Background

Stretching from Baghdad’s western suburbs to the borders of Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, Anbar province—Iraq’s largest geographically—encompasses 32% of the country’s land area, but contains only about 5% of its population. Almost three-quarters of Anbar’s estimated 1.6 million residents live in the province’s two most populous districts, Ramadi and Falluja, both of which lie within easy driving distance of Baghdad. Mostly desert and sparsely inhabited, Anbar has the lowest population density of any province in Iraq, with about 10 persons per square mile.\(^{254}\)

Anbar’s predominantly Sunni Arab population is almost evenly divided between those living in urban (52%) and rural (48%) settings, with almost all of the urban residents living in a series of towns and cities stretching northwest from Falluja along the fertile Euphrates River valley to al-Qaim.\(^{255}\) To the south and southwest of this settled corridor lies Anbar province’s largest district, al-Rutba, whose arid deserts dominate the landscape all the way to Iraq’s borders with Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Of the complex mosaic of tribes, clans, and families that have dominated Anbar’s politics and economy for centuries, the Dulaimi tribal confederation is the most prominent. Historically, the Dulaimis used their strategic position astride the trade routes between Baghdad and points west to extort payment from travelers, traders, and pilgrims alike. In World War I, much of the Dulaimi confederacy initially supported the Ottomans, later switching sides when British forces turned the tide against the Turks in 1917. In later years, the Dulaimis, in general, supported the Ba’athists, receiving a measure of autonomy and patronage. However, they too often fell victim to Ba’athist depredations, making their support for the government tenuous and conditional. Initially quiescent after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in April 2003, many of the Dulaimis soon became supporters of the insurgency—at least for a time.\(^{256}\)

Post-invasion Developments

A Deteriorating Situation, 2003–2006

Although Anbar was not the scene of any major engagements during the three-week campaign in 2003 to depose the Ba’athist government, the province quickly became a center of insurgent activity. When the Coalition Provisional Authority disbanded the Iraqi Army in May 2003, untold thousands of Anbari men were summarily put out of a job, losing both a source of income and personal status. Moreover, Anbar—which means granary or storehouse in Arabic and is derived from the Persian word for arsenal—was the site of at least 96 ammunition and weapon storage sites and much of Iraq’s domestic arms industry.\(^{257}\) With relatively few Coalition personnel policing the vast province in 2003, and fewer still guarding its lengthy border with Syria, many of these sites were looted by insurgents, making Anbar’s pacification that much more challenging. Largely unscathed by the battles of March–April 2003, many of the estimated 40,000 Ba’athist security and intelligence officials who resided in Anbar soon became active in the burgeoning insurgency.\(^{258}\)

As the insurgency grew in numbers, strength, and audacity, Falluja became one of the centers of resistance to the U.S.-led
Coalition. On March 31, 2004, four U.S. contractors working for Blackwater USA were ambushed and butchered by insurgent forces in Falluja—their bodies subsequently desecrated and paraded through the streets. In response to these well-publicized murders, the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) ordered U.S. Marines to storm Falluja. But on April 9—four days after the assault began and before the city had been secured—MNF-I ordered the Marines to halt the attack under pressure from leading Iraqi politicians and the Arab media. Over the ensuing months, U.S. Marines cordoned off Falluja before storming and taking the city in November 2004.²⁵⁹

While Falluja saw much of the heaviest fighting in 2004, MNF-I also conducted operations throughout Anbar province between 2003 and 2006, including campaigns in Ramadi, al-Qaim, and Haditha, and along the upper stretches of the Euphrates River valley.²⁶⁰ Figure 3.3 displays some of the most significant events affecting Anbar’s security between 2003 and 2009, and Figure 3.4 shows the number of monthly security incidents in the province from January 2004 to December 2010.


In the initial stages of the insurgency, many of the Sunni tribal sheiks allied—sometimes actively, other times tacitly—with foreign fighters and former regime members to resist the Coalition and the new, Shia-dominated Government of Iraq (GOI), whom they perceived as undercutting their traditional authority. But as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) began increasingly brutal tactics, several leading sheiks built ad hoc alliances with Coalition units to oppose AQI in
a movement that became known as the Anbar Awakening, or the Sahwa.\textsuperscript{261}

The first stirrings of the Awakening came in 2005 when a few sheiks switched sides to fight AQI. Defection begat defection throughout the next year, culminating on September 14, 2006, in a public statement issued by a convention of Anbari sheiks that they would join with MNF-I to combat the insurgency.\textsuperscript{262} According to Awakening leader Sheikh Ahmad Abu Risha, whose brother was one of the Awakening’s leaders until he was killed in September 2007, Anbar’s tribes provided approximately 40,000 recruits for the security forces (28,000 for the police and 12,000 for the army).\textsuperscript{263} In an April meeting with SIGIR, Sheikh Abu Risha emphasized that the Sahwa was not a U.S. program, but rather an indigenous movement created to fight AQI’s extremism.\textsuperscript{264}

