and Access Controls is a parent weakness of many Tamper- ing, Repudiation and Elevation of Privilege</li> </ul>				distribution and length		
threats	Tampering with data	Process A on server to	Use SSL to ensure that	Assert that		
CWE-311: Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data is     an example of an Information Disclosure threat	in transit	Process B on client	data isn't modified in	tion cannot be established		
<ul> <li>CWE-400: (uncontrolled resource consumption) is one example of an unmitigated Denial of</li> </ul>			transit	without the use of SSL		
Service threat	←	<u> </u>	W			

SAFECode **Driving Security and Integrit** 

#### **Fundamental Practices for** Secure Software Development 2ND EDITION

A Guide to the Most Effective Secure **Development Practices in Use Today** 

February 8, 2011

#### EDITOR Stacy Simpson, SAFECode

#### AUTHORS


Mark Belk, Juniper Networks Matt Coles, EMC Corporation Cassio Goldschmidt, Symantec Corp. Michael Howard, Microsoft Corp. Kyle Randolph, Adobe Systems Inc.

Mikko Saario, Nokia Reeny Sondhi, EMC Corporation Izar Tarandach, EMC Corporation Antti Vähä-Sipilä, Nokia Yonko Yonchey, SAP AG

Making Security Measurable\*



5



Gartner Magic Quadrant for Static Application Security Testing Tools

Plus Some Other Important Tool Players...

Cenzic CAST Software Polyspace Security Innovation LDRA KDM Analytics SureLogic Programming Research Inc SofCheck


# **CWE Compatibility & Effectiveness Program**

# (launched Feb 2007)




Products are listed alphabetically by organization name:

with Declarations to Be CWE-Compatible.




# C/C++ "Breadth" Test Case Coverage


# Java "Breadth" Test Case Coverage





# **Code Analysis Effectiveness Assessment...**








MissingHandler

Namenic Errora

# **Common Security Errors in Programming**

The SARS Common Security Error in Programming map Restator the official employees in that are inspon-dde for the majority of the publicly in our maker sticition documently. 2004. It is based on the CVT Kommon Beatmen Incommitted that provide a unified, we should be of a between we alterate that will exclude more effective descention and action to find these weakers on a conversal- and effective them. The UNE was strendered in HATH' and sportword in the Department of Remelland Security. The number between parentheses represent the common evaluate stampanetics. To be such weakness Suphers between youan bradues are direct shidlens of the analyses listed. CVE De can be hand at the NUTRE CVE And are or accessed directly by putting the manifer implace of 2020 in the following Mill.



2009's Top 25 CVE Causes and important CWEs

Special thunks to Robert A. Martin of MITHE Corporation.

http://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitional###.html **Failure to Fulfill API Contract Behavioral Problems Channel and Path Errors** Handler Errors Security Features ('API Abuse') Behavioral Change in New Yersion or Environment Cryptographic issues Deployment of Wrong Handler Channel Enters. Credentials Management Expected Behavior Violation Wep Planty areas former Failure to Protect Alternate Path Failure to Clear Heap Memory Before Release Dangerous Hanaller not Disabled During Senation Uncontrolled Search Path Element Heap Inspection) · Unvertical Password Charge Masara Repaired Gryptographic Step Call to Non-abigaitour API - Maning Passaord Field Marking Ret Using a Bandom IV with CBC Made Unquarted Search Path on Element Unparted Raw Web Context Delivery Initialization and Week Cryptography for Parametric . Failure to Encrypt Sendere Data Use of Inherently Dangerous Function Untrusted Search Path - Wook Passmord Requirements -Chartest Garage of Security Montation lete Identification of Uploaded File Variables Wultiple Binds to the Same Port **Cleanup Errors** Not Using Parament Aging 12EE Rad Practices: Direct Management of Connections Insecure Default Variable Initialization Parrword Aging with Long Expiration Unnestricted File Upload Name allowed Description on the Party Name of Street, or other **Error Handling** Incorrect Check of Function Return Value Secure Attribute External Initialization of Trusted Variables Interflictently Protected Credentals Error Conditions, Raturn Values, Status Code · Bennethin One Was High Often Missaud, Arguments and Parameter Week Password Receivery Mechanism for Forgettee Reprint on Failed initial pation Failure to Use a Standard Gent Error Handling Mer Petroned · In adaptate Encryptics Strongth **User Interface Errors** Uncought Exception Missing Initialization Failure to Catch AE Exceptions in Service Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity - Use of a broken of Blong D Algorithms - 1177 UI Discrepancy for Security Feature Incomplete Ceanan - Grigte Walkdadion Error Nat Failing Security ( Tailing Open') Often Misused String Management · The of MLA Algorithm within a DARP Multiple Interpretations of Ut Input Improper Cleanup on Thrown Ecception. Improper Verbfacture of Gryptographic Signature Missing Carton Error Page 12EE Bad Practices: Direct Use of Sockets Permaniana, Privileges, and Access Controls **Ut Manuscreation of Ortical Information** the officer Stated South Unchacked Netzre Volum Acceptance of Extransmis Unitrative Data With Transed Data Faikare to Change Working Directory in chroot Jul - Permittion in such Pointer Issues successful distant Permission **Data Handling** Improperty Touried Revenue DNS Reliance on DNS Lookups in a Security Det **Konters Inhertual Parmasiers** otum of Pointer Value Outside of Expected Range Insufficient Type Distinction Insecure Preserved Informati Permissions Modification of Assumed-Immutable Data (MAID) Failure to Follow Specification Use of size of I on a Pointer Type legengan Hanillay et kenfi cert Permanen er Frailiges ter of inconvertility to Desire the Failure to Provide Specified Functionality iscorrect Pointer Scaling -Tailars to Add Sciegrity Clerck Value Actualized Army Indusing Patheness Trevertal and Excitations Briefs Incruser Validation of Intensity Check Value Use of Pointer Subtraction to Determine Size Increase Press action of Permanent correct Conversion Referent Human's Types Process Control Thust of System Event Date Exposed Unsale Active). 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
# Common Security Errors in Programming



