EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
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THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF RECENT TEMPORARY UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE EXTENSIONS

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Unemployment insurance (UI) provides a safety net for workers who have lost a job through no fault of their own, as long as they continue to search for new employment. During normal economic conditions, firms pay into state insurance systems that replace roughly half of the average individual's lost earnings, up to 26 weeks. However, the federal government historically funds additional weeks of benefits in response to an economic downturn. The benefits allow recipients to continue to support their families while searching for their next job.

In response to the recession that began in December 2007, Congress expanded UI benefits by creating Emergency Unemployment Compensation (EUC) and 100 percent federal funding of Extended Benefits (EB). These programs provide UI benefits after a worker exhausts state benefits, helping when it takes longer to find a job, such as in this severe downturn. These extensions began to expire on November 30, 2010. In this report, the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) examines the effects of the extensions thus far and the potential impact on the economy if Congress fails to act soon to continue these emergency measures.

As a result of these emergency expansions to UI:

- EUC and EB have helped 14 million unemployed workers as of October 2010. As of that date, there were almost 5 million unemployed workers benefiting from these programs each week.

- In total, these programs have benefited about 40 million people who have received, or lived with a recipient of, EUC or EB. This total includes 10.5 million children.

If these measures are not extended, the maximum eligibility for benefits in most states will revert to the pre-recessionary level of 26 weeks. The Department of Labor estimates that, relative to a month-long extension, 2 million unemployed workers will lose coverage in December 2010. And, relative to a year-long extension, nearly 7 million unemployed workers in total will lose coverage by November 2011.

Further, EUC and EB make up a substantial portion of household income. Without EUC and EB, the typical household receiving these benefits will see their income fall by a third. In the 42 percent of households where the EUC or EB recipient is the sole wage-earner, 90 percent of income will be lost.

This important income replacement allows individuals that have suffered from job loss to avoid a dramatic drop in their spending levels. Research studies have documented that UI is an extremely effective form of support for the economy relative to other government programs, both in terms of bang-for-the-buck and timeliness. EUC and EB recipients spend their benefit checks, rather than saving them, and a drop in this income will translate into a sizeable drop in aggregate spending.

Specifically, CEA estimates that:

- Employment was about 800,000 higher, and the level of GDP 0.8 percent higher, in September 2010 than would have been the case without EUC and EB.

- Without an extension, employment would be about 600,000 lower, and GDP 0.6 percent lower, in December 2011 than if a year-long extension were passed.

Previously, Congress continued federal expansions of UI until the economy was much further along the road to recovery. With 10 consecutive months of private sector job growth and half a percentage point drop in the unemployment rate since its peak, the economy is beginning to recover. However, the unemployment rate remains unacceptably high and there are still 5 job seekers for every job opening. For the last half-century, Congress has consistently extended UI benefits when economic circumstances substantially increased the difficulty of finding a job. Given the current labor market conditions, failing to continue UI extensions now would be unprecedented.

I. INTRODUCTION

As a form of insurance against job loss, employers pay taxes into state government unemployment systems at rates based, in part, on past usage of the system. State governments then provide weekly payments of $300, on average, to workers who have lost a job through no fault of their own, replacing roughly half of an individual's lost earnings.[1] Typically, unemployed workers can receive up to 26 weeks of benefits, as long as they continue to search for work. In an economy with normal labor demand, one would expect most unemployed workers to find a job within this time frame. However, in December 2007 the United States began to slide into a deep recession. By October 2009, the unemployment rate was 10.1 percent, and there were more than 6 jobs seekers for every job opening, compared to just 1.5 prior to the recession.

Recognizing that unemployed workers would have a significantly harder time finding jobs, Congress created Emergency Unemployment Compensation 2008 (EUC) in June of that year. This swift action put unemployment benefits in place much earlier than has been done in previous recessions – almost one year before GDP stopped declining. These early efforts by Congress resulted in UI playing a greater role in stabilizing the economy, as suggested in a recent Department of Labor report.[2]

As the labor market worsened, Congress further extended and expanded the program, particularly for unemployed workers in the hardest-hit states. As part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Congress provided for 100 percent federal funding of Extended Benefits (EB), a program usually funded jointly by the state and federal governments. Individuals are eligible for EB once they exhaust their EUC benefits if their state meets certain unemployment-based triggers. All told, an unemployed worker could receive up to 99 weeks of coverage in those states with the highest rates of unemployment. (See the Appendix for more detail on these programs.)

