Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General

Independent Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Reporting of FY 2012 Drug Control Performance Summary Report





OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528 / www.oig.dhs.gov

JAN 3 1 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Eugene H. Schied Assistant Commissioner U.S. Customs and Border Protection

FROM:

Anne L. Richards and Children Assistant Inspector General for Audits

SUBJECT:

Independent Review of U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Reporting of FY 2012 Drug Control Performance Summary Report

Attached for your information is our final report, *Independent Review of U.S. Customs* and Border Protection's Reporting of FY 2012 Drug Control Performance Summary Report. U.S. Customs and Border Protection's management prepared the Performance Summary Report and management assertions to comply with the requirements of the Office of National Drug Control Policy Circular, Drug Control Accounting, dated May 1, 2007.

We contracted with the independent public accounting firm KPMG LLP to perform the review. KPMG LLP is responsible for the attached independent accountants' report, dated January 25, 2013, and the conclusions expressed in it. We do not express an opinion on the Performance Summary Report or management's assertions. This report contains no recommendations.

Consistent with our responsibility under the *Inspector General Act*, we are providing copies of our report to appropriate congressional committees with oversight and appropriation responsibility over the Department of Homeland Security. We will post the report on our website for public dissemination.

Please call me with any questions, or your staff may contact Mark Bell, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits, at (202) 254-4100.

Attachment



KPMG LLP Suite 12000 1801 K Street, NW Washington, DC 20006

Independent Accountants' Report

Deputy Inspector General U.S. Department of Homeland Security:

We have reviewed the accompanying Performance Summary Report of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Customs and Border Protection (CBP) for the year ended September 30, 2012. We have also reviewed the accompanying management's assertions for the year ended September 30, 2012. CBP's management is responsible for the Performance Summary Report and the assertions.

Our review was conducted in accordance with attestation standards established by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and applicable standards contained in *Government Auditing Standards*, issued by the Comptroller General of the United States. A review is substantially less in scope than an examination, the objective of which is the expression of an opinion on the Performance Summary Report and management's assertions. Accordingly, we do not express such an opinion.

Management of CBP prepared the Performance Summary Report and management's assertions to comply with the requirements of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Circular, *Drug Control Accounting*, dated May 1, 2007 (the Circular).

Based on our review, nothing came to our attention that caused us to believe that (1) the Performance Summary Report for the year ended September 30, 2012, is not presented, in all material respects, in conformity with the Circular, or that (2) management's assertions referred to above are not fairly stated, in all material respects, based on the criteria set forth in the Circular.

This report is intended solely for the information and use of the management of DHS and CBP, the DHS Inspector General, the ONDCP, and the U.S. Congress, and is not intended to be and should not be used by anyone other than these specified parties.

KPMG LLP

January 25, 2013

1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW Washington, DC 20229



JAN 2 5 2013

MEMORANDUM FOR:	Ms. Anne L. Richards Assistant Inspector General for Audit Department of Homeland Security
FROM:	Deborah J. Schilling Chief Financial Officer Office of Administration
SUBJECT:	Management's Assertions for CBP's Performance Summary Report to ONDCP

In compliance with the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Circular, *Drug Control Accounting*, dated May 1, 2007, U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) submits its Performance Summary Report to ONDCP. The report contains the results of CBP's Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 performance in support of the *National Drug Control Strategy*.

CBP makes the following assertions:

- (1) Performance reporting system is appropriate and applied. CBP has a system to capture performance information accurately and the system was properly applied to generate the performance data:
 - (a) The source of the data for the performance measure amount of Currency Seized on Exit from the United States is obtained from TECS (Drug Control Decision Unit – Salaries and Expenses);
 - (b) The source of the data for the performance measure Percentage of Joint Interagency Task Force – South Annual Mission Hour objective achieved is TECS (Drug Control Decision Unit – Air and Marine Operations); and
 - (c) The source of the data for the performance measure, Number of Apprehensions on the southwest border between the Ports of Entry is the e3 Processing Database (Drug Control Decision Unit – Salaries and Expenses).
- (2) All but one of the performance targets in FY 2012 were met, and an explanation for the missed target for 'Outbound currency seizures at the ports of entry' is provided in Performance Summary Report;
- (3) Methodology to establish performance targets is reasonable and applied. Professional judgement was used in establishing performance measure targets based on subject matter experts with several years of experience in the field; and

