**FIPS PUB 201-2** FEDERAL INFORMATION PROCESSING STANDARDS PUBLICATION Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of **Federal Employees and Contractors** REVISED DRAFT Computer Security Division Information Technology Laboratory National Institute of Standards and Technology Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8900 July 2012 STATES OF

### U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

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NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY

Patrick D. Gallagher, Under Secretary of Commerce for Standards and Technology and Director

36	Acknowledgements
37	
38	NIST would like to acknowledge the significant contributions of the Identity, Credential, and
39	Access Management Subcommittee (ICAMSC) and the Smart Card Interagency Advisory Board
40	(IAB) for providing valuable contributions to the development of technical frameworks on which
41	this Standard is based.
42	Special thanks to those who have participated in the business requirements meeting and provided
43	valuable comments in shaping this Standard.

#### 46 47 The Federal Information Processing Standards Publication Series of the National Institute of Standards 48 and Technology (NIST) is the official series of publications relating to standards and guidelines adopted 49 and promulgated under the provisions of the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 50 2002. 51 Comments concerning FIPS publications are welcomed and should be addressed to the Director, 52 Information Technology Laboratory, National Institute of Standards and Technology, 100 Bureau Drive, 53 Stop 8900, Gaithersburg, MD 20899-8900. 54 Charles H. Romine, Director 55 Information Technology Laboratory 56 57 58 59 60 **ABSTRACT** 61 62 This Standard specifies the architecture and technical requirements for a common identification standard 63 for Federal employees and contractors. The overall goal is to achieve appropriate security assurance for 64 multiple applications by efficiently verifying the claimed identity of individuals seeking physical access 65 to Federally controlled government facilities and electronic access to government information systems. 66 The Standard contains the minimum requirements for a Federal personal identity verification system that 67 meets the control and security objectives of Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 [HSPD-12], 68 including identity proofing, registration, and issuance. The Standard also provides detailed specifications 69 that will support technical interoperability among PIV systems of Federal departments and agencies. It 70 describes the card elements, system interfaces, and security controls required to securely store, process, 71 and retrieve identity credentials from the card. The physical card characteristics, storage media, and data 72 elements that make up identity credentials are specified in this Standard. The interfaces and card 73 architecture for storing and retrieving identity credentials from a smart card are specified in Special 74 Publication 800-73, Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification. The interfaces and data formats of 75 biometric information are specified in Special Publication 800-76, Biometric Data Specification for 76 Personal Identity Verification. The requirements for cryptographic algorithms are specified in Special 77 Publication 800-78, Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for Personal Identity Verification. The 78 requirements for the accreditation of the PIV Card issuers are specified in Special Publication 800-79, 79 Guidelines for the Accreditation of Personal Identity Verification Card Issuers. The unique 80 organizational codes for Federal agencies are assigned in Special Publication 800-87, Codes for the 81 Identification of Federal and Federally-Assisted Organizations. The requirements for card readers are 82 specified in Special Publication 800-96, PIV Card to Reader Interoperability Guidelines. The format for 83 encoding the chain-of-trust for import and export is specified in Special Publication 800-156. 84 Representation of PIV Chain-of-Trust for Import and Export. The requirements for issuing PIV derived 85 credentials are specified in Special Publication 800-157, Guidelines for Personal Identity Verification 86 (PIV) Derived Credentials. 87 This Standard does not specify access control policies or requirements for Federal departments and

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agencies.

**FOREWORD** 

- 89 Keywords: architecture, authentication, authorization, biometrics, credential, cryptography, Federal
- 90 Information Processing Standards (FIPS), HSPD-12, identification, identity, infrastructure, model,
- 91 Personal Identity Verification, PIV, public key infrastructure, PKI, validation, verification.

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102	Federal Information Processing Standards Publications (FIPS PUBS) are issued by the National Institute
104	of Standards and Technology (NIST) after approval by the Secretary of Commerce pursuant to the
105	Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002.
106	1. Name of Standard.
107	FIPS PUB 201-2: Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal Employees and Contractors. 1
108	2. Category of Standard.
109	Information Security.
110	3. Explanation.
111 112 113 114	Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 [HSPD-12], dated August 27, 2004, entitled "Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors," directed the promulgation of a Federal standard for secure and reliable forms of identification for Federal employees and contractors. It further specified secure and reliable identification that—
115	(a) is issued based on sound criteria for verifying an individual employee's identity;
116	(b) is strongly resistant to identity fraud, tampering, counterfeiting, and terrorist exploitation;
117	(c) can be rapidly authenticated electronically; and
118	(d) is issued only by providers whose reliability has been established by an official accreditation process.
119 120 121 122 123	The directive stipulated that the Standard include graduated criteria, from least secure to most secure, to ensure flexibility in selecting the appropriate level of security for each application. Executive departments and agencies are required to implement the Standard for identification issued to Federal employees and contractors in gaining physical access to controlled facilities and logical access to controlled information systems.
124	4. Approving Authority.
125	Secretary of Commerce.

<sup>1</sup> This Standard is in response to Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12, which states that it is "intended only to improve the internal management of the executive branch of the Federal Government."

## 126 **5. Maintenance Agency.**

Department of Commerce, NIST, Information Technology Laboratory (ITL).

#### 128 **6. Applicability.**

- This Standard is applicable to identification issued by Federal departments and agencies to Federal
- employees and contractors (including contractor employees) for gaining physical access to Federally
- controlled facilities and logical access to Federally controlled information systems, except for "national
- security systems" as defined by 44 U.S.C. 3542(b)(2). Except as provided in [HSPD-12], nothing in this
- Standard alters the ability of government entities to use the Standard for additional applications.
- Special-Risk Security Provision—The U.S. Government has personnel, facilities, and other assets
- deployed and operating worldwide under a vast range of threats (e.g., terrorist, technical, intelligence),
- particularly heightened overseas. For those agencies with particularly sensitive threats from outside the
- 137 contiguous United States, the issuance, holding, and/or use of PIV Cards with full technical capabilities as
- described herein may result in unacceptably high risk. In such cases of extant risk (e.g., to facilities,
- individuals, operations, the national interest, or the national security), by the presence and/or use of full-
- capability PIV Cards, the head of a department or independent agency may issue a select number of
- maximum security credentials that do not contain (or otherwise do not fully support) the wireless and/or
- biometric capabilities otherwise required/referenced herein. To the greatest extent practicable, heads of
- departments and independent agencies should minimize the issuance of such special-risk security
- credentials so as to support interagency interoperability and the President's policy. Use of other risk-
- mitigating technical (e.g., high-assurance on-off switches for the wireless capability) and procedural
- mechanisms in such situations is preferable, and as such is also explicitly permitted and encouraged. As
- protective security technology advances, the need for this provision will be re-assessed as the Standard
- undergoes the normal review and update process.

## 149 7. Specifications.

- Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 201 Personal Identity Verification (PIV) of Federal
- 151 Employees and Contractors.

### 152 **8.** Implementations.

- This Standard satisfies the control objectives, security requirements, and technical interoperability
- requirements of [HSPD-12]. The Standard specifies implementation of identity credentials on integrated
- circuit cards for use in a Federal personal identity verification system.
- A PIV Card must be personalized with identity information for the individual to whom the card is issued,
- in order to perform identity verification both by humans and automated systems. Humans can use the
- physical card for visual comparisons, whereas automated systems can use the electronically stored data on
- the card to conduct automated identity verification. In implementing PIV systems and pursuant to
- Section 508 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the Act), as amended, agencies have the responsibility to
- accommodate federal employees and contractors with disabilities to have access to and use of information
- and data comparable to the access to and use of such information and data by federal employees and
- 163 contractors who are not individuals with disabilities. In instances where Federal agencies assert
- exceptions to Section 508 accessibility requirements (e.g., undue burden, national security, commercial
- non-availability), Sections 501 and 504 of the Act requires Federal agencies to provide reasonable
- accommodation for federal employees and contractors with disabilities whose needs are not met by the
- baseline accessibility provided under Section 508. While Section 508 compliance is the responsibility of

- 168 Federal agencies and departments, this Standard specifies options to aid in implementation of the
- 169 requirements:
- + Section 4.1.4.3 specifies Zones 21F and 22F as an option for orientation markers of the PIV Card.
- + Section 2.8 describes an alternative to the National Criminal History Check (NCHC) in instances where an applicant has unclassifiable fingers.
- + Sections 2.8, and 2.9 specify alternative methods for the 1:1 biometric match required at PIV Card issuance, reissuance, renewal, and reset.
- + Section 6 defines authentication mechanisms with varying characteristics for both physical and logical access (e.g., with or without PIN, over contact, contactless, or virtual contact interface).
- 177 Federal departments and agencies must use accredited issuers to issue identity credentials for Federal
- employees and contractors. For this purpose, NIST provided guidelines for the accreditation of PIV Card
- issuers in [SP 800-79]. The Standard also covers security and interoperability requirements for PIV
- 180 Cards. For this purpose, NIST has established the PIV Validation Program that tests implementations for
- 181 conformance with this Standard as specified in [SP 800-73] and [SP 800-78]. Additional information on
- this program is published and maintained at <a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/piv/npivp/">http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/piv/npivp/</a>. The U.S. General
- Services Administration (GSA) has set up the FIPS 201 Evaluation Program to evaluate conformance of
- different families of products that support the PIV processes of this Standard see Appendix A.5.
- The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) provides implementation oversight for this Standard. The
- respective numbers of agency-issued 1) general credentials and 2) special-risk credentials (issued under
- the Special-Risk Security Provision) are subject to annual reporting to the OMB under the annual
- reporting process in a manner prescribed by OMB.
- 189 **9. Effective Date.**
- 190 This Standard is effective immediately and supersedes FIPS 201-1 (Change Notice 1). New optional
- features of this Standard that depend upon the release of new or revised NIST Special Publications are
- effective upon final publication of the supporting Special Publications.
- 193 **10.** Implementation Schedule.
- This Standard mandates the implementation of some of the PIV Card features that were optional to
- implement in FIPS 201-1. To comply with FIPS 201-2, all new and replacement PIV Cards shall be
- issued with the mandatory PIV Card features no later than 12 months after the effective date of this
- 197 Standard.
- Accreditations of PIV Card issuers (PCIs) that occur 12 months after the effective date of this Standard
- shall be in compliance with FIPS 201-2.
- FIPS 201-2 compliance of PIV components and subsystems is provided in accordance with M-06-18
- 201 [OMB0618] and M-11-11 [OMB1111] through products and services from GSA's Interoperability Test
- 202 Program and Approved Products and Services List, once available. Implementation Guidance to PIV
- 203 enabled federal facilities and information systems, in accordance to M-11-11 will be outlined in the
- "Federal Identity, Credential, and Access Management (FICAM) Roadmap and Implementation
- 205 Guidance."

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14. Patents.

#### 206 11. Qualifications. 207 The security provided by the PIV system is dependent on many factors outside the scope of this Standard. 208 Upon adopting this Standard, organizations must be aware that the overall security of the personal 209 identification system relies on— 210 assurance provided by the issuer of an identity credential that the individual in possession of the 211 credential has been correctly identified; 212 protection provided to an identity credential stored within the PIV Card and transmitted between the 213 card and the PIV issuance and usage infrastructure; and 214 protection provided to the identity verification system infrastructure and components throughout the 215 entire lifecycle. 216 Although it is the intent of this Standard to specify mechanisms and support systems that provide high 217 assurance personal identity verification, conformance to this Standard does not assure that a particular 218 implementation is secure. It is the implementer's responsibility to ensure that components, interfaces, 219 communications, storage media, managerial processes, and services used within the identity verification 220 system are designed and built in a secure manner. 221 Similarly, the use of a product that conforms to this Standard does not guarantee the security of the 222 overall system in which the product is used. The responsible authority in each department and agency 223 shall ensure that an overall system provides the acceptable level of security. 224 Because a standard of this nature must be flexible enough to adapt to advancements and innovations in 225 science and technology, NIST has a policy to review this Standard within five years to assess its 226 adequacy. 227 12. Waivers. 228 As per the Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, waivers to Federal Information 229 Processing Standards are not allowed. 230 13. Where to Obtain Copies. 231 This publication is available through the Internet by accessing http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/.

Aspects of the implementation of this Standard may be covered by U.S. or foreign patents.

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#### 1. Introduction

- Authentication of an individual's identity is a fundamental component of physical and logical access
- 204 control processes. When an individual attempts to access security-sensitive buildings, computer systems,
- or data, an access control decision must be made. An accurate determination of an individual's identity is
- 206 needed to make sound access control decisions.
- A wide range of mechanisms is employed to authenticate an identity, utilizing various classes of identity
- credentials. For physical access, an individual's identity has traditionally been authenticated by use of
- paper or other non-automated, hand-carried credentials, such as driver's licenses and badges. Access
- authorization to computers and data has traditionally been based on identities authenticated through user-
- selected passwords. More recently, cryptographic mechanisms and biometric techniques have been used
- in physical and logical security applications, replacing or supplementing the traditional identity
- 213 credentials.

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- The strength of the authentication that is achieved varies, depending upon the type of credential, the
- process used to issue the credential, and the authentication mechanism used to validate the credential.
- This document establishes a standard for a Personal Identity Verification (PIV) system based on secure
- and reliable forms of identity credentials issued by the Federal government to its employees and
- 218 contractors. These credentials are intended to authenticate individuals who require access to Federally
- 219 controlled facilities, information systems, and applications. This Standard addresses requirements for
- initial identity proofing, infrastructures to support interoperability of identity credentials, and
- accreditation of organizations and processes issuing PIV credentials.

### 222 **1.1 Purpose**

- This Standard defines a reliable, government-wide identity credential for use in applications such as
- access to Federally controlled facilities and information systems. This Standard has been developed
- within the context and constraints of Federal law, regulations, and policy based on information processing
- technology currently available and evolving.
- 227 This Standard specifies a PIV system within which a common identity credential can be created and later
- 228 used to verify a claimed identity. The Standard also identifies Federal government-wide requirements for
- security levels that are dependent on risks to the facility or information being protected.

### 230 **1.2 Scope**

- Homeland Security Presidential Directive-12 [HSPD-12], signed by President George W. Bush on August
- 27, 2004, established the requirements for a common identification standard for identity credentials issued
- by Federal departments and agencies to Federal employees and contractors (including contractor
- employees) for gaining physical access to Federally controlled facilities and logical access to Federally
- controlled information systems. HSPD-12 directs the Department of Commerce to develop a Federal
- 236 Information Processing Standards (FIPS) publication to define such a common identity credential. In
- accordance with HSPD-12, this Standard defines the technical requirements for the identity credential
- 238 that—
- 239 (a) is issued based on sound criteria for verifying an individual employee's identity;
- 240 (b) is strongly resistant to identity fraud, tampering, counterfeiting, and terrorist exploitation;
- 241 (c) can be rapidly authenticated electronically; and

- 242 (d) is issued only by providers whose reliability has been established by an official accreditation process.
- 243 This Standard defines authentication mechanisms offering varying degrees of security for both logical and
- 244 physical access applications. Federal departments and agencies will determine the level of security and
- 245 authentication mechanisms appropriate for their applications. This Standard does not specify access
- 246 control policies or requirements for Federal departments and agencies. Therefore, the scope of this
- 247 Standard is limited to authentication of an individual's identity. Authorization and access control
- decisions are outside the scope of this Standard. Moreover, requirements for a temporary card used until
- a new or replacement PIV Card arrives are out of scope of this Standard.

## 250 1.3 Change Management

- 251 Every revision of this Standard introduces refinements and changes that may impact existing
- implementations. FIPS 201 and its normative specifications encourage implementation approaches that
- reduce the high cost of configuration and change management by architecting resilience to change into
- 254 system processes and components. Nevertheless, changes and modifications are introduced. Because of
- the importance of this issue, this Change Management section has been added to the Standard.
- 256 This section provides change management principles and guidance to manage newly introduced changes
- and modifications to the previous version of this Standard. Specifically, this section provides a
- description of the types of changes expected in FIPS 201 revisions.

## 259 1.3.1 Backward Compatible Change

- A backward compatible change is a change or modification to an existing feature that does not break the
- systems using this feature. For example, changing the Card Authentication certificate from optional to
- mandatory does not affect the systems using the Card Authentication certificate for authentication (i.e.,
- using the PKI-CAK mechanism).

#### 264 1.3.2 Non-Backward Compatible Change

- A non-backward compatible change is a change or modification to an existing feature such that the
- modified feature cannot be used with existing systems. For example, changing the format of the
- biometric data would not be compatible with the existing system, because a biometric authentication
- attempt with the modified format would fail. Similarly, changing the PIV Card Application IDentifier
- 269 (AID) would introduce a non-backward compatible change. As a result, all systems interacting with the
- 270 PIV Card would need to be changed to accept the new PIV AID.

### **1.3.3** New Features

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- New features are optional or mandatory features that are added to the Standard. New features do not
- interfere with backward compatibility because they are not part of the existing systems. For example, the
- addition of an optional on-card biometric comparison (OCC) authentication mechanism is a new feature
- that does not affect the features in current systems. The systems will need to be updated if an agency
- decides to support the OCC-AUTH authentication mechanism.

#### 1.3.4 Deprecated and Removed

- When a feature is discontinued or no longer needed, it is deprecated. Such a feature remains in the
- 279 current Standard as an optional feature but its use is strongly discouraged. A deprecated feature does not
- affect existing systems but should be phased out in future systems, because the feature will be removed in
- the next revision of the Standard. For example, existing PIV Cards with deprecated data elements remain

- valid until they naturally expire. Replacement PIV Cards, however, should not re-use the deprecated
- features because the next revision of the Standard will remove the support for deprecated data elements.

## 284 1.3.5 FIPS 201 Version Management

- Subsequent revisions of this Standard may necessitate FIPS 201 version management that introduces new
- version numbers for FIPS 201 products. Components that may be affected by version management
- include, for example, PIV Cards, PIV middleware software, and card issuance systems.
- New version numbers will be assigned in [SP 800-73], if needed, based on the nature of the change. For
- 289 example, new mandatory features introduced in a revision of this Standard may necessitate a new PIV
- 290 Card Application version number so that systems can quickly discover the new mandatory features.
- Optional features, on the other hand, may be discoverable by an on-card discovery mechanism.

### 1.4 Document Organization

- 293 This Standard describes the minimum requirements for a Federal personal identification system that
- meets the control and security objectives of [HSPD-12], including identity proofing, registration, and
- issuance. It provides detailed technical specifications to support the control and security objectives of
- 296 [HSPD-12] as well as interoperability among Federal departments and agencies. This Standard describes
- 297 the policies and minimum requirements of a PIV Card that allows interoperability of credentials for
- 298 physical and logical access. The physical card characteristics, storage media, and data elements that make
- up identity credentials are specified in this Standard. The interfaces and card architecture for storing and
- retrieving identity credentials from a smart card are specified in Special Publication 800-73 [SP 800-73],
- 301 Interfaces for Personal Identity Verification. Similarly, the requirements for collection and formatting of
- 302 biometric information are specified in Special Publication 800-76 [SP 800-76], Biometric Data
- 303 Specification for Personal Identity Verification. The requirements for cryptographic algorithms are
- specified in Special Publication 800-78 [SP 800-78], Cryptographic Algorithms and Key Sizes for
- 305 Personal Identity Verification. The requirements for the accreditation of PIV Card issuers are specified in
- 306 Special Publication 800-79 [SP 800-79], Guidelines for the Accreditation of Personal Identity
- 307 Verification Card Issuers. The unique organizational codes for Federal agencies are assigned in Special
- 308 Publication 800-87 [SP 800-87], Codes for the Identification of Federal and Federally-Assisted
- 309 Organizations. The requirements for the PIV Card reader are provided in Special Publication 800-96 [SP
- 310 800-96], PIV Card to Reader Interoperability Guidelines. The format for encoding the chain-of-trust for
- import and export is specified in Special Publication 800-156 [SP 800-156], Representation of PIV
- 312 Chain-of-Trust for Import and Export. The requirements for issuing PIV derived credentials are specified
- in Special Publication 800-157 [SP 800-157], Guidelines for Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Derived
- 314 *Credentials*.