Importantly, the current tiered structure of EUC and EB allows for a natural phasing down of coverage as economic conditions improve. Many of the eligible weeks of benefits are determined at the state level by thresholds based on states' unemployment rates; the maximum length of coverage provided by these federal programs is shorter in states with better economies. Beyond this natural phase down, however, the legislation authorizing these programs began to expire on November 30, 2010 and the millions of Americans receiving coverage through these programs have already begun losing benefits.

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[1] Estimates are from the Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration.

[2] A report commissioned by the Department of Labor (Vroman 2010) found unemployment insurance – both the regular state program and emergency federal programs – reduced the fall in GDP by 18 percent.

In this report, the Council of Economic Advisers (CEA) analyzes what the impact of the EUC and EB has been on the recipients and their families, as well as on the economy as a whole. In addition, the report examines the consequences of not extending these benefits.

II. WHO HAS BEEN HELPED BY THE FEDERAL UI EXTENSIONS?

Figure 1 shows the total number of EUC and EB recipients over time, since the start of the programs. By the end of 2008, 2.5 million unemployed workers had received EUC or EB. As the recession deepened, more and more unemployed workers who were unable to find jobs by the time they exhausted their 26 weeks of regular UI benefits moved into these programs. As of October 2010, 14 million people had received benefits from these UI extensions at some point. (See Appendix Table 2 for a breakdown of EUC and EB recipients by state.)

Figure 1: Recipients of UI Extensions (Cumulative)



Source: Department of Labor (Employment and Training Administration) data

Currently, almost 5 million of the 6 million long-term unemployed receive EUC or EB.[3] On average, unemployed workers receive benefits equal to roughly half of their lost wages. While EUC and EB payments go directly to workers, their families benefit from the income support as well. Figure 2 shows the importance of these benefits to the household income of recipients. The bars show the share of a household's income that EUC and EB represent by the type of household. In the typical household receiving EUC or EB, these programs make up a third of all

[3] Some have chosen not to apply or are ineligible, and some have exceeded the limit of benefits in their state.

income. However, for the 42 percent of EUC and EB recipients who are the sole wage-earners in their household, benefits make up 90 percent of household income.[4]

Figure 2: Share of Household Income from EUC and EB, by Household Type



Source: CEA calculations from *Current Population Survey*, March 2010 Supplement

While 14 million people had received EUC or EB through October 2010, CEA estimates that an additional 26 million people living in their households benefited indirectly. Figure 3 illustrates the beneficiaries of these programs across different types of households. Importantly, approximately 42 percent of all EUC and EB recipients have, or live with, children. As of October 2010, 10.5 million children had benefited from EUC or EB through a household member. Further, 3 million of these children were in households where the UI recipient was the sole wage-earner. In total, about 40 million people had benefited from EUC or EB through at least one household member.

[4] Included in this 42 percent are 3 percent of recipient households where there are two EUC or EB recipients contributing to income, and no other wage earners.

Figure 3: The 40 Million Beneficiaries of EUC and EB, as of October 2010



Source: CEA calculations from *Current Population Survey*, March 2010 Supplement

As the large number of beneficiaries makes clear, the EUC and EB programs have helped a wide range of American households, mostly the middle class. While households receiving EUC and EB are distributed across all household income levels, middle-class households make up two-thirds of the recipients.[5]

III. How Do EUC and EB Extensions Affect the Macroeconomy?

In addition to providing income insurance for families, UI can also help the short-run performance of the economy as a whole.[6] The drop in economic activity that marks a recession

[5] Middle class is defined as households with annual incomes in 2009 that were between $20,000 and $100,000, or 60 percent of all households.

[6] See Auerbach and Feenberg (2000).

typically leads to job loss, which results in a significant decline in income and therefore consumption for workers and their families. This job loss has a snowball effect as the reduction in spending by families experiencing job loss means further loss of demand for businesses, leading to further unemployment. UI can mitigate this cycle by helping unemployed workers avoid precipitous drops in spending. Economic research has found that without UI, a typical family whose head of household becomes unemployed would spend 22 percent less on food – as compared to the 7 percent drop that is actually observed because of the UI system.[7] In addition, unemployment is a leading cause of mortgage defaults, and the income provided by UI helps avert foreclosures.[8]

Moreover, the Congressional Budget Office notes that UI extensions are "both timely and cost-effective in spurring economic activity and employment."[9] The evidence suggests that the additional spending from UI happens very soon after the federal cost is incurred. In contrast, many other job creation measures have significantly longer lags between the federal cost and the economic benefit.