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# 2009 SANS/CWE Top 25 Programming Errors (released 12 Jan 2009) cwe.mitre.org/top25/



Making Security Measurable\*

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# 20010 CWE/SANS Top 25 Programming Errors (released 16 Feb 2010) cwe.mitre.org/top25/

- Sponsored by:
  - National Cyber Security Division (DHS)
- List was selected by a group of security experts from 34 organizations including:
  - Academia: Purdue, Northern Kentucky University
  - Government: CERT, NSA, DHS
  - Software Vendors: Microsoft,
     Oracle, Red Hat, Apple, Juniper,
     McAfee, Symantec, Sun,
     RSA (of EMC)
  - Security Vendors: Veracode,
     Fortify, Mandiant, Cigital, SRI,
     Secunia, Breach, SAIC, Aspect,
  - Security Groups: OWASP, WASC




Making Security Measurable

# Main Goals


- Raise awareness for developers
- Help universities to teach secure coding
- Empower customers who want to ask for more secure software
- Provide a starting point for in-house software shops to measure their own progress





critical programming errors that can lead to serious software vulnerabilities. They are often easy to find, and easy to exploit. They are dangerous because they will frequently allow attackers to completely take over the software, steal data, or prevent the software from working at all.

The Top 25 list is a tool for education and awareness to help programmers to prevent the kinds of vulnerabilities that plague the software industry, by identifying and avoiding all-too-common mistakes that occur before software is even shipped. Software customers can use the same list to help them to ask for more secure software. Researchers in software security can use the Top 25 to



## **Insecure Interaction Between Components**

These weaknesses are related to insecure ways in which data is sent and received between separate components, modules, programs, processes, threads, or systems.

- <u>CWE-20</u>: Improper Input Validation
- <u>CWE-116</u>: Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output
- <u>CWE-89</u>: Failure to Preserve SQL Query Structure (aka 'SQL Injection')
- <u>CWE-79</u>: Failure to Preserve Web Page Structure (aka 'Cross-site Scripting')
- <u>CWE-78</u>: Failure to Preserve OS Command Structure (aka 'OS Command Injection')
- <u>CWE-319</u>: Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information
- <u>CWE-352</u>: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
- <u>CWE-362</u>: Race Condition

<u>CWE-209</u>: Error Message Information Leak

### **Risky Resource Management**

The weaknesses in this category are related to ways in which software does not properly manage the creation, usage, transfer, or destruction of important system resources.

- <u>CWE-119</u>: Failure to Constrain Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
- <u>CWE-642</u>: External Control of Critical State Data
- <u>CWE-73</u>: External Control of File Name or Path
- <u>CWE-426</u>: Untrusted Search Path
- <u>CWE-94</u>: Failure to Control Generation of Code (aka 'Code Injection')
- <u>CWE-494</u>: Download of Code Without Integrity Check
- <u>CWE-404</u>: Improper Resource Shutdown or Release
- <u>CWE-665</u>: Improper Initialization
- <u>CWE-682</u>: Incorrect Calculation

## **Porous Defenses**

The weaknesses in this category are related to defensive techniques that are often misused, abused, or just plain ignored.