Coalition forces were quick to capitalize on the Awakening movement, beginning in 2007 to subsidize and otherwise support Anbar sheiks who had chosen to ally with the Coalition.\textsuperscript{265} As part of this strategic shift toward empowering local leaders willing to fight AQI, MNF-I commanders in June 2007 began using Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) funds to hire former insurgents to guard checkpoints and neighborhoods throughout Anbar province as part of the broader Sons of Iraq (SOI) program.\textsuperscript{266} Although the empirical effects of the SOI program on security in Anbar are difficult to quantify, a SIGIR audit issued in January 2011 suggests that, in at least some cities and towns, they may have been positive. Figure 3.5 summarizes some of the audit’s findings as they pertain to Anbar province.

The pivotal year of 2007 also saw the beginning of the U.S. troop surge. Announced by President Bush in January of that year, this five-brigade, Baghdad-focused reinforcement effort also included extending the tours of duty for about 4,000 U.S. Marines stationed in Anbar.\textsuperscript{267} The cumulative effects of “the surge” devastated the insurgency in Anbar province. In the words of one U.S. soldier, AQI had “overplayed [its] hand” —and lost.\textsuperscript{271}

As Figure 3.6 makes clear, the combined effects of the Awakening and “the surge” devastated the insurgency in Anbar province. In the words of one U.S. soldier, AQI had “overplayed [its] hand” —and lost.\textsuperscript{271}

The cost of this apparent victory in U.S. lives, however, has been profound. Since

**Figure 3.5
SONS OF IRAQ IN ANBAR PROVINCE**

Beginning in October 2008, the Government of Iraq (GOI) progressively assumed full management responsibility for the Sons of Iraq (SOI) program from Coalition forces, taking control of more than 4,000 Anbari personnel on February 1, 2009. Under the terms of an agreement with the Multi-National Force-Iraq, the GOI promised to provide government employment for all 95,120 SOI members. A SIGIR audit released last quarter, however, reported that meeting this goal has been challenging. As of December 2010, 41% of all SOI personnel had been transferred to GOI jobs—but none from Anbar province. Anbar SOI members also receive lower salaries than SOI from other provinces. According to USF-I, the GOI pays Anbar SOI members $130 per month, which is less than the $240–300 per month that most other SOI members receive.

Note: USF-I states that a number of Anbar SOI members transitioned to the ISF when the U.S. military administered the program. Five of the nine provinces with SOI have seen no transitions since the GOI took over the program.


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Anbar official speaks at the “Hope of Anbar” conference in 2007 in Ramadi. (DoD photo)

This multifaceted U.S. and Iraqi approach were immediate and apparent:

- The number of new police recruits in Ramadi tripled in June 2006 and again in July.\textsuperscript{268}
- Attacks in Anbar decreased from a high of 1,350 in October 2006 to about 200 in August 2007.\textsuperscript{269}
- Insurgents carried out a daily average of 32 attacks in Anbar and neighboring Salah Al-Din provinces between mid-February and early May 2007; the average declined to 11 daily attacks between early December 2007 and late February 2008.\textsuperscript{270}

As Figure 3.6 makes clear, the combined effects of the Awakening and “the surge” devastated the insurgency in Anbar province. In the words of one U.S. soldier, AQI had “overplayed [its] hand” —and lost.\textsuperscript{271}

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Anbar official speaks at the “Hope of Anbar” conference in 2007 in Ramadi. (DoD photo)

Anbar sheiks and Iraqi policemen dance during the “Hope of Anbar” conference. (DoD photo)

2003, at least 1,335 U.S. troops have been killed in action in Anbar province.\textsuperscript{272}

**Fragile Stability, 2008–2011**

With the security situation dramatically improving, 2008 became a year of transition. In February, U.S. Marines turned over security responsibility for the once-violent town of Heet to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). As the summer wore on, ISF units increasingly took the lead in conducting joint security operations. The transition culminated on September 1, when Anbar (after a brief delay) became the eleventh province transferred to Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC), a process that placed Iraqi forces in charge of security in the province.\textsuperscript{273}

As the violence diminished, Anbaris said they would be more willing to turn to local police when victimized by a crime, rather than relying on family members. Figure 3.7 shows how trust in both the Awakening members and local police
units grew between 2008 and 2009. According to Sheik Abu Risha, in recent years Iraqi courts have convicted and sentenced to death about 160 terrorists for committing capital crimes in Anbar.\textsuperscript{274}

Security in 2011

Today, while security in Anbar has improved, GOI civilian and military officials are regularly targeted by insurgents, as are leading sheiks and members of the Awakening movement. For example, on April 12, terrorists detonated a bomb that partially destroyed the house of an Awakening member in Baghdad’s western suburbs, wounding several of his family members. Despite these difficulties, Sheik Abu Risha declared that his Sahwa “will never turn to al-Qaeda,” but warned that this “does not mean we will sit still when we are being threatened.”\textsuperscript{275} Figure 3.8 provides details of some of the violent incidents that took place in Anbar province between January 1 and April 11, 2011.\textsuperscript{276}

