FOCUS ON DIYALA

Background

Bordered by Iran, the Kurdistan Region, Baghdad, the mostly Sunni province of Salah Al-Din, and the overwhelm-
ingly Shia province of Wasit, Diyala is a microcosm of Iraq. With its contentious intercommunal relationships, mixed economy, and varied geography, the major issues in Diyala reflect, albeit on a smaller scale, the foremost challenges facing Iraq. As one U.S. brigade commander said about Diyala in 2007, “basically, all the issues and conflicts that exist through all Iraq . . . exist here.”

With no national census since 1987 and large-scale population displacements having occurred both before and after 2003, measuring the size and composition of Iraqi provincial populations with precision is impossible. The situation is particularly difficult in Diyala because of the Ba’athist regime’s mass resettlement of Arabs there and related expulsions of Kurds in the period after the Iran-Iraq War. Most estimates, however, show that a majority of Diyala’s residents are Sunni Arabs, but as Figure D.1 shows, they share the province with several different groups. Intertwined amidst this ethnic mosaic is an even more complex web of tribes. According to the U.S. military, in 2007 there were at least 25 major tribes and almost 100 sub-tribes in Diyala, some of which encompassed both Sunni and Shia branches. As a former Diyala Provincial Council member told SIGIR in July, ethnic tensions were minimized prior to 2003 because, “Saddam ruled with an iron fist.”

Geography

Provincial Capital: Ba’quba
Area: 6,828 square miles (17,685 square kilometers), 4.1% of national territory
Major Cities: Ba’quba, Baladrooz, al-Khalis, Kifri, and Khanaqin

Demography

Population: 1.65 million (2009 GOI est.)
Rural vs. Urban: 59% vs. 41%
Major ethnosectarian groups: Sunni (55%); Shia (25%); Kurds (10%); others, including Turkmen, Christians, and Yazidis (10%)

Political Economy

Governor: Abdul-Nasser al-Mahdawi (Iraqi Accordance Front)
Provincial Council Chairman: Talib Mohammad Hasan (Kurdistani Alliance)
Main Industry: Agriculture

U.S. Presence

Diyala PRT Closure Date: September 2011
Total U.S. Reconstruction Funds Committed: $1.06 billion
Ongoing U.S. Capital Investment: $54.9 million
Planned U.S. Capital Investment: $5.18 million

Because its oil and natural gas resources have yet to be extensively developed, Diyala’s economy remains heavily dependent on agriculture. Once known as the “City of Oranges” for its bountiful citrus groves, the provincial capital of Ba‘quba lies at the heart of the fertile Diyala River valley, which bisects the province from the northeast to the southwest. But a plurality of the province’s population (40%) resides in the province’s largest, and mostly desert, district of Baladrooz.

Arab-Kurdish Dispute
North of Baladrooz lies the district of KhanAQin—the central focus of Arab-Kurdish tensions in Diyala province. In the aftermath of the Iran-Iraq War, Saddam Hussein attempted to “Arabize” much of KhanAQin by expelling large numbers of Feyli (Shia) Kurds from Iraq, accusing them of actively sympathizing with their Shia co-religionists across the border. In their place, the Ba’athists relocated Sunni Arab families—thought to be more sympathetic to Saddam—to take ownership of the vacated homes. After 2003, many displaced Kurds resettled in the district, and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) asserted claims to parts of KhanAQin and neighboring Kifri districts—claims contested by the Government of Iraq (GOI).

These tensions led to a stand-off between Kurdish Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi Army (IA) in August 2008, when elements of the IA’s 1st Division entered KhanAQin—a movement that the IA’s Chief of Staff, a Kurd, claims not to have known of in advance. Like the disputes between the GOI and KRG over Kirkuk, the conflicting claims over northern Diyala are meant to be settled as part of the process set forth in Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution. But, to date, the GOI has made little progress in moving forward with the Article 140 process, which requires it to conduct both a census and referendum. Underscoring the unresolved nature of this dispute, in late May 2011, the KhanAQin municipal government raised the KRG flag over an official border crossing with Iran for the first time.

Since 2010, the U.S. military has been engaged in joint patrols with the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and Kurdish Peshmerga along the Kurdistan Region’s southern border. As of June 30, no firm plans exist regarding what force, if any, will replace them if the U.S. military withdraws from Iraq as scheduled by the end of the year. This led former U.S. Forces-Iraq (USF-I) Commanding General Raymond Odierno to publicly raise last year the possibility of an international peacekeeping force eventually patrolling territories claimed by both the KRG and GOI.