- <u>CWE-285</u>: Improper Access Control (Authorization)
- <u>CWE-327</u>: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
- <u>CWE-259</u>: Hard-Coded Password
- <u>CWE-732</u>: Insecure Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
- <u>CWE-330</u>: Use of Insufficiently Random Values
- <u>CWE-250</u>: Execution with Unnecessary Privileges
- <u>CWE-602</u>: Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security

### **Insecure Interaction Between Components**

These weaknesses are related to insecure ways in which data is sent and received between separate components, modules, programs, processes, threads, or systems.

For each weakness, its ranking in the general list is provided in square brackets.

Rank	CWE ID	Name
[1]	CWE-79	Failure to Preserve Web Page Structure ('Cross-site Scripting')
[2]	<u>CWE-89</u>	Improper Sanitization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
[4]	CWE-352	Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
[8]	CWE-434	Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type
[9]	<u>CWE-78</u>	Improper Sanitization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
[17]	CWE-209	Information Exposure Through an Error Message
[23]	CWE-601	URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')
[25]	CWE-362	Race Condition

### **Risky Resource Management**

The weaknesses in this category are related to ways in which software does not properly manage the creation, usage, transfer, or destruction of important system resources.

Rank	CWE ID	Name
[3]	CWE-120	Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
[7]	CWE-22	Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
[12]	CWE-805	Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value
[13]	CWE-754	Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions
[14]	CWE-98	Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP File Inclusion')
[15]	CWE-129	Improper Validation of Array Index
[16]	CWE-190	Integer Overflow or Wraparound
[18]	CWE-131	Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size
[20]	CWE-494	Download of Code Without Integrity Check
[22]	CWE-770	Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling

### **Porous Defenses**

The weaknesses in this category are related to defensive techniques that are often misused, abused, or just plain ignored.

Rank	CWE ID	Name
[5]	CWE-285	Improper Access Control (Authorization)
[6]	CWE-807	Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision
[10]	CWE-311	Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data
[11]	<u>CWE-798</u>	Use of Hard-coded Credentials
[19]	<u>CWE-306</u>	Missing Authentication for Critical Function
[21]	CWE-732	Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource
[24]	CWE-327	Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm

http://cwe.mitre.org/top25/index.html

## 2 <u>CWE-89</u>: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')

### Summary

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Weakness Prevalence	High	Consequences	Data loss, Security bypass
Remediation Cost	Low	Ease of Detection	Easy
Attack Frequency	Often	Attacker Awareness	High

### Discussion

These days, it seems as if software is all about the data: getting it into the database, pulling it from the database, massaging it into information, and sending it elsewhere for fun and profit. If attackers can influence the SQL that you use to communicate with your database, then suddenly all your fun and profit belongs to them. If you use SQL queries in security controls such as authentication, attackers could alter the logic of those queries to bypass security. They could modify the queries to steal, corrupt, or otherwise change your underlying data. They'll even steal data one byte at a time if they have to, and they have the patience and know-how to do so.

### Technical Details | Code Examples | Detection Methods | References

### **Prevention and Mitigations**

### Architecture and Design

Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid.

For example, consider using persistence layers such as Hibernate or Enterprise Java Beans, which can provide significant protection against SQL injection if used properly.

### Architecture and Design

If available, use structured mechanisms that automatically enforce the separation between data and code. These mechanisms may be able to provide the relevant quoting, encoding, and validation automatically, instead of relying on the developer to provide this capability at every point where output is generated.

Process SQL queries using prepared statements, parameterized queries, or stored procedures. These features should accept parameters or variables and support strong typing. Do not dynamically construct and execute query strings within these features using "exec" or similar functionality, since you may

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### **Monster Mitigations**

These mitigations will be effective in eliminating or reducing the severity of the Top 25. These mitigations will also address many weaknesses that are not even on the Top 25. If you adopt these mitigations, you are well on your way to making more secure software.

A Monster Mitigation Matrix is also available to show how these mitigations apply to weaknesses in the Top 25.

ID	Description
<u>M1</u>	Establish and maintain control over all of your inputs.
<u>M2</u>	Establish and maintain control over all of your outputs.
<u>M3</u>	Lock down your environment.
<u>M4</u>	Assume that external components can be subverted, and your code can be read by anyone.
<u>M5</u>	Use industry-accepted security features instead of inventing your own.
GP1	(general) Use libraries and frameworks that make it easier to avoid introducing weaknesses.
GP2	(general) Integrate security into the entire software development lifecycle.
GP3	(general) Use a broad mix of methods to comprehensively find and prevent weaknesses.
GP4	(general) Allow locked-down clients to interact with your software.