Management's Assertions for U.S. Customs and Border Protection's Drug Seizure Data Page 2

(4) Adequate performance measures exist for all significant drug control activities. CBP has established at least one acceptable performance measure for each Drug Control Decision Unit identified in reports. Each performance measure considers the intended purpose of the National Drug Control Program Activity.

To address any questions you have regarding this submission, please contact me at (202) 344-2300, or a member of your staff may contact Mr. James McNally, Director, Investment Analysis Office, at (202) 344-1651.

Debuard g. Schilling

Deborah J. Schilling

U.S. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Customs and Border Protection Performance Summary Report FY 2012

The performance measures presented below directly link to the 2012 *National Drug Control Strategy* by evaluating U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) success in disrupting domestic drug trafficking. This Performance Summary Report (PSR) contains at least one performance measure per drug control decision unit as required by the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) Circular, *Drug Control Accounting*, dated May 1, 2007. The drug control decision units are as follows: (1) Salaries and Expenses, (2) Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology, and (3) Air and Marine Operations. Based on this PSR, the attached Management Assertions letter states the following: (1) the performance reporting system is appropriate and applied; (2) all but one of the performance targets in FY 2012 were met and an explanation for the missed target for 'Outbound currency seizures at the ports of entry' is provided in the discussion below; (3) the methodology used to establish performance targets is reasonable and applied; and (4) adequate performance measures exist for all significant drug control activities.

Drug Control Decision Unit – Salaries and Expenses

Performance Measure – Office of Field Operations – Amount of currency seized on exit from the United States.

(1) Performance Measures

This measure assists in evaluating CBP's success in disrupting domestic drug trafficking at the land and air ports of entry, a key outcome for the National Drug Control Strategy. Since this measure is based upon the seizure-related enforcement outcomes of CBP's Outbound enforcement program, the measure provides an indicator of the success that CBP has in disrupting domestic drug trafficking at our borders by stemming the flow of potential narcotics-related proceeds destined to criminal or transnational groups.

The CBP Office of Field Operations (OFO) conducts risk-based Outbound operations at land border ports and airports enabling CBP to enforce U.S. laws and regulations applying to the Outbound arena, including immigration and drug laws. The Outbound enforcement program is part of CBP's effort to effectively monitor and control the flow of goods and people leaving the United States. The goal of CBP's Outbound enforcement program is to keep the United States safe by preventing the illicit export of goods, ranging from firearms to components of weapons of mass destruction, from falling into the hands of terrorists, criminal elements and individuals seeking to circumvent U.S. export control laws and to disrupt criminal elements and terrorist organizations by interdicting their proceeds and arresting members of their organizations. A number of presidential strategies, including the President's National Export Initiative, the President's Export Control Reform Initiative, the National Drug Control Strategy, and the National Southwest Border Counternarcotics Strategy, designate the Outbound program as a crucial component in the war on drugs.

This measure is calculated from Outbound seizure-related enforcement action data entered into TECS by the CBP Officer at the time of occurrence of the violation. TECS provides computerbased access to enforcement files of common interest, on-line access to the Federal Bureau of Investigation's National Crime Information Center, as well as an interface with the National Law Enforcement Telecommunications System. Its enforcement transaction data is made available to the Border Stat information system. The summary data is compiled and extracted into the Operations Management Report (OMR) module in Border Stat on a monthly basis. The monthly summary data is reviewed by OFO's Outbound Program Manager to verify accuracy and identify and investigate anomalies. The monthly data in support of this measure is compiled on a quarterly and annual basis and reported to Department of Homeland Security.