Security
The Insurgency Intensifies: 2003–2006
Between 2003 and 2006, the insurgency gradually intensified in Diyala, as armed groups streamed into the province from cities where there was a larger Coalition military presence, such as Baghdad. By June 2007, the number of monthly incidents had reached 1,023:

By April 2006, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, then-head of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), felt secure enough to declare Diyala as the capital of the caliphate he intended to establish in Iraq. That same month, AQI launched a large-scale offensive in the province, striking targets across Diyala from their rural bastions in the farmlands near Ba‘quba.

Although Coalition forces killed al-Zarqawi in a June airstrike on his hideout near Ba‘quba, the security situation in the province continued to deteriorate as the year wore on. Sectarian tensions in Diyala were also exacerbated by the Sunni perception that the Shia-dominated police force acted in a partisan manner. In one incident, a police sweep netted about 900 detainees—all but 2 of whom were Sunnis.

As the security situation grew worse, Diyala’s government ceased to function. In September 2006, Diyala officials stopped distributing regular food rations and fuel to residents. In October, the provincial government recessed because of the deteriorating security situation. By December, the insurgency effectively controlled Ba‘quba and much of the Diyala valley.

Securing Diyala: 2007
Beginning in January 2007, Coalition forces, led by the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, slowly reasserted control over Diyala. After clearing AQI fighters from the village of Turki southeast of Ba‘quba in Operation Turki Bowl, U.S. forces gradually pushed toward the provincial capital. In an attempt to counter the increased tempo of U.S. operations, AQI launched several attacks in March and April, using suicide bombers against civilian targets in towns and villages and kidnapping and killing many GOI officials. Shia militias also constituted a serious security threat. In late February, U.S. troops uncovered a cache of more than 150,000...
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### FOCUS ON DIYALA

#### Significant Security Events in Diyala, 2006–2008

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>April: Abu Muqab al-Zarqawi declares Diyala the capital of his caliphate.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>June 7: Al-Zarqawi killed in U.S. airstrike.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>October: U.S. army sweeps rural areas east and south of Ba’quba.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Mid-May: Coalition forces clear AQI elements from farming communities northeast of Ba’quba.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>September: AQI launches a series of attacks on Diyala.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>September 24: Suicide bomber kills 28 at a reconciliation meeting in Ba’quba.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>March: US and SOI increase presence northeast of Ba’quba.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>August: SOI arrests several Diyala SOI leaders.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Note:
This timeline highlights selected major events during 2006–2008.

Source: SIGIR analysis of GOI and U.S. government documents and open-source information in Arabic and English.

### Figures
- **Figure D.2**: Significant Security Events in Diyala, 2006–2008
- **Figure D.3**: Comparison of AQI’s presence in Diyala.

### Text:

Iranian-made weapons, suggesting that Iraq’s eastern neighbor was supplying Shia militia operating in Diyala. On June 19, 2007, U.S. and ISF units began Operation Arrowhead Ripper to clear Ba’quba city and its environs. Although fighting continued throughout the summer, Ba’quba was mostly secure by August, as U.S. forces pushed AQI out of the city and into the hinterlands. By mid-year, AQI’s religious extremism and brutal tactics, along with an increasingly assertive Coalition military presence, contributed to many of AQI’s secular Sunni allies abandoning them and beginning to provide intelligence and other assistance to the U.S. military. These collections of concerned local citizens included the Ba’quba Guardians, a U.S.-backed group formed in July 2007 to provide security in the provincial capital. Eventually, many of these groups would be financially supported by the U.S. military via the Sons of Iraq (SOI) initiative.


In 2008, Coalition military operations in Diyala emphasized clearing AQI remnants from farming communities and small towns in the Diyala valley. In contrast to previous operations, which swept through these areas without leaving behind a permanent security presence, U.S. and ISF units began establishing outposts in several outlying communities. Figure D.3 compares AQI’s presence in Diyala in December 2006 to its presence in March 2008.

In 2007 and 2008, tensions grew between Diyala’s Shia provincial police chief, Ghanem al-Qurishi, and the mostly Sunni SOI. This conflict came to
Diyala officials expressed grave concerns to SIGIR in July meetings about the security situation. The province’s chief prosecutor remarked that every time he steps outside his house, it “is a walk into the unknown.”

