15. Thinking again of ALL of the projects for which your Provincial Reconstruction Team was responsible, please describe below the THREE MOST COMMON METRICS you used to measure the effectiveness of the reconstruction and stabilization projects that your team completed.

**FREQUENCIES**

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**COMMENTS**

1) Willingness and ability of relevant GoI entity to assume financial responsibility for the project in the future; 2) Number of stakeholders benefiting from the project; 3) Iraqi public perception about the USG's role in the project.

number of targeted Iraqi recipients reached, attendance at training programs, passage of laws and other gov measures following democratic methods

1) Activity with the project extending past the period of direct USG/military involvement; 2) Ability to build on a previous project; 3) Awareness of the populace beyond the direct beneficiaries of the project

difficult to measure progress in rule of law, human rights, women's rights, or independent media.

Sustainability Local community or gvt buy-in Number of vulnerable individuals/groups benefitting

The metrics we had were basically useless. We had to try to observe if the project was of any benefit or not. This was very difficult and I think any metrics were likely very flawed.

1) GOI acceptance and use of the finished project 2) actual quality of construction, and 3) 12 month later verification it still existed

Jobs created, people trained, grants let


Banana index - We checked the markets to see if perishable things like bananas were available. We knew we had stability (and a reasonable electric supply) if we found bananas, milk and eggs. We also went to visit and touch projects, talked to locals. We could see the differences if there was less sewage etc.

If the projects contributed to an overall improvement in government performance If the projects improved the economic output of the province If the local Iraqi's were able to continue to operate and maintain the project and equipment after our initial involvement.

-- number of jobs created/businesses opened -- Iraqi ownership of projects, including maintenance and repair -- Amount of consultation between Iraqi provincial govt, local govts, and population regarding priorities.
| Government buy in Commitment by local authorities for operations, staffing and maintenance |
| Cost effectiveness |
| Follow-up to micro grants was not always feasible given the size of the region that we were covering and constraints in travel. Micro-grants were likewise very diverse. In general, we looked for successful completion of what the micro-grantee had indicated would be the outcome (e.g., publication of a magazine by students with information on human rights and civic responsibilities - was the magazine published? Was it distributed to students?). Micro-grants for economic activities (e.g., funding for a women's bee-raising cooperative) were harder to assess as these were multi-year ventures - we weren't able to track whether the women would be able to sustain the activity over the course of a number of years and actually make money. For the Rule of Law program (not grant funding in this case, but implemented by a USG-contracted technical adviser, and one of the most important activities that we engaged in, given the rule-of-law deficit in the region) our metrics were Iraqi Kurdistan regional government buy-in to a stakeholder-drafted action plan and concrete steps to implement the action plan. |

1) Synergy of economic, political, and social effects of projects (particularly effective with agriculture projects); 2) Effect of projects beyond government officials; 3) viability and reliability of partners |

| The Embassy's Maturity Model |
| Sustainability Iraqi buy-in Ability to monitor the project and determine outcomes |
| 1. Number of provincial and local employees trained in governance. 2. # of population receiving clean water/proper sanitation/electrical services. 3. # of judges, lawyers and court officials trained/courts built & rebuilt |

Sustainability. Improving independence from foreign agricultural goods and job creation. Will the project help return the Iraqi people to a pre-liberation state. |

How many local councils could we get up and running. Once they were up and running then other benefits could flow from training and capacity building. |

--Iraqi community buy-in (financial or in-kind contributions) --Diversity of participants --GOI support -- |

money no others |

Percent of population with access to clean water. Number of public infrastructure improvement projects completed. Extent of positive Iraqi local media coverage of PRT efforts. |
16. What do you believe were the THREE MOST COMMON metrics used by the Embassy to measure the effectiveness of projects in your area?

FREQUENCIES

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COMMENTS

1) Iraqi public perception of the USG's role, especially the military's role; 2) Dollars spent; 3) Number of stakeholders benefiting from the project.

The Maturity Model was simply too broad to demonstrate actual progress, and the causal link between PRT activities and outcomes would have been weak even if it wasn't.

Number of projects Integration with military efforts high value "deliverables"

The embassy and the military had a set of metrics that they wanted us to use to fill out reports. These were simply unrealistic. A review of these projects was difficult and the metrics provided to the embassy and the military were often simply answers to the wrong questions.

