


9lqo9q fo enoilliN Employment Status of Iraqis, by Age and Gender


	səti	Selected Economic Comparisons, Iraq vs. United Sta	Ublic Distribution System: A Flow Chart of Responsibility				
SATATE GATINU	DAЯI						
007'E\$	051\$	Per capita income, per month		Households collect PDS rations			(TOM) obsTrs of Trade (MOT)
008'E\$	09E\$	Police salary, per month		from the Food and Flour Agents.			announces composition and quantity of food
\$5,450-\$3,900	00८\$	Teacher salary, per month					pasket for the month.
\$79'81\$-005't1\$	05†'8\$	Elected leader salary, per month (Iraq—Member of Parliament; U.S.—Member of Congress; leadership positions command higher salaries)			The stand of the s		MOT notifies Food and Flour Modert
051'5\$	\$812	Household income, per month			the Food and Flour Agents		the rations for distribution.
% <b>†</b> E	%SE	Percentage of household expenditures spent on housing (including utilities, fuel, furnishings, and supplies)		Food and Flour foods are the straight smeti SDG eft	noituditisib rof		
%El	%9E	Percentage of household expenditures spent on food		from the	mio[] pac poo]		$\sim$
77	8	Hours of power, daily		warehouse or mill.	Food and Flour Agents take the		stann A woll has beel
28.2\$	91.0\$	Price of 1 gallon of gas			coupons to a		Food and Flour Agents collect coupons from
\$0.42-\$0.64	25.02-54.0	Price of 1 pound of rice \$			where they pay for the rations and		'splodesuod
Z1.0 <b>\$</b>	100.0\$	Price per kWh of electricity from grid			receive an invoice.	Ш	

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(World Health Org)

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0 :nsibəM	0 :nsib9M	0 :nsibəM	0 :nsib9M	Median: 33	Median: 20						
lraq: -1.00 (15%)	lraq: -1.51 (0%)	lraq: -0.99 (0%)	lraq: -0.94 (0%)	lraq: 13 (6%)	lraq: 11 (24%)						
VOICE AND ACCOUNTABILITY (World Bank Institute)	RULE OF LAW (World Bank Institute)	GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS (World Bank Institute)	CONTROL OF CORRUPTION (World Bank Institute)	CIVIL LIBERTIES (Freedom House)	Political Rights (supplied mobasta)						
Вилім в Јизтех											

Millennium Challenge Corporation Scorecard





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
entral goal of the recor

lran-supported Special Groups

# **Major Tribal and Ethnosectarian Groups**

INVESTING IN PEOPLE

In 1974, a short-lived ernment collapsed, and war broke out, causing thousands of Kurds to flee to neighboring countries. Kurds fought the Iraqi government again in the 1980s—at one point eliciting support from Iran—and in 1988, Saddam Hussein's government dropped poison gas on the Kurdish village of Halabja, killing an estimated 5,000 people. In 1991, Kurds fled again to Iran and Turkey after staging a failed uprising against Saddam Hussein's regime following the Persian Gulf War, but later attained de facto self-rule and held parliamentary elections. Kurdish factions fought each other in civil war in the mid-1990s, but since 2003, those factions have participated in Iraqi elections as rell as separate elections to form the semi-autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).



groups, including Christians, Yazidis, Turkomen, and Shabaks. Comprising both Sunni and Shia, the Jabouri reaped both wealth and power in exchange for providing thousands of men from their tribe to fight against Iran in the 1980s under the Ba'athist regime. That relationship fell apart after a group of prominent Jabouri reportedly plotted to assassinate Saddam Hussein in 1990. He purged the tribe's leaders, and the Jabouri now cooperate with

**Sunni and Shia** 

Iraq's Sunni and Shia have coexisted for centuries, despite ancient religious rifts and Shia

the predominantly Shia south, however, rebels sought unsuccessfully throughout the

1970s, 1980s, and 1990s to overthrow successive Ba'athist regimes. The Iran-Iraq War

(1980–1988) increased the Sunni-controlled government's distrust of Iraq's Shia popula-

tion, and tens of thousands were expelled to Iran. At the same time, Iraq's Shia fought

in the war against Iran. Socially and economically, Sunnis tended to benefit from lar-

gesse of the Ba'athist government, while Shia areas were often neglected, creating marked

economic and social disparities between the two groups. In 2003, both Shia and Sunn

groups joined Iraq's interim governments, and though a majority of Sunnis boycotted

2005 CoR elections, both groups participated in the 2010 CoR elections.

resistance to Sunni Ba'athist rule. Intermarriage between the sects is not uncommon. I

on advising and assisting the ISF and safeguarding civilian development specialists. September will also see the departure of USF-I's Commanding General, Raymond Odierno, who will transfer command after the conclusion of the U.S.