“There isn’t anything that makes me hopeful. If anything, I’m cynical. As long as sectarianism still exists it will kill all hope and optimism, and fear will reign. As a country, we need security. We’ve gone back 100 years. The other countries of the region—once having only sand—are thriving today … and look like European cities. All we want in Iraq is to be stable enough to start catching up.”

**Future of U.S. Presence**

While the provincial officials who spoke to SIGIR expressed mixed feelings about the planned departure of the U.S. troops currently stationed in Ba’quba, they were unanimous in their wish for the United States to maintain some presence in the province after December 2011. One Diyala official told SIGIR that, “if the United States pulls out all its [civilian and military] personnel from the province,
Figure D.5

SELECTED INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE IN DIYALA, 4/10/2011–7/10/2011

April

Wednesday, April 13: Local government official wounded by IED in Ba‘quba
Thursday, April 14: Police spokesman survived bomb attack on his residence in Ba‘quba
Thursday, April 28: Suicide bomber attacked Shia mosque in Baladroz, killing 8 and wounding about 15
Friday, April 29: Imam of a mosque in Khanaqin killed with his family by gunmen; 4 Awakening members killed in armed attack on a house south of Ba‘quba

May

Friday, May 6: Bodyguard of Awakening sheik stabbed to death south of Ba‘quba
Saturday, May 7: 7 police officers wounded in car bomb attack in Ba‘quba; 5 killed and 3 wounded in attack on money exchange in Ba‘quba
Saturday, May 22: Ministry of Oil official killed by gunmen in Khanaqin
Saturday, May 28: 2 attacks (IED and grenade) killed 1 civilian and wounded 3 police officers in Ba‘quba

June

Tuesday, June 7: Police chief of Hibhib, a small town west of Ba‘quba, killed by sticky bomb detonation
Saturday, June 11: Retired IA officer and his son killed by sticky bomb detonation in Khanaqin
Tuesday, June 14: Suicide bombers and gunmen attacked Diyala provincial government complex in Ba‘quba, killing 2 police officer and wounding more than 20 others
Saturday, June 18: Bomb killed 3 in Ba‘quba
Sunday, June 19: Sticky bomb explodes in Ba‘quba killed 1 and injured 3
Monday, June 20: Mayor of Judeidat Al-Shat, a small town north of Ba‘quba, killed by gunmen who attacked his residence
Sunday, June 26: Suicide bomber kills police chief near Ba‘quba
Tuesday, June 28: Mayor of Ba‘quba survived IED attack on his vehicle

July

Monday, July 4: Official from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan party shot and killed northeast of Ba‘quba
Wednesday, July 6: VBIED attack in Ba‘quba killed 2 police officers and wounded 20 other people
Thursday, July 7: IED exploded near a butcher shop west of Ba‘quba, wounding 3
Saturday, July 9: Booby-trapped motorcycle explodes in Ba‘quba, wounding 2

Note: The security incidents cited above are intended to provide a sense of the types of violence occurring in Diyala province. This is not intended to be a comprehensive list of all security incidents.


it will be a very big mistake.” Diyala officials cited the simmering religious and ethnic tensions—between Sunni and Shia, and Arabs and Kurds—and its strategic location on the Iranian border as two reasons weighing in favor of a continued U.S. presence in the province.205

Camp Ashraf: A Lingering Issue

Located northeast of the town of al-Khalis, Camp Ashraf has housed members of the Iranian Mujahedin-e-Khalq (MeK) (also known as the People’s Mujahedin Organization of Iran) for more than two decades. The MeK fought as allies of Saddam Hussein in his wars against Iran and the U.S.-led Coalition and were placed on the U.S. Department of State (DoS) list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations. In mid-2004, Coalition forces granted the camp’s residents protection under international law, on the condition that they relinquish their arms.

On January 1, 2009, the U.S. military transferred control of Camp Ashraf and its approximately 3,400 residents to the GOI on the understanding that these protections would continue. However, ISF units have entered the camp on at least two occasions since January 2009, and each encounter resulted in multiple deaths. Most recently, an ISF incursion in early April resulted in the deaths of more than 30 camp residents. A U.S. congressional delegation attempted to visit Camp Ashraf during a June 2011 trip to Iraq, but was not granted GOI permission to travel there. Current GOI plans call for shutting down Camp Ashraf by the end of the year and relocating the MeK elsewhere, either in Iraq or another country.206

S I G I R Deputy Inspector General meets with Diyala officials.