M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	CWE					
High		DiD	Mod		CWE-22: Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')					
Mod	High	DiD	Ltd		CWE-78: Improper Sanitization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')					
Mod	High		Ltd		-79: Failure to Preserve Web Page Structure ('Cross-site Scripting')					
Mod	High	DiD	Ltd		CWE-89: Improper Sanitization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')					
Mod		DiD	Ltd		CWE-98: Improper Control of Filename for Include/Require Statement in PHP Program ('PHP File Inclusion')					
Mod		DID	Ltd		CWE-120: Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')					
High		DID	Ltd		CWE-129: Improper Validation of Array Index					
Mod		DiD	Ltd		CWE-131: Incorrect Calculation of Buffer Size					
Mod		DiD	Ltd		CWE-190: Integer Overflow or Wraparound					
Ltd	High	DiD	Mod	-	CWE-209: Information Exposure Through an Error Message					
		DiD	Mod	Mod	CWE-285: Improper Access Control (Authorization)					
		Mod		Mod	CWE-306: Missing Authentication for Critical Function					
		DiD			CWE-311: Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data					
				High	CWE-327: Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm					
			Ltd		CWE-352: Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)					
		DiD			CWE-362: Race Condition					
Mod		DiD	Mod		CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type					
		DiD			CWE-494: Download of Code Without Integrity Check					
Mod	Mod		Ltd		CWE-601: URL Redirection to Untrusted Site ('Open Redirect')					
2 12	Ltd	DiD		Mod	CWE-732: Incorrect Permission Assignment for Critical Resource					
Mod	Ltd	DiD			CWE-754: Improper Check for Unusual or Exceptional Conditions					
Ltd		DiD	Ltd		CWE-770: Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling					
		DiD	High	Mod	CWE-798: Use of Hard-coded Credentials					
Mod		DiD	Ltd		CWE-805: Buffer Access with Incorrect Length Value					
Mod		DiD	Mod	Mod	CWE-807: Reliance on Untrusted Inputs in a Security Decision					

# **Focus Profiles**

The prioritization of items in the general Top 25 list is just that - general. The rankings, and even the selection of which items should be included, can vary widely depending on context. Ideally, each organization can decide how to rank weaknesses based on its own criteria, instead of relying on a single general-purpose list.

A separate document provides several "focus profiles" with their own criteria for selection and ranking, which may be more useful than the general list.

Name	Description
<u>On the Cusp:</u> Weaknesses that Did Not Make the 2010 Top 25	From the original nominee list of 41 submitted CWE entries, the Top 25 was selected. This "On the Cusp" profile includes the remaining 16 weaknesses that did not make it into the final Top 25.
Educational Emphasis	This profile ranks weaknesses that are important from an educational perspective within a school or university context. It focuses on the CWE entries that graduating students should know, including historically important weaknesses.
Weaknesses by Language	This profile specifies which weaknesses appear in which programming languages. Notice that most weaknesses are actually language- independent, although they may be more prevalent in one language or another.
Weaknesses Typically Fixed in Design or Implementation	This profile lists weaknesses that are typically fixed in design or implementation.
Automated vs. Manual Analysis	This profile highlights which weaknesses can be detected using automated versus manual analysis. Currently, there is very little public, authoritative information about the efficacy of these methods and their utility. There are many competing opinions, even among experts. As a result, these ratings should only be treated as guidelines, not rules.
Weaknesses by Language	This profile specifies which weaknesses appear in which programming languages. Notice that most weaknesses are actually language- independent, although they may be more prevalent in one language or another.
For Developers with Established Software Security Practices	This profile is for developers who have already established security in their practice. It uses votes from the major developers who contributed to the Top 25.
Ranked by Importance - for Software Customers	This profile ranks weaknesses based primarily on their importance, as determined from the base voting data that was used to create the general list. Prevalence is included in the scores, but it has much less weighting than importance.
Weaknesses by Technical Impact	This profile lists weaknesses based on their technical impact, i.e., what an attacker can accomplish by exploiting each weakness.

# **Background Details to Check Out**

Process description

# cwe.mitre.org/top25

- Changelog for each revision
- On the Cusp weaknesses that almost made it
- Appendices
  - Selection Criteria and Supporting Fields
  - Threat Model for the Skilled, Determined Attacker

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# **On the Cusp: Other Weaknesses to Consider**

# Table of Contents

- 1. Introduction
- 2. Weaknesses that did not have sufficient prevalence or severity
- Weaknesses covered by more general entries

# Introduction

The CWE/SANS Top 25 is really just a starting point for developers. Many weaknesses were considered for inclusion on the Top 25, but some did not make it to the final list. Some were not considered to be severe enough; others were not considered to be prevalent enough. Sometimes, the Top 25 reviewers themselves had mixed opinions on whether a weakness should be added to the list or not.