1) Amount of money spent, 2) the number of projects reported, 3) the size of our power point presentation claiming success

Jobs created, people trained, grants let


The Embassy has a "maturity grid" that would attempt to estimate progress on various themes, such as rule of law, reconciliation etc. When we could actually visit the projects (after the severe fighting diminished) we would do the usual checks to see if the money had been spend and stuff had been built.

Improvement to government performance Reduction in civil strife and violence Effective utilization of available resources/funds.

To my knowledge, the Embassy never evaluated the effectiveness of projects.

How closely it tied into a national program How quickly the money could be spent How visible to project was to the population

I cannot recall.

1) Stabilization and security 2) Try to win "hearts and minds" 3) Enhance governance capability and economic development

The Embassy's Maturity Model

Sustainability ability to monitor meeting administrations policy goals

Don't remember.
Initially it was the number of projects on the roll and how much money had you gone through. By spring of 08 the emphasis was more on capacity.

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<tr>
<td>money spent</td>
<td>decrease in violence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>public GOI acknowledge of USG contribution</td>
<td>money spent photo ops generated vip visits enabled</td>
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Unknown.
20. What indicators led you to believe that some CERP funding was lost to fraud or corruption? Please write in your answer.

FREQUENCIES

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COMMENTS

The limited number of companies capable of competitively bidding on technical projects and possible collusion between these (as well as the PRT's limited ability to conduct due diligence on these companies because of the security situation), the absence of ethical separation between local officials involved in decision-making and companies seeking USG projects, and the suggestion of inappropriate use of USG-funded facilities on some projects.

disappearance of items given to recipient orgs, intended beneficiaries informing us resources did not arrive, catching local gov officials misusing programs.

Use of subcontractors by principal agents for projects indicated that our sourcing methods were too narrow, but we did not have a way to develop a better net of potential contractors in the 10 months of operation. Money routed through the District Council always enabled kickbacks, attested in private by teh Council members not in line to profit.

Difficulty of monitoring projects in no-go areas Poor managment oversight of USAID’s CSP program

Work on construction was priced very high, as high or higher than in the U.S. The resulting buildings were poorly constructed and often were subcontracted several times. Funded training which was not directly observed usually did not occur. Buildings renovated by the coalition in 2004 were put in for renovation again in 2008/9 by the government.

We had a USACE office co-located in [province]. At least one if not more of their members was arrested for taking bribes and lowering project standards. They wasted more money than imaginable through bad contracting, poor oversight and worse project selection. find the money they handled and you will find the wastage and can work the percentages..maybe not all fraud, but stupid has to count also.

It was difficult to have competitive tenders for many projects, and I presume some invoices were not at the lowest possible costs due to padding for materials, personnel, etc. that were not necessary.

Not sure, just a suspicion that some Iraqi recipients may have misspent funds. But I have no evidence. My hope is that this was a small amount.

It depends on what you mean by corruption. The local culture had norms different from ours. I am reasonably certain that our PRT members and the USMC were honet in delivering the funds. I am also reasonably certain that our partners worked in good faith by their standards. I am not
sure how much always got done at the right price and I could not tell you how much was "corruption" and how much was just poor execution. We succeeded in our goal to reduce violence. Maybe some of the project money bought that result.

Earlier PRT officers reported that some donated materials had been misappropriated.

The primary indicator were outrageous prices for goods, equipment or services. Another was the number of middlemen or intermediaries involved in a project.

Word of mouth from Iraqi contacts Commission on Integrity investigations Visible signs of wealth among key Iraqi officials tied involved in the development process.

I don't have any first-hand indication of corruption, but assume that there might have been some element of over-billing in micro-grants. I cannot speak to other programs over which I didn't have direct responsibility (e.g., USACE construction projects).

The list of military "approved" contractors was flawed and never seemed to be subject to reassessment. The U.S. Military was too prone to spending way too much money (CERP) for projects (Embassy QRF was much better managed). Savvy Iraqis formed "NGO's" merely to collect money for projects. Local and provincial officials (with the notable exception of judicial officials) did not see to the proper use of funds as agreed.

Responsiveness/quality of work by Iraqi contractors.

I am unable to judge the amount of money lost to fraud. I do know I was in a constant battle regarding overtime of 3161 employees and I can say the USDA team probably provided the best bang for the buck with a close second of funding lab materials for the University of Baghdad. I could not have done any of this without the strong support of the brigade's leadership.