(2) Prior Years Performance Targets and Results

Fiscal Year (FY):	FY 2008	FY2009	FY2010	FY 2011	FY2012
Target:	None	None	None	\$40.0M	\$35.0M
Actual:	\$33.8M	\$58.1M	\$47.37M	\$47.35M	\$31.9M

OFO did not formally collect or report this performance measure to DHS during the period FY 2008 through FY 2010. Because of this, no targets were set for this measure over this time period. Selective Outbound operations were conducted in FY 2008 and regular risk-based Outbound operations were initiated on a test basis beginning in May 2009, prior to formally creating the Outbound Division in FY 2010. Substantially more currency was seized in FY 2009, once resources were dedicated to Outbound enforcement on a regular basis, as compared to FY 2008. This measure was selected as a DHS Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) strategic measure beginning in FY 2011. The FY 2012 target of \$35M was derived from analysis of available Outbound program seizure data for FY 2010 and 2011, based on risk-based Outbound enforcement operations. For FY 2012, CBP was unable to reach this target, with a total of \$31.9M seized. The initiation of regular risk-based Outbound operations in FY 2009 may have influenced changes in illegal activity on the part of smugglers in subsequent years, with decreases observed in both the total amounts seized and the number of large seizures (over one million dollars) in FY 2012 as compared to FY 2009. The deterrence effect of conducting Outbound enforcement operations has resulted in a decrease in the amount of currency seized over time as smuggling organizations have made adjustments to their activities.

(3) Current Year Performance Targets

Fiscal Year:FY 2013Target:\$30M

Currently, CBP conducts limited risk-based Outbound enforcement operations, examining only departing goods and travelers identified as high-risk based on CBP Officer assessment at the ports and/or automated systems alerts triggered by available data. This data includes information such as lookouts placed in TECS or provided to officers by agents from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), members of the Border Enforcement Security Teams (BEST), agents from the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), local law enforcement officers, or derived from various licensing agencies targeting controlled or sensitive

items departing the U.S. contrary to law; TECS records flagged by license plate readers (LPRs), the National Targeting Center (NTC), or the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC); and alerts triggered by the Automated Targeting System (ATS). Based upon this risk-based operational strategy and the deterrence effect associated with a relatively new program (as described above), a decrease in the amount of currency seized is an expected outcome, which resulted in setting a performance target for FY 2013 at \$30.0M. If Outbound enforcement operations are maintained at the same level in FY 2013 and beyond, then it is expected that the deterrence effect upon illegal activities will be maintained and that the target will continue to be set at \$30.0M for FY 2014 and subsequent years.

(4) Quality of Performance Data

The data underlying this measure is accurate, complete and unbiased. CBP Officers enter information into TECS (the principle system of record used by CBP) for each currency seizure performed. A first line supervisor must review the information and approve it before it can be extracted and included in daily, monthly and annual reporting. A validation check is also conducted when the data is extracted from TECS and reported via the BorderStat management reporting system. The reported results are reviewed by the Outbound Program Manager for accuracy and identification of anomalies, which are researched and resolved.

Drug Control Decision Unit – Border Security Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology

Performance Measure – Office of Border Patrol - Number of apprehensions on the Southwest Border between the ports of entry.

(1) Performance Measures

This measure assists in gauging CBP's success in addressing areas of greatest risk, including areas that experience narcotics smuggling, along our Nation's borders. The measure targets an overall reduction in the number of apprehensions along the Southwest border from historic levels. Although many factors, including enforcement, the economy, and natural disasters, can contribute to the ebbs and flows of apprehensions, a key change in CBP's enforcement posture over the past several years since 9/11 has been a healthy build-up in resources and capabilities, including fencing, infrastructure and technology. This vastly improved enforcement posture has coincided with an overall decrease in apprehensions since 2005.

The U.S. Border Patrol is the principal operational component that works to mitigate all threats – terrorists and weapons of terrorism, smuggling of narcotics, other contraband, and people, and the illegal entry of people across the border. Border Patrol agents prepare for, detect, and intercept any and all combinations of these threats that present themselves along the borders. The enforcement advantage gained from fencing, other infrastructure, and technology, such as sensors and cameras, allows agents to more effectively and efficiently perform their duties to detect, identify, and intercept threats.