#### **Transforming the U.S. Diplomatic Posture** in the Provinces

The United States currently has deployed 16 joint civilianmilitary reconstruction teams, known as Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). Reductions in this number are planned for the remainder of 2010 and 2011 as DoS moves toward normalizing its posture in Iraq. Ultimately, five PRTs will be transformed into Enduring Presence Posts—two as consulates (in Erbil and Basrah) and three temporary posts along the Arab-Kurd "fault line" in Tameem, Ninewa, and Diyala provinces.

**Preparing for the Handover of Police Training** In October 2011, DoS's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) will assume from DoD responsibility for training Iraq's police. Currently, DoD's training program focuses on basic policing skills and counterinsurgency operations and has more than 5,000 personnel operating from more than 50 bases and training centers. INL's program will place greater emphasis on advanced training and management skills, rely on about 350 advisors, and operate out of regional bases in northern, central, and southern Iraq.

### **SIGIR Oversight**

As USF-I and DoS alter the size and scope of their presence in Iraq, SIGIR will adjust the focus and nature of its oversight work. This quarter, SIGIR issued 12 audit and inspection reports, reviewing progress on a diverse assortment of U.S.-funded reconstruction projects, including a slaughterhouse, a series of projects aimed at refurbishing the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP), and a bee farm. Notable findings from these twelve reports included:

• 24 BIAP-related projects valued at \$16.1 million have largely led to unsuccessful outcomes.

• A \$5.6 million slaughterhouse-construction project in Basrah was plagued by poor planning; and 19 months after the contract was awarded, it still lacks reliable electricity, water, and a way to dispose of the waste products from

#### • The contractor responsible for improving the Iraqi Ministry of Health's ability to operate and maintain 109 Primary Healthcare Centers corrected construction and equipment deficiencies at 17 of them.

• \$1 million in equipment intended for Iraq's Special Operations Forces is either not being used or is missing.

To date, SIGIR's audit work has saved, recovered, or put to better use more than \$800 million.

This quarter, SIGIR also issued the third interim report on its congressionally mandated forensic review of all U.S.-funded transactions concerning the Iraq reconstruction effort. A major aspect of SIGIR's forensic audit program is the joint audit and investigative initiative in which teams of SIGIR auditors and investigators focus on programs that afford easy access to cash and have weak controls over expenditures. This initiative continues to identify instances of questionable activity. Since our last report in January 2010, SIGIR has opened an additional 13 criminal investigations involving 18 subjects. This brings the total number of criminal investigations opened resulting from this initiative to 45, involving a total of 60 subjects.

Another major aspect of SIGIR's forensic audit program is the congressionally mandated forensic audit of DoD, DoS, and USAID expenditures. Since its last report, SIGIR has reviewed an additional 10,000 transactions valued at \$4 billion, bringing the total transactions reviewed to 83,000 transactions valued at \$32 billion. In addition to testing for anomalous activity, this forensic effort provides critical information in support of ongoing SIGIR audits, investigations, and the audit and investigative initiative.

In the coming months, SIGIR will issue its first evaluations reports. These assessments—seven of which are currently planned—will step back and take a broader view of the U.S. reconstruction effort, asking what the U.S. taxpayer has received for the more than \$53 billion in U.S. funds committed to rebuilding and developing Iraq.

Regarding U.S. relief and reconstruction plans, programs, and operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction provides independent and objective:

• oversight and review through comprehensive audits, inspections, and investigations

• advice and recommendations on policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness

• prevention, detection, and deterrence of fraud, waste, and abuse

• information and analysis to the Congress, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the American people

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., was appointed Inspector General in January 2004. In March, the IG completed his 26th trip to Iraq to review progress on the

#### **TO OBTAIN A FULL REPORT**

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# SIGIR QUARTERLY REPORT

SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

#### **NEW PLAYERS AND PRIORITIES** IN THE NEXT CHAPTER **OF U.S.-IRAQ RELATIONS**

Over the next 20 months, a series of events will alter the dynamics of bilateral relations between the United States and the Government of Iraq (GOI): a new government will take the reins of power in Baghdad and conduct Iraq's first nationwide census in a generation; the United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) will see a change in leadership, and a new commander will oversee the conclusion of the U.S. military's advise-and-assist mission; a new Chief of Mission at U.S. Embassy-Baghdad will be responsible for the evolving U.S. diplomatic presence in Iraq; and—in December 2011—the last U.S. troops will withdraw from Iraq, 8 years after deposing the totalitarian regime of Saddam Hussein.

#### **Parliamentary Elections**

On March 7, 2010, about 11.5 million Iraqi citizens went to the polls to elect the 325 members of Iraq's newly expanded Council of Representatives (CoR). Unlike the previous parliamentary elections in December 2005, Iraqi voters could vote for a group of allied politicians (generally referred to as a list, or bloc) and, if they so chose, support a specific candidate. On April 19, 2010, Iraq's Independent High Electoral Commission ordered a manual recount of the more than 2.5 million ballots cast in Baghdad province, potentially affecting the winners of many of Baghdad's 70 seats. The fundamental question of who will form and lead Iraq's

next government remains unanswered. Iraq's Higher Judicial



Iragi Police officers in Tikrit show their ink-stained index fingers after an early-voting session for election-support personnel on March 4, 2010.