The answer might be none because we spent so little. However, the checks and balances in a place like "restive" [Province] in 07/08 were spotty at best so I can't say that money was not absolutely lost to fraud or corruption, but if there was it was probably pretty low.

Sheiks rich, people poor same contractors always seemed to get contracts

In a place like Iraq, I just assume that there was corruption involving Iraqi contractors and Iraqi officials. I did not detect any, but I was only there for one year (minus three R&Rs) and did not speak Arabic.
21. Please provide below any additional comments you may have on the use of CERP for reconstruction and stabilization, or the measurement of its impact that you feel would be beneficial to this project. Please DO NOT enter any personal information in this field.

FREQUENCIES

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COMMENTS

PRTs may have had significantly less impact on their host communities than intended and than what was shared out in positive propaganda by our military counterparts, but they nonetheless provided an important link to provincial and local government officials and provided leverage for the USG as it offered advice. Some of the PRT projects resonated strongly with the populace, while others led Iraqis to believe that Americans were gullible. It was a complex environment given our limited mobility, but certainly more nuanced than most lay observations acknowledge.

We found that the provincial Iraqi officials for the most part could not be trusted. We determined to channel as many programs and funding as possible directly to private Iraqi citizens so they would receive the benefits, have a stake in the democratic process, and think well of Americans. Based on input from Iraqis we knew, from beneficiaries, and from Iraqi officials we trusted, this proved to be an effective approach.

The first priority would have stabilization and decrease of violence against US troops, but the well-led brigade to which we were attached had already pacified through kinetic and nonkinetic activities to the point they sustained zero casualties in the first 6 months of the year. The chief destabilizing activities were by various GOI entities, especially the Sadr-led ministries. The GOI, Baghdad PC, and even the karkh DC remained indifferent to reconciliation, except to placate the military and other USG. The Sunni Awakening was an opportunity squandered by the GOI, but the US military expectations for the central government to embrace the Sons of Iraq were clearly unrealistic from the beginning - on the other hand, this program was effective in keeping USG troops much safer. The litter of unfinished or finished and abandoned throughout Baghdad was due to a large extent by the input metrics favored by the military and the overly ambitious and strategic output metrics favored by State and AID.

We spent much less on projects than other PRT's, because we lacked access to CERP, because we had difficulty getting the Embassy to approve many of our projects, because the need was less, and because we spent much of our time on traditional diplomatic activity rather than projects. The projects we did undertake were often in fields like human rights, women's rights, independent media and rule of law. I felt these were worthwhile projects that advanced U.S. objectives in Iraq. But it was very difficult to measure how successful we were. I do not believe money was lost due to fraud because we did a small number of low-cost projects, the money usually went directly to costs that could be accounted for, and Iraqi-Americans at DAI
Development Alternatives, Inc. closely monitored all our grant recipients.

Most of the monies spent by our ePRT were provided by the military because the State provided monies were not flexible enough to respond to needs in the field.

U.S. government funds should not be used unless the government of the area is friendly and is interested in undertaking the reforms needed to actually produce results. Rarely if ever did we see any meaningful reforms take place that would justify the funding provided. The Iraqi government was willing for us to spend money but they wanted to control the funds and use them for whatever purpose they wished. If the execution of the funds for a project were run through Iraqi hands they stole most of the funds. By reinforcing this type of corruption we led people in Iraq to believe that the U.S. condones corruption and is a corrupt state. We did ourselves more harm by the loose nature of our funding and project management than if we had done nothing.

Poor direction from Baghdad, lack of standardized policy on events in the region and misplaced priorities. Virtually no money or centralized effort to change education or health care and our band-aid approach in the field could not dent the issues. We failed to focus on what the people wanted/needed and in place substituted what we (MIL/DOS/AID/NGOs) wanted to do. Too much money wasted due to the rapid turn over of personnel on the Mil side, as I witnessed projects that were done three times due to new troops arriving. Favored contractors and incompetent USACE support made more Iraqi millionaires than I can count. Use of money to supplant knowledge and time does not work. Understanding a developmental strategy or approach cannot be measured in 30-60-90 days. At least in [province] we were the first to join the Brigade in a single unified strategy and approach to gain traction on short term and long term goal. Lot of failure, lot of success, lot of pain and we were probably the most successful in teaching the real lessons to the Iraqis and not just providing window dressing. Overall, the effort could have been much better, but when you engage in 12month cycles, you never have the time to fully achieve all of your goals. Staffing is also one of the main factors in success or failures. Having the wrong people serve as stewards of the government funds was counterproductive and led to funds being wasted as the Iraqis were smarter and more cunning than most americans without international development exposure could grasp. 27 months in [province], I think I saw the good, the bad, and the ugly.