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- 315 This Standard contains normative references to other documents, and to the extent described in each
- 316 citation these documents are included by reference in this Standard. Should normative text in this
- 317 Standard conflict with normative text in a referenced document the normative text in this Standard
- 318 prevails for this Standard.
- 319 All sections in this document are *normative* (i.e., mandatory for compliance) unless specified as
- *informative* (i.e., non-mandatory). Following is the structure of this document:
- + Section 1, Introduction, provides background information for understanding the scope of this Standard. This section is *informative*.

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appendix is informative.

323 + Section 2, Common Identification, Security, and Privacy Requirements, outlines the requirements 324 for identity proofing, registration, and issuance, by establishing the control and security 325 objectives for compliance with [HSPD-12]. This section is normative. 326 + Section 3, PIV System Overview, serves to provide a PIV system overview. This section is 327 informative. 328 + Section 4, PIV Front-End Subsystem, provides the requirements for the components of the PIV 329 front-end subsystem. Specifically, this section defines requirements for the PIV Card, logical 330 data elements, biometrics, cryptography, and card readers. This section is *normative*. 331 + Section 5, PIV Key Management Requirements, defines the processes and components required 332 for managing a PIV Card's lifecycle. It also provides the requirements and specifications related 333 to this subsystem. This section is normative. 334 Section 6, PIV Cardholder Authentication, defines a suite of authentication mechanisms that are 335 supported by the PIV Card, and their applicability in meeting the requirements of graduated 336 levels of identity assurance. This section is *normative*. 337 + Appendix A, PIV Validation, Certification, and Accreditation, provides additional information 338 regarding compliance with this document. This appendix is *normative*. 339 + Appendix B, PIV Object Identifiers and Certificate Extension, provides additional details for the 340 PIV objects identified in Section 4. This appendix is *normative*. 341 + Appendix C, Glossary of Terms, Acronyms, and Notations, describes the vocabulary and textual 342 representations used in the document. This appendix is *informative*. 343 + Appendix D, References, lists the specifications and standards referred to in this document. This 344 appendix is *informative*.

+ Appendix E, Revision History, lists changes made to this Standard from its inception. This

#### 347 Common Identification, Security, and Privacy Requirements 348 This section addresses the fundamental control and security objectives outlined in [HSPD-12], including 349 the identity proofing requirements for Federal employees and contractors. 350 2.1 **Control Objectives** 351 [HSPD-12] established control objectives for secure and reliable identification of Federal employees and 352 contractors. These control objectives, provided in paragraph 3 of the directive, are quoted here: 353 (3) "Secure and reliable forms of identification" for purposes of this directive means identification that (a) 354 is issued based on sound criteria for verifying an individual employee's identity; (b) is strongly resistant to 355 identity fraud, tampering, counterfeiting, and terrorist exploitation; (c) can be rapidly authenticated 356 electronically; and (d) is issued only by providers whose reliability has been established by an official 357 accreditation process. 358 Each agency's PIV implementation shall meet the four control objectives (a) through (d) listed above 359 such that-360 Credentials are issued 1) to individuals whose identity has been verified and 2) after a proper 361 authority has authorized issuance of the credential. 362 A credential is issued only after National Agency Check with Written Inquiries (NACI) (or equivalent 363 or higher) or Tier 1 or higher federal background investigation is initiated and the Federal Bureau of 364 Investigation (FBI) National Criminal History Check (NCHC) portion of the background 365 investigation is completed. 366 An individual is issued a credential only after presenting two identity source documents, at least one 367 of which is a Federal or State government issued picture ID. 368 Fraudulent identity source documents are not accepted as genuine and unaltered. 369 A person suspected or known to the government as being a terrorist is not issued a credential. 370 No substitution occurs in the identity proofing process. More specifically, the individual who appears 371 for identity proofing, and whose fingerprints are checked against databases, is the person to whom the 372 credential is issued. 373 No credential is issued unless requested by proper authority. 374 A credential remains serviceable only up to its expiration date. More precisely, a revocation process 375 exists such that expired or invalidated credentials are swiftly revoked. 376 A single corrupt official in the process may not issue a credential with an incorrect identity or to a

+ An issued credential is not duplicated or forged, and is not modified by an unauthorized entity.

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person not entitled to the credential.

### 379 **2.2 Credentialing Requirements**

- 380 Federal departments and agencies shall use the credentialing guidance issued by the Director of the Office
- of Personnel Management (OPM) to heads of departments and agencies when determining whether to
- issue or revoke PIV Cards (e.g., [SPRINGER MEMO], [FIS]<sup>2</sup>). In addition to OPM's [FIS], Federal
- department and agencies shall also apply credentialing requirements specified in applicable OMB
- memoranda (e.g., OMB Memorandum M-05-24 [OMB0524]).

### 2.3 Biometric Data Collection for Background Investigations

- The following biometric data shall be collected from each PIV applicant:
- 4 A full set of fingerprints. Biometric identification using fingerprints is the primary input to law
   enforcement checks. In cases where ten fingerprints are not available, then as many fingers as
- possible shall be imaged. In cases where obtaining any fingerprints is impossible, agencies shall seek
- 390 OPM guidance for alternative means of performing the law enforcement checks.
- 391 This collection is not necessary for applicants who have a completed and favorably adjudicated NACI (or
- equivalent or higher) or Tier 1 or higher federal background investigation that can be located and
- 393 referenced.

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Fingerprint collection shall be conformant to the procedural and technical specifications of [SP 800-76].

#### 395 2.4 Biometric Data Collection for PIV Card

- The following biometric data shall be collected from each PIV applicant:
- 4 Two fingerprints, for off-card comparison. These shall be taken either from the full set of fingerprints collected in Section 2.3, or collected independently.
- 399 + An electronic facial image.
- 400 The following biometric data may optionally be collected from a PIV applicant:
- 401 + One or two iris images.
- + Two fingerprints, for on-card comparison, which may be the same as the two fingerprints collected for off-card comparison.
- 404 If the biometric data that is collected as specified in this section and in Section 2.3 is collected on separate
- occasions, then a 1:1 biometric match of the applicant shall be performed at each visit against biometric
- 406 data collected during a previous visit.
- 407 Biometric data collection shall be conformant to the procedural and technical specifications of
- 408 [SP 800-76]. The choice of which two fingers is important and may vary between persons. The
- recommended selection and order is specified in [SP 800-76].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Federal Investigative Standards. [URL will be added for OPM's new investigative standard once published ~July 2012.]

#### 2.5 Biometric Data Use

- The full set of fingerprints shall be used for one-to-many identification in the databases of fingerprints
- 412 maintained by the FBI.

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- The two mandatory fingerprints shall be used for preparation of templates to be stored on the PIV Card as
- described in Section 4.2.3.1. The fingerprints provide an interagency-interoperable authentication
- mechanism through a match-off-card scheme as described in Section 6.2.1. These fingerprints are also
- 416 the primary means of authentication during PIV issuance and maintenance processes.
- The optional fingerprints may be used for preparation of the fingerprint templates for on-card comparison
- 418 as described in Section 4.2.3.1. OCC may be used to support card activation as described in Section 4.3.1
- and cardholder authentication as described in Section 6.2.2.
- 420 The electronic iris images may be stored on the PIV Card as described in Section 4.2.3.1. Agencies may
- choose to collect iris biometrics as a second biometric to support multimodal authentication to improve
- accuracy, operational suitability, to accommodate user preferences, or as a backup when the fingerprint
- 423 biometric is unavailable.
- 424 The electronic facial image:
- + shall be stored on the PIV Card as described in Section 4.2.3.1;
- + shall be printed on the PIV Card according to Section 4.1.4.1;
- + may be used for generating a visual image on the monitor of a guard workstation for augmenting the visual authentication process defined in Section 6.2.6; and
- + may be used for biometric authentication in operator-attended PIV issuance, reissuance, renewal and verification data reset processes.

### 431 **2.6 Chain-of-Trust**

- 432 A card issuer may optionally maintain, for each PIV Card issued, a documentary chain-of-trust for the
- 433 identification data it collects. The chain-of-trust is a sequence of related enrollment data records that are
- 434 created and maintained through the methods of contemporaneous acquisition of data within each
- enrollment data record, and biometric matching of samples between enrollment data records.<sup>3</sup>
- 436 It is recommended that the following data be included in the chain-of-trust:
- + A log of activities that documents who took the action, what action was taken, when and where the action took place, and what identification data was collected.
- 439 + An enrollment data record that contains the most recent collection of each of the biometric data 440 collected. The enrollment data record describes the circumstances of biometric acquisition including 441 the name and role of the acquiring agent, the office and organization, time, place, and acquisition

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> For example, ten fingerprints for law enforcement checks may be collected at one time and place, and two fingerprints for PIV Card templates may be collected at a later time and different place, provided that the two fingerprints are verified as among the ten original fingerprints.

- method. The enrollment data record may also document unavailable biometric data or failed attempts
- 443 to collect biometric data. The enrollment data record may contain historical biometric data.
- + The most recent unique identifiers (i.e., Federal Agency Smart Credential Number (FASC-N) and
- Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID)) issued to the individual. The record may contain historical
- 446 unique identifiers.
- + Information about the authorizing entity who has approved the issuance of a credential.
- + Current status of the background investigation, including the results of the investigation once completed.
- 450 + The evidence of authorization if the credential is issued under a pseudonym.
- 451 + Any data or any subsequent changes in the data about the cardholder. If the changed data is the cardholder's name, then the issuer should include the evidence of a formal name change.
- The biometric data in the chain-of-trust shall be valid for at most 12 years. In order to mitigate ageing
- effects and thereby maintain operational readiness of a cardholder's PIV Card, agencies may require
- biometric enrollment more frequently than 12 years.
- The chain-of-trust contains personally identifiable information (PII). If implemented, it shall be protected
- in a manner that protects the individual's privacy and maintains the integrity of the chain-of-trust record
- both in transit and at rest. A card issuer may import and export a chain-of-trust in the manner and
- representation described in [SP 800-156].
- The chain-of-trust can be applied in several situations to include:
- 461 + Extended enrollment: a PIV applicant enrolls a full set of fingerprints for background investigations
- at one place and time, and two fingerprints for the PIV Card at another place and time. The chain-of-
- 463 trust would contain identifiers and two enrollment data records, one with a full-set fingerprint
- transaction, and one with two fingerprint templates. The two fingerprint templates would be matched
- against the corresponding fingers in the ten-fingerprint data set to link the chain.
- 466 + Reissuance: a PIV cardholder loses his/her card. Since the card issuer has biometric enrollment data
- records, the cardholder can perform a 1:1 biometric match to reconnect to the card issuer's chain-of-
- 468 trust. The card issuer need not repeat the identity proofing and registration process. The card issuer
- proceeds to issue a new card as described in Section 2.9.2.
- 470 + Interagency transfer: a Federal employee is transferred from one agency to another. When the
- 471 employee leaves the old agency, he/she surrenders the PIV Card and it is destroyed. When the
- employee arrives at the new agency and is processed in, the card issuer in the new agency requests the
- employee's chain-of-trust from the card issuer in the old agency, and receives the chain-of-trust. The
- employee performs a 1:1 biometric match against the chain-of-trust, and the interaction proceeds as
- described in Section 2.8.2.

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### 2.7 PIV Identity Proofing and Registration Requirements

- Departments and agencies shall follow an identity proofing and registration process that meets the
- 478 requirements defined below when issuing PIV Cards.

479 The organization shall adopt and use an approved identity proofing and registration process in 480 accordance with [SP 800-79]. 481 Biometrics shall be captured as specified in Sections 2.3 and 2.4. 482 The process shall begin by locating and referencing a completed and favorably adjudicated NACI (or 483 equivalent or higher) or Tier 1 or higher federal background investigation record. In the absence of a 484 record, the process shall ensure 1) the initiation of a Tier 1 or higher federal background investigation and 485 2) the completion of the Automated Record Checks (ARC) of the background investigation. In cases where 486 the ARC results are not received within 5 days of the ARC initiation, the FBI NCHC (fingerprint check) 487 portion of the ARC shall be complete before credential issuance. 488 The applicant shall appear in-person at least once before the issuance of a PIV Card. 489 During identity proofing, the applicant shall be required to provide two forms of identity source documents in original form. <sup>4</sup> The identity source documents shall be bound to that applicant and 490 491 shall be neither expired nor cancelled. If the two identity source documents bear different names, 492 evidence of a formal name change shall be provided. The primary identity source document shall be 493 one of the following forms of identification: 494 - a U.S. Passport or a U.S. Passport Card; 495 a Permanent Resident Card or an Alien Registration Receipt Card (Form I-551); 496 a foreign passport; 497 an Employment Authorization Document that contains a photograph (Form I-766); 498 a Driver's license or an ID card issued by a state or possession of the United States provided it 499 contains a photograph; 500 a U.S. Military ID card; 501 a U.S. Military dependent's ID card; or 502 a PIV Card. 503 The secondary identity source document may be from the list above, but cannot be of the same type 504 as the primary identity source document. The secondary identity source document may also be any of 505 the following: 506 - a U.S. Social Security Card issued by the Social Security Administration; 507 an original or certified copy of a birth certificate issued by a state, county, municipal 508 authority, possession, or outlying possession of the United States bearing an official seal;

<sup>4</sup> Departments and agencies may choose to accept only a subset of the identity source documents listed in this section. For example, in cases where identity proofing for PIV Card issuance is performed prior to verification of employment authorization, departments and agencies may choose to require the applicant to provide identity source documents that satisfy the requirements of Form I-9, *Employment Eligibility Verification*, in addition to the requirements specified in this

section.

contains a photograph;

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an ID card issued by a federal, state, or local government agency or entity, provided it

511	_	a voter's registration card;
512	_	a U.S. Coast Guard Merchant Mariner Card;
513	_	a Certificate of U.S. Citizenship (Form N-560 or N-561);
514	_	a Certificate of Naturalization (Form N-550 or N-570);
515	_	a U.S. Citizen ID Card (Form I-197);
516	_	an Identification Card for Use of Resident Citizen in the United States (Form I-179);
517 518	_	a Certification of Birth Abroad or Certification of Report of Birth issued by the Department of State (Form FS-545 or Form DS-1350);
519	_	a Temporary Resident Card (Form I-688);
520	_	an Employment Authorization Card (Form I-688A);
521	_	a Reentry Permit (Form I-327);
522	_	a Refugee Travel Document (Form I-571);
523	_	an Employment authorization document issued by Department of Homeland Security (DHS);
524	_	an Employment Authorization Document issued by DHS with photograph (Form I-688B);
525	_	a driver's license issued by a Canadian government entity; or
526	_	a Native American tribal document.
527 528 529	the pri	V identity proofing, registration, issuance, reissuance, and renewal processes shall adhere to nciple of separation of duties to ensure that no single individual has the capability to issue a ard without the cooperation of another authorized person.
530 531 532	accredited	y proofing and registration process used when verifying the identity of the applicant shall be by the department or agency as satisfying the requirements above and approved in writing by deputy secretary (or equivalent) of the Federal department or agency.
533 534 535 536 537	working for must be es Security, e	ements for identity proofing and registration also apply to citizens of foreign countries who are or the Federal government overseas. However, a process for identity proofing and registration tablished using a method approved by the U.S. Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic xcept for employees under the command of a U.S. area military commander. These procedures depending on the country.
538	2.8 PIV	Card Issuance Requirements
539 540 541 542	The issuan requirement	ats and agencies shall meet the requirements defined below when issuing identity credentials. ce process used when issuing credentials shall be accredited by the department as satisfying the ats below and approved in writing by the head or deputy secretary (or equivalent) of the Federa t or agency.

+ Credentials are issued after a proper authority has authorized issuance of the credential.

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- 544 + The organization shall use an approved PIV credential issuance process in accordance with [SP 800-79].
- Before issuing the identity credential, the process shall ensure that a previously completed and favorably adjudicated NACI (or equivalent or higher) or Tier 1 or higher federal background investigation is on record. In the absence of a record, the required federal background investigation shall be initiated. The credential should not be issued before the results of the ARC are complete. However, if the results of the ARC have not been received in 5 days, the identity credential may be issued based on the FBI NCHC. In the absence of an FBI NCHC (e.g., due to unclassifiable fingerprints) the ARC results are required prior to issuing a PIV Card. The PIV Card shall be revoked if the results of the background investigation so justify.
- 553 + Biometrics used to personalize the PIV Card must be those captured during the identity proofing and registration process.
- 555 During the issuance process, the issuer shall verify that the individual to whom the credential is to be 556 issued is the same as the intended applicant/recipient as approved by the appropriate authority. 557 Before the card is provided to the applicant, the issuer shall perform a 1:1 biometric match of the 558 applicant against biometrics available on the PIV Card. The 1:1 biometric match requires either a 559 match of fingerprint(s) or, if unavailable, other optional biometric data that are available. Minimum 560 accuracy requirements for the biometric match are specified in [SP 800-76]. On successful match, the 561 PIV Card shall be released to the applicant. If the match is unsuccessful, or if no biometric data is 562 available, the cardholder shall provide two identity source documents (as specified in Section 2.7). 563 and an attending operator shall inspect these and compare the cardholder with the facial image printed 564 on the PIV Card.
- The organization shall issue PIV credentials only through systems and providers whose reliability has
   been established by the agency and so documented and approved in writing (i.e., accredited) in
   accordance with [SP 800-79].
- 568 + The PIV Card shall be valid for no more than six years.
- PIV Cards that contain topographical defects (e.g., scratches, poor color, fading, etc.) or that are not properly printed shall be destroyed. The PIV Card issuer is responsible for the card stock, its
- management, and its integrity.

### 572 2.8.1 Special Rule for Pseudonyms

573 In limited circumstances Federal employees and contractors are permitted to use pseudonyms during the 574 performance of their official duties with the approval of their employing agency. If an agency determines 575 that use of a pseudonym is necessary to protect an employee or contractor (e.g., from physical harm, 576 severe distress, or harassment),<sup>5</sup> the agency may formally authorize the issuance of a PIV Card to the 577 employee or contractor using the agency-approved pseudonym. The issuance of a PIV Card using an 578 authorized pseudonym shall follow the procedures in Section 2.8, PIV Card Issuance Requirements, 579 except that the card issuer must receive satisfactory evidence that the pseudonym is authorized by the 580 agency.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> See, for example, Section 10.5.7 of the Internal Revenue Service Manual (http://www.irs.gov/irm/index.html), which authorizes approval by an employee's supervisor of the use of a pseudonym to protect the employee's personal safety.

#### 2.8.2 Grace Period

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- In some instances an individual's status as a Federal employee or contractor will lapse for a brief time
- period. For example, a Federal employee may leave one Federal agency for another Federal agency and
- thus occur a short employment lapse period, or an individual who was under contract to a Federal agency
- may receive a new contract from that agency shortly after the previous contract expired. In these
- instances, the card issuer may issue a new PIV Card without repeating the identity proofing and
- registration process if the issuer has access to the applicant's chain-of-trust record and the applicant can
- be reconnected to the chain-of-trust record.
- When issuing a PIV Card under the grace period, the card issuer shall verify that PIV Card issuance has
- been authorized by a proper authority and that the employee's or contractor's background investigation is
- valid. Re-investigations shall be performed if required, in accordance with OPM guidance. At the time
- of issuance, the card issuer shall perform a 1:1 biometric match of the applicant to reconnect to the chain-
- of-trust. The 1:1 biometric match requires either a match of fingerprint(s) or, if unavailable, other
- optional biometric data that are available. On successful match, the new PIV Card shall be released to the
- applicant. If the match is unsuccessful, or if no biometric data is available, the cardholder shall provide
- the two identity source documents (as specified in Section 2.7), and an attending operator shall inspect
- these and compare the cardholder with the facial image retrieved from the enrollment data record and the
- facial image printed on the new PIV Card.