CEA's analysis of the effect of the UI extensions on the U.S. economy shows a significant increase in GDP and a higher level of employment due to the aggregate demand the benefits sustain.[10] Specifically, as of September 2010,[11] CEA estimates that EUC and EB have:

- Increased the level of employment by 793,000 jobs,[12] and
- Increased the level of GDP by 0.8 percent.[13]

(Appendix Table 2 includes a breakdown of jobs supported by state.)

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[7] See Gruber (1997). Other research, including Browning and Crossley (2001), also finds strong consumption smoothing effects of UI.
[8] See Foote et al. (2009).
[9] The Congressional Budget Office (2010) ranks extensions of unemployment benefits as the most effective policy for generating short-term growth.
[10] The analysis is based on methodology used in prior CEA analyses (e.g. CEA 2009) and uses similar multipliers as those used in outside analyses of UI, including Zandi (2010).
[11] Due to data limitations, these estimates are only available through September 2010.
[12] This measures the impact on the level of employment at a point in time. Given the ongoing nature of the program, the jobs last for an extended amount of time. The number of job-years created or saved by the program through September 2010 is estimated to be 893,000. In addition, since the demand generated by benefits paid out in recent quarters will support the economy over the next year, the total job-years created or saved by spending through November 2010 is estimated to be 1.4 million by the end of 2011.
[13] Vroman (2010) discusses the economic impact of the UI program during the recent recession. The report had similar findings, showing that employment was 714,000 higher on average each quarter because of the federal unemployment expansions. The report also shows that regular state UI resulted in employment being 891,000 higher, for a total of 1.6 million jobs higher on average in each quarter of the expansions.

Finally, the actual cost of these programs to the government is likely below the official outlays for two reasons. First, because the programs support hundreds of thousands of jobs and increase economic activity significantly, they also generate partially-offsetting tax revenue through income, payroll, and sales taxes. Second, without the income support from UI, many families would need to draw on other programs such as the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP, formerly known as food stamps) or Social Security Disability Insurance (DI).[14]

Some argue that these UI extensions have led to an increase in the unemployment rate, worrying that UI provides a disincentive to search for work. However, such disincentive effects estimated by economists have typically been small.[15] Further, the literature suggests that the effect of UI on job search behavior is likely even smaller in recessions.[16] As an example, researchers at the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco find that workers who are eligible for unemployment insurance during the current recession are finding jobs at a nearly identical rate to those who are ineligible.[17]

In short, as a form of insurance, the expanded UI programs are intended to provide income support for workers and their families during periods of job loss, but they have substantial benefits to the broader economy as well. Because of these benefits, the net cost to the federal government is likely to be less than the official cost score of the UI programs.[18]

IV. THE IMPACT OF LETTING UI EXTENSIONS EXPIRE

As described above (and in full detail in the Appendix), on November 30, 2010, the EUC and EB programs began to expire.[19] And, the total number of people exhausting their benefits will ramp up, as more recipients reach the end date of their program or current tier of EUC.

Figure 4 illustrates the number of exhaustees under current law (red line) and under one possible alternative, a year-long extension (blue line). Even in the case of an extension, some unemployed workers will lose coverage as they exhaust the benefits available to them under the current program. However, a far greater number will exhaust their benefits if there is no extension, so the red line increases much more steeply.

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[14] Unemployment benefits are included in the income calculation used to determine SNAP eligibility. Therefore, without UI, more families would be eligible to receive SNAP. Further, Autor and Duggan (2006) document that when unemployment increases so does the number of individuals who apply for and receive DI. They make the point that, by providing a substitute, UI may reduce enrollment in DI. They also document that the average DI enrollee stays in the program for many years and ends up costing the federal government over $240,000.

[15] See Katz (2010) and Card and Levine (2000).

[16] See Kroft and Notowidigdo (2010) and Schmieder, von Wachter, and Bender (2010).

[17] See Valletta and Kuang (2010).

[18] The Congressional Budget Office (2008) also noted this effect in its cost analysis of the Emergency Extended Unemployment Compensation Act of 2008, the first extension that Congress passed.

