The background features a large, light blue rounded square with a white border. Inside this square, there are several overlapping, semi-transparent yellow and orange geometric shapes, including pentagons and hexagons, arranged in a pattern that suggests a network or data structure.

# **Semantic Interoperability in IT Security: Ontology for IT Product Representation**

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Technology (NIST)

# Introduction (1 of 2)

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There are many challenges to implementing information system security (ISS) measures for private and public organizations:

- Number and variety of systems to secure
- Need to comply with mandates
- Need to respond quickly to new threats
- Need for interoperability across disparate organizations and agencies (e.g. across entire Federal Government infrastructure)

## Introduction – (2 of 2)

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*“NIST is a non-regulatory federal agency within the U.S. Department of Commerce. **NIST's mission** is to promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement science, standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic security and improve our quality of life.”*

– [http://www.nist.gov/public\\_affairs/general\\_information.cfm](http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/general_information.cfm)

# Agenda

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- What is the NIST Security Automation Program?
- What is the value of standardized IT security data models?
- How do IT product ontologies fit in?
- How does this work compare with other product ontologies?
- What does the current ontology look like?


# NIST Security Automation Program is all about interoperability

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- Program designed to create standardized communication and reporting data models around IT security.
  - Multiple domains to model including compliance, vulnerabilities, events, remediation, and reporting.
  - Goal is vertical and horizontal interoperability
- Focus is on increasing the level of interoperability between heterogeneous IT security domains.
  - Enables fast and accurate correlation within the enterprise and across organizations/agencies.
  - Interoperability will allow diverse tool suites and repositories to share data across multiple security domains.

# Product Data is Central to IT Security Data Models

↔ = Semantic Mappings



## Important Definitions

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- **Product** – “*complete set of computer programs, procedures and associated documentation and data designed for delivery to a software consumer*”
  - Definition from ISO 19770-2 Standard
  - Represents the product model, not a physical instantiation of a product.

## Why do we need another product ontology?

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- Don't we have enough?





ISO 19770-2

- Not yet, no model is focusing on the security viewpoint of product data.
  - Or at least I haven't found it.
- Semantic links are possible between models.



# Multiple viewpoints of product data exist and separate ontologies are needed to model the disparate viewpoints



- Viewpoints of product data exist outside of security.
- Domain specific systems can query product data from each disparate domain.
- Enterprise-wide systems can query data through a middle-ontology layer.




# Overview of Product Ontology for National Vulnerability Database

# Important Definitions

- **Identification Strategy** – The way in which an organization names and versions a product.

## Examples

Heterogeneous Approaches Exist




## What is the National Vulnerability Database (NVD)?

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- US Government central repository of security automation content.
  - Holds vulnerability and configuration management XML data adhering to Security Automation Schemas.
  - Over 40,000 vulnerabilities, and 137 Security Checklists.
- Contains explicit links between vulnerability/configuration data and IT product data.
  - Referred to as applicability statements.
- NVD Product ontology is designed to capture and facilitate the relationships required within NVD.
  - Goal is to make the security data more meaningful.

# NVD Product Ontology begins to define IT security viewpoint of product data.

= Semantic Mappings  
 = Application Queries




# NVD Product Ontology Goals

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- Ontology must support NVD's primary use case involving making statements of applicability between IT concepts (e.g. Vulnerabilities, Security Configuration Checklists) and IT products.
- Ontology must support the ability to make statements of applicability at various levels of abstraction and across ranges of products (e.g. Microsoft Windows version 4.3 to 5.6).
- Ontology must support the ability to capture granular product identification data which may vary on a per product basis.