### 2.9 PIV Card Maintenance Requirements

- The PIV Card shall be maintained using processes that comply with this section.
- The data and credentials held by the PIV Card may need to be updated or invalidated prior to the
- expiration date of the card. The cardholder may change his or her name, retire, or change jobs; or the
- employment may be terminated, thus requiring invalidation of a previously issued card. In this regard,
- procedures for PIV Card maintenance must be integrated into department and agency procedures to
- ensure effective card maintenance. In order to maintain operational readiness of a cardholder's PIV Card,
- agencies may require PIV Card update, reissuance, or biometric enrollment more frequently than the
- 607 maximum PIV Card and biometric lifetimes stated in this Standard. Shorter lifetimes may be specified by
- agency policy collectively, or on a case-by-case basis as sub-par operation is encountered.

#### 2.9.1 PIV Card Renewal Requirements

- Renewal is the process by which a valid PIV Card is replaced without the need to repeat the entire
- 611 identity proofing and registration procedure. The renewal process may be used to replace a PIV Card that
- 612 is nearing expiration or in the event of an employee status or attribute change. The entire identity
- proofing, registration, and issuance process, as described in Sections 2.7 and 2.8, shall be repeated if the
- 614 issuer does not maintain a chain-of-trust record for the cardholder or if the renewal process was not
- started before the original PIV Card expired.
- The renewal process for a PIV Card starts when a proper authority authorizes renewal of the credential.
- The issuer shall verify that the employee's or contractor's background investigation is valid before
- renewing the card and associated credentials. Re-investigations shall be performed if required, in
- accordance with OPM guidance.
- The issuer shall perform a 1:1 biometric match of the applicant to reconnect to the chain-of-trust. The 1:1
- biometric match requires either a match of fingerprint(s) or, if unavailable, other optional biometric data
- that are available. Minimum accuracy requirements for the biometric match are specified in [SP 800-76].

- On successful match, the new PIV Card shall be released to the applicant. If the match is unsuccessful, or
- if no biometric data is available, the cardholder shall provide the original PIV Card and another primary
- identity source document (as specified in Section 2.7), and an attending operator shall inspect these and
- 626 compare the cardholder with the facial image retrieved from the enrollment data record and the facial
- image printed on the new PIV Card.
- Prior to receiving the new PIV Card, the cardholder shall surrender the original PIV Card, which shall be
- 629 collected and destroyed when the new PIV Card is issued.
- 630 If there is any data change about the cardholder, the issuer will record this in the chain-of-trust, if
- applicable. If the changed data is the cardholder's name, then the issuer shall meet the requirements in
- 632 Section 2.9.1.1, Special Rule for Name Change by Cardholder.
- Previously collected biometric data may be reused with the new PIV Card if the expiration date of the
- new PIV Card is no later than 12 years after the date that the biometric data was obtained. As biometric
- authentication accuracy degrades with the time elapsed since initial collection, issuers may elect to refresh
- the biometric data after reconnecting the applicant to their chain-of-trust. Even if the same biometric data
- is reused with the new PIV Card, the digital signature must be recomputed with the new FASC-N and
- 638 UUID.
- A new PIV Authentication certificate and a new Card Authentication certificate shall be generated. The
- corresponding certificates shall be populated with the new FASC-N and UUID. For cardholders who are
- required to have a digital signature certificate, a new digital signature certificate shall also be generated.
- Key management key(s) and certificate(s) may be imported to the new PIV Card.

## 643 2.9.1.1 Special Rule for Name Change by Cardholder

- Name changes frequently occur as a result of marriage, divorce, or as a matter of personal preference. In
- the event that a cardholder notifies a card issuer that his or her name has changed, and presents the card
- issuer with evidence of a formal name change, such as a marriage certificate, a divorce decree, judicial
- recognition of a name change, or other mechanism permitted by State law or regulation, the card issuer
- shall issue the cardholder a new card following the procedures set out in Section 2.9.1, PIV Card Renewal
- Requirements. If the expiration date of the new card is no later than the expiration date of the original
- PIV Card and no data about the cardholder, other than the cardholder's name, is being changed, then the
- new PIV Card may be issued without obtaining the approval of a proper authority and without performing
- a re-investigation.

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#### 2.9.2 PIV Card Reissuance Requirements

- Reissuance is the process by which a PIV Card that has been compromised, lost, stolen, or damaged is
- 655 replaced by a new PIV Card without the need to repeat the entire identity proofing and registration
- procedure. The cardholder can also apply for reissuance of a valid PIV Card if one or more logical
- credentials have been compromised. The entire identity proofing, registration, and issuance process, as
- described in Sections 2.7 and 2.8, shall be repeated if the issuer does not maintain a chain-of-trust record
- for the cardholder or if the cardholder did not apply for reissuance before the original PIV Card expired.
- In case of reissuance, the card issuer shall verify that the employee's or contractor's background
- investigation is valid before reissuing the card and associated credentials.
- The issuer shall perform a 1:1 biometric match of the applicant to reconnect to the chain-of-trust. The 1:1
- biometric match requires either a match of fingerprint(s) or, if unavailable, other optional biometric data

- held in the chain-of-trust (see Section 2.6). Minimum accuracy requirements for the biometric match are
- specified in [SP 800-76]. On successful match, the new PIV Card shall be released to the applicant. If
- the match is unsuccessful, or if no biometric data is available, the cardholder shall provide two identity
- source documents (as specified in Section 2.7), and an attending operator shall inspect these and compare
- the cardholder with the facial image retrieved from the enrollment data record and the facial image
- printed on the new card.
- When reissuing a PIV Card, normal revocation procedures must be in place for the compromised, lost,
- stolen, or damaged card to ensure the following:
- + The PIV Card itself is revoked. Any local databases that contain FASC-N or UUID values must be
- updated to reflect the change in status.
- + The certification authority (CA) shall be informed and the certificates corresponding to the PIV
- Authentication key and asymmetric Card Authentication key on the PIV Card shall be revoked. If
- present, the certificates corresponding to the digital signature key and the key management key shall
- also be revoked.
- The PIV Card shall be collected and destroyed if possible. In the case of a lost, stolen, or compromised
- 679 card, normal revocation procedures shall be completed within 18 hours of notification. In certain cases,
- 18 hours is an unacceptable delay and in those cases emergency procedures must be executed to
- disseminate the information as rapidly as possible. Departments and agencies are required to have
- procedures in place to issue emergency notifications in such cases.
- If the expiration date of the reissued PIV Card is later than the expiration date of the old card, the card
- 684 issuer shall ensure that a proper authority has authorized reissuance of the credential, and that a re-
- investigation is performed if required, in accordance with OPM guidance. The same biometric data may
- be reused with the new PIV Card if the expiration date of the new PIV Card is no later than 12 years after
- the date that the biometric data was obtained.

#### 688 2.9.3 PIV Card Post Issuance Update Requirements

- A PIV Card post issuance update may be performed without replacing the PIV Card in cases where none
- of the printed information on the surface of the card is changed. The post issuance update applies to cases
- where one or more certificates, keys, biometric data objects, or signed data objects are updated. A post
- 692 issuance update shall not modify the PIV Card expiration date, FASC-N, or UUID.
- A PIV Card post issuance update may be done locally (performed with the issuer in physical custody of
- the PIV Card) or remotely (performed with the PIV Card at a remote location). Post issuance updates
- shall be performed with issuer security controls equivalent to those applied during PIV Card reissuance.
- 696 For remote post issuance updates, the following shall apply:
- + Communication between the PIV Card issuer and the PIV Card shall occur only over mutually authenticated secure sessions between tested and validated cryptographic modules (one being the PIV
- 699 Card).
- 700 + Data transmitted between the PIV Card issuer and PIV Card shall be encrypted and contain data integrity checks.
- + The PIV Card Application will communicate with no end point entity other than the PIV Card issuer during the remote post issuance update.

- Post issuance updates to biometric data objects, other than to the digital signature blocks within the
- biometric data objects, shall satisfy the requirements for verification data reset specified in Section 2.9.4.
- 706 If the PIV Authentication key, asymmetric Card Authentication key, the digital signature key, or the key
- management key, was compromised, the corresponding certificate shall be revoked.

#### 2.9.4 PIV Card Verification Data Reset

- The Personal Identification Number (PIN) on a PIV Card may need to be reset if the cardholder has
- forgotten the PIN or if PIN-based cardholder authentication has been disabled from the usage of an
- invalid PIN more than the allowed number of retries stipulated by the department or agency.<sup>6</sup> PIN reset
- may be performed in-person at the issuer's facility, at an unattended kiosk operated by the issuer, or
- remotely via a general computing platform:

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- + When PIN reset is performed in-person at the issuer's facility, the issuer shall ensure that the cardholder's biometric matches the stored biometric on the reset PIV Card, through either an on-card or off-card 1:1 biometric match, before providing the reset PIV Card back to the cardholder. In cases where a biometric match is not possible, the cardholder shall provide the PIV Card to be reset and another primary identity source document (as specified in Section 2.7). An attending operator shall inspect these and compare the cardholder with the facial image retrieved from the enrollment data record and the facial image printed on the card.
- + PIN reset at an unattended issuer-operated kiosk shall ensure that the cardholder's biometric matches the stored biometric on the PIV Card, through either an on-card or off-card 1:1 biometric match, and that the PIV Card is authenticated. If the biometric match or card authentication is unsuccessful, the kiosk shall not reset the PIV Card.
- + Remote PIN reset on a general computing platform (e.g., desktop, laptop) shall only be performed if the following requirements are met:
  - o the cardholder initiates a PIN reset with the issuer operator;
- 728 o the operator authenticates the owner of the PIV Card through an out-of-band authentication procedure (e.g., pre-registered knowledge tokens); and
  - o the cardholder's biometric matches the stored biometric on the PIV Card through a 1:1 on-card biometric comparison.
- The remote PIN reset operation shall satisfy the requirements for remote post issuance updates specified in Section 2.9.3.
- Departments and agencies may adopt more stringent procedures for PIN reset (including disallowing PIN reset). PIN reset procedures shall be formally documented by each department and agency.
- Verification data other than the PIN may also be reset (i.e., re-enrollment) by the card issuer. Before the
- reset, the issuer shall perform a 1:1 biometric match of the cardholder to reconnect to the chain-of-trust.
- The type of biometric used for the match shall not be the same as the type of biometric data that is being
- reset. For example, if fingerprint templates for on-card comparison are being reset, then a 1:1 iris match
- could be used to reconnect to the chain-of-trust. If no alternative biometric data is available, the
- cardholder shall provide the PIV Card to be reset and another primary identity source document (as

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Cardholders may change their PINs anytime by providing the current PIN and the new PIN values.

- specified in Section 2.7). An attending operator shall inspect these and compare the cardholder with the
- facial image retrieved from the enrollment data record and the facial image printed on the PIV Card.
- New verification reference data shall be enrolled. The PIV Card's activation methods associated with the
- verification data shall be reset and the new verification data shall be stored on the card.
- 746 Departments and agencies may adopt more stringent procedures for verification data reset (including
- disallowing verification data reset); such procedures shall be formally documented by each department
- and agency.

### 749 **2.9.5 PIV Card Termination Requirements**

- 750 The PIV Card shall be terminated under the following circumstances:
- + a Federal employee separates (voluntarily or involuntarily) from Federal service;
- + an employee of a Federal contractor separates (voluntarily or involuntarily) from his or her employer;
- + a contractor changes positions and no longer needs access to Federal buildings or systems;
- 754 + a cardholder is determined to hold a fraudulent identity; or
- 755 + a cardholder passes away.
- 756 Similar to the situation in which the card or a credential is compromised, normal termination procedures
- must be in place as to ensure the following:
- 758 + The PIV Card shall be collected and destroyed, if possible.
- The PIV Card itself is revoked. Any local databases that indicate current valid (or invalid) FASC-N
   or UUID values must be updated to reflect the change in status.
- 761 + The CA shall be informed and the certificates corresponding to PIV Authentication key and the
- asymmetric Card Authentication key on the PIV Card shall be revoked. If the PIV Card cannot be
- 763 collected, the certificates corresponding to the digital signature and key management keys shall also
- be revoked, if present. If the PIV Card is collected and destroyed, then revocation of the certificates
- corresponding to the digital signature and key management keys is optional.
- The PII collected from the cardholder is disposed of in accordance with the stated privacy and data retention policies of the department or agency.
- 768 If the card cannot be collected, normal termination procedures shall be completed within 18 hours of
- notification. In certain cases, 18 hours is an unacceptable delay and in those cases emergency procedures
- must be executed to disseminate the information as rapidly as possible. Departments and agencies are
- 771 required to have procedures in place to issue emergency notifications in such cases.

### 772 **2.10** PIV Derived Credentials Issuance Requirements

- A valid PIV Card may be used as the basis for issuing a PIV derived credential in accordance with NIST
- 774 Special Publication 800-157, Guidelines for Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Derived Credentials

775 [SP 800-157]. When a cardholder's PIV Card is terminated as specified in Section 2.9.5, any PIV derived 776 credentials issued to the cardholder shall also be terminated.

### 2.11 PIV Privacy Requirements

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- 778 HSPD-12 explicitly states that "protect[ing] personal privacy" is a requirement of the PIV system. As
- 779 such, all departments and agencies shall implement the PIV system in accordance with the spirit and letter
- 780 of all privacy controls specified in this Standard, as well as those specified in Federal privacy laws and
- 781 policies including but not limited to the E-Government Act of 2002 [E-Gov], the Privacy Act of 1974
- 782 [PRIVACY], and OMB Memorandum M-03-22 [OMB0322], as applicable.
- 783 Departments and agencies may have a wide variety of uses of the PIV system and its components that
- 784 were not intended or anticipated by the President in issuing [HSPD-12]. In considering whether a
- 785 proposed use of the PIV system is appropriate, departments and agencies shall consider the
- 786 aforementioned control objectives and the purpose of this Standard, namely "to enhance security, increase
- 787 Government efficiency, reduce identity fraud, and protect personal privacy" [HSPD-12]. No department
- 788 or agency shall implement a use of the identity credential inconsistent with these control objectives.
- 789 To ensure the privacy throughout PIV lifecycle, departments and agencies shall do the following:
- 790 Assign an individual to the role of privacy official.<sup>7</sup> The privacy official is the individual who 791 oversees privacy-related matters in the PIV system and is responsible for implementing the privacy 792 requirements in the Standard. The individual serving in this role shall not assume any other 793 operational role in the PIV system.
- 794 Conduct a comprehensive Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) on systems containing PII for the 795 purpose of implementing PIV, consistent with the methodology of [E-Gov] and the requirements of 796 [OMB0322]. Consult with appropriate personnel responsible for privacy issues at the department or 797 agency (e.g., Chief Information Officer) implementing the PIV system.
- 798 Write, publish, and maintain a clear and comprehensive document listing the types of information that 799 will be collected (e.g., transactional information, PII), the purpose of collection, what information 800 may be disclosed to whom during the life of the credential, how the information will be protected, and 801 the complete set of uses of the credential and related information at the department or agency. 802 Provide PIV applicants full disclosure of the intended uses of the information associated with the PIV 803 Card and the related privacy implications.
- 804 Assure that systems that contain PII for the purpose of enabling the implementation of PIV are
- handled in full compliance with fair information practices as defined in [PRIVACY].
- 806 Maintain appeals procedures for those who are denied a credential or whose credentials are revoked.
- 807 Ensure that only personnel with a legitimate need for access to PII in the PIV system are authorized to 808 access the PII, including but not limited to information and databases maintained for registration and 809 credential issuance.8

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> Privacy official refers to the Senior Agency Official for Privacy (SAOP) or Chief Privacy Officer (CPO).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> Agencies may refer to NIST SP 800-122 [SP 800-122], Guide to Protecting the Confidentiality of Personally Identifiable Information (PII), for a best practice guideline on protection of PII.

810 Coordinate with appropriate department or agency officials to define consequences for violating 811 privacy policies of the PIV system. 812 Assure that the technologies used in the department or agency's implementation of the PIV system 813 allow for continuous auditing of compliance with stated privacy policies and practices governing the 814 collection, use, and distribution of information in the operation of the program. 815 Utilize security controls described in [SP 800-53], Recommended Security Controls for Federal 816 Information Systems, to accomplish privacy goals, where applicable. 817 Ensure that the technologies used to implement PIV sustain and do not erode privacy protections 818 relating to the use, collection, and disclosure of PII. Specifically, employees may choose to use an 819 electromagnetically opaque sleeve or other technology to protect against any unauthorized contactless 820 access to information stored on a PIV Card.

## 3. PIV System Overview

- The PIV system is composed of components and processes that support a common (smart card-based)
- 823 platform for identity authentication across Federal departments and agencies for access to multiple types
- of physical and logical access environments. The specifications for the PIV components in this Standard
- promote uniformity and interoperability among the various PIV system components, across departments
- and agencies, and across installations. The specifications for processes in this Standard are a set of
- minimum requirements for the various activities that need to be performed within an operational PIV
- 828 system. When implemented in accordance with this Standard, the PIV Card supports a suite of
- authentication mechanisms that can be used consistently across departments and agencies. The
- authenticated identity information can then be used as a basis for access control in various Federal
- physical and logical access environments. The following sections briefly discuss the functional
- components of the PIV system and the lifecycle activities of the PIV Card.

### 3.1 Functional Components

- An operational PIV system can be logically divided into the following three major subsystems:
- + PIV Front-End Subsystem—PIV Card, card and biometric readers, and PIN input device. The PIV
- cardholder interacts with these components to gain physical or logical access to the desired Federal
- resource.

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- + PIV Card Issuance and Management Subsystem—the components responsible for identity
- proofing and registration, card and key issuance and management, and the various repositories and
- services (e.g., public key infrastructure (PKI) directory, certificate status servers) required as part of
- the verification infrastructure.
- **PIV Relying Subsystem**—the physical and logical access control systems, the protected resources,
- and the authorization data.
- The PIV relying subsystem becomes relevant when the PIV Card is used to authenticate a cardholder who
- is seeking access to a physical or logical resource. Although this Standard does not provide technical
- specifications for this subsystem, various mechanisms for identification and authentication are defined in
- Section 6 to provide consistent and secure means for performing the authentication function preceding an
- access control decision.
- Figure 3-1 illustrates a notional model for the operational PIV system, identifying the various system
- components and the direction of data flow between these components. The boundary shown in the figure
- is not meant to preclude FIPS 201 requirements on systems outside these boundaries.




Figure 3-1. PIV System Notional Model

#### 3.1.1 PIV Front-End Subsystem

The PIV Card will be issued to the applicant when all identity proofing, registration, and issuance processes have been completed. The PIV Card has a credit card-size form factor, with one or more embedded integrated circuit chips (ICC) that provide memory capacity and computational capability. The PIV Card is the primary component of the PIV system. The holder uses the PIV Card for authentication to various physical and logical resources.

Card readers are located at access points for controlled resources where a cardholder may wish to gain access (physical and logical) by using the PIV Card. The reader communicates with the PIV Card to retrieve the appropriate information, located in the card's memory, to relay it to the access control systems for granting or denying access.

Card writers, which are very similar to the card readers, personalize and initialize the information stored on PIV Cards. Card writers may also be used to perform remote PIV Card updates (see Section 2.9.3). The data to be stored on PIV Cards includes personal information, certificates, cryptographic keys, the PIN, and biometric data, and is discussed in further detail in subsequent sections.

PIN input devices can be used along with card readers when a higher level of authentication assurance is required. The cardholder presenting the PIV Card must type in his or her PIN into the PIN input device. For physical access, the PIN is typically entered using a PIN pad device; a keyboard is generally used for

- logical access. The input of a PIN provides a "something you know" authentication factor that 872
- 873 activates 10 the PIV Card and enables access to other credentials resident on the card that provide
- 874 additional factors of authentication. A cryptographic key and certificate, for example, provides an
- additional authentication factor of "something you have" (i.e., the card) through PKI-based 875
- 876 authentication.
- 877 Biometric readers may be located at secure locations where a cardholder may want to gain access. These
- 878 readers depend upon the use of biometric data of the cardholder, stored in the memory of the card, and its
- 879 comparison with a real-time biometric sample. The use of biometrics provides an additional factor of
- 880 authentication ("something you are") in addition to entering the PIN ("something you know") and
- 881 providing the card ("something you have") for cryptographic key-based authentication ("something you
- 882 have"). This provides for a higher level of authentication assurance.