Funds and resources provided for in 2010 created an even stronger enforcement environment for 2011, as noted in the 2011 National Drug Control Strategy.¹ These came in the form of the

¹ Executive Office of the President of the United States, 2011 National Drug Control Strategy, 2011, p. 60.

Emergency Supplemental for Border Security (Public Law 111-230) signed in August 2010 by President Obama, which provided funds for hiring additional Border Patrol agents and other law enforcement and Department of Justice resources; the continuation of the Alliance to Combat Transnational Threats (ACTT); and the 2010 authorization for the temporary deployment of additional National Guard troops along the Southwest border for Operation Phalanx – for a time period that included all of FY 2011. The deployments contributed "additional capabilities and capacity to assist law enforcement agencies as a bridge to longer-term enhancements in the efforts to target illicit networks' trafficking in people, drugs, illegal weapons, money, and violence associated with these illegal activities...[t]heir support has allowed CBP to bridge the gap and hire additional agents to support the Southwest border, as well as field additional technology and communications capabilities that Congress provided."²

Operation Phalanx was continued in FY 2012 and has been extended until December 31, 2012. From inception until February 29, 2012, the National Guard provided up to 1,200 personnel³ to support U.S. Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) with its Southwest Border Security mission in four Southwest Border states: California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas. These personnel performed duties as Entry Identification Team members, Remote Video Surveillance System operators, and Mobile Surveillance Capability operators. On March 1, 2012, the National Guard transitioned from "Boots on the Ground" and began providing surveillance via rotary and fixed wing aerial platforms. There are currently a total of 22 airframes allocated to the Tucson, Laredo, and Rio Grande sectors. From March 1, 2012 to September 30, 2012, 14,511 apprehensions were made by the Border Patrol with Operation Phalanx assists. During this same time period, Border Patrol agents seized 85,871.21 pounds of marijuana with Operation Phalanx assists.

One of the principal areas of concern in FY 2011 and FY 2012 was Arizona, especially Tucson Sector, where both apprehensions and marijuana seizures were higher than in any other Border Patrol sector.⁴ Accordingly, many of the resources discussed above were focused on Tucson sector in FY 2011 and FY 2012. Stronger enforcement resources and better detection capabilities correlated with a decrease in apprehensions,⁵ as shown in the measure results below. Concurrently, as fewer people attempted illegal entries, agents were able to turn more attention and capabilities towards detecting and intercepting other threats, such as narcotics. In fact, in Tucson sector, as apprehensions decreased from 212,202 in FY 2010 to 123,285 in FY 2011 and 120,000 in FY 2012, marijuana seizures in Tucson Sector increased from 1,033,227 pounds in FY2010 to 1,039,443 pounds in 2011, and in FY 2012 fell to 1,015,332 pounds, or 44% of total marijuana seizures on the Southwest border. In Arizona's adjoining Yuma sector, where

² Ibid.

³ Letter from Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism and National Security Advisor on Southwest Border Security to Senator Levin, Chairman of Senate Armed Services Committee, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/Letter_to_Chairman_Levin.pdf.

⁴ In 2010, Tucson sector was responsible for 212,202 of the total 463,382 national apprehensions, or 46% and for 47% of the 447,731 total Southwest border apprehensions; and for 1,033,227 pounds of the total 2,431,214 pounds of national marijuana seizures, or 42%, and for 43% of the 2,417,170 total pounds of Southwest border seizures. In 2011, Tucson sector was responsible for 123,285 of the total 327,577 Southwest border apprehensions, or 38%; and for 1,039,443 pounds of the total 2,518,211 pounds of marijuana seizures, or 41%.

⁵ Apprehensions fell in Tucson sector in FY 2011 to 123,285 from 212,202 in FY 2010, a 42% reduction. They declined again (but began leveling off) in 2012 to 120,000, a 3% reduction.

apprehensions in FY2012 remained below 2 percent of total Southwest border apprehensions (Yuma sector had 6,500 apprehensions in FY2012, or less than 2 percent of the 356,873 Southwest border apprehensions), heroin seizures were up 147 percent to 1,089 ounces in 2012, from 441 ounces in 2011. This represented 17 percent of all Southwest border heroin seized in FY2012.