[19] EUC expired on November 30, 2010, while 100 percent federally funding of EB expired on December 1, 2010.

Figure 4
Looking Forward: Exhaustees With and Without an Extension (Cumulative)



Source: Department of Labor estimates

As can be seen in Figure 4, the impact of failing to extend EUC and EB is both quick and substantial:

- Under current law, 2 million people will exhaust benefits in December 2010, relative to an extension.

- By November 2011, 6.7 million people total will exhaust benefits, relative to an extension.

If EUC and EB are not extended, there will be repercussions for the overall economy as well. Figure 5 depicts the employment impact of EUC and EB under current law and under a one-year extension.[20] The solid blue line shows the impact on employment of the UI extensions through September 2010. The dashed blue line shows the impact on employment if the program is extended, continuing to support aggregate demand as unemployed workers do not experience dramatic declines in spending levels. The dashed red line shows the impact if there is no extension.

[20] Because the model that the CEA uses to forecast employment and GDP is designed to give end-of-quarter estimates, the reported estimates are technically through December 2011.

Figure 5: Estimated Impact of UI Extensions on Employment



Source: CEA and Department of Labor estimates. Dashed lines indicate projections.

As Figure 5 shows, not extending EUC and EB would have a significant negative effect on the immediate macroeconomic conditions. For example, CEA estimates that in December 2011, without a year-long extension:

- Employment would be 593,000 lower than if there were an extension;[21] and

- GDP would be 0.6 percent lower than if there were an extension.[22]

(See Appendix Table 3 for a breakdown of projected impacts by state.)

[21] As explained above, the analysis describes the number of workers employed at a point in time due to the program. These jobs last over time, generating a significant number of job-years. If there is an extension, the overall EUC and EB programs will save or create roughly 2.3 million job-years, almost all by the end of 2012. Roughly 730,000 of these job-years are due to the proposed year-long extension.

[22] These estimates are consistent with outside estimates, including the Economic Policy Institute (2010), the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities (2010), and the Joint Economic Committee (2010), which use slightly different techniques. Both the JEC and CBPP use estimates from the CBO for the number of years of full time equivalent employment generated by various types of spending. These estimates include both the impact on the number of jobs and the lengthening of the work week for some employees. In addition, these estimates measure both the jobs and the length of time the jobs exist, similar to the "job-year" concept discussed in the footnote above. The CEA estimate of 730,000 job-years generated by the extension is more conservative than the CBPP and JEC estimate of over 1 million years of full time equivalent employment generated by the extension.

V. HOW WOULD AN ADDITIONAL EXTENSION COMPARE TO THOSE IN PREVIOUS RECESSIONS?

Congress has provided federal UI benefits in response to every recession since 1957.[23] The number of additional weeks allotted and the time period covered has varied, although in recent history, federal benefits have been extended to last 2 to 3 years after the end date of the recession. For example, the benefits passed under President Reagan lasted until June 1985, over 2.5 years beyond the official end date of the 1981-82 recession. At that time, the economy had already made a sizeable recovery from its trough (GDP had grown 16 percent), and the unemployment rate had fallen below 7.5 percent.

Congress stepped in to help those workers who lost their jobs in this most recent recession in a similar fashion. At the time EUC was created in June 2008, 1.6 million workers, or nearly one-in-five job seekers, had been unemployed for longer than 26 weeks. This response by Congress was much faster than in previous recessions due to the speed with which the economy was weakening. By the time further increases in the number of weeks of benefits available in the hardest hit states were added in November 2009, the number of long-term unemployed had risen to 5.9 million.

While the labor market has shown signs of improvement, it is far from fully recovered. As of October 2010, the unemployment rate stood at 9.6 percent and 6 million workers, or 42 percent of job seekers, were long-term unemployed and the average duration of unemployment was 34 weeks. According to the most recent data, there are still 5 job seekers per job opening (versus 1.5 pre-recession) and the probability that an unemployed worker finds a job in any given month is under 20 percent. For the long-term unemployed, the monthly job-finding rate is closer to 12 percent. The current state of the U.S. labor market is substantially weaker than when prior extensions of UI were ended.