### 3.1.2 PIV Card Issuance and Management Subsystem

- 884 The identity proofing and registration component in Figure 3-1 refers to the process of collecting, storing,
- 885 and maintaining all information and documentation that is required for verifying and assuring the
- 886 applicant's identity. Various types of information are collected from the applicant at the time of
- 887 registration.

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- 888 The card issuance and maintenance component deals with the personalization of the physical (visual
- 889 surface) and logical (contents of the ICC) aspects of the card at the time of issuance and maintenance
- 890 thereafter. This includes printing photographs, names, and other information on the card and loading the
- 891 relevant card applications, biometrics, and other data.
- 892 The key management component is responsible for the generation of key pairs, the issuance and
- 893 distribution of digital certificates containing the public keys of the cardholder, and management and
- 894 dissemination of certificate status information. The key management component is used throughout the
- 895 lifecycle of PIV Cards—from generation and loading of authentication keys and PKI credentials, to usage
- 896 of these keys for secure operations, to eventual renewal, reissuance, or termination of the card. The key
- 897 management component is also responsible for the provisioning of publicly accessible repositories and
- 898 services (such as PKI directories and certificate status responders) that provide information to the
- 899 requesting application about the status of the PKI credentials.

#### 3.1.3 PIV Relying Subsystem

- 901 The PIV relying subsystem includes components responsible for determining a particular PIV
- 902 cardholder's access to a physical or logical resource. A physical resource is the secured facility (e.g.,
- 903 building, room, parking garage) that the cardholder wishes to access. The logical resource is typically a
- 904 network or a location on the network (e.g., computer workstation, folder, file, database record, software
- 905 program) to which the cardholder wants to gain access.
- 906 The authorization data component comprises information that defines the privileges (authorizations)
- 907 possessed by entities requesting to access a particular logical or physical resource. An example of this is
- 908 an access control list (ACL) associated with a file on a computer system.
- 909 The physical and logical access control system grants or denies access to a particular resource and
- 910 includes an identification and authentication (I&A) component as well as an authorization component.


<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> For more information on the terms "something you know," "something you have," and "something you are," see [SP 800-63]. <sup>10</sup> Alternatively, on-card biometric comparison can be used to activate the PIV Card.

- The I&A component interacts with the PIV Card and uses mechanisms discussed in Section 6 to identify
- and authenticate cardholders. Once authenticated, the I&A component passes information to the
- authorization component which in turn interacts with the authorization data component to match the
- cardholder information to the information on record. Access control components typically interface with
- the card reader, the PIN input device, the biometric reader, supplementary databases, and any certificate
- 916 status service.

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#### 3.2 PIV Card Lifecycle Activities

- The PIV Card lifecycle consists of seven activities. The activities that take place during fabrication and
- pre-personalization of the card at the manufacturer are not considered a part of this lifecycle model.
- 920 Figure 3-2 presents these PIV activities and depicts the PIV Card request as the initial activity and PIV
- 921 Card termination as the end of life.



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Figure 3-2. PIV Card Lifecycle Activities

- 924 Descriptions of the seven card lifecycle activities are as follows:
- PIV Card Request. This activity applies to the initiation of a request for the issuance of a PIV Card to an applicant and the validation of this request.
- Hentity Proofing and Registration. The goal of this activity is to verify the claimed identity of the applicant, verify that the entire set of identity source documents presented at the time of registration is valid, capture biometrics, and optionally create the chain-of-trust record.
- 930 + PIV Card Issuance. This activity deals with the personalization (physical and logical) of the card and the issuance of the card to the intended applicant.
- 932 + PKI Credential Issuance. This activity deals with generating logical credentials and loading them
   933 onto the PIV Card.

- PIV Card Usage. During this activity, the PIV Card is used to perform cardholder authentication for access to a physical or logical resource. Access authorization decisions are made after successful cardholder identification and authentication.
- PIV Card Maintenance. This activity deals with the maintenance or update of the physical card and the data stored thereon. Such data includes various card applications, PINs, PKI credentials, and biometrics.
- 940 **+ PIV Card Termination.** The termination process is used to permanently destroy or invalidate the PIV Card and the data and keys needed for authentication so as to prevent any future use of the card for authentication.

#### 943 **PIV Front-End Subsystem** 944 This section identifies the requirements for the components of the PIV front-end subsystem. Section 4.1 945 provides the physical card specifications. Section 4.2 provides the logical card specifications. Section 946 4.3 specifies the requirements for card activation. Section 4.4 provides requirements for PIV Card 947 readers. 948 4.1 **PIV Card Physical Characteristics** 949 References to the PIV Card in this section pertain to the physical characteristics only. References to the 950 front of the card apply to the side of the card that contains the electronic contacts; references to the back 951 of the card apply to the opposite side from the front side. 952 The PIV Card's physical appearance and other characteristics should balance the need to have the PIV 953 Card commonly recognized as a Federal identification card while providing the flexibility to support 954 individual department and agency requirements. Having a common look for PIV Cards is important in 955 meeting the objectives of improved security and interoperability. In support of these objectives, 956 consistent placement of printed components and technology is generally necessary. 957 The PIV Card shall comply with physical characteristics as described in International Organization for 958 Standardization (ISO)/International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) 7810 [ISO7810], ISO/IEC 10373 959 [ISO10373], ISO/IEC 7816 for contact cards [ISO7816], and ISO/IEC 14443 for contactless cards 960 [ISO14443]. 961 4.1.1 **Printed Material** 962 The printed material shall not rub off during the life of the PIV Card, nor shall the printing process 963 deposit debris on the printer rollers during printing and laminating. Printed material shall not interfere 964 with the contact and contactless ICC(s) and related components, nor shall it obstruct access to machine-965 readable information. 966 4.1.2 Tamper Proofing and Resistance 967 The PIV Card shall contain security features that aid in reducing counterfeiting, are resistant to tampering, 968 and provide visual evidence of tampering attempts. At a minimum, a PIV Card shall incorporate one such 969 security feature. Examples of these security features include the following: 970 optical varying structures; 971 optical varying inks; 972 laser etching and engraving; 973 holograms; 974 holographic images; and

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watermarks.

Incorporation of security features shall—

- 977 + be in accordance with durability requirements;
- 978 + be free of defects, such as fading and discoloration;
- 979 + not obscure printed information; and
- 980 + not impede access to machine-readable information.
- Departments and agencies may incorporate additional tamper-resistance and anti-counterfeiting methods.
- As a generally accepted security procedure, Federal departments and agencies are strongly encouraged to
- periodically review the viability, effectiveness, and currency of employed tamper resistance and anti-
- 984 counterfeiting methods.

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# 4.1.3 Physical Characteristics and Durability

- The following list describes the physical requirements for the PIV Card.
- 987 + The PIV Card shall contain a contact and a contactless ICC interface.
- The card body shall be white in accordance with color representation in Section 4.1.5. Only a
   security feature, as described in Section 4.1.2, may modify the perceived color slightly. Presence of a
   security feature shall not prevent the recognition of white as the principal card body color by a person
   with normal vision (corrected or uncorrected) at a working distance of 50 cm to 200 cm.
- 992 The card body structure shall consist of card material(s) that satisfy the card characteristics in 993 [ISO7810] and test methods in American National Standards Institute (ANSI) 322 [ANSI322]. 994 Although the [ANSI322] test methods do not currently specify compliance requirements, the tests 995 shall be used to evaluate card material durability and performance. The [ANSI322] tests minimally 996 shall include card flexure, static stress, plasticizer exposure, impact resistance, card structural 997 integrity, surface abrasion, temperature and humidity-induced dye migration, ultraviolet light 998 exposure, and a laundry test. Cards shall not malfunction or delaminate after hand cleaning with a 999 mild soap and water mixture.
- + The card shall be subjected to actual, concentrated, or artificial sunlight to appropriately reflect 2000 hours of southwestern United States' sunlight exposure in accordance with [ISO10373], Section 5.12. Concentrated sunlight exposure shall be performed in accordance with [G90-98] and accelerated exposure in accordance with [G155-00]. After exposure, the card shall be subjected to the [ISO10373] dynamic bending test and shall have no visible cracks or failures. Alternatively, the card may be subjected to the [ANSI322] tests for ultraviolet and daylight fading resistance and subjected to the same [ISO10373] dynamic bending test.
- + There are methods by which proper card orientation can be indicated. Section 4.1.4.3, for example, defines Zones 21F and 22F, where card orientation features may be applied. Note: If an agency determines that tactilely discernible markers for PIV Cards imposes an undue burden, the agency must implement policies and procedures to accommodate employees and contractors with disabilities in accordance with Sections 501 and 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
- + The card shall be 27- to 33-mil thick (before lamination) in accordance with [ISO7810].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> For some individuals, the contact surface for the ICC may be sufficient for determining the orientation of the card.

- 1013 + The PIV Card shall not be embossed. 1014 Decals shall not be adhered to the card. 1015 Departments and agencies may choose to punch an opening in the card body to enable the card to be 1016 oriented by touch or to be worn on a lanyard. Departments and agencies should ensure such 1017 alterations are closely coordinated with the card vendor and/or manufacturer to ensure the card 1018 material integrity and printing process is not adversely impacted. Departments and agencies are 1019 strongly encouraged to ensure such alterations do not— 1020 compromise card body durability requirements and characteristics; 1021 - invalidate card manufacturer warranties or other product claims; 1022 - alter or interfere with printed information, including the photo; or 1023 damage or interfere with machine-readable technology, such as the embedded antenna. 1024 The card material shall withstand the effects of temperatures required by the application of a polyester 1025 laminate on one or both sides of the card by commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) equipment. The 1026 thickness added due to a laminate layer shall not interfere with the smart card reader operation. The 1027 card material shall allow production of a flat card in accordance with [ISO7810] after lamination of 1028 one or both sides of the card. 1029 The PIV Card may be subjected to additional testing. 1030 4.1.4 Visual Card Topography 1031 The information on a PIV Card shall be in visual printed and electronic form. This section covers the 1032 placement of visual and printed information. It does not cover information stored in electronic form, such 1033 as stored data elements, and other possible machine-readable technologies. Logically stored data 1034 elements are discussed in Section 4.2. As noted in Section 4.1.3, the PIV Card shall contain a contact and a contactless ICC interface. This 1035 1036 Standard does not specify whether a single chip is used or multiple chips are used to support the mandated 1037 contact and contactless interfaces. 1038 To achieve a common PIV Card appearance, yet provide departments and agencies the flexibility to 1039 augment the card with department or agency-specific requirements, the card shall contain mandated and 1040 optional printed information and mandated and optional machine-readable technologies. Mandated and 1041 optional items shall generally be placed as described and depicted. Printed data shall not interfere with 1042 machine-readable technology. 1043 Areas that are marked as reserved should not be used for printing. The reason for the recommended 1044 reserved areas is that placement of the embedded contactless ICC module may vary from manufacturer to 1045 manufacturer, and there are constraints that prohibit printing over the embedded contactless module. The
- Because technological developments may obviate the need to have a restricted area, or change the size of

PIV Card topography provides flexibility for placement of the embedded module, either in the upper

right-hand corner or in the lower bottom portion. Printing restrictions apply only to the area where the

the restricted area, departments and agencies are encouraged to work closely with card vendors and

embedded module is located (i.e., upper right-hand corner, lower bottom portion).

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manufacturers to ensure current printing procedures and methods are applied as well as potential integration of features that may improve tamper resistance and anti-counterfeiting of the PIV Card.

# 4.1.4.1 Mandatory Items on the Front of the PIV Card

Zone 1F—Photograph. The photograph shall be placed in the upper left corner, as depicted in Figure 4-1, and be a full frontal pose from top of the head to shoulder. A minimum of 300 dots per inch (dpi) resolution shall be used. The background should follow recommendations set forth in [SP 800-76].

Zone 2F—Name. The full name <sup>12</sup> shall be printed directly under the photograph in capital letters. The full name shall be composed of a Primary Identifier (i.e., surnames or family names) and a Secondary Identifier (i.e., pre-names or given names). The printed name shall match the name on the identity source documents provided during identity proofing and registration to the extent possible. The full name shall be printed in the <Primary Identifier>, <Secondary Identifier> format. The entire full name should be printed on available lines of Zone 2F and either identifier could be wrapped. The wrapped identifier shall be indicated with ">" character at the end of the line. The identifiers may be printed on separate lines if each fits on one line. Departments and agencies shall use the largest font size of 7 to 10 points that allows the full name to be printed. The font size 7 point allows space for 3 lines and shall only be used if the full name is greater than 45 characters. Table 4-1 provides examples of separate Primary and Secondary Identifier lines, single line with identifiers, wrapped full names, and full name in three lines. Note that the truncation should only occur if the full name cannot be printed in 7 point font.

Names in the Primary Identifier and the first name in the Secondary Identifier shall not be abbreviated.

Other names and conventional prefixes and suffixes, which shall be included in the Secondary Identifier, may be abbreviated. The special character "." (period) shall indicate such abbreviations, as shown in Figure 4-2. Other uses of special symbols (e.g., "O'BRIEN") are at the discretion of the issuer.

**Table 4-1. Name Examples** 

Name: John Doe  Characteristics: simple full name of individual who does not have a middle name, two lines sufficient with 10 points.	DOE, JOHN
Name: Anna Maria Eriksson  Characteristics: simple full name, two lines sufficient with 10 points.	ERIKSSON, ANNA MARIA
Name: Anna Maria Eriksson  Characteristics: simple full name with abbreviated middle name, two lines sufficient with 10 points.	ERIKSSON, GANNA M.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Alternatively, an authorized pseudonym as provided under the law as discussed in Section 2.8.1.

Name: Anna Maria Eriksson  Characteristics: simple full name, one line	ERIKSSON, ANNA MARIA G
sufficient for full name with 10 points.	
Name: Susie Margaret Smith-Jones	SMITH-JONES, SUSIE MARGARET
Characteristics: longer full name in two lines, sufficient space in 10 points.	SUSIE MARGARE I
Name: Susie Margaret Smith-Jones	SMITH-JONES, SUSIE MA>G
Characteristics: longer full name wrapped, two lines sufficient with 10 points.	RGARET
Name: Chayapa Dejthamrong Krusuang Nilavadhanananda	NILAVADHANANANDA, CHAYA>G PA DEJTHAMRONG KRUSUANG
Characteristics: longer full name wrapped, two lines NOT sufficient with 10 points. Reduce the font size to 8 points.	
Name: Vaasa Silvaan Beenelong Wooloomooloo Warrandyte Warwarnambool	BEENELONG WOOLOOMOOLOO WARRANDYTE WARWARNAMBOOL, VAASA SILVAAN
Characteristics: longer full name, two lines NOT sufficient with 8 point, 7 point allows sufficient space for three lines in Zone 2F.	
Name: Vaasa Silvaan Beenelong Wooloomooloo Warrandyte Warwarnambool	BEENELONG WOOLOOMOOLOO W> ARRANDYTE WARWARNAMBOOL, V> AASA SILVAAN
Characteristics: same as previous but full name is wrapped.	
Name: Dingo Pontooroomooloo Vaasa Silvaan Beenelong Wooloomooloo Warrandyte Warwarnambool	BEENELONG WOOLOOMOOLOO W> ARRANDYTE WARWARNAMBOOL, D> INGO PONTOOROOMOOLOO VAASA
Characteristics: truncated full name, three lines with 7 point NOT sufficient.	

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Zone 8F—Employee Affiliation. An employee affiliation shall be printed on the card as depicted in Figure 1075 1076

4-1. Some examples of employee affiliation are "Employee," "Contractor," "Active Duty," and

1077 "Civilian."

1078 Zone 10F—Agency, Department, or Organization. The organizational affiliation shall be printed as

1079 depicted in Figure 4-1.

- 1080 Zone 14F—Card Expiration Date. The card expiration date shall be printed on the card as depicted in
- Figure 4-1. The card expiration date shall be in a YYYYMMMDD format whereby the MMM characters
- represent the three-letter month abbreviation as follows: JAN, FEB, MAR, APR, MAY, JUN, JUL, AUG,
- SEP, OCT, NOV, and DEC. The Zone 14F expiration date shall be printed in Arial 6 to 9 point bold.
- 2008 Zone 15F—Color-Coding for Employee Affiliation. Color-coding shall be used for additional
- identification of employee affiliation as a background color for Zone 2F (name) as depicted in Figures 4-1
- and 4-4. The following color scheme shall be used:
- 1087 + Blue—Foreign National
- 1088 + White—Government Employee
- 1089 + Green—Contractor.
- Foreign National color-coding has precedence over Government Employee and Contractor color-coding.
- These colors shall be reserved and shall not be employed for other purposes. Also, these colors shall be
- printed in accordance to the color specifications provided in Section 4.1.5. Zone 15F may be a solid or
- patterned line at the department or agency's discretion.
- Zone 18F—Affiliation Color Code. The affiliation color code "B" for Blue, "W" for White, or "G" for
- Green shall be printed in a white circle in Zone 15F as depicted in Figure 4-1. The diameter of the circle
- shall not be more than 5 mm. Note that the lettering shall correspond to the printed color in Zone 15F.
- 2007 Zone 19F—Card Expiration Date. The card expiration date shall be printed in a MMMYYYY format in
- the upper right-hand corner as depicted in Figure 4-1. The Zone 19F expiration date shall be printed in
- 1099 Arial 12pt Bold.

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# 1100 4.1.4.2 Mandatory Items on the Back of the PIV Card

- 1101 Zone 1B—Agency Card Serial Number. This item shall be printed as depicted in Figure 4-6 and contain
- the unique serial number from the issuing department or agency. The format shall be at the discretion of
- the issuing department or agency.
- 1104 Zone 2B—Issuer Identification Number. This item shall be printed as depicted in Figure 4-6 and consist
- of six characters for the department code, four characters for the agency code, and a five-digit number
- that uniquely identifies the issuing facility within the department or agency.

#### 4.1.4.3 Optional Items on the Front of the PIV Card

- This section contains a description of the optional information and machine-readable technologies that
- may be used and their respective placement. The storage capacity of all optional technologies is as
- 1110 prescribed by individual departments and agencies and is not addressed in this Standard. Although the
- items discussed in this section are optional, if used they shall be placed on the card as designated in the
- examples provided and as noted.
- 1113 Zone 3F—Signature. If used, the department or agency shall place the cardholder signature below the
- photograph and cardholder name as depicted in Figure 4-3. The space for the signature shall not interfere
- with the contact and contactless placement. Because of card surface space constraints, placement of a
- signature may limit the size of the optional two-dimensional bar code.