My comments are limited to the use of QRF [Quick Response Funds] funds; my brigade also used CERP monies in parallel.

I feel that my year in Anbar accomplished a lot. I am morally certain that our activities saved lifes, Iraqi and American. I know of specific people who I think would have been in serious danger of being killed, if not for us. I think our ecological restoration projects got real Iraqi interest and could help form the basis of real quality of life progress. We understood that it was a solution only if it was an Iraqi solution and we insisted on putting boots on the ground. I personally walked in all the major cities of my region, talked to people, and was seen. It was worth the discomfort and danger to do these things. I am not sure about sustainability. We made friends, but then we left. We did what many feared we would, i.e. went home before the job was done. I do not have personal knowledge of how this worked, or didn't. I would say that we planted to seeds; others need to help them grow. IMO – the USMC were great diplomats. The idea that they rotate them through more than once was very good. All my success depended on cooperation with the Marines and I believe that some of their success was contributed by my team. I would add one caveat. We (State) didn't learn the PRT lessons well. We treated these like
a separate part of something else. We did not go into lessons learned. The USMC did a much better job as a learning organization. Even this survey is largely useless. What we need is a qualitative analysis, one that tells the stories and maps the human terrain. We did some great things that should be studied and some bad ones that should be avoided, but our conditions were different from what others faced and will face. We also tried to be too American and too PC. Iraqis had different priorities. One example - we tried to build solar energy. It didn't work because of the dust. The Iraqis wanted diesel. They understood their needs. We also needed to drive harder bargains. The Iraqis did not respect "generosity." They prefer hard negotiations. We got things for less than half the price by the end than we had paid at the start. We could just say "no" if we thought the deal was sour. My goal was to GIVE the Iraqis nothing, but rather to partner with them on everything. If they would not put up some of their own time or money, we walked away … but we never had to walk away once they knew we would. The worst sort of officer in charge of a PRT is one who wants to "help". This is more of a business than a charity.

Even after we coordinated with local officials on designing and implementing projects we often found the resulting facilities and materials poorly utilized. There were often local political conflicts that prevented effective project completion. Many local officials depended on us to provide needed services and improvements rather than use their own government resources. Many requests from local officials were designed to strengthen their own political power vs. provide the best services to their constituents. There continued to be a severe need for effective planning, budgeting and project implementation on the part of the local and provincial government leaders.

On my PRT, we made a real effort to only engage in projects that were part of a larger program that was geared to one or more of our lines of effort, and we chose those projects/programs we felt would have the most effect. But most of us were only in Iraq for one year, and measuring impact over the longer term was all but impossible. And as military and PRT resources began to draw down near the end of my time in Iraq, we just didn't have the capacity to do so. However, I was quite pleased with the short term impact of our projects and I do feel they made a difference in the lifes of Iraqis in our province. What the longer term impact is -- or will be -- is difficult to evaluate. I do not feel that my PRT wasted or put USG funds to bad use during my tenure. That said, there were a few projects that did not turn out as we would have liked or planned. However, I believe we were able to use these instances to help our Iraqi partners identify issues in their own operations and procedures that they could work to improve.

People working in PRTs who support development often come into the process cold. They generally have to learn the rules regarding contracting and use of development funds on the job. Coordination between those who spend and those who audit could have been better.

Better coordination between funding agencies and harmonizing civilian and military goals should be the top priority.

The metric for success shouldn't be the number of projects or the amount of money spent, rather sustainability of projects and capacity building. I think that by the middle of 08 we were getting smarter but my impression is that it was not yet consistently so.

Our PRT cooperation with U.S. military and GOI counterparts was excellent, but largely a product of willing and capable personalities. Close collaboration should be an institutional prerequisite for future civilian-military joint undertakings in conflict zones.
The U.S. Institute of Peace recently posted transcripts of over 100 interviews with Iraq PRT vets (2008-2010) on its website (search there under Iraq Oral History Project). Many are very revealing about reconstruction challenges.