(2) Prior Years Performance Targets and Results

This performance measure began in FY 2011.

Fiscal Year:	FY 2008	FY2009	FY2010	FY 2011	FY2012
Target:	N/R ⁶	N/R	N/R	<=390,000	<=371,000
Actual:	705,005	540,865	447,731	327,577	356,873

The Border Patrol was successful in meeting its target to reduce apprehensions along the Southwest border during a time when comprehensive and focused activities by the Border Patrol took place, especially in the Tucson sector of Arizona, where apprehensions were highest. Measures taken in FY 2011 and FY 2012 that were aimed at decreasing apprehensions included the continuation of the operation ACTT; the positioning in 2011 and maturation in 2012 of 1,000 additional agents along the Southwest Border; and the deployment of National Guard troops along the Southwest border.

(3) Current Year Performance Targets⁷

 Fiscal Year:
 FY 2013

 Target:
 ≤ 391,000

The goal to decrease apprehensions on the Southwest border from 447,731 in FY 2010 to 390,000 or fewer in FY 2011 and 371,000 or fewer in FY 2012 was based on the recognition that with less illegal alien volume across the border, agents can devote more time to other law enforcement efforts and techniques, including the detection and interdiction of narcotics. As discussed above, significant efforts were made and resources were focused in FY 2011 and FY 2012 in the Tucson Sector of Arizona to drive down apprehensions. This led to an even greater reduction in apprehensions than had been projected, ending FY 2012 with 356,873 apprehensions Apprehensions are expected to rise in FY2013, but are expected to remain low compared to historical numbers.

(4) Quality of Performance Data

The data underlying this measure is valid, accurate, complete, timely and consistent. In an independent Verification and Validation (V&V) review of this performance measure completed in June 2011, the measure was found to "demonstrate exemplary data quality and the data is

⁶ Not reported.

⁷ Performance targets are based on the expert opinions of operational and programmatic staff at headquarters, with consultation as needed from field offices.

highly useable as it applies to this measure. The measure is considered complete and reliable." ⁸ Five factors were considered in the V&V. These factors, along with the corresponding overall score for each factor, are shown below:

Valid:	8 (out of 10)
Accurate:	8 (out of 10)
Complete:	8 (out of 10)
Timely:	10 (out of 10)
Consistent:	10 (out of 10)

This resulted in an overall V&V score of 9 (out of 10).

The highlights of each factor are presented below:

Valid:

- Measure meets performance goal and contributes to Department of Homeland Security strategic goals and objectives.
- Measure aligns to U.S. Customs and Border Protection and Border Patrol strategic goals and objectives.
- The measure is valid as a short-term measure, since specific enforcement enhancements in the Tucson sector were used to explain the decrease in apprehensions. Other factors that could influence the level of apprehensions remained fairly constant during this short time period.

Accurate:

- Potential sources of error in data entry of apprehensions are identified by monthly data quality reports at the Headquarters level, and any discovered errors are corrected at the station level by designated points of contact.
- Detailed processes and procedures for gathering and entering apprehension data are documented in the Border Patrol Handbook. The Border Patrol Training Academy conducts a 6-day course for all incoming agents on processing and entering apprehension data into the system of record.
- As per the Border Patrol Handbook, supervisors at the station level are responsible for the integrity of data entered into the system on their shifts.

Complete:

- The parameters of an apprehension constitute a defined scope, giving clarity to data that should be entered as an apprehension.
- Data is reported for the entirety of the Southwest Border between the ports of entry on a daily, monthly, annual, and ad hoc basis.
- Reporting controls ensure that all stations report apprehension data daily.

⁸ Energetics (a subsidiary of VSE Corporations), *Independent Verification and Validation of Performance Measure Data*, June 2011, p. 1.