Governance

Relations between the provincial government and Baghdad remain somewhat contentious. This quarter, Diyala’s governor threatened to resign if the GOI failed to release certain detainees and accede to his demands on other security matters.207 As of July 10, however, he had not followed through with his threat.

Provincial Elections, 2005 and 2009

In 2005, a widespread boycott by most Sunni Arab political parties of Iraq’s first post-2003 provincial elections resulted in a coalition of Shia parties winning almost 50% of the 41 seats on Diyala’s Provincial Council, despite Shia number-ing only about one-fourth of the province’s population. The only major Sunni Arab party participating in the 2005 provincial elections in Diyala, the Iraqi Islamic Party, won 14 seats. A Kurdish-led bloc won the remaining 7 seats. Thus, Sunni Arabs, who comprise more than one-half of the province’s population, held only about one-third of the seats on the Provincial Council. After the 2005 elections, council members chose as governor Ra‘ad Hameed al-Mula Jowad al-Tamimi, a Shia Arab affiliated with the party now known as the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq.208

Four years later, Sunni Arab turnout increased dramatically, resulting in two Sunni Arab-led parties finishing first and second in Diyala’s 2009 provincial elections. The United Accord and Reform Front in Diyala and the National
Iraqi Project combined to win 15 of the 29 seats on the newly reduced-in-size Provincial Council. The council subsequently elected as governor Abdul-Nasser al-Mahdawi, a Sunni. 209 Figure D.6 compares the approximate Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish populations in 2005 and 2009 with the percentage of council seats won by each community.

### Council Seats Won in Diyala, 2005 vs. 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Community</th>
<th>2005 Election Results</th>
<th>2009 Election Results</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Shia</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sunni</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kurd</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of Province Population</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Residents of al-Khalis confer with ISF officials about insurgent attacks. (USF-I photo)

### Council of Representatives

In the March 2010 national parliamentary elections, former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s al-Iraqiya bloc won 8 of Diyala’s 13 seats, with about 60% of eligible voters casting ballots. The Shia-dominated Iraqi National Alliance finished second, winning 3 seats. The Kurdish alliance and Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s State of Law coalition each won one seat. 210

### Economic Development

According to Diyala officials and community leaders with whom SIGIR met in early July 2011, the provincial economy is one of the worst-performing in Iraq. Diyala officials estimated unemployment at about two-thirds of the working-age population.

The provincial economy runs a deficit, producing little that contributes to the national coffers while drawing about $120 million annually from Baghdad for payroll and stipends. Diyala officials have chiefly ascribed the poor performance of the economy to the near anarchy that characterized the province before 2008.

Officials added that although some progress has been made in the past three years, security in the province has deteriorated in recent months, placing even that fragile progress at substantial risk. 211 The uncertain security environment in Diyala has dissuaded foreign companies from committing resources to the province. One study concluded that less than 1% of all foreign commercial activity in Iraq last year occurred in Diyala. 212

### Provincial Investment Promotion

Diyala has two main investment-promotion organizations operating to improve its economy: 213

- **Diyala Chamber of Commerce.** With a membership of about 5,000, the Chamber is the largest economic development organization in the province, assisting businesses in obtaining loans, monitoring inflation, and promoting exports. However, the Chamber reported that its operations have been somewhat impeded by the Ministry of Interior’s seizure of half of its headquarters building.

- **Provincial Investment Commission (PIC).** Beset by political infighting from its inception more than two years ago, the PIC is struggling to gain a foothold in the province and has not received any funds from the Ministry of Finance. The nine commissioners who lead the PIC have not been paid, and they currently operate out of a rented house. The U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Diyala is helping the PIC find a permanent headquarters.