- 2011 Zone 4F—Agency Specific Text Area. If used, this area can be used for printing agency specific
- requirements, such as employee status, as shown in Figure 4-2.
- Zone 5F—Rank. If used, the cardholder's rank shall be printed in the area as illustrated in Figure 4-2.
- Data format is at the department or agency's discretion.
- Zone 6F—Portable Data File (PDF) Two-Dimensional Bar Code. If used, the PDF bar code placement
- shall be as depicted in Figure 4-2 (i.e., left side of the card). If Zone 3F (a cardholder signature) is used,
- the size of the PDF bar code may be affected. The card issuer should confirm that a PDF used in
- 1124 conjunction with a PIV Card containing a cardholder signature will satisfy the anticipated PDF data
- storage requirements.
- 2012 Zone 9F— Header. If used, the text "United States Government" shall be placed as depicted in Figure
- 4-4. Departments and agencies may also choose to use this zone for other department or agency-specific
- information, such as identifying a Federal emergency responder role, as depicted in Figure 4-2.
- 2012 Zone 11F—Agency Seal. If used, the seal selected by the issuing department, agency, or organization
- shall be printed in the area depicted. It shall be printed using the guidelines provided in Figure 4-2 to
- ensure information printed on the seal is legible and clearly visible.
- 1132 Zone 12F—Footer. The footer is the location for the Federal Emergency Response Official identification
- label. If used, a department or agency may print "Federal Emergency Response Official" as depicted in
- Figure 4-2, preferably in white lettering on a red background. Departments and agencies may also use
- Zone 9F to further identify the Federal emergency respondent's official role. Some examples of official
- roles are "Law Enforcement," "Fire Fighter," and "Emergency Response Team (ERT)."
- When Zone 15F indicates Foreign National affiliation and the department or agency does not need to
- highlight emergency response official status, Zone 12F may be used to denote the country or countries of
- citizenship. If so used, the department or agency shall print the country name or the three-letter country
- abbreviation (alpha-3 format) in accordance with ISO 3166-1, Country Codes [ISO3166]. Figure 4-4
- illustrates an example of Foreign National color-coding using country abbreviations.
- Zone 13F—Issue Date. If used, the card issuance date shall be printed above the expiration date in
- 1143 YYYYMMMDD format as depicted in Figure 4-3.
- 2014 Zone 16F—Photo Border. A border may be used with the photo to further identify employee affiliation,
- as depicted in Figure 4-3. This border may be used in conjunction with Zone 15F to enable departments
- and agencies to develop various employee categories. The photo border shall not obscure the photo. The
- border may be a solid or patterned line. For solid and patterned lines, red shall be reserved for emergency
- response officials, blue for foreign nationals, and green for contractors. All other colors may be used at
- the department or agency's discretion.
- 1150 Zone 17F—Agency Specific Data. In cases in which other defined optional elements are not used, Zone
- 1151 17F may be used for other department or agency-specific information, as depicted in Figure 4-5.
- 2015 Zone 20F—Organizational Affiliation Abbreviation. The organizational affiliation abbreviation may be
- printed in the upper right-hand corner below the Zone 19F expiration date as shown in Figure 4-2. If
- printed, the organizational affiliation abbreviation shall be printed in Arial 12pt Bold.
- Zone 21F –Edge Ridging or Notched Corner Tactile Marker. If used, this area shall incorporate edge
- ridging or a notched corner to indicate card orientation as depicted in Figure 4-4. Departments and


- agencies should ensure such alterations are closely coordinated with the card vendor and/or manufacturer
- to ensure the card material integrity and printing process is not adversely impacted.
- 2159 Zone 22F Laser Engraving Tactile Marker. If used, tactilely discernible marks shall be created using
- laser engraving to indicate card orientation as depicted in Figure 4-4. There shall be an opening in the
- 1161 lamination foil where laser engraving is performed. Departments and agencies should ensure such
- alterations are closely coordinated with the card vendor and/or manufacturer to ensure the card material
- integrity and printing process is not adversely impacted.

# 4.1.4.4 Optional Items on the Back of the PIV Card

- 2006 Zone 3B—Magnetic Stripe. If used, the magnetic stripe shall be high coercivity and placed in accordance
- with [ISO7811], as illustrated in Figure 4-7.
- Zone 4B—Return Address. If used, the "return if lost" language shall be generally placed on the back of
- the card as depicted in Figure 4-7.
- Zone 5B—Physical Characteristics of Cardholder. If used, the cardholder physical characteristics (e.g.,
- height, eye color, hair color) shall be printed in the general area illustrated in Figure 4-7.
- Zone 6B—Additional Language for Emergency Response Officials. Departments and agencies may
- 1172 choose to provide additional information to identify emergency response officials or to better identify the
- cardholder's authorized access. If used, this additional text shall be in the general area depicted and shall
- 1174 not interfere with other printed text or machine-readable components. An example of a printed statement
- is provided in Figure 4-7.
- 1176 Zone 7B—Standard Section 499, Title 18 Language. If used, standard Section 499, Title 18, language
- warning against counterfeiting, altering, or misusing the card shall be printed in the general area depicted
- 1178 in Figure 4-7.

- 2002 Zone 8B—Linear 3 of 9 Bar Code. If used, a linear 3 of 9 bar code shall be generally placed as depicted
- in Figure 4-7. It shall be in accordance with Association for Automatic Identification and Mobility (AIM)
- standards. Beginning and end points of the bar code will be dependent on the embedded contactless
- module selected. Departments and agencies are encouraged to coordinate placement of the bar code with
- the card vendor.
- Zone 9B—Agency-Specific Text. In cases in which other defined optional elements are not used, Zone 9B
- may be used for other department or agency-specific information, as depicted in Figure 4-8. For example,
- emergency response officials may use this area to provide additional details.
- 2008 Zone 10B—Agency-Specific Text. Zone 10B is similar to Zone 9B in that it is another area for providing
- department or agency-specific information.
- For Zones 9B and 10B, departments and agencies are encouraged to use this area prudently and minimize
- printed text to that which is absolutely necessary.
- 1191 In the case of the Department of Defense, the back of the card will have a distinct appearance as depicted
- in Figure 4-8. This is necessary to display information required by the Geneva Accord and to facilitate
- legislatively mandated medical entitlements.

- All measurements around the figure are in millimeters and are from the top-left corner.
- All text is to be printed using the Arial font.
- Unless otherwise specified, the font size should be 5pt normal weight for data labels (also referred to as tags) and 6pt bold for actual data.



Area for additional optional data. Agency-specific data may be printed in this area. See other examples for required placement of additional optional data elements.

Area likely to be needed by card manufacturer. Optional data may be printed in this area but may be subject to restrictions imposed by card and/or printer manufacturers.

Figure 4-1. Card Front—Printable Areas and Required Data

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Unless otherwise specified, the font size should be 5pt normal weight for tags and 6pt bold for data.




Figure 4-2. Card Front—Optional Data Placement—Example 1

Unless otherwise specified, the font size should be 5pt normal weight for tags and 6pt bold for data.




Figure 4-3. Card Front—Optional Data Placement—Example 2

Unless otherwise specified, the font size should be 5pt normal weight for tags and 6pt bold for data.




Figure 4-4. Card Front—Optional Data Placement—Example 3

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Unless otherwise specified, the font size should be 5pt normal weight for tags and 6pt bold for data.





Figure 4-5. Card Front—Optional Data Placement—Example 4

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All measurements are in millimeters and are from the top-left corner.

All text is to be printed using the Arial font.

Unless otherwise specified, the recommended font size is 5pt normal weight for tags and 6pt bold for data.



Optional data area. Agency-specific data may be printed in this area. See examples for required placement of optional data elements.

Optional data area likely to be needed by card manufacturer. Optional data may be printed in this area, but will likely be subject to restrictions imposed by card and/or printer manufacturers.

Figure 4-6. Card Back—Printable Areas and Required Data

All measurements are in millimeters and are from the top-left corner.  $\label{eq:left}$ 

All text is to be printed using the Arial font.

Unless otherwise specified, the recommended font size is 5pt normal weight for tags and 6pt bold for data.




Figure 4-7. Card Back—Optional Data Placement—Example 1

All measurements are in millimeters and are from the top-left corner.

All text is to be printed using the Arial font.

Unless otherwise specified, the recommended font size is 5pt normal weight for tags and 6pt bold for data.




Figure 4-8. Card Back—Optional Data Placement—Example 2

# 4.1.5 Color Representation

- 1216 Table 4-2 provides quantitative specifications for colors in three different color systems: sRGB
- 1217 Tristimulus, sRGB ([IEC 61966], Color management default RGB color space), and CMYK (Cyan,
- 1218 Magenta, Yellow and Key or 'black'). Since the card body is white, the white color-coding is achieved
- by the absence of printing. Note that presence of the security feature, which may overlap colored or
- printed regions, may modify the perceived color. In the case of colored regions, the effect of overlap
- shall not prevent the recognition of the principal color by a person with normal vision (corrected or
- 1222 uncorrected) at a working distance of 50 cm to 200 cm.

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Table 4-2. Color Representation

Color	Zone	sRGB Tristimulus	sRGB Value	CMYK Value
		Value (IEC 61966-2-1)	(IEC 61966-2-1)	$\{C,M,Y,K\}$
White	15F	{255, 255, 255}	{255, 255, 255}	$\{0, 0, 0, 0\}$
Green	15F	{153, 255, 153}	{203, 255, 203}	{40, 0, 40, 0}
Blue	15F	{0, 255, 255}	{0, 255, 255}	{100, 0, 0, 0}
Red	12F	{253, 27, 20}	{254, 92, 79}	{0, 90, 86, 0}

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The colors in Table 4-2 can be mapped to the Pantone 13 color cue; however, note that this will not

produce an exact match. An agency or department may use the following Pantone mappings in cases

- where Table 4-2 scales are not available.
- 1228 + Blue—630C
- 1229 + White—White
- 1230 + Green—359C
- 1231 + Red—032C

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### 4.2 PIV Card Logical Characteristics

- This section defines logical identity credentials and the requirements for use of these credentials.
- 1235 To support a variety of authentication mechanisms, the PIV logical credentials shall contain multiple data
- elements for the purpose of verifying the cardholder's identity at graduated assurance levels. The
- 1237 following mandatory data elements are part of the data model for PIV logical credentials that support
- authentication mechanisms interoperable across agencies:
- 1239 + a PIN;
- 1240 + a CHUID;
- 1241 + PIV authentication data (one asymmetric key pair and corresponding certificate);

-

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> Pantone is a registered name protected by law.

- + two fingerprint templates;
- 1243 + an electronic facial image; and
- + card authentication data (one asymmetric key pair and corresponding certificate).
- This Standard also defines two data elements for the PIV data model that are mandatory if the cardholder
- has a government-issued email account at the time of credential issuance. These data elements are:
- + an asymmetric key pair and corresponding certificate for digital signatures; and
- + an asymmetric key pair and corresponding certificate for key management.
- 1249 This Standard also defines optional data elements for the PIV data model. These optional data elements
- 1250 include:

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- + one or two iris images;
- + one or two fingerprint templates for on-card comparison;
- 1253 + a symmetric Card Authentication key for supporting physical access applications; and
- + a symmetric PIV Card Application Administration key associated with the card management system.
- In addition to the above, other data elements are specified in [SP 800-73].
- 1256 PIV logical credentials fall into the following three categories:
- 1257 1. credential elements used to prove the identity of the cardholder to the card (CTC authentication):
- 1258 2. credential elements used to prove the identity of the card management system to the card (CMTC authentication); and
- 3. credential elements used by the card to prove the identity of the cardholder to an external entity (CTE authentication) such as a host computer system.
- 1262 The PIN falls into the first category, the PIV Card Application Administration Key into the second
- category, and the CHUID, biometric credentials, symmetric keys, and asymmetric keys into the third.
- 1264 The fingerprint templates for on-card comparison fall into the first and third categories.

### 4.2.1 Cardholder Unique Identifier (CHUID)

- 1266 The PIV Card shall include the CHUID as defined in [SP 800-73]. The CHUID includes the Federal
- 1267 Agency Smart Credential Number (FASC-N) and the Global Unique Identification Number (GUID),
- which uniquely identify each card as described in [SP 800-73]. The value of the GUID data element shall
- be a 16-byte binary representation of a valid Universally Unique IDentifier (UUID) [RFC4122]. The
- 1270 CHUID shall also include an expiration date data element in machine-readable format that specifies when
- the card expires. The expiration date format and encoding rules are as specified in [SP 800-73].
- The CHUID shall be accessible from both the contact and contactless interfaces of the PIV Card without
- card activation. The FASC-N, UUID, and expiration date shall not be modified post-issuance.

- 1274 This Standard requires inclusion of the asymmetric signature field in the CHUID container. The
- asymmetric signature data element of the CHUID shall be encoded as a Cryptographic Message Syntax
- 1276 (CMS) external digital signature, as specified in [SP 800-73]. Algorithm and key size requirements for
- the asymmetric signature and digest algorithm are detailed in [SP 800-78].
- The public key required to verify the digital signature shall be provided in the *certificates* field of the
- 1279 CMS external digital signature in a content signing certificate, which shall be an X.509 digital signature
- 1280 certificate issued under the id-fpki-common-devicesHardware, id-fpki-common-hardware, or id-fpki-
- 1281 common-High policy of [COMMON]. 14 The content signing certificate shall also include an extended
- key usage (extKeyUsage) extension asserting id-PIV-content-signing. Additional descriptions for the PIV
- object identifiers are provided in Appendix B.

# 4.2.2 Cryptographic Specifications

- The PIV Card shall implement the cryptographic operations and support functions as defined in
- 1286 [SP 800-78] and [SP 800-73].

- The PIV Card must store private keys and corresponding public key certificates, and perform
- cryptographic operations using the asymmetric private keys. At a minimum, the PIV Card must store two
- asymmetric private keys and the corresponding public key certificates, namely the PIV Authentication key
- and the asymmetric Card Authentication key. The PIV Card must also store a digital signature key and a
- key management key, and the corresponding public key certificates, unless the cardholder does not have a
- 1292 government-issued email account at the time of credential issuance.
- The PIV Card may include an asymmetric private key and corresponding public key certificate to
- establish symmetric keys for use with secure messaging, as specified in [SP 800-73] and [SP 800-78].
- 1295 Secure messaging enables data and commands transmitted between the card and an external entity to be
- both integrity protected and encrypted. Secure messaging may be used, for example, to enable the use of
- on-card biometric comparison as an authentication mechanism.
- Once secure messaging has been established, a *virtual contact interface* may be established.
- Requirements for the virtual contact interface are specified in [SP 800-73]. Any operation that may be
- performed over the contact interface of the PIV Card may also be performed over the virtual contact
- interface. With the exception of the Card Authentication key and keys used to establish a secure
- messaging, the cryptographic private key operations shall be performed only through the contact interface
- or the virtual contact interface.
- 1304 Symmetric cryptographic operations are not mandated for the contactless interface, but departments and
- 1305 agencies may choose to supplement the basic functionality with storage for a symmetric Card
- Authentication key and support for a corresponding set of cryptographic operations. For example, if a
- department or agency wants to utilize Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) based challenge/response for
- 1308 physical access, the PIV Card must contain storage for the AES key and support AES operations through
- the contactless interface. Algorithms and key sizes for each PIV key type are specified in [SP 800-78].
- 1310 The PIV Card has both mandatory keys and optional keys:
- + The *PIV Authentication key* is a mandatory asymmetric private key that supports card and cardholder authentication for an interoperable environment.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> For legacy PKIs, as defined in Section 5.4, the certificates may be issued under a department or agency-specific policy that has been cross-certified with the Federal Bridge CA (FBCA) at the Medium Hardware or High Assurance Level.

- + The *asymmetric Card Authentication key* is a mandatory private key that supports card authentication for an interoperable environment.
- + The *symmetric (secret) Card Authentication key* supports card authentication for physical access, and it is optional.
- + The digital signature key is an asymmetric private key supporting document signing.
- + The *key management key* is an asymmetric private key supporting key establishment and transport.

  Optionally, up to twenty retired key management keys may also be stored on the PIV Card.
- + The *PIV Card Application Administration Key* is a symmetric key used for personalization and post-issuance activities, and it is optional.
- + The PIV Card may include additional key(s) for use with secure messaging. These keys are defined in [SP 800-73] or [SP 800-78].
- All PIV cryptographic keys shall be generated within a [FIPS140] validated cryptographic module with
- overall validation at Level 2 or above. In addition to an overall validation of Level 2, the PIV Card shall
- provide Level 3 physical security to protect the PIV private keys in storage. The scope of the validation
- for the PIV Card shall include all cryptographic operations performed over both the contact and
- 1328 contactless interfaces (1) by the PIV Card Application, (2) as part of secure messaging as specified in this
- section, and (3) as part of remote post issuance updates as specified in Section 2.9.3. Specific algorithm
- testing requirements for the cryptographic operations performed by the PIV Card Application are
- 1331 specified in [SP 800-78].
- Requirements specific to storage and access for each key are detailed below. Where applicable, key
- management requirements are also specified.
- + PIV Authentication Key. This key shall be generated on the PIV Card. The PIV Card shall not
- permit exportation of the PIV Authentication key. The cryptographic operations that use the PIV
- Authentication key shall be available only through the contact and the virtual contact interfaces of the
- PIV Card. Private key operations may be performed using an activated PIV Card without explicit
- user action (e.g., the PIN need not be supplied for each operation).
- The PIV Card shall store a corresponding X.509 certificate to support validation of the public key.
- The X.509 certificate shall include the FASC-N in the subject alternative name extension using the
- pivFASC-N attribute to support physical access procedures. The X.509 certificate shall also include
- the UUID value from the GUID data element of the CHUID in the subject alternative name extension.
- The UUID shall be encoded as a uniform resource identifier (URI), as specified in Section 3 of
- [RFC4122]. The expiration date of the certificate must be no later than the expiration date of the PIV
- 1345 Card. The PIV Authentication certificate shall include a PIV NACI indicator (background
- investigation indicator) extension; this non-critical extension indicates the status of the subject's
- background investigation at the time of card issuance. Section 5 of this document specifies the
- certificate format and the key management infrastructure for the PIV Authentication key.
- + Asymmetric Card Authentication Key. The asymmetric Card Authentication key shall be
- generated on the PIV Card. The PIV Card shall not permit exportation of the Card Authentication
- key. Cryptographic operations that use the Card Authentication key shall be available through the
- contact and the contactless interfaces of the PIV Card. Private key operations may be performed using
- this key without card activation (e.g., the PIN need not be supplied for operations with this key).

- 1354 The PIV Card shall store a corresponding X.509 certificate to support validation of the public key. 1355 The X.509 certificate shall include the FASC-N in the subject alternative name extension using the 1356 pivFASC-N attribute to support physical access procedures. The X.509 certificate shall also include 1357 the UUID value from the GUID data element of the CHUID in the subject alternative name extension. 1358 The UUID shall be encoded as a URI, as specified in Section 3 of [RFC4122]. The expiration date of 1359 the certificate must be no later than the expiration date of the PIV Card. Section 5 of this document 1360 specifies the certificate format and the key management infrastructure for asymmetric PIV Card 1361 Authentication keys.
- 1362 **Symmetric Card Authentication Key.** The symmetric Card Authentication key is imported onto the 1363 card by the issuer. The PIV Card shall not permit exportation of this key. If present, the symmetric 1364 Card Authentication key shall be unique for each PIV Card and shall meet the algorithm and key size 1365 requirements stated in [SP 800-78]. If present, cryptographic operations using this key may be 1366 performed without card activation (e.g., the PIN need not be supplied for operations with this key). 1367 The cryptographic operations that use the Card Authentication key shall be available through the 1368 contact and the contactless interfaces of the PIV Card. This Standard does not specify key 1369 management protocols or infrastructure requirements.
- + Digital Signature Key. The PIV digital signature key shall be generated on the PIV Card. The PIV Card shall not permit exportation of the digital signature key. If present, cryptographic operations using the digital signature key may only be performed using the contact and the virtual contact interfaces of the PIV Card. Private key operations may not be performed without explicit user action, as this Standard requires the cardholder to authenticate to the PIV Card each time it performs a private key computation with the digital signature key.
- The PIV Card shall store a corresponding X.509 certificate to support validation of the public key.

  The expiration date of the certificate must be no later than the expiration date of the PIV Card.

  Section 5 of this document specifies the certificate format and the key management infrastructure for PIV digital signature keys.
- + Key Management Key. This key may be generated on the PIV Card or imported to the card. If present, the cryptographic operations that use the key management key must only be accessible using the contact and the virtual contact interfaces of the PIV Card. Private key operations may be performed using an activated PIV Card without explicit user action (e.g., the PIN need not be supplied for each operation).
- The PIV Card shall store a corresponding X.509 certificate to support validation of the public key.

  Section 5 of this document specifies the certificate format and the key management infrastructure for key management keys.
- + PIV Card Application Administration Key. The PIV Card Application Administration Key is imported onto the card by the issuer. If present, the cryptographic operations that use the PIV Card Application Administration Key must only be accessible using the contact interface of the PIV Card.
- 1391 4.2.3 PIV Biometric Data Specifications
- 1392 **4.2.3.1** Biometric Data Representation
- 1393 The following biometric data shall be stored on the PIV Card:

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> [NISTIR7863], *Cardholder Authentication for the PIV Digital Signature Key*, addresses the appropriate use of PIN caching related to digital signatures.