VI. CONCLUSION

Congress created EUC and provided 100 percent federal funding of EB in order to deliver critical income support to individuals and their families as well as to the economy during this severe economic downturn. These extensions have helped 14 million unemployed workers to date. In total, about 40 million people live in households where at least one member has received EUC or EB. However, if the recent federal benefits are not extended, 2 million

[23] The only exception is the short recession during 1980, which was followed by a deeper recession beginning in July 1981. Congress passed an extension to UI in August 1982, probably in response to the effects of both recessions.

unemployed workers will lose coverage in December and a total of almost 7 million will lose coverage by November 2011 in comparison to a year-long extension.

Allowing these extensions to expire now will reduce the income of the typical affected household by approximately one-third during a time when the job market is still not recovered. With less income, spending will fall, and this will translate into about 600,000 fewer jobs and 0.6 percent lower GDP in December 2011, relative to an extension.

The U.S. economy has made important strides in the last year. Since the employment trough in December 2009, there have been 10 consecutive months of private sector job growth and private sector employment has risen by more than one million jobs. However, the unemployment rate remains unacceptably high and there are still 5 job seekers for every job opening. For the last half-century, Congress has consistently extended UI benefits when economic circumstances were serious enough to make finding a job difficult. Given the current labor market conditions, failing to continue UI extensions now would be unprecedented.

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APPENDIX I
HOW DO REGULAR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND THE FEDERAL EXTENSIONS WORK?

Unemployment insurance is available to workers who lose their jobs through no fault of their own. Employers provide a form of insurance against job loss by paying taxes into state government unemployment systems at rates based, in part, on past usage of the system. State governments then provide weekly payments of $300, on average, replacing a little under half of a worker's lost earnings. Unemployed workers can receive up to 26 weeks of benefits, as long as they continue to search for work. In an economy with normal labor demand, one would expect most unemployed workers to find a job within this time frame.

In response to the recession that began in December 2007, Congress created the federal Emergency Unemployment Compensation 2008 program (EUC) in June of that year. At that time, EUC provided 13 weeks of federally-financed additional compensation to eligible individuals in all states. As the labor market worsened, Congress extended the 13 weeks to 20, and added 3 more "tiers" of EUC which unemployed workers move through sequentially until they find a job or decide to stop searching and drop out of the labor force. The first two tiers, providing a combined 34 weeks of additional coverage, are available in every state. The next two tiers, adding a total of 19 weeks, are available based on state unemployment rates.

Congress also provided for 100 percent federal funding of Extended Benefits (EB), a program for which individuals are eligible once they exhaust their EUC benefits. EB can add up to 20 weeks of coverage following EUC. All told, an unemployed worker could receive up to 99 weeks of coverage in those states with the highest rates of unemployment. EB is a permanent joint federal-state program that is triggered by state-level economic conditions. Many states passed less-restrictive triggers that are contingent on the current 100 percent federal EB funding.[24] In the permanent EB program, state governments split the monetary burden with the federal government. When 100 percent federal funding expires, most states will automatically revert back to the higher triggers within a few weeks, and EB will cease to be available to their claimants.

Importantly, the structure of EUC and EB allows for a natural phasing down of coverage as economic conditions improve. Since tiers 3 and 4 of EUC as well as EB are determined by thresholds based on the state-level unemployment rate, the maximum length of coverage is shorter in states with better economies.

[24] In most states, to qualify for EB, the unemployment rate must be above the trigger value shown in Appendix Table 1 and be higher than it was in the corresponding period of either of the past two years.

Appendix Table 1: Details of Unemployment Insurance Coverage			
Program		Length (weeks)	Eligibility
State UI		26	all
EUC	Tier 1	20	all
	Tier 2	14	all
	Tier 3[1]	13	state unemployment rate > 6%
	Tier 4[2]	6	state unemployment rate > 8.5%
EB[3]	Option 1	13	state unemployment rate > 6.5%
	Option 2	20	state unemployment rate > 8%

1. As of November 2010, tier 3 is triggered on in 45 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.

2. As of November 2010, tier 4 is triggered on in 25 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.

3. States are either in option1 or option 2 (or neither), recipients do not move sequentially through each option. States must also have a law in place which triggers on EB under these conditions. As of November 2010, EB is triggered on in 35 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico.

Based on current law, these existing extensions began to phase out on November 30, 2010. This means that recipients who are receiving federally funded benefits (i.e., EUC or EB) will remain eligible for their current tier but will no longer be eligible for subsequent tiers.[25] The majority of workers who currently receive regular unemployment insurance and those that become unemployed in the future will not receive additional benefits once they exhaust their first 26 weeks of coverage. While EB may continue to be available in some states, in which workers would be eligible after finishing their 26 week regular programs, without 100 percent federal funding most states will likely trigger off EB as well.