### Agriculture

Diyala contains about 10% of all arable land in Iraq, and its agricultural sector is the main source of employment in the province, providing roughly 70% of all nongovernment jobs. Primary crops include dates (of which there are more than 72 local varieties), citrus fruits, seasonal vegetables (such as eggplants and peppers), wheat, barley, grapes, and figs. 214

Under the Ottoman Empire, most farmland in Diyala was registered to tribal collectives. Today, farms are held under a variety of different types of deeds, including private, tribal, government-owned and -operated, and government-owned but provided to businesses or citizens for commercial exploitation. This complicated system of land ownership is just one factor affecting the development of Diyala’s farming sector. Other challenges include low rainfall, which averages about four inches per year; poorly maintained irrigation canals; lack of fertilizer; limited refrigerated-storage facilities; and poor road networks. 215

Most of the water used for farming comes from the Diyala River, which flows from Iran, through the Kurdistan Region, into the province. According to
the provincial Director General (DG) of Water Resources, “amounts released from Iran are totally arbitrary because there are no agreements between the two governments.” The KRG also dams the water, further limiting the province's supply. “As a result, we can't plan anything,” the DG said.

Studies on underground water sources have found that water tables are between 60 and 360 feet deep, but their high salinity and sulfur levels render them unusable. As a consequence, many people unable to sustain their farms are migrating to the cities and joining the ranks of the unemployed. The DG said his office is trying to adopt new irrigation technologies such as drip irrigation with assistance from PRT Diyala, but stated that the challenges are still vast.216

On July 9, residents of Khanaqin conducted a protest march against the Iranian government’s decision to interrupt the downstream flow of water in one of the Diyala River’s tributaries. According to the chairman of Diyala’s Provincial Council, local officials lodged a formal complaint with Baghdad about this matter in May, but did not receive a response.217

Banking
The banking sector is a major component of the provincial economy, but it, too, is struggling to address multiple challenges. There are only 11 branches of the government-owned Rafidain and Rashid banks for a province of more than 1.6 million people. The Diyala Supervisor of Banking stressed the need for private banks to open in the province because they would have better technical infrastructure and more experienced staff.218

Banks do make loans available to Diyala residents, albeit in limited fashion. The GOI Real Estate Bank offers 20-year loans for homes at 2%, while Rafidain offers 15-year loans at 8%. For those who follow Islamic law, which prohibits the payment of interest, the GOI is exploring the establishment of Islamic banks. Prime Minister al-Maliki also recently set up a fund that provides five types of no-interest loans to farmers. But Diyala officials noted that there is no oversight of these loans after the money is lent.219

Natural Gas and Oil
On June 5, 2011, the Ministry of Oil finalized a 20-year contract with a Turkish-led consortium to develop the Mansuriya natural gas field, located about 50 kilometers northeast of Ba’quba, near the Iranian border. The field is estimated to be capable of producing about 320 million cubic feet of gas per day. As part of the deal, Turkey’s state-owned oil and gas company (TPAO) will contribute 50% of the investment needed to exploit this field, the Kuwait Energy Company will contribute 30%, and the Korean Gas Corporation will provide the remaining 20%. Production is not estimated to come on line until 2015.220

The Ministry of Oil announced plans to conduct its fourth hydrocarbon licensing round in early 2012, which would include a large natural-gas exploration site that runs from southern Diyala under the inter-provincial border into northern Wasit.221

Diyala lacks the large oil fields found in provinces to its north and south, further contributing to its relative impoverishment. Most of Diyala’s modest oil deposits are located in the northern area of the province. Naft Kana, the largest field, produces about 16,000 barrels per day, much of which is shipped to Baghdad by truck for refining. According to PRT Diyala, the oil sector provides about 32,000 jobs in Diyala.222

Industrial Activity
According to PRT Diyala, large businesses operating in the province (those with more than 100 employees) provide jobs for more than 11,000 individuals.223 Many of Diyala’s largest firms, however, are not operational. Cheap imports have caused several food-processing plants to cease operations, as their products were priced out of the market. Politics also plays a role. For example, al-Khalis Medicinal Alcohol Plant lies idle because the GOI has denied the owners financing, citing their close association with the former Ba’athist government. Table D.1 summarizes the current state of Diyala’s large businesses.224

State-owned Enterprises: A Case Study
The largest state-owned enterprise (SOE) operating in the province is the Diyala State Company for Electrical Industries (DEI). Established in 1977, the company began producing a variety of small consumer and industrial goods in the early 1980s. Employing more than 3,500
Small and Medium-sized Businesses

While large SOEs dominated much of Iraq’s pre-war command economy, the past eight years have witnessed the rise of smaller, independent businesses. More than 70% of small and medium-sized businesses in Diyala have been established since 2003. Of these, 45% operate in the trade sector, selling consumer goods or other products out of suqs (Arabic for markets) or small shops. Figure D.7 shows a sector breakout of these businesses, comparing them with the rest of Iraq.