1394 Two fingerprint templates. If no fingerprint images meeting the quality criteria of [SP 800-76] are 1395 available, the PIV Card shall nevertheless be populated with fingerprint records as specified in 1396 [SP800-76]. 1397 + An electronic facial image. 1398 The following biometric data may also be stored on the PIV Card: 1399 + One or two iris images. 1400 Fingerprint templates for on-card comparison. <sup>16</sup> All biometric data shall be stored in the data elements referenced by [SP 800-73] and in conformance 1401 1402 with the preparation and formatting specifications of [SP 800-76]. 1403 4.2.3.2 Biometric Data Protection 1404 The integrity of all biometric data, except for fingerprint templates for on-card comparison, shall be 1405 protected using digital signatures as follows. The records shall be prepended with a Common Biometric 1406 Exchange Formats Framework (CBEFF) header (referred to as CBEFF\_HEADER) and appended with the 1407 CBEFF signature block (referred to as the CBEFF\_SIGNATURE\_BLOCK) [CBEFF]. 1408 The format for CBEFF\_HEADER is specified in [SP 800-76]. 1409 The CBEFF SIGNATURE BLOCK contains the digital signature of the biometric data and thus 1410 facilitates the verification of integrity of the biometric data. The CBEFF SIGNATURE BLOCK shall be 1411 encoded as a CMS external digital signature as specified in [SP 800-76]. The algorithm and key size 1412 requirements for the digital signature and digest algorithm are detailed in [SP 800-78]. 1413 The public key required to verify the digital signature shall be contained in a content signing certificate, 1414 which shall be issued under the id-fpki-common-devicesHardware, id-fpki-common-hardware, or id-fpkicommon-High policy of [COMMON]. 17 The content signing certificate shall also include an extended 1415 key usage (extKeyUsage) extension asserting id-PIV-content-signing. If the signature on the biometric 1416 1417 was generated with a different key than the signature on the CHUID, the certificates field of the CMS 1418 external digital signature shall include the content signing certificate required to verify the signature on 1419 the biometric. Otherwise, the certificates field shall be omitted. Additional descriptions for the PIV 1420 object identifiers are provided in Appendix B. 1421 4.2.3.3 Biometric Data Access 1422 The PIV biometric data, except for fingerprint templates for on-card comparison, that is stored on the card 1423 shall be readable through the contact interface and after the presentation of a valid PIN; and 1424 may optionally be readable through the virtual contact interface and after the presentation of a valid

<sup>16</sup> The on-card and off-card fingerprint reference data are stored separately and, as conformant instances of different formal fingerprint standards, are syntactically different. This is described more fully in [SP 800-76].

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PIN.

<sup>17</sup> For legacy PKIs, as defined in Section 5.4, the certificates may be issued under a department or agency-specific policy that has been cross-certified with the Federal Bridge CA (FBCA) at the Medium Hardware or High Assurance Level.

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1426 On-card biometric comparison may be performed over the contact and the contactless interfaces of the 1427 PIV Card to support card activation (Section 4.3.1) and cardholder authentication (Section 6.2.2). The 1428 fingerprint templates for on-card comparison shall not be exportable. If implemented, on-card biometric 1429 comparison shall be implemented and used in accordance with [SP 800-73] and [SP 800-76]. 1430 4.2.4 PIV Unique Identifiers 1431 A cardholder is authenticated through identification and authentication (I&A) using the PIV credential 1432 (and its identifier) in authentication mechanisms described in Section 6. The authenticated identity may 1433 then be used as the basis for making authorization decisions. Unique identifiers for both authentication 1434 and authorization are provided in this Standard in order to uniquely identify the cardholder. The two 1435 types of identifiers that serve as identification (of the cardholder) for authentication and authorization 1436 purposes, are described as follows: 1437 Credential identifiers 1438 Each PIV card contains a UUID and a FASC-N that uniquely identify the card and, by 1439 correspondence, the cardholder. These two credential identifiers are represented in all of the 1440 authentication data elements for the purpose of binding the PIV data elements to the same PIV Card. 1441 Cardholder Identifiers 1442 Other identifiers may be present in credentials on the PIV Card that identity the cardholder rather than 1443 the card. Examples include the subject name and names that may appear in the subjectAltName 1444 extension in the PIV Authentication certificate. 1445 4.3 PIV Card Activation The PIV Card shall be activated<sup>18</sup> to perform privileged<sup>19</sup> operations such as using the PIV 1446 1447 Authentication key, digital signature key, and key management key. The PIV Card shall be activated for 1448 privileged operations only after authenticating the cardholder or the appropriate card management system. 1449 Cardholder activation is described in Section 4.3.1 and card management system activation is described in 1450 Section 4.3.2. 1451 4.3.1 Activation by Cardholder 1452 PIV Cards shall implement user-based cardholder activation to allow privileged operations using PIV 1453 credentials held by the card. At a minimum, the PIV Card shall implement PIN-based cardholder 1454 activation in support of interoperability across departments and agencies. Other card activation 1455 mechanisms (e.g., OCC card activation), only as specified in [SP 800-73], may be implemented and shall 1456 be discoverable. For PIN-based cardholder activation, the cardholder shall supply a numeric PIN. The 1457 verification data shall be transmitted to the PIV Card and checked by the card. If the verification data 1458 check is successful, the PIV Card is activated. The PIV Card shall include mechanisms to block 1459 activation of the card after a number of consecutive failed activation attempts. 1460 The PIN should not be easily guessable or otherwise individually identifiable in nature (e.g., part of a 1461 Social Security Number, phone number). The required PIN length shall be a minimum of six digits.

18 Activation in this context refers to the unlocking of the PIV Card Application so privileged operations can be performed.

<sup>19</sup> A read of a CHUID or use of the Card Authentication key is not considered a privileged operation.

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# 4.3.2 Activation by Card Management System

- 1463 PIV Cards may support card activation by the card management system to support card personalization
- and post-issuance card update. To activate the card for personalization or update, the card management
- system shall perform a challenge response protocol using cryptographic keys stored on the card in
- accordance with [SP 800-73]. When cards are personalized, PIV Card Application Administration Keys
- shall be set to be specific to each PIV Card. That is, each PIV Card shall contain a unique PIV Card
- 1468 Application Administration Key. PIV Card Application Administration Keys shall meet the algorithm
- and key size requirements stated in [SP 800-78].

# 4.4 Card Reader Requirements

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- 1471 This section provides minimum requirements for the contact and contactless card readers. Also, this
- section provides requirements for PIN input devices. Further requirements are specified in [SP 800-96].

# 1473 **4.4.1 Contact Reader Requirements**

- 1474 Contact card readers shall conform to the [ISO7816] standard for the card-to-reader interface. These
- readers shall conform to the Personal Computer/Smart Card (PC/SC) Specification [PCSC] for the reader-
- to-host system interface in general desktop computing environment. Specifically, the contact card readers
- shall conform to the requirements specified in [SP 800-96]. In physical access control systems where the
- readers are not connected to general-purpose desktop computing systems, the reader-to-host system
- interface is not specified in this Standard.

# 1480 4.4.2 Contactless Reader Requirements

- 1481 Contactless card readers shall conform to [ISO14443] standard for the card-to-reader interface and data
- transmitted over the [ISO14443] link shall conform to [ISO7816]. In cases where these readers are
- connected to general-purpose desktop computing systems, they shall conform to [PCSC] for the reader-to-
- host system interface. Specifically, the contactless card readers shall conform to the requirements
- specified in [SP 800-96]. In physical access control systems where the readers are not connected to
- general-purpose desktop computing systems, the reader-to-host system interface is not specified in this
- Standard. This is necessary to allow retrofitting of PIV readers into existing physical access control
- systems that use a variety of non-standard card reader communication interfaces.

# 1489 4.4.3 Reader Resilience and Flexibility

- The international standard ISO/IEC 24727 [ISOIEC 24727] enables a high degree of interoperability
- between electronic credentials and relying subsystems by means of an adaptation layer. To make
- interoperability among PIV System middleware, card readers, and credentials more resilient and flexible,
- the Department of Commerce will evaluate ISO/IEC 24727 and propose an optional profile of ISO/IEC
- 1494 24727 in [SP 800-73]. The profile will explain how profile-conformant middleware, card readers, and
- 1495 PIV Cards can be used interchangeably with middleware, card readers, and PIV Cards currently deployed.
- 1496 Specifications of the profile will become effective, as an optional means to implement PIV System
- readers and middleware, when OMB determines that the profile specifications are complete and ready for
- deployment.

1499	4.4.4 Card Activation Device Requirements
1500 1501 1502 1503 1504	When the PIV Card is used with OCC data or a PIN for physical access, the input device shall be integrated with the PIV Card reader. When the PIV Card is used with OCC data or a PIN for logical access (e.g., to authenticate to a Web site or other server), the input device is not required to be integrated with the PIV Card reader. If the input device is not integrated with the PIV Card reader, the OCC data or the PIN shall be transmitted securely and directly to the PIV Card for card activation.
1505	The specifications for fingerprint capture devices for on-card comparison are given in [SP 800-76].
1506 1507 1508	Malicious code could be introduced into the PIN capture and biometric reader devices for the purpose of compromising or otherwise exploiting the PIV Card. General good practice to mitigate malicious code threats is outside the scope of this document. <sup>20</sup>
1300	threats is outside the scope of this document.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> See SP 800-53, Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems and Organizations [SP 800-53].

# 5. PIV Key Management Requirements

- 1510 PIV Cards consistent with this specification will have two or more asymmetric private keys. To manage
- the public keys associated with the asymmetric private keys, departments and agencies shall issue and
- manage X.509 public key certificates as specified below.
- 1513 **5.1 Architecture**
- The CA that issues certificates to support PIV Card authentication shall participate in the hierarchical PKI
- for the Common Policy managed by the Federal PKI. Self-signed, self-issued, and CA certificates issued
- by these CAs shall conform to Worksheet 1: Self-Signed Certificate Profile, Worksheet 2: Self-Issued CA
- 1517 Certificate Profile, and Worksheet 3: Cross Certificate Profile, respectively, in X.509 Certificate and
- 1518 Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Extensions Profile for the Shared Service Providers (SSP) Program
- 1519 [PROF]. The requirements for legacy PKIs are defined in Section 5.4.
- 1520 **5.2 PKI Certificate**
- 1521 All certificates issued to support PIV Card authentication shall be issued under the X.509 Certificate
- 1522 Policy for the U.S. Federal PKI Common Policy Framework [COMMON]. The requirements in this
- 1523 certificate policy cover identity proofing and the management of CAs and registration authorities. CAs
- and registration authorities may be operated by departments and agencies, or may be outsourced to PKI
- service providers. For a list of PKI service providers that have been approved to operate under
- 1526 [COMMON], see http://www.idmanagement.gov.
- 1527 5.2.1 X.509 Certificate Contents
- The required contents of X.509 certificates associated with PIV private keys are based on [PROF]. The
- relationship is described below:
- + Certificates containing the public key associated with an asymmetric Card Authentication key shall
- 1531 conform to Worksheet 8: Card Authentication Certificate Profile in [PROF].
- + Certificates containing the public key associated with a digital signature private key shall conform to
- Worksheet 5: End Entity Signature Certificate Profile in [PROF] and shall specify either the id-fpki-
- 1534 common-hardware or id-fpki-common-High policy in the certificate policies extension.
- + Certificates containing the public key associated with a PIV Authentication private key shall conform
- to Worksheet 9: PIV Authentication Certificate Profile in [PROF].
- + Certificates containing the public key associated with a key management private key shall conform to
- Worksheet 6: Key Management Certificate Profile in [PROF].<sup>21</sup>
- + Requirements for algorithms and key sizes for each type of PIV asymmetric key are given in [SP 800-78].

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> Note that key management certificates may assert the id-fpki-common-policy, id-fpki-common-hardware, or id-fpki-common-High policy in the certificate policies extension. Applications / relying systems sensitive to the assurance level may choose not to accept certificates that only assert id-fpki-common-policy.

### 1541 **5.3 X.509 CRL Contents**

- 1542 CAs that issue certificates corresponding to PIV private keys shall issue CRLs as specified in
- [COMMON]. The contents of X.509 CRLs shall conform to Worksheet 4: CRL Profile in [PROF].

# 1544 **5.4 Legacy PKIs**

- For the purposes of this Standard, legacy PKIs are the PKIs of departments and agencies that have cross-
- 1546 certified with the Federal Bridge CA (FBCA) at the Medium Hardware or High Assurance Level. Legacy
- 1547 PKIs that issue PIV Authentication certificates and Card Authentication certificates shall meet the
- requirements specified in Sections 5.2.1, 5.3, 5.5, 5.5.1, and 5.5.2, with respect to the PIV Authentication
- 1549 certificates and Card Authentication certificates that they issue. Departments and agencies may assert
- department or agency-specific policy object identifiers (OIDs) in PIV Authentication Certificates and
- 1551 Card Authentication Certificates in addition to the id-fpki-common-authentication policy OID and the id-
- fpki-common-cardAuth OID, respectively. This specification imposes no requirements on digital
- signature or key management certificates issued by legacy PKIs.

# 1554 5.5 PKI Repository and OCSP Responder(s)

- 1555 The PIV PKI repository and Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) responder provides PIV Card and
- key status information across departments, agencies, and other organizations, to support high-assurance
- interagency PIV Card interoperation. Departments and agencies will be responsible for notifying CAs
- when cards or certificates need to be revoked. CAs shall maintain the status of servers and responders
- needed for PIV Card and certificate status checking.
- 1560 The expiration date of the authentication certificates (PIV Authentication certificate and Card
- 1561 Authentication certificate) shall not be after the expiration date of the PIV Card. If the card is revoked,
- the authentication certificates shall be revoked. However, an authentication certificate (and its associated
- key pair) may be revoked without revoking the PIV Card and may then be replaced. The presence of a
- valid, unexpired, and unrevoked authentication certificate on a card is proof that the card was issued and
- 1565 is not revoked.
- Because an authentication certificate typically is valid several years, a mechanism to distribute certificate
- status information is necessary. CRL and OCSP are the two commonly used mechanisms. CAs that issue
- authentication certificates shall maintain a Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) accessible web server that
- 1569 holds the CRLs for the certificates it issues, as well as any CA certificates issued to or by it, as specified
- 1570 in [PROF].
- 1571 PIV Authentication certificates and Card Authentication certificates shall contain the
- 1572 *crlDistributionPoints* and *authorityInfoAccess* extensions needed to locate CRLs and the authoritative
- 1573 OCSP responder, respectively. In addition, every CA that issues these authentication certificates shall
- operate an OCSP server that provides certificate status for every authentication certificate the CA issues.

### 1575 5.5.1 Certificate and CRL Distribution

- 1576 This Standard requires distribution of CA certificates and CRLs using HTTP. Specific requirements are
- 1577 found in the Shared Service Provider Repository Service Requirements [SSP REP].
- 1578 Certificates that contain the FASC-N or UUID in the subject alternative name extension, such as PIV
- 1579 Authentication certificates and Card Authentication certificates, shall not be distributed publicly (e.g., via
- the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP) or HTTP accessible from the public Internet).

1581 1582 1583	Individual departments and agencies can decide whether other user certificates (digital signature and key management) can be distributed via LDAP. When user certificates are distributed, the requirements in Table IV—End-Entity Certificate Repository Service Requirements of [SSP REP] shall be satisfied.
1584	5.5.2 OCSP Status Responders
1585 1586 1587 1588	OCSP [RFC2560] status responders shall be implemented as a supplementary certificate status mechanism. The OCSP status responders must be updated at least as frequently as CRLs are issued. The definitive OCSP responder for each certificate shall be specified in the <i>authorityInfoAccess</i> extension as described in [PROF].

# 6. PIV Cardholder Authentication

- 1590 This section defines a suite of authentication mechanisms that are supported by all the PIV Cards, and
- their applicability in meeting the requirements for a set of graduated levels of identity assurance. This
- section also defines some authentication mechanisms that make use of credential elements that may
- optionally be included on PIV Cards. Specific implementation details of authentication mechanisms
- identified in this section are provided in [SP 800-73]. Moreover, while a wide range of authentication
- mechanisms is identified in this section, departments and agencies may adopt additional mechanisms that
- use the identity credentials on the PIV Card. In the context of the PIV Card Application, identity
- authentication is defined as the process of establishing confidence in the identity of the cardholder
- presenting a PIV Card. The authenticated identity can then be used to determine the permissions or
- authorizations granted to that identity for access to various physical and logical resources.

#### 6.1 PIV Assurance Levels

- 1601 This Standard defines four levels of assurance for identity authentication supported by the PIV Card
- Application. Each assurance level sets a degree of confidence established in the identity of the holder of
- the PIV Card. The entity performing the authentication establishes confidence in the identity of the PIV
- 1604 cardholder through the following:
- 1605 1) the rigor of the identity proofing process conducted prior to issuing the PIV Card;
- 1606 2) the security of the PIV Card issuance and maintenance processes; and
- 1607 3) the strength of the technical mechanisms used to verify that the cardholder is the owner of the PIV Card.
- Section 2 of this Standard defines requirements for the identity proofing, registration, issuance, and
- maintenance processes for PIV Cards and establishes a common level of assurance in these processes.
- The PIV identity proofing, registration, issuance, and maintenance processes meet or exceed the
- requirements for E-Authentication Level 4 [OMB0404]. The PIV Card contains a number of visual and
- logical credentials. Depending on the specific PIV data used to authenticate the holder of the PIV Card to
- an entity that controls access to a resource, varying levels of assurance that the holder of the PIV Card is
- the owner of the card can be achieved. This is the basis for the following PIV assurance levels defined in
- 1616 this Standard:

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- + LITTLE or NO Confidence—Little or no assurance in the identity of the cardholder;
- + SOME Confidence—A basic degree of assurance in the identity of the cardholder;
- + HIGH Confidence—A strong degree of assurance in the identity of the cardholder;
- + VERY HIGH Confidence—A very strong degree of assurance in the identity of the cardholder.
- Parties responsible for controlling access to Federal resources (both physical and logical) shall determine
- the appropriate level of identity assurance required for access, based on the harm and impact to
- 1623 individuals and organizations as a result of errors in the authentication of the identity of the PIV
- 1624 cardholder. Once the required level of assurance has been determined, the authentication mechanisms
- specified within this section may be applied to achieve the required degree of confidence in the identity of
- the PIV cardholder.

# 6.1.1 Relationship to OMB's E-Authentication Guidance

- The levels of identity authentication assurance defined within this Standard are closely aligned with
- Section 2 of OMB's E-Authentication Guidance for Federal Agencies, M-04-04 [OMB0404].
- Specifically, Table 6-1 shows the notional relationship between the PIV assurance levels and the M-04-04
- 1631 E-Authentication assurance levels.

#### Table 6-1. Relationship Between PIV and E-Authentication Assurance Levels

PIV Assurance Levels	Comparable OMB E-Authentication Levels		
	Level Number	Description	
LITTLE or NO confidence	Level 1	Little or no confidence in the asserted identity's validity	
SOME confidence	Level 2 Some confidence in the asserted identity's validity		
HIGH confidence	Level 3	evel 3 High confidence in the asserted identity's validity	
VERY HIGH confidence	Level 4 Very high confidence in the asserted identity's validity		

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- [OMB0404] addresses "four levels of identity assurance for electronic transactions requiring
- authentication" and prescribes a methodology for determining the level of identity assurance required
- based on the risks and potential impacts of errors in identity authentication. In the context of the PIV
- 1637 Card, owners of logical resources shall apply the methodology defined in [OMB0404] to identify the level
- of identity authentication assurance required for their electronic transaction. Parties that are responsible
- for access to physical resources may use a methodology similar to that defined in [OMB0404] to
- determine the PIV assurance level required for access to their physical resource; they may also use other
- applicable methodologies to determine the required level of identity assurance for their application.