With respect to severity, some Top 25 users may have a significantly different threat model. For example, software uptime may be critical to consumers who operate in critical infrastructure or e-commerce environments. However, in the threat model being used by the Top 25, availability is regarded as slightly less important than integrity and confidentiality.

With respect to prevalence, some Top 25 items may not be applicable to the class of software being developed. For example, cross-site scripting is specific to the Web, although analogs exist in other technologies. In other cases, developers may have already eliminated much of the Top 25 in past efforts, so they want to look for other weaknesses that may still be present in their software.

Some on-the-cusp items were omitted because they are already indirectly covered on the Top 25, usually by a more general entry. However, these would be important to consider as individual items.

For these reasons, users of the Top 25 should seriously consider including these weaknesses in their analyses.

BACK TO TOP

# Weaknesses that did not have sufficient prevalence or severity

[26]	136	CWE-749: Exposed Dangerous Method or Function
2		Just 2 points from the Top 25, possibly on the rise.
[27]	129	CWE-307: Improper Restriction of Excessive Authentication Attempts
		Possibly squeezed off the Top 25 by cousins such as missing authentication.
[28]	125	CWE-212: Improper Cross-boundary Removal of Sensitive Data
		Important when privacy is a main concern.
[29]	124	CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values
	2	Not always security-relevant, but still dangerous if it is.
[30]	120	CWE-59: Improper Link Resolution Before File Access ('Link Following')
		A burst in CVE statistics in 2008 shows that these can still be prevalent if focused attention is paid to them.
[31] (tie)	120	CWE-134: Uncontrolled Format String
		Usually easily findable, and code execution possibilities have been reduced due to compiler changes, e.g. removal of support for "%n" sequences.
[32]	119	CWE-476: NULL Pointer Dereference
		Typically cause a denial of service in C/C++ but, for certain Linux kernels and possibly other environments, exploitable for code execution.
[33] (tie)	119	CWE-681: Incorrect Conversion between Numeric Types
		May be on the rise in future years, especially in transitions from 32-bit to 64-bit architectures.
[34]	118	CWE-426: Untrusted Search Path
		Prevalence is uncertain.
[35]	116	CWE-454: External Initialization of Trusted Variables or Data Stores
	×	High prevalence in PHP environments with register_globals enabled, or by programmers who are not familiar with the effectiveness of reverse engineering, or the many ways that inputs can be modified.
[36]	114	CWE-416: Use After Free
2		Likely on the rise in future years.
[37] (tie)	114	CWE-772: Missing Release of Resource after Effective Lifetime
		Important when prevention of denial of service is critical.
[38]	106	CWE-799: Improper Control of Interaction Frequency
Ĵ.		Important when prevention of denial of service is critical. Also a critical component of brute force attacks against security features.
[39]	100	CWE-456: Missing Initialization
		Not always security-relevant; also, easily findable and fixable with modern compilers and code scanners.
[40]	91	CWE-672: Operation on a Resource after Expiration or Release
		Sometimes catchable by the compiler, but may increase in future years.
[41]	77	CWE-804: Guessable CAPTCHA
ŝ.	_	Not very prevalent since the use of CAPTCHA is not very prevalent, and importance is generally less than that of other security features such as encryption and authentication.

# **Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)**

## How is this different from the OWASP Top Ten?

The short answer is that the OWASP Top Ten covers more general concepts and is focused on web applications. The CWE Top 25 covers a broader range of issues than what arise from the web-centric view of the OWASP Top Ten, such as buffer overflows. Also, one goal of the CWE Top 25 is to be at a level that is directly actionable to programmers, so it contains more detailed issues than the categories being used in the Top Ten. There is some overlap, however, since web applications are so prevalent, and some issues in the Top Ten have general applications to all classes of software.

## How are the weaknesses prioritized on the list?

With the exception of Input Validation being listed as number 1 (partially for educational purposes), there is no concrete prioritization. Prioritization differs widely depending on the audience (e.g. web application developers versus OS developers) and the risk tolerance (whether code execution, data theft, or denial of service are more important). It was also believed that the use of categories would help the organization of the document, and prioritization would impose a different ordering.

