

14. Thinking again of ALL of the CERP projects for which you were responsible, please describe below the THREE MOST COMMON metrics you used as a BATTALION COMMANDER to measure the effectiveness of the reconstruction and stabilization efforts in your operational environment.

FREQUENCIES

	Frequency	Percent
Response Provided	14	58.3
No Response Provided	10	41.7
Total	24	100.0

COMMENTS

<p>It is difficult to name our "Top Three" metrics, because it implies a quantitative system. We used both qualitative and quantitative analysis in considering the effectiveness of our projects. Since at any given time, we had a wide number of projects ongoing, it was also nearly impossible to determine cause/effect between one project and one result, however, IN GENERAL, we considered the following: Reports of Iraqi deaths, Shops opening in the market, number of IED tips (from locals) versus finds (by Marines). Another key factor was the return of Iraqi judges/reestablishment of Iraqi court system.</p>
<p>Ability to tie the CERP money to other Coalition and ISF [Iraqi Security Force] activities in the area; an increase in the level of cooperation with local populace to assist with information gathering; and improved economic and quality of life conditions.</p>
<p>Were our coalition partners able to take credit for both the idea and the action; could this project be perceived as favoring one group within the local community; Did the project have an immediately positive effect and was it likely that effect was sustainable.</p>
<p>1. Overall security levels which allowed both US and Iraqi citizen freedom of movement 2. New, re-started small business 3. Degree of independence of government institutions (local police, city councils, etc)</p>
<p>1 - Economic Expansion - Freshness and availability of basic staples (food freshness and turnover, cooking oil, vegetables) followed by expansion of other consumer goods in the local markets and then availability and sale of durable goods (TV, refrigerators, furniture) 2 - New home building / current home repairs 3 - Employment - what was the availability in the local economies for day labor, new business starts, old business rebuild</p>
<p>1: Impact to local community; 2: could we get a contractor to actually complete the project; 3: Essential vice nice to have</p>
<p>open stores in market area, # of students or patients, services rendered by city bureaucracy</p>
<p>1. Immediate or very short term visibility of impact on Fallujans (they had to see improvements quickly to convince them that the plan we were executing was in their best interest). 2. Alleviated one of the Fallujans biggest concerns - electricity (generator repair), trash clean up (for CF FP reasons also), or provision of basic services. 3. Putting angry young men to work to get them off the streets and away from the insurgent influence to participate in violence for pay</p>

to be able to put some food on their families table.
Did the local men join the Iraqi Army or Police force.
1) Showed GoI involvement and development 2) Used local population for workforce 3)impact upon community
No useful "metrics." Subjective evaluation of impact of project on local conditions.
Increase of security
money spent
Iraqis working, violence levels, state of normalcy when conducting patrols

15. What do you believe were the THREE MOST COMMON metrics that your BRIGADE HQ used to measure the effectiveness of the reconstruction and stabilization efforts in your operational environment?

FREQUENCIES

	Frequency	Percent
Response Provided	14	58.3
No Response Provided	10	41.7
Total	24	100.0

COMMENTS

US Casualties, IED strikes vs Finds, # of small arms engagements.
I believe they were similar to what I described in question 14.
We derived our metrics from theirs, and they had additional considerations.
1. Overall security levels which allowed both US and Iraqi citizen freedom of movement 2. New, re-started small business 3. Degree of independence of government institutions (local police, city councils, etc)
1 - Reduction in daily significant events 2 - Increased intelligence reporting from local populace 3 - Increased local governance (Iraqi arrests and prosecutions)
?
Number of attacks, money spent, atmospheric
Essentially the same as mine.
Same as above.
Same as Bn
1) Expenditure 2) Timeliness 3) Subjective (GoI feedback)
increase of commerce
?
violence levels, detainees, complaints voiced to the Civil Affairs Teams

16. What do you believe were the THREE MOST COMMON metrics that your DIVISION HQ used to measure the effectiveness of the reconstruction and stabilization efforts in your operational environment?