[25] EB shuts off completely within one or two weeks after federal funding expires, while EUC claimants are allowed to finish out their tiers before losing benefits.

Appendix Table 2: Past Impact of EUC and EB by State

State	Total EUC/EB recipients through October 2010	Estimated impact of EUC/EB on employment in September 2010
Alabama	159,745	5,254
Alaska	24,999	1,377
Arizona	232,065	10,027
Arkansas	105,460	4,844
California	1,752,892	115,948
Colorado	194,831	11,756
Connecticut	183,139	14,053
Delaware	36,941	1,748
District of Columbia	29,523	2,429
Florida	945,639	43,392
Georgia	502,963	21,598
Hawaii	37,737	2,790
Idaho	64,484	3,069
Illinois	618,130	41,515
Indiana	369,641	19,804
Iowa	130,122	4,958
Kansas	133,148	5,157
Kentucky	93,742	9,723
Louisiana	93,434	2,989
Maine	42,660	1,977
Maryland	220,727	8,628
Massachusetts	401,623	24,959
Michigan	620,210	41,639
Minnesota	261,294	13,281
Mississippi	98,154	3,202
Missouri	220,338	9,997
Montana	48,458	1,377
Nebraska	56,104	1,645
Nevada	184,386	11,356
New Hampshire	37,429	1,662
New Jersey	592,840	51,063
New Mexico	54,744	3,083
New York	870,771	55,203
North Carolina	624,890	27,964
North Dakota	12,935	332
Ohio	531,044	29,506
Oklahoma	95,340	4,650
Oregon	224,422	14,208
Pennsylvania	968,517	47,195
Puerto Rico	26,090	4,211
Rhode Island	55,548	4,223
South Carolina	242,551	9,853
South Dakota	6,515	208
Tennessee	259,460	10,581
Texas	621,452	36,389
Utah	76,971	3,781
Vermont	21,167	1,135
Virgin Islands	3,821	181
Virginia	194,365	8,014
Washington	262,352	21,096
West Virginia	51,379	2,264
Wisconsin	243,929	15,016
Wyoming	17,210	692
Total	13,958,331	793,000

Source: CEA and Department of Labor estimates

Appendix Table 3: Projected Future Impact of Current Law[1]

State	People losing coverage by November 2011 under current law	Estimated fewer number of jobs in December 2011 under current law
Alabama	77,946	6,876
Alaska	13,535	1,194
Arizona	127,560	11,253
Arkansas	32,861	2,899
California	1,013,384	89,399
Colorado	100,471	8,863
Connecticut	79,065	6,975
Delaware	17,251	1,522
District of Columbia	11,631	1,026
Florida	531,029	46,846
Georgia	301,688	26,614
Hawaii	14,454	1,275
Idaho	25,622	2,260
Illinois	286,102	25,239
Indiana	131,625	11,612
Iowa	34,119	3,010
Kansas	38,166	3,367
Kentucky	81,005	7,146
Louisiana	39,083	3,448
Maine	18,485	1,631
Maryland	65,061	5,740
Massachusetts	177,795	15,685
Michigan	299,590	26,429
Minnesota	103,032	9,089
Mississippi	87,389	7,709
Missouri	60,500	5,337
Montana	11,752	1,037
Nebraska	14,313	1,263
Nevada	83,139	7,334
New Hampshire	12,627	1,114
New Jersey	321,774	28,386
New Mexico	32,861	2,899
New York	459,075	40,499
North Carolina	232,285	20,492
North Dakota	2,225	196
Ohio	238,320	21,024
Oklahoma	38,011	3,353
Oregon	113,978	10,055
Pennsylvania	353,989	31,228
Puerto Rico	84,976	7,496
Rhode Island	24,369	2,150
South Carolina	95,173	8,396
South Dakota	2,215	195
Tennessee	94,977	8,379
Texas	334,410	29,501
Utah	27,794	2,452
Vermont	4,900	432
Virgin Islands	412	36
Virginia	59,637	5,261
Washington	158,563	13,988
West Virginia	18,982	1,675
Wisconsin	126,565	11,165
Wyoming	6,232	550
Total	6,722,000	593,000

Source: CEA and Department of Labor estimates

[1]Relative to a year-long extension