Although they pre-date American malls by millennia, suqs serve much the same function, bringing together a wide variety of commercial enterprises and service providers in one location. In Diyala, about 50% of all small businesses are housed in suqs, as are the offices of many doctors, lawyers, and other professionals. Cognizant of their importance to the local economy, AQI conducted operations out of bases located inside the suqs, which consequently suffered significant damage when U.S. and Iraqi forces conducted clearing operations aimed at eliminating these terrorist nests. The Aruba Suq in al-Muqdadiya, Diyala’s largest market, suffered extensive damage as a result of such operations.

Table D.2 summarizes U.S.-funded efforts to refurbish Diyala suqs.
TABLE D.2
U.S.-funded Support for Diyala Suqs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>% of Provincial Business</th>
<th>Number of Shops</th>
<th>Assistance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Aruba (al-Muqdadiya)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2,500 (200 open)</td>
<td>Former headquarters of AQI in Diyala and a major Coalition rehabilitation project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Ba’quba</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>Several Coalition projects have focused on rehabilitating this market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khan Bani Sa’ad</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1,500</td>
<td>CSP is rehabilitating this market and coalition forces have provided roughly $400,000 in microloans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baladrooz</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Rehabilitated by Coalition forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old Ba’quba</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>I-CERP funds are currently being used to rehabilitate this market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Khalis</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>CSP project submitted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abu Sayda</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>CSP project submitted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buhritz (Ba’quba)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>Received some Coalition funding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Mulameen (al-Muqdadiya)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hibhib</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>CSP project submitted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udain (1)</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>CSP project submitted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Udain (2)</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>Rehabilitated by Coalition forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khanaqin</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mandali</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>n/a</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Rule of Law
Citing recent increases in the overall number of convictions, the province’s chief judge and chief prosecutor told SIGIR that the Diyala judiciary, though facing profound challenges, is improving its performance. The chief prosecutor noted that the magnitude and complexity of cases is the main problem facing Diyala judges. He stated that about 70% of recent convictions involved terrorism matters. He said that, “before 2003, the worst case we had was a homicide case,” adding that, “back then, we handled about 175 cases per year… Last year we handled 880 cases.” In looking ahead to the rest of 2011, he said that the court is on track to handle even more cases than in 2010, having opened more than 500 new cases between January and June of this year.231

Police
According to the chief judge and chief prosecutor, the Iraqi police in Diyala are improving. They cited a decrease in the number of pre-trial detainees from 2,500 in November 2010 to around 1,200 in May 2011, suggesting that the police are now less likely to round up suspects and detain them without conducting a proper investigation.232 However, the chief prosecutor voiced concern over the quality of some police. He said that these officers, drawn from army backgrounds, have less respect for court orders. The chief prosecutor added that sometimes these problematic officers will not release a prisoner despite a judge’s ruling, while other times they will not arrest someone even though the court issued a valid warrant for that person’s detention. He also noted that there continue to be some illiterate police officers who cannot perform basic job functions.233

Corruption
Diyala provincial government officials described corruption in the province as rampant, noting that positions that should be occupied by skilled technocrats are instead filled with patronage appointees whose loyalties lie with politicians in Baghdad. Since government jobs are often the only employment to be had, corruption in the public sector affects the entire provincial economy. Several officials mentioned sectarianism as one factor contributing to corruption, as unqualified government officials use their positions to advance the financial and political interests of themselves and their particular affiliations.234

According to Commission of Integrity (COI) officials, GOI anticorruption agencies in Diyala focus their efforts on the capital, and they often lack the will and the means to carry their oversight to the provinces. They cited inadequate resources—such as cars, personnel, office equipment, and funding—and pressure from local officials and religious leaders as factors inhibiting their efforts.235

From January 1 to May 31, 2011, the COI reportedly referred 186 suspects from Diyala to investigative judges (IJJs) for further action: 139 (75%) were accused of violating Article 240, which criminalizes the disobeying of directions given by a public official, and 36 (19%) were alleged to have used forged educational or professional certificates to obtain employment or promotion. Thus, 94% of the COI cases sent to IJJs during that period involved relatively minor allegations, and no cases involving senior Diyala officials had been forwarded for adjudication.236