FREQUENCIES

	Frequency	Percent
Response Provided	14	58.3
No Response Provided	10	41.7
Total	24	100.0

COMMENTS

US Casualties, IED strikes vs Finds, # of small arms engagements.
I am not sure.
Same as Regt HQ. At the Division level they focused on provincial stability and governance development projects
1. Overall security levels which allowed both US and Iraqi citizen freedom of movement 2. Regional trade (ag, industry, commerce) 3. Return to normalcy (basic services and infrastructure)
1 - decrease in significant event reporting 2 - increased power production 3 - increased local governance (budgeting, funding, and ownership of governmental support functions)
?
number of attacks, money spent
1. The overall impact on Fallujah - violence calming down and the city looking like it is actually improving (solar powered street lights and the city being cleaned up - both made a great impression as VIP's flew over or drove through the city. 2. The amount of money being spent on what they considered to be priorities. 3. Not sure what else. It has been a while.
Unknown.
Same as Regt.
Similar to Regimental HQ metrics, with more emphasis on the most strictly quantifiable (percentage of available funds expended).
ability of govt to function with limited US involvement
?
violence levels, power capacity, detainees

19. What indicators led you to believe that some CERP funding was lost to fraud or corruption? Please write in your answer.

FREQUENCIES

	Frequency	Percent
Response Provided	12	50.0
No Response Provided	12	50.0
Total	24	100.0

COMMENTS

<p>Routinely projects were awarded to cronies of the police chief, mayor, or others in power. This was so common as to be endemic to the system of CERP awards; it literally became part of the "cost of doing business." HOWEVER, over time, the "cut" did decrease, as violence dropped and the perception that MAYBE some real governance could take seat and everyone did not necessarily need to grab what they could before things fell apart again. We were also fortunate to get a Mayor who, while he dispensed favors like an old-school politician, was smart enough to dispense them across a number of tribes and regions, and was not personally lining his pockets as badly as his predecessor, who had cooperated with AQI for personal (monetary) gain.</p>
<p>We asked our Iraqi partners and they stated that the AQIZ graft was about 10%.</p>
<p>The growing 'tribal competition' for projects led me to conclude that there was some 'overhead costs' that could be attributed to corruption.</p>
<p>1-everybody got a cut 2-poor quality work and materials 3-hard to track the actual cost</p>
<p>money for contracts was diverted to local sheiks by the contracted agent in order to allow hiring in the local area (however, this was not all bad, because much of the money was used to fund care programs, i.e. it was there version of social security and medicaid.) Some contractors tried to rip-off the program which required extensive oversight of the program to limit the theft of funds. In the end, monitoring and choice of contractors was critical to achieve the endstate you were seeking. Like any weapon system, you have to monitor your round impacts, adjust fire, or switch weapon systems if your not achieving the effects desired)</p>
<p>we latter found out that contrators were paying part of the money to the local insurgency for "protection". what percentage was always hard to tell, but the better we were at leveraging CERP we saw a corresponding increase in the sophistication of enemy equipment and training.</p>
<p>I would hear about the cuts former contractors would be forced to give AQI - this was anecdotal and after-the-fact. Every official had "their contractor" and we'd spread around contracts to ensure everyone was happy. Some contractors would complain about the amount of bribes US backed tribal leaders would demand. I could never confirm this to be true.</p>
<p>Who was involved (Iraqi's) in the contract and how it seemed to benefit them. To a degree, it was impossible to stop, but we vetted as closely as we could. We also checked very closely to ensure that we got what we paid for.</p>
<p>Indicators presented to me after fact, as a result of investigations, of local goverment corruption. There was an understanding that most tribal and local leaders took a certain % off the top of</p>

most projects. To the Iraqis this was not corruption but part of their accepted business practice.
Rumors of contractors overcharging -- subsequent experience in Afghanistan where I became more savvy on the prime contractor/sub-contractor networks, similar to those used in Iraq, and the potential for cost inflation and profiteering these allowed. Had no real knowledge of this when in Iraq in 2006, and very little autonomy to allocate CERP money in any event as this was heavily centralized at RCT [regimental combat team] level.
Price fixing was a common trend across the AO [area of operations]. Iraqis knew that the US would pay top dollar for projects.
1. high cost of projects

20. Please provide below any additional comments you may have on the use of CERP for reconstruction and stabilization, or the measurement of its impact that you feel would be beneficial to this project. Please DO NOT enter any personal information in this field.