Timely:

- An apprehension report is run and delivered at the Headquarters level for each calendar month, no later than the 7th day of the following month.
- Quarterly results for this measure are forwarded to CBP's Performance Management and Analysis Division by the end of the month following the close of the quarter; date stamps for transmission show that reports were sent on time.
- Field and Headquarters personnel receive a daily apprehension report from the Headquarters Statistics unit, showing apprehensions, narcotics seizures, and other data from each sector. These reports can also be run as needed for any defined time period, allowing field teams to adjust resources and operations as needed to respond to trends.

Consistent:

- Uniform definitions and concepts for processing illegal aliens are established in the Border Patrol Handbook and at the Academy.
- The same system, e3 Processing Database, is used across all field stations for collecting and processing data.

The reviewer's policy is to offer recommendations for improvement for any areas that do not receive a perfect score of 10. Therefore, though the Border Patrol measure scored a 9 in the 2011 Assessment Report, areas for improvement were noted. In FY 2012 the independent V&V reviewer followed up to conduct a Post-assessment Action Review of the Border Patrol's "implementation of the recommendations presented in the 2011 Measure Assessment Report."⁹ The reviewer determined that the Border Patrol had addressed all recommendations from the previous year. The recommendations and program actions are summarized as follows¹⁰:

Recommendation from the 2011 Measure Assessment Report	Program Actions
The Independent Review Team recommends that the component develop a full-scale logic model (and supporting text) that describes how its deterrence activities impact apprehensions of illegal aliens crossing the border. The model should include any external factors that may impact steps in the apprehension process. This establishes a more meaningful context for making a judgment of program effectiveness.	Due to already on-going efforts to capture and analyze more apprehension data the program did not develop the full scale logic model recommended This action addressed the recommendation and improved the validity of the measure.
The Independent Review Team recommends that the component develop measures and supporting data at each step in the apprehension process to enhance information on program effectiveness.	Due to already on-going efforts to capture and analyze more apprehension data the program did not create additional measures for each step of the apprehension process. This action addressed the recommendation and improved the validity of the measure.
The Independent Review Team recommends that the	The Consequence Delivery System (CDS) provides

⁹ Energetics (a subsidiary of VSE Corporations), *Post-Assessment Improvement Actions: Review and Report of Findings*, June 2012, p. 1.

¹⁰ Ibid., p. 7.

component provide data about extraneous factors and border patrol effectiveness to either verify that these variables did not contaminate the measure results or to normalize the data across time periods when these other variables underwent significant change.	the program with additional resources to analyze apprehension data. A CDS report can break down apprehension data into specific categories and track apprehended aliens over the course of their life. This action addressed the recommendation and improved the validity of the measure.
The Independent Review Team recommends that CBP, in conjunction with other Components, examine whether or not particular entries can be locked in the e3 Processing Database. Ideally, entries could only be altered by users with a certain status (e.g., Supervisory) and a pin number associated with that entry. For example, only the CBP supervisor of where the entry originated from can change a CBP entry or CBP personnel with administrative access to the whole database, such as the IT department or the Statistics and Data Integrity unit chief could change a CBP entry.	To combat inconsistencies the program developed an additional report to help identify inconsistencies, it then submits a system change request to the Enforcement Systems branch to have the inconsistencies fixed. This action addressed the recommendation and improved the accuracy of the measure.
The Independent Review Team recommends that CBP update the Border Patrol Handbook and Academy training materials to reference the current processing system used, e3, instead of the old system, ENFORCE.	Updates to the e3 Processing Database, the Border Patrol Handbook and Border Patrol training materials is a lengthy process, but underway. The handbook is going through the approval process now. This action addressed the recommendation and improved the accuracy of the measure.
The Independent Review Team recommends that CBP update the Description of Measure field and the Scope of Data field in the FYHSP system to clarify that the only apprehensions covered by the measure are those made by the Office of Border Patrol.	The program updated the description of the scope to specify that only apprehensions made by the Border Patrol are included in the measure. This action addressed the recommendation and improved the completeness of the measure.
The Independent Review Team also recommends that CBP develop documentation, other that the FYHSP printout, that defines basic elements of the measure scope and basic elements of their activities such as apprehension, arrest, Southwest Border, Northwest Border, Non-Mexican, Non-Canadian, etc.	The program is also developing a Border Patrol lexicon that defines some the terms listed in the recommendation. The lexicon is in the approval process right now. This action addressed the recommendation and improved the completeness of the measure.