Living Conditions
In meetings with SIGIR, Diyala officials expressed a pervasive sense of pessimism about the future of the province. As one government official said, “Our fathers lived better than we did, and the lives we
Popular Dissatisfaction with Services

A recent survey of 3,223 Diyala residents conducted by Al-Noor Universal Foundation found widespread dissatisfaction with the provision of government services. Only about 11% of respondents characterized services as either good or very good, while 48% chose the lowest possible descriptive category—bad—to describe the state of public services in the province. Respondents cited five main reasons for poor services:

- unstable security situation
- lack of government oversight
- low levels of civic pride
- inadequate transparency and accountability
- sectarianism among government officials

When asked whether services had improved over the past year, 14% said that they had, while 79% said they had remained the same or deteriorated. Dissatisfaction over cleanliness, health care, education, public works, and availability of fuel was voiced by 65%–80% of all respondents; lack of power was cited as a problem by more than 82%.245

Displaced Persons

According to PRT Diyala, more than 60,000 former residents of Diyala are still displaced, living mostly in Baghdad, Najaf, Kerbala, and Sulymaniyah provinces. In June 2011, the UN reported that 8% of Iraq’s internally displaced persons (IDPs) reside in Diyala, making it one of the provinces most affected by the intercommunal violence that have lived, as difficult as they have been, they are better than the lives our children will lead.” These officials noted that Diyala remains dependent on Baghdad for jobs, subsidies, and other assistance, and remarked that even the agricultural sector—once the driving force behind the provincial economy—is stagnant and underperforming.237

Poverty

A 2009 GOI study listed Diyala as one of Iraq’s five least-developed provinces, along with Muthanna, Thi-Qar, Missan, and Qadissiya. An estimated 33% of Diyala residents have incomes below the national poverty line of about $2.20 per day, compared with a national average of 23%.238 As Figure D.8 shows, the poverty level is greatest in the western parts of the province and in the rural southern district of Baladrooz.

Electricity

Like most of Iraq, the estimated demand for electricity in Diyala province outstrips the available supply, leading to persistent power shortages, especially in the hot summer months. From mid-2008 through the end of 2009, the province’s power situation improved significantly, with the load served by the national grid increasing from 62% of estimated demand to 98%. But the situation began deteriorating in 2010, and this quarter, only about 65% of estimated demand was served.239

Drinking Water

Diyala’s main water sources do not meet the province’s needs. Downstream flows from the Tigris River and smaller rivers originating in Iran and the Kurdistan Region are insufficient supplements to the province’s main drinking-water source, the reservoir formed by the Himreen Dam. The UN reports that more than 40% of all Diyala residents suffer from the irregular availability of drinking water, a figure that rises to 74% in al-Muqdadiya district. Moreover, approximately half of all households in al-Muqdadiya (47%), Kifri (53%), and Baladrooz (40%) districts drink water directly from a stream, river, or lake, although bottled water is readily available in most cities and towns.243

Figure D.8

Poverty in Diyala, by District, 6/2011

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>0–15%</th>
<th>15–25%</th>
<th>25–35%</th>
<th>35%+</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Khalis</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Al-Muqdadiya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Khanaqin</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kifri</td>
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<td>Ba’quba</td>
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<tr>
<td>Baladrooz</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Note: Data reflects the percentage of households reporting average expenditures in the lowest quintile, as measured nationally by the UN.


Power situation improved significantly, with the load served by the national grid increasing from 62% of estimated demand to 98%. But the situation began deteriorating in 2010, and this quarter, only about 65% of estimated demand was served.239

While some of this decrease is attributable to increased demand during the summer months and the proliferation of electronic devices, the percentage of demand met is the lowest it has been for this period since 2007.240

Diyala’s only indigenous power-generation capacity is at the Himreen Dam, with production this quarter averaging a modest 12 megawatts (MW). The bulk of the power consumed in Diyala is imported from Iran.241 The GOI’s Ministry of Electricity currently is in talks with the French company, Alstom, about building a 720 MW combustion-turbine plant in Mansuriya.242

Displaced Persons

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followed the bombing of the Samarra mosque in February 2006. Of all Diyala IDPs, 83% originally resided within the province. As Figure D.9 shows, more than half of Diyala IDPs have taken refuge in Ba’quba district.  