FREQUENCIES

	Frequency	Percent
Response Provided	11	45.8
No Response Provided	13	54.2
Total	24	100.0

COMMENTS

I served as a BN CO in both Iraq and Afghanistan and the SINGLE biggest lesson learned that I took away from both experiences is that we (the US) have put an unnecessary "firewall" between the Maneuver unit commanders and the political process of reconciliation and reconstruction. In my battalion, we endeavored to break this barrier down by close daily coordination with PRT commanders being completely transparent with them in our use of CERP. However, since PRT commanders did not work for battalion commanders in either location, this was yet another one of those "Handcon" relationships that I had to maintain/develop as a Bn CO. Counterinsurgency requires commanders who are responsible for all the lines of operation within their area. We should strive to line up maneuver commanders with the political boundaries that the nation recognizes, rather than "jam" regional or area commanders on top of them, where no history of affiliation exists. PRTs, while effective, also serve to provide a point of fracture for US/Coalition influence, as the national/local officials very quickly realize that they can petition multiple commanders for projects. Additionally, when maneuver commanders do not feel responsible for reconstruction, reestablishment of governance and rule of law, then it is TOO EASY to simply focus on the "symptom" of security measures, IEDs, looking for insurgents, etc. I routinely reminded my Marines the old adage that "when the only tool you have is a hammer, all your problems look like nails."

CERP was exceptionally valuable to me during my time in Iraq because it allow my battalion to put our money where our mouth was. We always tried to combined battalion counter-insurgency activities with CERP expenditures designed to improve that overall situation in a targetted area. As an example, we understood that if we could win the support of the mothers of Fallujah, we could improve the security situation. The best way to win the support of the mothers was to improve security while also providing a modicum of health care to their children. We combined security sweeps with Medical Capabilities teams to work towards these ends. CERP supported this effort.

CERP funds were CRITICAL for our Battalion to be able to back up what we said our purpose for being there was with actions that reinforced the message. I believe our success in growing a local police force and establishing local governance was linked to this synergy in strategic communication, which required both words and action on our part and was enabled with CERP in many instances.

-I felt there were too many uncoordinated "projects" being worked by too many organizations-- as a Bn Cmdr it was often hard to see the comprehensive strategy...if there was one. -Money was the most important weapon but the process was unweildy and cumbersome for the guys who really needed it--the company commanders. The guy on the ground needs to have the "pocket money" and be trusted to use it appropriately for small, quick wins. Of course, larger projects need the scrutiny and integration of HHQ. -For a while, there was a lot of discussion about the use of cerp for security (ie sons of iraq) purposes that truly hindered the warfighter at a critical time. there was also a huge disparity between what the Marines were paying SOI [Sons of Iraq] in Al Anbar and the what the Army was paying in other provinces (Army was significantly higher). This caused a lot of angst amongst the SOI.

CERP funds were critical to restoring stability and reducing many of the internal, policitically driven insurgencies. Local populace was seeking a return to stability. Needs of food, shelter, power and the ability to provide for their families drove there decision process. Increase empolyment, decrease likelyhood of picking up a gun or facilitating other insurgents. Improve local economies and local goverance took root. What ever we applied CERP too, it had to be done in conjuction with local leadership - Sheik, City Council, Local police chiefs. It had to have a method of Iraqi sustainability and it had to be built into the local and provincial budgeting process or have private economic sustainability.

With all the various types of money used for R&D and stabilization it need to be simplified and all the processes streamlined. I believe that in order to more effectively integrate all these resources we need to first have an integrated campiagn objective/goal that everyone knows and all projects need to nest inside these previously agreed upon objectives. With this type of design you could and should decentralize execution to increase tempo and thus the battlefield effect. The delays in approval, the duplication of resources, the building of infrastructure without the concomitant civil capacity became a waste of resources and time.

Metrics for large projects or LOOs [lines of operation] must be determined early on and tracked across battalion rotations. While units shouldn't be discouraged from developing metrics anything I developed lacked historical context. I couldn't tell if I was making a difference or just doing what everyone before me did - build schools and clinics despite the lack of teachers and doctors. Policy questions need to be answered ahead of time as well. Are we pushing for a society where health care is state funded or privatized? That should determine how and where I construct my clinics. Will schools educate boys and girls together? Locals say no - build more rooms so my contractor gets more money. US government has an informal goal of increasing the role of women in society but does that manifest itself in how we build the schools? Without policy and viable, long term metrics you're R&S efforts will be disjointed and difficult to prioritize.

It was absolutely vital to what we were doing in Fallujah. CERP funds were a major part of that operation.

Bn and Regt Commanders are given responsibility for the execution of CERP funds and I believe they are more than capable of selecting projects that will best support their intent and the impact they want upon the battle space. However, what they do not have are SMEs to help QA work, costs, and project details. Commanders need assistance in measuring the performance of these contracts.

N/A

Our unit did NOT have direct control of CERP funds or projects, as we did not control any one

area. However, we provided security overwatch for other units and civil affairs teams for their execution of CERP projects. The marks made in this survey, are based on our joint planning, knowledge, and continual oversight of the same projects during the deployment.