Drug Control Decision Unit – Air and Marine Operations

Performance Measure – Office of Air and Marine – Percentage of Joint Interagency Task Force-South (JIATF-S) annual mission hour objective achieved.

(1) Performance Measures

This performance measure identifies the degree to which the CBP Office of Air and Marine (OAM) meets its intended flight hours for JIATF-S in support of the National Drug Control Strategy.

The National Interdiction Command and Control Plan (NICCP) sets the overarching operational architecture for organizations involved in interdicting illicit drugs in keeping with the goals and objectives of the National Drug Control Strategy. JIATF-S is the tasking coordinator and controller for counter-drug missions within the transit and source zones. JIATF-S submits its resource allocation requirements through the NICCP. The Department of Homeland Security responds to the requirements in a Statement of Intent. OAM typically supports JIATF-S requests with P-3 Airborne Early Warning (AEW) and P-3 Long-Range Tracker (LRT) aircraft, but has also supported JIATF-S with other aircraft, including its Dash 8, Chet, and C12M fixed-wing aircraft; Blackhawk rotor-wing aircraft; and unmanned aircraft systems.

As a result of the August 19, 2003, Presidential Determination Regarding U.S. Assistance to the Government of Colombia Airbridge Denial Program, OAM began receiving funding in FY 2005 to support JIATF-S as part of its base budget.

(2) Prior Years Performance Targets and Results

The Percentage of JIATF-S Annual Mission Hour Objective Achieved was a new measure in FY 2011.

Fiscal Year:	FY 2008	FY2009	FY2010	FY 2011	FY 2012
Target:	None	None	None	100%	100%
Actual:	N/A	N/A	N/A	100%	100%

While the performance measure was new in FY 2011, OAM did track actual flight hours flown in support of JIATF-S in prior fiscal years. The actual flight hours for FY 2008 through FY 2010 are available, but a percentage cannot be provided for those years since the performance measure did not exist and there was not target to calculate the percentage.

In the NICCP, dated March 17, 2010, JIATF-S forecasted its FY 2011 support requirements for a range of aircraft. In its FY 2011 Statement of Intent, the Department of Homeland Security responded to the requirements in the NICCP. In a memorandum dated October 27, 2011, U.S. Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Alan Bersin notified Office of National Drug Control Policy Director R. Gil Kerlikowske the following: "based on current anticipated budgets and planning estimates, CBP expects to be able to support between 5,000 and 6,000 P-3 flight hours in the transit zone" with the amount of funding budgeted for this effort.

During FY 2012, OAM met JIATF-S requests with P-3 aircraft. The OAM P-3 aircraft flew a total of 5,593.1 hours, meeting 100 percent of the hours intended for JIATF-S for support in the transit zone that were anticipated in the 2011 memorandum to Office of National Drug Control Policy Director R. Gil Kerlikowske.

(3) Current Year Performance Targets

Fiscal Year: 2013

Target: Provide 100 percent of the 5,000 hours of JIATF-S support for the transit zone.

In the FY 2013 Department of Homeland Security Statement of Intent, CBP stated that it would provide 5,000 flight hours in the transit zone.

(4) Quality of Performance Data

The data underlying this measure is accurate, complete and unbiased. OAM P-3 flight data are recorded using a Post Flight Record Form (CBPAVP-051-2 RI 26 July 2004). The flight data entry is then validated against the Computerized Aircraft Reporting and Material Control (CARMAC) System, which is utilized by aircraft maintenance to track flight time accrued on the aircraft. The flight data is then checked monthly against the Air and Marine Operations Report (AMOR) module of TECS; its data can be queried through any CBP computer with appropriate access.



Appendix A Report Distribution

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