Council ruled that the top vote-getting bloc does not necessarily choose the Prime Minister; rather, this privilege goes to whichever party can form a governing coalition. Months of intense negotiations may yet transpire as Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law Coalition (89 seats, pending recount) vies with former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's

government. But certain facts now appear settled: • The incumbent Prime Minister dominated Iraq's Shia

ing 51 (56%) of al-Iraqiya's 91 seats.

al-Iraqiya bloc (91 seats, pending recount) to construct an

alliance capable of controlling the 163 seats needed to form a

Major Office Holders: Where Are They Now?

- heartland, winning the most seats in nine provinces. • Notwithstanding the fact that al-Iraqiya is led by the Shia (but secular-leaning) Ayad Allawi, Sunni voters strongly supported Allawi's bloc, with two Sunni-led parties provid-
- Women will occupy 82 seats in the new CoR, 25% of the total, as required by Iraq's constitution.
- New members will feature prominently in the new parliament. Only 62 legislators (19%) in the new CoR will have

While it is not yet clear which combination of parties will form the next government—or who will lead it—many of Iraq's key ministries will almost certainly be under new management, and U.S. officials will have to develop new relationships

#### A Fragile Calm

Election Day in Iraq was relatively free of violence. Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), with support from USF-I, took the lead in protecting more than 10,000 polling centers, but a series of scattered attacks killed approximately 38 civilians. Several mass-casualty attacks rocked Baghdad in April as insurgents sought to take advantage of political uncertainty. Unlike their practice in recent quarters, however, violent extremists tended to avoid targeting GOI ministry buildings, instead bombing apartment buildings, foreign embassies, and mosques. Notwithstanding these persistent challenges, a joint U.S-Iraqi military operation in mid-April killed the two top leaders of al-Qaeda in Iraq: Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and Abu Ayub al-Masri. One U.S. soldier died in the assault.

#### **USF-I Repositioning Proceeds Apace**

On August 31, 2010, in recognition of the formal end of the U.S. combat mission in Iraq, the Department of Defense (DoD) will replace Operation Iraqi Freedom with Operation New Dawn. Beginning in September, the remaining U.S. forces—numbering about 50,000 troops—will concentrate

## **Influential in Iraq**



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ISF Capacity, as of 3/31/2010

Ayad Allawi
Ethnicity/Religion:
Arab/Shia Islam
Political Positions: (2004–2005)
Party/Coalition:
Iraqi National List/Iraqi
National Movement (al-Iraqiya) **Note:** Secular-leaning



Ibrahim al-Ja'afari Ethnicity/Religion: Arab/Shia Islam Political Positions: Vice President of Iraq (2004–2005), Prime Minister of Iraq (2005–2006) Party/Coalition: Islamic Dawa/Iraqi National Alliance

**Note:** Sayyid (descendent of prophet Mohammad); succeede

by al-Maliki as leader of

the Dawa Party.

National Alliance Note: Influential

Grand Ayatollah

religious figure; son of famous Iraqi cleric

Mohammad Sadeq al-Sadr; early critic of

U.S. intervention in His followers had

several violent clashes with Coalition Forces.



Barham Salih Ethnicity/Religion: Kurd/Sunni Islam Political Positions: Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq (2004–2005), GOI

Minister of Planning (2005), Deputy Prime Minister of Iraq (2006–2009), Prime

Minister of Kurdistan Region (2009–Present)

Kurdistan/Kurdistan List

**Note:** Leader of the join

KDP/PUK Kurdistan List during July 2009 KRG

Party/Coalition: Patriotic Union of

Political Positions President of the

(2005–present)
Party/Coalition:
Kurdish Democratic

Party (KDP)/ Kurdistani Coalition

political family.

**Note:** Leader of the KDP;

Kurdistan Region



None
Party/Coalition:
Sadrist Movement/Iraqi



Ahmed Chalabi Ethnicity/Religior Arab/Shia Islam Political Positions (2005), Deputy Prime Minister (2005–2006) Party/Coalition: Iraqi National Congress/Iraqi National **Note:** Early advocate for U.S. military action in Iraq; early favorite of the U.S. Administration.



Iraqi Security Forces

AIRYS %4.7 11.6% PAKISTAN 11.6% AFGHANIST

AIBARA IDUAS %2.21

21.9% KUWAIT NAGROAN

Security Dilemma in Iraq

SINAHĐIA ZE,ES2









Tariq al-Hashimi Ethnicity/Religion: Arab/Sunni Islam Political Positions:

(2006–present)
Party/Coalition:

Renewal List/al-Iraqiya Note: Moderate

politician and leader of the Iraqi Islamic Party,

which backed the Irac

National Movement

(al-Iraqiya, headed by Prime Minister Ayad

Allawi) in the March

Arab/Shia Islam
Political Positions:



Kurd/Sunni Islam

Political Positions: President of Iraq (2005–Present) Party/Coalition: Patriotic Union of **Note:** Founder/leader

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