# Why are you including overlapping concepts like input validation and XSS, or incorrect calculation and buffer overflows? Why do you have mixed levels of abstraction?

While it would have been ideal to have a fixed level of abstraction and no overlap between weaknesses, there are several reasons why this was not achieved.

Contributors sometimes suggested different CWE identifiers that were closely related. In some cases, this difference was addressed by using a more abstract CWE identifier that covered the relevant cases.

In other situations, there was strong advocacy for including lower-level issues such as SQL injection and crosssite scripting, so these were added. The general trend, however, was to use more abstract weakness types.

While it might be desired to minimize overlap in the Top 25, many vulnerabilities actually deal with the interaction of 2 or more weaknesses. For example, external control of user state data (CWE-642) could be an important weakness that enables cross-site scripting (CWE-79) and SQL injection (CWE-89). To eliminate overlap in the Top 25 would lose some of this important subtlety.


Finally, it was a conscious decision that if there was enough prevalence and severity, design-related weaknesses would be included. These are often thought of as being more abstract than weaknesses that arise during implementation.


The Top 25 list tries to strike a delicate balance between usability and relevance, and we believe that it does so, even with this apparent imperfection.

## Why don't you use hard statistics to back up your claims?

The appropriate statistics simply aren't publicly available. The publicly available statistics are either too highlevel or not comprehensive enough. And none of them are comprehensive across all software types and environments.

# **People are Starved for Simplicity**







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## SDL and the CWE/SANS Top 25

to the CWE/SANS list, just cure Title

Bryan here. The security community has been buzzing since SANS and MITRE's joint announcement earlier this month of their list of the <u>Top 25 Most Dangerous</u> <u>Programming Errors</u>. Now, I don't want to get into a debate in this blog about whether this new list will become the new de facto standard for analyzing security vulnerabilities (or indeed, whether it already has become the new standard). Instead, I'd like to present an overview of how the Microsoft SDL maps

		WE/SAINS IISC, JUSC	CWE	Title	Education?	Manual Process?	Tools?	Threat Model?
1 1 1 1	May.		20	Improper Input Validation	Y	Y	Y	Y
wl Walk			116	Improper Encoding or Escaping of Output	Y	Y	Y	
SDL Pro		and I have writte		Failure to Preserve SQL Query Structure (aka SQL Injection)	Y	Y	Y	
- OPLIND	coverag	e of the Top 25 ar	79	Failure to Preserve Web Page Structure (aka Cross-Site Scripting)	Y	Y	Y	
urance	believe	that the results te	78	Failure to Preserve OS Command Structure (aka OS Command Injection)	Y		Y	
threat	25 were	developed indepe	319	Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information	Y			Y
uncac		m out of the softw		Cross-site Request Forgery (aka CSRF)	Y		Y	
		white paper and	262	Race Condition	Y			
				Error Message Information Leak	Y	Y	Y	
		e around every m		Failure to Constrain Memory Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer	Y	Y	Y	
	made m	any of the same S	642	External Control of Critical State Data	Y			Y
	for you	to download and ι	73	External Control of File Name or Path	Y	Y	Y	
		1 (A) <b>1</b> (A) ( <b>1</b> (A)	426	Untrusted Search Path	Y		Y	
	Below is	s a summary of ho	94	Failure to Control Generation of Code (aka 'Code Injection')	Y	Y		
	see the	SDL covers every	494	Download of Code Without Integrity Check				Y
	them (ra	ace conditions and	404	Improper Resource Shutdown or Release	Y		Y	
		iple SDL requirem	005	Improper Initialization	Y		Y	
		prevent or detect	682	Incorrect Calculation	Y		Y	
	LOOIS LO	prevent or detect	285	Improper Access Control (Authorization)	Y	Y		Y
	CWE	Title	327	Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm	Y	Y	Y	
	CAAE	nue	259	Hard-Coded Password	Y	Y	Y	Y
			732	Insecure Permission Assignment for Critical Resource	Y	Y		
		Improper Input Va		Use of Insufficiently Random Values	Y	Y	Y	
	116	Improper Encodin	250	Execution with Unnecessary Privileges	Y	Y		Y
efings		Escaping of Output		Client-Side Enforcement of Server-Side Security	Y			Y

Education? Manual Process? Tools? Threat Model?

# **CWE Outreach: A Team Sport** May/June Issue of IEEE Security & Privacy...

CWE-732: Insecure Permission Assignment for Critical Resource cral times here, but review all missions and ACLs on all of you create in the file system configuration stores such as Windows registry. In the ca Windows Vista and later. change any default ACL in th system or registry unless you tend to weaken the ACL.