### 1642 6.2 PIV Card Authentication Mechanisms

- 1643 The following subsections define the basic types of authentication mechanisms that are supported by the
- 1644 credential set hosted by the PIV Card Application. PIV Cards can be used for identity authentication in
- environments that are equipped with card readers as well as those that lack card readers. Card readers.
- when present, can be contact readers or contactless readers. The usage environment affects the PIV
- authentication mechanisms that may be applied to a particular situation.

# 6.2.1 Authentication Using Off-Card Biometric Comparison

- The PIV Card Application hosts the signed fingerprint templates and, optionally, the signed iris images.
- 1650 Either biometric can be read from the card following cardholder-to-card (CTC) authentication using a PIN
- supplied by the cardholder. These PIV biometrics are designed to support a cardholder-to-external
- system (CTE) authentication mechanism through a match-off-card scheme. The following subsections
- define two authentication schemes that make use of the PIV biometrics. <sup>22</sup>
- Some characteristics of the PIV Biometrics authentication mechanisms (described below) are as follows:

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> As noted in Section 4.2.3.1, neither the fingerprint templates nor the iris images are guaranteed to be present on a PIV Card, since it may not be possible to collect fingerprints from some cardholders and iris images collection is optional. When biometric authentication cannot be performed, PKI-AUTH is the recommended alternate authentication mechanism.

1655 Slower mechanism, because it requires two interactions (e.g., presentation of PIN and biometric) with 1656 the cardholder. 1657 Strong resistance to use of unaltered card by non-owner since PIN and cardholder biometric are 1658 required. 1659 Digital signature on biometric, which is checked to further strengthen the mechanism. 1660 Does not provide protection against use of a revoked card. 1661 Applicable with contact card readers, and contactless card readers that support the virtual contact 1662 interface. 6.2.1.1 Unattended Authentication Using PIV Biometric (BIO) 1663 1664 The following steps shall be performed for unattended authentication of the PIV biometric: The CHUID or another data element 23 is read from the card and is checked to ensure the card has not 1665 expired and that it is from a trusted source. 1666 1667 The cardholder is prompted to submit a PIN, activating the PIV Card. 1668 The PIV biometric is read from the card. 1669 The signature on the biometric is verified to ensure the biometric is intact and comes from a trusted 1670 source. Note that the signature verification may require retrieval of the content signing certificate 1671 from the CHUID if the signature on the biometric was generated with the same key as the signature 1672 on the CHUID. 1673 The cardholder is prompted to submit a live biometric sample. 1674 If the biometric sample matches the biometric read from the card, the cardholder is authenticated to 1675 be the owner of the card. 1676 The FASC-N (or UUID) in the CHUID or other data element is compared with the FASC-N (or 1677 UUID) in the Signed Attributes field of the external digital signature on the biometric. 1678 A unique identifier within the CHUID or other data element is used as input to the authorization 1679 check to determine whether the cardholder should be granted access. 1680 6.2.1.2 Attended Authentication of PIV Biometric (BIO-A) 1681 This authentication mechanism is the same as the unattended biometrics (BIO) authentication mechanism;

<sup>23</sup> The PIV Authentication certificate or Card Authentication certificate may be leveraged instead of the CHUID to verify that the card is not expired.

the only difference is that an attendant (e.g., security guard) supervises the use of the PIV Card and the

submission of the biometric by the cardholder.

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# 1684 6.2.2 Authentication Using On-Card Biometric Comparison (OCC-AUTH)

- The PIV Card Application may host the optional on-card biometric comparison algorithm. In this case,
- on-card biometric comparison data is stored on the card, which cannot be read, but could be used for
- identity verification. A live-scan biometric is supplied to the card to perform cardholder-to-card (CTC)
- authentication and the card responds with an indication of the success of the on-card biometric
- 1689 comparison. The response includes information that allows the reader to authenticate the card. The
- cardholder PIN is not required for this operation. The PIV Card shall include a mechanism to block this
- authentication mechanism after a number of consecutive failed authentication attempts as stipulated by
- the department or agency. As with authentication using the PIV biometrics, if agencies choose to
- implement on-card biometric comparison, it shall be implemented as defined in [SP 800-73] and
- 1694 [SP 800-76].
- Some of the characteristics of the on-card biometric comparison authentication mechanism are as follows:
- 1696 + Highly resistant to credential forgery.
- + Strong resistance to use of unaltered card by non-owner.
- 1698 + Applicable with contact and contactless card readers.

# 1699 6.2.3 Authentication Using PIV Asymmetric Cryptography

- 1700 The PIV Card contains two mandatory asymmetric authentication private keys and corresponding
- certificates to support cardholder-to-external system (CTE) authentication, as described in Section 4. The
- following subsections shall be used to perform authentication using the authentication keys.

# 1703 6.2.3.1 Authentication with the PIV Authentication Certificate Credential (PKI-AUTH)

- 1704 The following steps shall be performed for PKI-AUTH:
- + The reader reads the PIV Authentication certificate from the PIV Card Application.
- + The reader validates the PIV Authentication certificate from the PIV Card Application using standards-compliant PKI path validation<sup>24</sup> to ensure that it is neither expired nor revoked and that it is
- 1708 from a trusted source.
- + The cardholder is prompted to submit a PIN, which is used to activate the card. (If implemented, other card activation mechanisms, as specified in [SP 800-73], may be used to activate the card.)
- + The reader issues a challenge string to the card and requests an asymmetric operation in response.
- 1712 + The card responds to the previously issued challenge by signing it using the PIV Authentication private key.
- + The reader verifies that the card's response is the expected response to the issued challenge.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> Path validation should be configured to specify which policy OIDs are trusted. The policy OID for the PIV Authentication certificate is id-fpki-common-authentication.

1715 A unique identifier from the PIV Authentication certificate is extracted and passed as input to the 1716 access control decision. 1717 Some of the characteristics of the PKI-based authentication mechanism are as follows: 1718 Requires the use of certificate status checking infrastructure. 1719 Highly resistant to credential forgery. 1720 Strong resistance to use of unaltered card by non-owner since card activation is required. 1721 Applicable with contact card readers, and contactless card readers that support the virtual contact 1722 interface. 1723 6.2.3.2 Authentication with the Card Authentication Certificate Credential (PKI-CAK) 1724 The following steps shall be performed for PKI-CAK: 1725 The reader reads the Card Authentication certificate from the PIV Card Application. 1726 The reader validates the Card Authentication certificate from the PIV Card Application using 1727 standards-compliant PKI path validation<sup>25</sup> to ensure that it is neither expired nor revoked and that it is 1728 from a trusted source. 1729 The reader issues a challenge string to the card and requests an asymmetric operation in response. 1730 The card responds to the previously issued challenge by signing it using the Card Authentication 1731 private key. 1732 The reader verifies that the card's response is the expected response to the issued challenge. 1733 A unique identifier from the Card Authentication certificate is extracted and passed as input to the 1734 access control decision. 1735 Some of the characteristics of the PKI-CAK authentication mechanism are as follows: 1736 Requires the use of certificate status checking infrastructure. 1737 Highly resistant to credential forgery. 1738 Low resistance to use of unaltered card by non-owner of card. 1739 Applicable with contact and contactless readers.

<sup>25</sup> Path validation should be configured to specify which policy OIDs are trusted. The policy OID for the Card Authentication certificate is id-fpki-common-cardAuth.

# 1740 6.2.4 Authentication with the Symmetric Card Authentication Key (SYM-CAK)

- 1741 The PIV Card Application may host the optional symmetric Card Authentication key. In this case, the
- symmetric Card Authentication key shall be used for PIV cardholder authentication using the following
- 1743 steps:
- + The CHUID, PIV Authentication certificate, or Card Authentication certificate data element is read
- from the PIV Card and is checked to ensure the card has not expired.
- 1746 + The digital signature on the data element is checked to ensure that it was signed by a trusted source
- and is unaltered.
- + The reader issues a challenge string to the card and requests a response.
- + The card responds to the previously issued challenge by encrypting the challenge using the symmetric
- 1750 Card Authentication key.
- 1751 + The response is validated as the expected response to the issued challenge.
- + A unique identifier within the data element is used as input to the authorization check to determine
- whether the cardholder should be granted access.
- Some of the characteristics of the symmetric Card Authentication key authentication mechanism are as
- 1755 follows:
- 1756 + Resistant to credential forgery.
- + Does not provide protection against use of a revoked card.
- 1758 + Low resistance to use of unaltered card by non-owner of card.
- + Applicable with contact and contactless readers.

# 1760 6.2.5 Authentication Using the CHUID

- 1761 The PIV Card provides a mandatory logical credential called the CHUID. As described in Section 4.2.1,
- the CHUID contains numerous data elements.
- 1763 The CHUID shall be used for PIV cardholder authentication using the following steps:
- + The CHUID is read electronically from the PIV Card.
- + The digital signature on the CHUID is checked to ensure the CHUID was signed by a trusted source
- and is unaltered.
- + The expiration date on the CHUID is checked to ensure that the card has not expired.
- 1768 + A unique identifier within the CHUID is used as input to the authorization check to determine
- whether the cardholder should be granted access.
- 1770 Some characteristics of the CHUID-based authentication mechanism are as follows:

- + Can be used for rapid authentication for high volume access control.
- + Low resistance to use of unaltered card by non-owner of card.
- + Does not provide protection against use of a revoked card.
- + Applicable with contact and contactless readers.
- 1775 As the CHUID authentication mechanism provides LITTLE or NO assurance in the identity of the
- 1776 cardholder, use of the CHUID authentication mechanism is deprecated. It is expected that the CHUID
- authentication mechanism will be removed from this Standard at the next five-year revision.
- 1778 6.2.6 Authentication Using PIV Visual Credentials (VIS)
- 1779 Visual authentication of a PIV cardholder shall be used only to support access control to physical
- 1780 facilities and resources.
- 1781 The PIV Card has several mandatory topographical features on the front and back that support visual
- identification and authentication, as follows:
- 1783 + Zone 1F Photograph;
- 1784 + Zone 2F Name;
- 1785 + Zone 8F Employee Affiliation;
- 1786 + Zone 10F Agency, Department, or Organization;
- + Zones 14F and 19F Card Expiration Date;
- 1788 + Zone 15F Color-Coding for Employee Affiliation;
- + Zone 1B Agency Card Serial Number (back of card);
- 1790 + Zone 2B Issuer Identification Number (back of card).
- The PIV Card may also bear optional components, some of which are:
- + Zone 11F Agency Seal;
- + Zone 5B Physical Characteristics of Cardholder (back of card);
- + Zone 3F Signature.
- When a cardholder attempts to pass through an access control point for a Federally controlled facility, a
- human guard shall perform visual identity verification of the cardholder, and determine whether the
- identified individual should be allowed through the control point. The following steps shall be applied in
- the visual authentication process:
- + The guard at the access control entry point determines whether the PIV Card appears to be genuine and has not been altered in any way.

1801 1802	+ The guard compares the cardholder's facial features with the picture on the card to ensure that they match.
1803	+ The guard checks the expiration date on the card to ensure that the card has not expired.
1804 1805	+ The guard compares the cardholder's physical characteristic descriptions to those of the cardholder. (Optional)
1806 1807	+ The guard collects the cardholder's signature and compares it with the signature on the card. (Optional)
1808 1809 1810	+ One or more of the other data elements on the card (e.g., name, employee affiliation, agency card serial number, issuer identification, agency name) are used to determine whether the cardholder should be granted access.
1811	Some characteristics of the visual authentication mechanism are as follows:
1812	+ Human inspection of card, which is not amenable for rapid or high volume access control.
1813	+ Resistant to use of unaltered card by non-owner of card.
1814	+ Low resistance to tampering and forgery.
1815	+ Does not provide protection against use of a revoked card.
1816	+ Applicable in environments with and without card readers.
1817	6.3 PIV Support of Graduated Assurance Levels for Identity Authentication
1818 1819 1820 1821 1822 1823 1824	The PIV Card supports a set of authentication mechanisms that can be used to implement graduated assurance levels for identity authentication. The following subsections specify the basic PIV authentication mechanisms that may be used to support the various levels of identity authentication assurance as defined in Section 6.1. Two or more complementing authentication mechanisms may be applied in unison to achieve a higher degree of assurance of the identity of the PIV cardholder. For example, PKI-AUTH and BIO may be applied in unison to achieve a higher degree of assurance in cardholder identity.
1825 1826 1827 1828 1829 1830 1831 1832	Adequately designed and implemented relying systems can achieve the PIV Card authentication assurance levels stated in Tables 6-2 and 6-3. Less adequately designed or implemented relying systems may only achieve lower authentication assurance levels. The design of components of relying systems, including card readers, biometric readers, cryptographic modules, and key management systems, involves many factors not fully specified by FIPS 201, such as correctness of the functional mechanism, physical protection of the mechanism, and environmental conditions at the authentication point. Additional standards and best practice guidelines apply to the design and implementation of relying systems, e.g., [FIPS140] and [SP 800-116].
1833	6.3.1 Physical Access
1834 1835 1836	The PIV Card may be used to authenticate the identity of the cardholder in a physical access control environment. For example, a Federal facility may have physical entry doors that have human guards at checkpoints, or may have electronic access control points. The PIV-supported authentication mechanisms

for physical access control systems are summarized in Table 6-2. An authentication mechanism that is suitable for a higher assurance level can also be applied to meet the requirements for a lower assurance level. Moreover, the authentication mechanisms in Table 6-2 can be combined to achieve higher assurance levels.<sup>26</sup>

Table 6-2. Authentication for Physical Access

PIV Assurance Level Required by Application/Resource	Applicable PIV Authentication Mechanism	
LITTLE or NO confidence	VIS, CHUID	
SOME confidence	PKI-CAK, SYM-CAK	
HIGH confidence	BIO	
VERY HIGH confidence	BIO-A, OCC-AUTH, PKI-AUTH	

# 6.3.2 Logical Access

The PIV Card may be used to authenticate the cardholder in support of decisions concerning access to logical information resources. For example, a cardholder may log in to his or her department or agency network using the PIV Card; the identity established through this authentication process can be used for determining access to file systems, databases, and other services available on the network.

Table 6-3 describes the authentication mechanisms defined for this Standard to support logical access control. An authentication mechanism that is suitable for a higher assurance level can also be applied to meet the requirements for a lower assurance level.

Table 6-3. Authentication for Logical Access

PIV Assurance Level Required by Application/Resource	Applicable PIV Authentication Mechanism		
	Local Workstation Environment	Remote/Network System Environment	
LITTLE or NO confidence	CHUID		
SOME confidence	PKI-CAK	PKI-CAK	
HIGH confidence	BIO		
VERY HIGH confidence	BIO-A, OCC-AUTH, PKI-AUTH	PKI-AUTH	

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> Combinations of authentication mechanisms are specified in [SP 800-116].

#### Appendix A—PIV Validation, Certification, and Accreditation 1858 1859 This appendix provides compliance requirements for PIV validation, certification, and accreditation, and 1860 is normative. **A.1** 1861 **Accreditation of PIV Card Issuers (PCI)** 1862 [HSPD-12] requires that all cards be issued by providers whose reliability has been established by an 1863 official accreditation process. The accreditation of the PIV Card issuer shall be reviewed through a third-1864 party assessment to enhance the trustworthiness of the credential. To facilitate consistent independent 1865 validation of the PCI, NIST developed a set of attributes as the basis of reliability assessment of PIV Card 1866 issuers in SP 800-79 and published this document in July 2005. Subsequent lessons learned in 1867 implementation experience (in credential management and PIV Card issuance) of various agencies 1868 together with the evolution of PCI organizations motivated NIST to develop a new accreditation 1869 methodology that is objective, efficient, and will result in consistent and repeatable accreditation 1870 decisions and published the substantial revision as SP 800-79-1 in June 2008 [SP 800-79]. The new PCI 1871 accreditation methodology is built on a foundation of four major accreditation topics, 13 accreditation 1872 focus areas, and a total of 79 control requirements distributed under the various accreditation focus areas. 1873 Associated with each control requirement is a set of assessment methods, the exercise of the latter will 1874 result in outcomes that form the basis for accreditation decisions. 1875 The four major accreditation topics identified in [SP 800-79] are: 1876 organizational preparedness; 1877 security management and data protection; 1878 infrastructure elements: and 1879 (PIV) processes. 1880 The entire spectrum of activities in the PCI accreditation methodology is divided into the following four 1881 phases: 1882 initiation phase; 1883 assessment phase; 1884 accreditation phase; and 1885 monitoring phase. 1886 The initiation phase involves communicating the goals of the assessment/accreditation to the key 1887 personnel of the PCI organization and the review of documents such as the PCI operations plan. In the 1888 assessment phase, the appropriate assessment methods stipulated in the methodology for each PCI control 1889 are carried out and the individual results recorded. The accreditation phase involves aggregating the 1890 results of assessment, arriving at an accreditation decision, and issuing the appropriate notification – the 1891 authorization to operate (ATO) or the denial of authorization to operate (DATO), that is consistent with

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the accreditation decision.

# A.2 Application of Risk Management Framework to IT System(s) Supporting PCI

- The accreditation of the capability and reliability of a PCI using the methodology outlined in [SP 800-79]
- depends upon adequate security for the information systems that are used for PCI functions. The
- assurance that such a security exists in a PCI is obtained through evidence of the application of the Risk
- Management Framework guidelines specified in [SP 800-37]. The methodology in [SP 800-37] in turn
- was created pursuant to a mandate in Appendix III of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular
- 1899 A-130. An Information system authorization decision together with evidence of security control
- monitoring compliant with [SP 800-37] guidelines signifies that a PCI organization's official accepts
- responsibility for the security (in terms of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of information) of the
- information systems that will be involved in carrying out the PCI functions. Hence evidence of
- successful application of Risk Management Framework consistent with [SP 800-37] guidelines is
- mandatory for issuing PCI accreditation using SP 800-79.

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# A.3 Conformance Testing of PIV Card Application and Middleware

- 1906 Assurance of conformance of the PIV Card Application and PIV Middleware interfaces to this Standard
- and its associated technical specifications is needed in order to meet the security and interoperability
- 1908 goals of [HSPD-12]. To facilitate this, NIST has established the NIST Personal Identity Verification
- 1909 Program (NPIVP). Under this program NIST has developed test procedures in SP 800-85A, PIV Card
- 1910 Application and Middleware Interface Test Guidelines (SP 800-73 compliance), and an associated toolkit
- for conformance testing of PIV Card Applications and PIV Middleware [SP 800-85A]. Commercial
- products under these two categories are tested by the set of accredited test laboratories, accredited under
- the National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program (NVLAP) program, using the NIST supplied
- test procedures and toolkit. The outcomes of the test results are validated by NIST, which then issues
- validation certificates. Information about NPIVP is available at
- 1916 http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SNS/piv/npivp.

## A.4 Cryptographic Testing and Validation

- All on-card cryptographic modules hosting the PIV Card Application and cryptographic modules of card
- issuance and maintenance systems shall be validated to [FIPS140] with an overall Security Level 2 (or
- higher). The facilities for [FIPS140] testing are the Cryptographic and Security Testing laboratories
- accredited by the NVLAP program of NIST. Vendors wanting to supply cryptographic modules can
- select any of the accredited laboratories. The tests conducted by these laboratories for all vendor
- submissions are validated and a validation certificate for each vendor module is issued by the
- 1924 Cryptographic Module Validation Program (CMVP), a joint program run by NIST and the
- 1925 Communications Security Establishment (CSE) of the Government of Canada. The details of the CMVP
- and NVLAP programs and the list of testing laboratories can be found at the CMVP Web site at
- http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/STM/cmvp/index.html.

### A.5 FIPS 201 Evaluation Program

- In order to evaluate the conformance of different families of products that support the PIV processes to
- this Standard and its associated technical specifications, the Office of Governmentwide Policy under GSA
- 1931 set up the FIPS 201 Evaluation Program. The product families currently include card personalization
- 1932 products, card readers, products involved in credential enrollment functions such as fingerprint and facial
- image capture equipment, biometric fingerprint template generators, etc. Products evaluated and
- approved under this program are placed on the FIPS 201 Approved Products List to enable procurement
- of conformant products by implementing agencies. The details of the program are available at
- 1936 http://fips201ep.cio.gov/.