During August–September 2008, more than 40,000 IDPs and refugees returned to Diyala province. The rate of return dropped sharply after that, and in April 2011, the UN reported only 1,810 returns.  

In 2009, the GOI created a Higher Committee to assist Diyala in establishing the conditions to entice displaced persons to return to their homes. The Diyala Initiative focuses on improving public access to water, electricity, food, shelter, and infrastructure. The initiative is supported by the UN and the U.S. government, with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and PRT Diyala assisting in the implementation of governance and agricultural programs. As of January 2011, the GOI had paid almost $30 million to compensate Diyala residents for damage caused by violence.  

### U.S. Reconstruction Program

According to PRT Diyala, since 2003, the U.S. government has spent more than $1.05 billion on infrastructure projects in Diyala province, or about $642 per resident. Figure D.10 shows U.S. expenditures in Diyala by project category and fund, based on information provided in September 2010, by the Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS).  

### USAID Operations in Diyala

USAID reports that its Inma agribusiness program has supported a number of initiatives in Diyala province, including:  

- importing commercially tested fruit trees and grape vines to enhance the quality of local orchards and vineyards  
- supporting a microfinance lending institution that, to date, has disbursed more than 300 loans valued at $976,200 in the province  
- providing training in a variety of specialized areas, including irrigation, livestock husbandry, financial management, and strategic planning  
- supporting two microfinance institutions in Diyala province—al-Thaiqa and al-Amman.  

...providing an $80,000 procurement grant to fund start-up costs associated with the establishment of the Diyala Economic Development Center in December 2009.  

USAID is also working with PRT Diyala to establish the Diyala Small Business Development Center (SBDC). Plans for this new organization are in the early stages, and while USAID has obtained a building for the SBDC, it has not received any funding to support it.  

### Other U.S. Reconstruction Efforts

In October 2010, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) completed work on a $10.7 million regional commando base in Ba’quba for the Iraqi Special Operations Forces. This Iraq Security Forces Fund (ISFF) project was USACE’s largest reconstruction initiative in Diyala. Other significant USACE reconstruction projects completed in Diyala include:  

- a $6.8 million, ISFF-funded location-command facility to support a reinforced Iraqi Army battalion stationed in Baladrooz  
- a $1.7 million, IRRF-funded primary healthcare center in al-Atheem
The DoS Iraq Strategic Partnership Office reported the completion of two projects in Diyala since July 2010:

- **Ba’quba General Hospital Surgical Health Center.** Financed by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and executed by USACE, this $8.7 million project expanded the Ba’quba General Hospital’s surgical health center. This three-story facility center includes a 50-bed intensive-care unit, 20 emergency-room beds, and surgical and trauma operating rooms.

- **Baghdad-Kirkuk Carriageway South.** This roadway-improvement project running through Diyala was executed by the Ministry of Construction and Housing using an $11.3 million IRRF grant. ISPO reported that the only remaining project it oversees in Diyala is an assessment of the Khan Bani Sa’ad prison site.

**SIGIR Oversight**
In 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority issued a task order to Parsons Delaware, Inc. (Parsons), to design and construct the 3,600-bed Khan Bani Sa’ad Correctional Facility in Diyala province. In June 2006, the U.S. government terminated the contract for default on the part of Parsons, leaving the facility partially completed. Subsequently, the U.S. government awarded three successor contracts to complete the work. In June 2007, the U.S. government, citing security reasons, terminated all remaining work on the project after investing approximately $40 million of the IRRF. Two months later, USACE unilaterally transferred the prison to the GOI, although the Ministry of Justice had informed USACE representatives that it would not “complete, occupy, or provide security” for the facility.

In June 2008, SIGIR inspected the prison, finding construction deficiencies, generally poor workmanship, and potentially dangerous conditions. SIGIR also determined that most of the $1.2 million in materials that the contractor reported as “abandoned” when the contract was terminated were missing from the site. In July 2011, GOI officials in Diyala province informed SIGIR that the correctional facility, which locals refer to as “the whale,” remained idle.

This quarter, ISPO reported that it is studying the current status of the prison site to confirm previous assessment results and assist in preparing an estimate of how much it would cost to render the facility useable. The study will also explore GOI interest, if any, in using the site.