#### CWF-330-Use of Insufficiently Random Values

Identify all the random m generators in your code and o mme which, if any, generate passwords, or some other secre Make sure the code generation random numbers is crymoer cally random and not a deter ittic pseudorandom generator the C runtime rand() fun Using functions like rand ( fine, but not for cryptography

#### CWE-250: Execution with Unnecessary Privileges

Identify all processes that repart of your solution and d mine what privileges they reto operate correctly. If a p runs as root (on Linux, Un Mac OS X) or system (Wind ask yourself "Why?" Some the answer is totally valid bethe code must perform a r leged operation, but somet you don't know why it runway other than. "That's the it's always run!" If the code need to operate at high priv keep the time span within y the code is bigh privilege as as possible-for example, ing a port below 1024 in a L application requires the cod be run as root, but after that

IIIIII

**Basic Training** 

#### CWE-426: Untrusted Old versions searched the rent directo filenames, w problems if had a weak fully, weak

portant that

form before

cess a file or

strict what e

or filename.

view look for

or accesses

and make su

name is appr

to valid data.

and "known

cellent way to

file and oath

men't comm no guarante tion worl't up searches or y tion from a Sensitive Information mised source environmen remedy is a path, but this international terns-for ex Vista the eV doesn't exist version of named copre erating syste correct path I CWE-94: RC4 or shared-key IPSec. Failure to Generatio It's common to see code injection vulnerabilities in lavaScript code that builds a string dynami-

time. Fuzz testing is also effective at detecting CWE-665, CWF-682: cally and passes it to eval() to execute. If the attacker controls Incorrect Calculation the source string in any way, he or she can create a malicious payload. The simplest way to eradicate this kind of bug is to eradicate the use calculations. If an attacker conof eval(), but that could mean trols one or more of the elements

HELE SECURITY & PRIVACY

#### CWE-352: Cross-Site CWE-119: **Request Forgery** Failure to Constrain Cross-site request forgery (also Memory Operati known as CSRF) vulnerabilities The dreaded buffer are a relatively new form of Web scourge of C and C++

weakness caused, in part, by a bad er vulnerability type 1 Web application design. In short, more headaches than buff this design doesn't verify that a request came from valid user code and is instead acting maliciously on the user's behalf. Generally, the best defense is to use a unique and unpredictable key for each user. Traditionally, verifying input to memory. For C and C doesn't mitigate this bug type because the input is called

#### **Race Condition** Race conditions are timing problenss that lead to unexpected

and the file open, which attack-

ers can use to change the file or

delete or create it. The safest way

to mitigate file system race con-

ditions is to open the object and

then use the resulting handle for

further operations. Also, con-

sider reducing the scope of shared

objects-for example, temporary

files should be local to the user

and not shared with multiple user

accounts. Correct use of synchro-

nization primitives (mutexes,

semaphores, critical sections) is

restrict detailed error messages to

protect it with an appropriate per-

mission or encrypt it and protect

the encryption key with an appro-

priate permission.

similarly important.

CWE-362.

behavior-for example, an application uses a filename to veri-CWE-78: Failure fy that a file exists and then uses to Preserve OS the same filename to open that **Command Structure** file. The problem is in the small

(XSS). CWE-79 is the real bug

that makes CWE-116 worse, In

the past, we took XSS bogs light-

ly, but now we see worms that can

exploit XSS vulnerabilities in so-

cial networks such as MySpace (for

example, the Samy worm). Also,

research into Web-related vulner-

tially over the past few years, with

new ways to attack systems remu-

larly uncovered. For pure XSS is-

sues as defined by CWE-79, the

best defense is to validate all in-

coming data. This has always been

the right approach and will prob-

ably continue to be so for the fore-

seeable future. Developers can also

add a layer of defense by encoding

output derived from untraved in-

put (see CWE-116).

abilities has progressed substan-

Many applications, particularly time delay between the check server applications, receive untrusted requests and use the data in them to interact with the underlying operating system. Unfortunately, this can lead to severe server compromise if the incoming data isn't analyzed-again, the best defense is to check the data. Also, running the potentially vulnerable

#### application with low privilege can help contain the damage. CWE-319: Cleartext Transmission of

Sensitive data must obviously be CWE-209: protected at test and while on Error Message the wire. The best solution to Information Leak this vulnerability is to use a welltested technology such as SSL/ Error information is critical to de-TLS or IPSec. Don't (ever)) create bugging failed operations, but you your own communication method must understand who can read

and cryptographic defense. This that data. In general, you should weakness is related to CWF-327 "Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm"), so make sure you aren't using weak 40-bit logged to an audit log.