# Appendix B—PIV Object Identifiers and Certificate Extension

This normative appendix provides additional details for the PIV objects identified in Section 4.

## B.1 PIV Object Identifiers

Table B-1 lists details for PIV object identifiers.

1941 Table B-1. PIV Object Identifiers

ID	Object Identifier	Description		
PIV eContent Types	PIV eContent Types			
id-PIV-CHUIDSecurityObject	2.16.840.1.101.3.6.1	The associated content is the concatenated contents of the CHUID, excluding the authentication key map <sup>27</sup> and the asymmetric signature field.		
id-PIV-biometricObject	2.16.840.1.101.3.6.2	The associated content is the concatenated CBEFF_HEADER + STD_BIOMETRIC_RECORD.		
PIV Attributes				
pivCardholder-Name	2.16.840.1.101.3.6.3	The attribute value is of type DirectoryString and specifies the PIV cardholder's name.		
pivCardholder-DN	2.16.840.1.101.3.6.4	The attribute value is an X.501 type Name and specifies the DN associated with the PIV cardholder in the PIV certificate(s).		
pivSigner-DN	2.16.840.1.101.3.6.5	The attribute value is an X.501 type Name and specifies the subject name that appears in the PKI certificate for the entity that signed the biometric or CHUID.		
pivFASC-N	2.16.840.1.101.3.6.6	The pivFASC-N OID may appear as a name type in the otherName field of the subjectAltName extension of X.509 certificates or a signed attribute in CMS external signatures. Where used as a name type, the syntax is OCTET STRING. Where used as an attribute, the attribute value is of type OCTET STRING. In each case, the value specifies the FASC-N of the PIV Card.		
PIV Extended Key Usage				
id-PIV-content-signing	2.16.840.1.101.3.6.7	This specifies that the public key may be used to verify signatures on CHUIDs and PIV biometrics.		
id-PIV-cardAuth 2.16.840.1.101.3.6.8		This specifies that the public key is used to authenticate the PIV Card rather than the PIV cardholder.		

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The OIDs for certificate policies are specified in [COMMON].

### B.2 PIV Certificate Extension

The PIV NACI indicator (background investigation indicator) extension indicates whether the subject's background investigation was incomplete at the time of credential issuance. The PIV NACI indicator (background investigation indicator) extension is always non-critical, and shall appear in all PIV

 $<sup>^{27}</sup>$  The authentication key map was deprecated in SP 800-73-2 and was removed from SP 800-73-3.

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- Authentication certificates and Card Authentication certificates. The value of this extension is asserted as follows:
- + TRUE if, at the time of credential issuance, (1) the FBI National Criminal History Fingerprint Check has completed, and (2) a background investigation has been initiated but has not completed.
- + FALSE if, at the time of credential issuance, the subject's background investigation has been completed and successfully adjudicated.
- The PIV NACI indicator (background investigation indicator) extension is identified by the id-piv-NACI object identifier. The syntax for this extension is defined by the following ASN.1 module.

```
PIV-Cert-Extensions { 2 16 840 1 101 3 6 10 1 }
1957
1958
1959
            DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::=
1960
1961
            BEGIN
1962
1963
            -- EXPORTS ALL --
1964
1965
            -- IMPORTS NONE --
1966
1967
            id-piv-NACI OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { 2 16 840 1 101 3 6 9 1 }
1968
1969
            NACI-indicator ::= BOOLEAN
1970
1971
            END
```

1972	Appendix C—Glossary of Terms, Acronyms, and Notations
1973	This informative appendix describes the vocabulary and textual representations used in the document.
1974	C.1 Glossary of Terms
1975	The following terms are used throughout this Standard.
1976 1977 1978	<b>Access Control:</b> The process of granting or denying specific requests: 1) obtain and use information and related information processing services; and 2) enter specific physical facilities (e.g., Federal buildings, military establishments, border crossing entrances).
1979 1980	<b>Applicant:</b> An individual applying for a PIV Card/credential. The applicant may be a current or prospective Federal hire, a Federal employee, a government affiliate, or a contractor. <sup>28</sup>
1981 1982 1983 1984	<b>Application:</b> A hardware/software system implemented to satisfy a particular set of requirements. In this context, an application incorporates a system used to satisfy a subset of requirements related to the verification or identification of an end user's identity so that the end user's identifier can be used to facilitate the end user's interaction with the system.
1985 1986 1987 1988	<b>Architecture:</b> A highly structured specification of an acceptable approach within a framework for solving a specific problem. An architecture contains descriptions of all the components of a selected, acceptable solution while allowing certain details of specific components to be variable to satisfy related constraints (e.g., costs, local environment, user acceptability).
1989 1990 1991	<b>Asymmetric Keys:</b> Two related keys, a public key and a private key, that are used to perform complementary operations, such as encryption and decryption or signature generation and signature verification.
1992 1993	<b>Authentication:</b> The process of establishing confidence of authenticity; in this case, in the validity of a person's identity and the PIV Card.
1994 1995 1996	<b>Biometric:</b> A measurable, physical characteristic or personal behavioral trait used to recognize the identity, or verify the claimed identity, of an applicant. Facial images, fingerprints, and iris image samples are all examples of biometrics.
1997 1998	<b>Biometric Information:</b> The stored electronic information pertaining to a biometric. This information can be in terms of raw or compressed pixels or in terms of some characteristic (e.g., patterns).
1999	Capture: The method of taking a biometric sample from an end user. [INCITS/M1-040211]
2000	Cardholder: An individual possessing an issued PIV Card.
2001 2002	<b>Card Management System:</b> The card management system manages the lifecycle of a PIV Card Application.
2003 2004	<b>Certificate Revocation List:</b> A list of revoked public key certificates created and digitally signed by a certification authority. [RFC 5280]

 $^{28}$  See Page 2 of [OMB0524] for further details of individuals who are eligible to be issued PIV Cards.

2005 2006	<b>Certification:</b> The process of verifying the correctness of a statement or claim and issuing a certificate as to its correctness.	
2007	Certification Authority: A trusted entity that issues and revokes public key certificates.	
2008 2009	<b>Chain-of-trust:</b> The chain-of-trust is a sequence of related enrollment data sets that is created and maintained by PIV Card issuers.	
2010 2011	<b>Comparison:</b> The process of comparing a biometric with a previously stored reference. See also "Identification" and "Identity Verification". [INCITS/M1-040211]	
2012 2013	<b>Component:</b> An element of a large system, such as an identity card, issuer, card reader, or identity verification support, within the PIV system.	
2014 2015 2016	<b>Conformance Testing:</b> A process established by NIST within its responsibilities of developing, promulgating, and supporting FIPS for testing specific characteristics of components, products, and services, as well as people and organizations for compliance with a FIPS.	
2017 2018 2019	<b>Credential:</b> Evidence attesting to one's right to credit or authority; in this Standard, it is the PIV Card and data elements associated with an individual that authoritatively binds an identity (and, optionally, additional attributes) to that individual.	
2020 2021	<b>Cryptographic Key (Key):</b> A parameter used in conjunction with a cryptographic algorithm that determines the specific operation of that algorithm.	
2022 2023	<b>E-Authentication Assurance Level:</b> A measure of trust or confidence in an authentication mechanism defined in [OMB0404] and [SP 800-63], in terms of four levels:	
2024	• Level 1: LITTLE OR NO confidence	
2025	• Level 2: SOME confidence	
2026	• Level 3: HIGH confidence	
2027	• Level 4: VERY HIGH confidence	
2028 2029	<b>Enrollment Data Set:</b> A record including information about a biometric enrollment: name and role of the acquiring agent, office and organization, time, place, and acquisition method.	
2030 2031 2032	<b>Federal Agency Smart Credential Number (FASC-N):</b> As required by FIPS 201, one of the primary identifiers on the PIV Card for physical access control. The FASC-N is a fixed length (25 byte) data object, specified in [SP 800-73], and included in several data objects on a PIV Card.	
2033 2034 2035 2036	<b>Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS):</b> A standard for adoption and use by Federal departments and agencies that has been developed within the Information Technology Laboratory and published by NIST, a part of the U.S. Department of Commerce. A FIPS covers some topic in information technology to achieve a common level of quality or some level of interoperability.	
2037 2038	<b>Hash Function:</b> A function that maps a bit string of arbitrary length to a fixed length bit string. Secure hash functions [FIPS180] satisfy the following properties:	
2039 2040	1. <b>One-Way.</b> It is computationally infeasible to find any input that maps to any pre-specified output.	

- 2041 2. Collision Resistant. It is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs that map to 2042 the same output. 2043 **Identification:** The process of discovering the identity (i.e., origin, initial history) of a person or item from the entire collection of similar persons or items. 2044 2045 **Identifier:** Unique data used to represent a person's identity and associated attributes. A name or a card 2046 number are examples of identifiers. 2047 **Identity:** The set of physical and behavioral characteristics by which an individual is uniquely 2048 recognizable. 2049 **Identity Proofing:** The process of providing sufficient information (e.g., identity history, credentials, 2050 documents) to establish an identity. 2051 **Identity Registration:** The process of making a person's identity known to the PIV system, associating a 2052 unique identifier with that identity, and collecting and recording the person's relevant attributes into the 2053 system. 2054 **Identity Verification:** The process of confirming or denying that a claimed identity is correct by 2055 comparing the credentials (something you know, something you have, something you are) of a person 2056 requesting access with those previously proven and stored in the PIV Card or system and associated with 2057 the identity being claimed. 2058 **Interoperability:** For the purposes of this Standard, interoperability allows any government facility or 2059 information system, regardless of the issuer, to verify a cardholder's identity using the credentials on the 2060 PIV Card. 2061 **Issuer:** The organization that is issuing the PIV Card to an applicant. Typically this is an organization 2062 for which the applicant is working. 2063 **Key:** See "Cryptographic Key." 2064 Match/Matching: The process of comparing biometric information against a previously stored biometric 2065 data and scoring the level of similarity.
- 2066 **Model:** A very detailed description or scaled representation of one component of a larger system that can
- be created, operated, and analyzed to predict actual operational characteristics of the final produced
- 2068 component.
- 2069 **Off-Card:** Refers to data that is not stored within the PIV Card or to a computation that is not performed
- by the Integrated Circuit Chip (ICC) of the PIV Card.
- 2071 **On-Card:** Refers to data that is stored within the PIV Card or to a computation that is performed by the
- 2072 Integrated Circuit Chip (ICC) of the PIV Card.
- 2073 **On-Card Comparison:** Comparison of fingerprint data transmitted to the card with reference data
- 2074 previously stored on the card.
- 2075 Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP): An online protocol used to determine the status of a public
- key certificate. [RFC 2560]

- 2077 **Path Validation:** The process of verifying the binding between the subject identifier and subject public
- key in a certificate, based on the public key of a trust anchor, through the validation of a chain of
- certificates that begins with a certificate issued by the trust anchor and ends with the target certificate.
- 2080 Successful path validation provides strong evidence that the information in the target certificate is
- 2081 trustworthy.
- 2082 **Personally Identifiable Information (PII):** Information that can be used to distinguish or trace an
- individual's identity, such as name, social security number, biometric records, etc. alone, or when
- 2084 combined with other personal or identifying information that is linked or linkable to a specific individual,
- such as date and place of birth, mother's maiden name, etc. [OMB0716]
- 2086 **Personal Identification Number (PIN):** A secret that a cardholder memorizes and uses to authenticate
- 2087 his or her identity.
- 2088 **Personal Identity Verification (PIV) Card:** A physical artifact (e.g., identity card, "smart" card) issued
- 2089 to an individual that contains stored identity credentials (e.g., photograph, cryptographic keys, digitized
- 2090 fingerprint representation) so that the claimed identity of the cardholder can be verified against the stored
- credentials by another person (human readable and verifiable) or an automated process (computer
- readable and verifiable).
- 2093 **PIV Assurance Level:** A degree of confidence established in the identity of the holder of the PIV Card.
- 2094 **Private Key:** The secret part of an asymmetric key pair that is typically used to digitally sign or decrypt
- 2095 data.
- 2096 **Pseudonyms:** a name assigned by a Federal department or agency through a formal process to a Federal
- employee for the purpose of the employee's protection (i.e., the employee might be placed at risk if his or
- 2098 her actual name were known) or for other purposes.
- 2099 **Public Key:** The public part of an asymmetric key pair that is typically used to verify signatures or
- 2100 encrypt data.
- 2101 **Public Key Infrastructure (PKI):** A support service to the PIV system that provides the cryptographic
- 2102 keys needed to perform digital signature-based identity verification and to protect communications and
- storage of sensitive verification system data within identity cards and the verification system.
- 2104 **PKI-Card Authentication Key (PKI-CAK):** A PIV authentication mechanism that is implemented by
- an asymmetric key challenge/response protocol using the Card Authentication key of the PIV Card and a
- 2106 contact or contactless reader.
- 2107 **PKI-PIV** Authentication Key (PKI-AUTH): A PIV authentication mechanism that is implemented by
- an asymmetric key challenge/response protocol using the PIV Authentication key of the PIV Card and a
- 2109 contact reader, or a contactless card reader that supports the virtual contact interface.
- 2110 **Recommendation:** A special publication of the ITL stipulating specific characteristics of technology to
- 2111 use or procedures to follow to achieve a common level of quality or level of interoperability.
- 2112 **Registration:** See "Identity Registration."

2113 2114 2115	<b>Symmetric Key:</b> A cryptographic key that is used to perform both the cryptographic operation and its inverse, for example to encrypt and decrypt, or create a message authentication code and to verify the code.			
2116 2117		The process of demonstrating that the system under consideration meets in all respects the of that system. [INCITS/M1-040211]		
2118	Verification:	See "Identity Verification."		
2119	C.2 Acro	onyms		
2120	The following	g acronyms and abbreviations are used throughout this Standard:		
2121	ACL	Access Control List		
2122	AES	Advanced Encryption Standard		
2123	AID	Application IDentifier		
2124	AIM	Association for Automatic Identification and Mobility		
2125	ANSI	American National Standards Institute		
2126	ARC	Automated Record Checks		
2127	ASTM	American Society for Testing and Materials		
2128	CA	Certification Authority		
2129	CAK	Card Authentication Key		
2130	<b>CBEFF</b>	Common Biometric Exchange Formats Framework		
2131	CHUID	Cardholder Unique Identifier		
2132	cm	Centimeter		
2133	CMS	Cryptographic Message Syntax		
2134	CMTC	Card Management System to the Card		
2135	CMVP	Cryptographic Module Validation Program		
2136	COTS	Commercial Off-the-Shelf		
2137	CRL	Certificate Revocation List		
2138	CSE	Communications Security Establishment		
2139	CTC	Cardholder to Card		
2140	CTE	Cardholder to External System		
2141	DHS	Department of Homeland Security		
2142	DN	Distinguished Name		
2143	DOB	Date of Birth		
2144	dpi	Dots Per Inch		
2145	ERT	Emergency Response Team		
2146	FASC-N	Federal Agency Smart Credential Number		
2147	<b>FBCA</b>	Federal Bridge Certification Authority		
2148	FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation		
2149	FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards		
2150	FIPS PUB	FIPS Publication		
2151	FISMA	Federal Information Security Management Act		
2152	GSA	U.S. General Services Administration		
2153	GUID	Global Unique Identification Number		

2154 2155	HSPD HTTP	Homeland Security Presidential Directive Hypertext Transfer Protocol	
2156 2157 2158 2159 2160 2161 2162 2163 2164 2165 2166	I&A IAB ICAMSC ICC ID IEC IETF INCITS ISO IT ITL	Identification and Authentication Interagency Advisory Board Identity, Credential, and Access Management Subcommittee Integrated Circuit Chip Identification International Electrotechnical Commission Internet Engineering Task Force International Committee for Information Technology Standards International Organization for Standardization Information Technology Information Technology Laboratory	
2167	LDAP	Lightweight Directory Access Protocol	
2168 2169	mm MWR	Millimeter Morale, Welfare, and Recreation	
2170 2171 2172 2173 2174 2175 2176	NAC NACI NCHC NIST NISTIR NPIVP NVLAP	National Agency Check National Agency Check with Written Inquiries National Criminal History Check National Institute of Standards and Technology National Institute of Standards and Technology Interagency Report NIST Personal Identity Verification Program National Voluntary Laboratory Accreditation Program	
2177 2178 2179 2180 2181	OCC OCSP OID OMB OPM	On-Card Biometric Comparison Online Certificate Status Protocol Object Identifier Office of Management and Budget Office of Personnel Management	
2182 2183 2184 2185 2186 2187 2188 2189	PCI PC/SC PDF PIA PII PIN PIV PKI	PIV Card Issuer Personal Computer/Smart Card Portable Data File Privacy Impact Assessment Personally Identifiable Information Personal Identification Number Personal Identity Verification Public Key Infrastructure	
2190	RFC	Request for Comments	
2191 2192 2193	SES SP SSP	Senior Executive Service Special Publication Shared Service Provider	
2194	TSA	Transportation Security Administration	

2195 2196 2197	URI U.S.C. UUID	Uniform Resource Identifier United States Code Universally Unique IDentifier
2198	C.3 Notat	ions
2199	This Standard	uses the following typographical conventions in text:
2200 2201		ta types are represented in <i>italics</i> . For example, <i>SignedData</i> and <i>SignerInfo</i> are data types r digital signatures.
2202 2203		words in CAPITALS separated with underscore represent CBEFF-compliant data  For example, CBEFF_HEADER is a header field in the CBEFF structure.

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# **Appendix E—Revision History**

The Revision History provides an overview of the changes to FIPS 201 since its initial release.

Version	Release Date	Updates
FIPS 201	February 2005	Initial Release
FIPS 201-1	March 2006	Added the requirement for electronically distinguishable from identity credentials issued to individuals who have a completed investigation (NACI Indictor).
FIPS 201-1 Change Notice 1	March 2006	Added clarification for variable placement of Agency Card Serial Number along the outer edge of the back of the PIV Card is allowed. Also, updated ASN.1 encoding for NACI Indicator (background investigation indicator).
FIPS 201-2, Revised Draft	May 2012	This version represents the 5-year review of FIPS 201 and change request inputs received from agencies. Following are the highlights of changes made in this version.
		Modified the requirement for accreditation of PIV Card issuer to include an independent review.
		Incorporated references to credentialing guidance and requirements issued by OPM and OMB.
		Made the facial image data element on the PIV Card mandatory.
		Added the option to collect and store iris biometric data on the PIV Card.
		Added option to use electronic facial image for authentication in operator-attended environments.
		Incorporated the content from Form I-9 that is relevant to FIPS 201.
		Introduced the concept of a "chain-of-trust" optionally maintained by a PIV Card issuer.
		Changed the maximum life of PIV Card from 5 years to 6 years.
		Added requirements for issuing a PIV Card to an individual under a pseudonymous identity.
		Added requirements for issuing a PIV Card to an individual within grace period.
		Added requirements for post-issuance updates.
		Added option to allow for remote PIN resets.
		Introduced the ability to issue PIV derived credentials.
		The employee affiliation color-coding and the large expiration date in the upper right-hand corner of the card are now mandatory.
		Made all four asymmetric keys and certificates mandatory.
		Introduced the concept of a virtual contact interface over which all functionality of the PIV Card is accessible.
		Added a mandatory UUID as a unique identifier for the PIV

Card in addition to the FASC-N. Added optional on-card biometric comparison as a means of performing card activation and as a PIV authentication mechanism. Removed direct requirement to distribute certificates and CRLs via LDAP. Updated authentication mechanisms to enable variations in implementations. Require signature verification and certification path validation in the CHUID, BIO, and BIO-A authentication mechanisms. The VIS and CHUID authentication mechanisms have been downgraded to indicate that they provide LITTLE or NO assurance in the identity of the cardholder. Deprecated the use of the CHUID authentication mechanism. The CHUID data element has not been deprecated and continues to be mandatory.

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