# High-level NVD Ontology Overview



= <owl:Class>  
 = <rdfs:subClassOf>  
ABC = <rdf:Property>


# Structure of the Ontology

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
- NVD Ontology models two separate concept structures as formal “is-a” hierarchies.
  - Category concept hierarchy
  - Identification concept hierarchy
- NVD Ontology also includes other types of semantic relationships.
  - Relationships between applications and codebases (“made up of” relationships)
  - Explicit differences between sets of products created by defining disjoint sets (e.g. hardware vs. software products)




# High-level NVD Ontology Overview



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



# Product Category Hierarchy




## Possible Predicates

- *hasIdentification*, domain of Product, range of IdentificationStrategy, <owl:inverseFunctionalProperty>
- *hasReleaseDate*, domain of Product
- *hasCpeName*, domain of Product
- *usesSharedLibrary*, domain of Application, range of SharedLibrary
- *contains*, domain of Product, range of Product, inverseOf *containedIn*
- *hasOwner*, domain of Product, range of Foaf:Agent, inverseOf *ownedBy*
- *hasAutomationTest*, domain of Product
- Many other possibilities exist, very granular predicates can be defined further down tree.






# Identification Concept Hierarchy




## Possible Predicates

- *hasName*, domain of IdentificationStrategy
- *hasModelNumber*, domain of PhysicalDeviceIdentificationStrategy
- *hasCiscoTrainIdentifier*, domain of CiscoIOS\_Strategy
- *hasCiscoInterimBuildNumber*, domain of CiscoIOS\_Strategy
- *hasMicrosoftMajorVersion*, domain of NTKernal\_Strategy
- *hasVersion*, domain of GenericIdentificationStrategy
- *hasUpdate*, domain of GenericIdentificationStrategy




# Product Instance Data Instantiated from Model Classes


Model



Instance Data




# hasIdentification Property Uniquely Identifies a Product




# The Ontology Provides the Capability for Modeling Ranges of Products

- This is accomplished with four predicates
  - *hasNextVersion*, *hasPreviousVersion*
  - *hasLaterVersion* (transitive), *hasEarlierVersion* (transitive)
- These four predicates are modeled using a predicate hierarchy such that the non-transitive predicates are related to the transitive predicates through `rdfs:subPropertyOf`.



# Inferencing for Product Range Data



## Assert:

*X hasNextVersion n2*

## Infer:

*X hasLaterVersion n2*

*n2 hasPreviousVersion X*

*n2 hasEarlierVersion X*

- The reasoner creates inferred triples which allow an observer to see all products in a version chain earlier and later than x. Inferred triples are also captured for n<sub>0</sub>, n<sub>1</sub>, n<sub>2</sub>, and n<sub>3</sub>.
- The version chain DOES have to be captured by a human since a version chain order is ambiguous

= product instance data

= asserted triple

= inferred triple

- In the future if IdentificationStrategies are modeled fully it may be possible to encode version chain order into the model and let the reasoner figure it out.

# Querying for Product Range Data

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- Analysts populate version chain using non-transitive predicates (hasNextVersion and hasPreviousVersion)
- A SPARQL query could then be written against the transitive predicates which the reasoner has inferred.
- Querying against the transitive predicates allow system to determine all “earlier” and all “later” versions (i.e. a product range).

```
SELECT ?product
WHERE {
    ?product a nvd:product
    ?product nvd:hasEarlierVersion 3.2
    ?product nvd:hasLaterVersion 5.4
```

- Keeps all application logic for range relationships in model
- This DOES require instance data to be fully populated
- Could potentially explode triples



# Additional Resources

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## NIST websites:

- SCAP Homepage: <http://scap.nist.gov>
- SCAP Validated Tools: <http://nvd.nist.gov/scapproducts.cfm>
- National Vulnerability Database: <http://nvd.nist.gov>
- NIST Computer Security Resource Center (CRSC)  
<http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/PubsSPs.html>

## NIST publications (available at <http://csrc.nist.gov>):

- Special Publication (SP) 800-126 Revision (Rev. 1), DRAFT The Technical Specification for the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP): SCAP Version 1.1, December 15, 2009
- SP 800-117, Draft Guide to Adopting and Using the Security Content Automation Protocol (SCAP), May 5, 2009

# Contact Information

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