Many buffer overruns in C and C++ code today are actually related to incorrect buffer- or array-size in a size calculation, he or she can redesigning the application.

#### runs. The best way to reproblem is to move awa and C++ where it mal and use higher-level I such as Ruby, C#, and cause they don't offer dir

cations, developers should "known bad" functions o C runtime (for example streat, strnepy.

#### sprint, and gets) and secure versions. Visual C many weak APIs at com and you should strive compiles. Also, fuzz te static analysis can help tential buffer overrun operating-system-level such as address space la

domization and no exect can help reduce the cha buffer overrun is exploita MICHAEL CWF-642: Microsoft

External Control of Critical State Unprotected state infi such as profile data or o formation, is subject to : it's important to protect by using the appropria control lists (ACLs) or pe

for persistent data and se of cryptographic defense a hashed message authe code (HMAC), for ondata. You can use an H persistent data as well.

#### CWE-73: **External Control** of Filename or Pa

trusted users. Remote and anon-Attackers might be able ymous users should see generic arbitrary file data if the messages with the detailed data the data that's used as car or path name. It's critic

#### the very least look for terms like "pwd" and "password" and make sure you have no hard-coded passords or secret data in the code. You should also store this data in secure location within the operating system. By secure, 1 mean

**Basic Training** Editors: Richard Ford, rford@se.fit.edu Michael Howard, mikebow@microsoft.cor

# Improving Software Security by Eliminating the CWE Top 25 Vulnerabilities

CWE/SANS Top 25 Most Dangerous Programming Errors" to help make developers more aware

(http://cwe.mitre.org/top25), 1 was one of the many people

#### from industry, government, and nesses in the list doesn't imply yo academia who provided input to software is secure from all forms the document attack: there are plenty more vi CWE, which stands for Comnerability types to worry about! mon Weakness Enumeration, is a

CWE-20: Improper project sponsored by the National Input Validation Cyber Security Division of the US Department of Homeland Security The vast majority of serious s to classify security bues. It assigns a curity vulnerabilities are inputunique number to weakness types validation issues: buffer overruns such as buffer overruns or cross-site SQL injection, and cross-si scripting bugs come immediatel scripting bugs (for example, CWE-327 is "Use of a Broken or Risky to mind. Developers simply trus Cryptographic Algorithm"). Shortthe incoming data instead of unly after the Top 25 list's release. destanding that they must analyze the input for validity. I can't stre Microsoft unweiled a document entitled "The Microsoft SDI, and the this enough-if developers sample CWE/SANS Top 25," to explain learned to never trust incomin how Microsoft's security processes data (in terms of format, conten can help prevent the worst offendand size), many serious bugs would ers (http://blogs.msdn.com/sdl/ go away. The core lesson here is for archive/2009/01/27/sdl-and-the developers to carefully validate in--cwe-sans-top-25.aspx). put and for designers to understar Full disclosure: I'm one of that

how they can build their systems t document's coauthors, but my purprotect input such that only trus users can manipulate the data. pose here isn't to reguraitate the Microsoft piece. Rather, my goal is to describe some best practices that CWE-116: can help you eliminate the CWE Improper Out

Top 25 vulnerabilities in your own Encodi development environment and products. It's also important to un-You coul derstand that addressing the weak- really isn't


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Improving Software Security by 68 Eliminating the CWE Top 25 Vulnerabilities

MICHAEL HOWARD







# The Top 25 is not...

- A silver bullet
- A guarantee of software health
- A perfect match for your unique needs
- As simple as it seems
- The only thing to include in contract language
- Completely found by tools



# The Top 25 is...

- A mechanism for awareness
- A trigger of questions
- A place for mitigations
- A conversation starter
- A first step on the long road to software assurance



# **CWE Top 25 2011**

- Starting this week
- Utilizing the Common Weakness Scoring System (CWSS 0.2) as under-pinning
- Will have numerous "Top 25's"

# - Including one for Web Applications

- Final "master" Top 25 list, will leverage combined score from multiple vignettes.
- No fixed date for release of the 2011 Top 25 at this point, may take 2 to 3 months.

Making Security Measurable


# **Common Weakness Scoring System (CWSS)**

# Archetypes:

- Web Browser User Interface
- Web Servers
- Application Servers
- Database Systems
- Desktop Systems
- SSL
- Internet
- DMZ
- Intranet

# Vignettes:

- 1. Web-based Retail Provider
- 2. Intranet resident health records management system of hospital



# **Questions?**

# martin@mitre.org