In addition, the deputy chairman of the Provincial Council noted that terrorists are being released from prison because, in some cases, U.S. troops who arrested them did not prepare sufficient paperwork to obtain convictions in Iraqi courts. As a result, some terrorists are
roaming freely, he said, and “the security situation is deteriorating rapidly.” He also observed that the army and police seemed to be the national government’s priorities, not the intelligence agencies, remarking that a more effective Iraqi intelligence apparatus could better counter foreign influences. He pointedly stated, “We have neighboring countries with intelligence agents working in Iraq trying to make the American democracy experiment here fail.”

The uncertain security situation has taken a toll on many residents. One provincial government official noted, “Right now we are completely confused. We call the occupier our friend. My friend who sits beside me—I don’t know if he will blow himself up.” Another added, “We now have cell phones, we have money, most of us here have houses and jobs. But we lack security. We send our children to school and don’t know if they will come back. We ride in nice cars but we don’t know if someone will plant a sticky bomb on them.”

In a series of April 2011 meetings, Anbari officials and citizens expressed to SIGIR an almost unanimous desire for continued U.S. military support to help maintain security in Iraq after the scheduled withdrawal of U.S. forces in December. Moreover, they reported that they seek expanded interaction with American businesses and diplomats.

**Restructuring Anbar’s Police Officer Corps**

When the U.S. military raced to train sufficient ISF in Anbar to stem the tide of the insurgency, they were unable to identify enough qualified officers willing to fill high-level positions in the police force. Necessity drove them to convey “honorary” rank to about 800 personnel who were, by default, performing the roles of more senior officers. Unfortunately, that resulted in “brigadier generals who can’t even read,” said newly appointed Police Chief Brigadier General Hadi. The Ministry of Interior (MOI) is now stripping those who hold these positions of their inflated rank, resulting in the loss of about half of the provincial police’s senior officer corps (newly demoted policemen can still remain *shurta*, or rank-and-file police, at lower pay). Chief Hadi told SIGIR that he hopes to make up the balance by allowing Saddam-era officers from the rank of second lieutenant to major to return to the force once they pass vetting procedures being run by the Justice and Accountability Commission.

Unhappiness with these terms could be a source of unrest in an already fragile security environment. The Deputy Chairman of the Provincial Council, Sadoun al-Jumayli, noted that, “because these officers know it is a fake rank, they are now stealing as much as they can, causing corruption to increase. They are also derelict in their duties because they do not have the right experience to hold these high ranks.” The MOI inspector general (IG) is aware of these issues and remarked that, given Anbar’s overwhelmingly Sunni population, replacement officers will likely be Sunnis. The MOI IG added that any attempt to use the righting of this problem to purge Sunnis from the police force will be closely monitored by his office.
Governance

Provincial Governments

Because Anbar’s population is almost exclusively Sunni Arab, its elections have been free of the sectarian strife that has defined political competition in more diverse provinces, such as Diyala, Tameem, and Baghdad. However, most Sunni Arabs boycotted Iraq’s first provincial elections in 2005, with only about 4,000 Anbar voters casting ballots. This changed dramatically in the next round of provincial elections, conducted in January 2009. Then, more than 300,000 Anbaris voted, and seven parties won at least two seats. The party headed by Awakening leader Sheik Abu Risha led the way, garnering eight seats and winning a plurality on the 27-seat council.

Representation in Baghdad

In Baghdad, Anbar is currently represented by 14 members on the Council of Representatives: 11 from former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi’s al-Iraqiya bloc, 2 from the Iraqi Accord bloc, and 1 from the Iraqi Unity Alliance. Sheik Abu Risha stated that the province’s overwhelming support for the Shia former Prime Minister demonstrates that Anbar’s Sunnis are willing to support Shia candidates “as long as they are Iraqis who love the country.”

Protests: An Incentive For Improved Governance

This quarter, large demonstrations in Ramadi and Falluja demanded Governor Qasim’s resignation. In response to the protesters’ demands for better public services, more jobs, and less corruption, Anbar’s government has formed several committees comprising concerned citizens to work with provincial officials to oversee contracting efforts and provide greater transparency.

Ramadi: A City Largely in Ruins

The provincial capital of Ramadi was the scene of several years of heavy fighting between Coalition and insurgent forces. Dilapidated, rubble-strewn, half-heartedly repaired, and largely abandoned, it remains one of the most devastated cities in contemporary Iraq. The markets are shuttered, and graffiti and debris line the major roadways. Investors—both Iraqi and foreign—have largely avoided...
Ramadi, and police officials told SIGIR that until investment improves the lives of Ramadi’s residents, the recent security gains will remain tenuous.289

Governor Qasim and Sheik Abu Risha on Anbar’s Future
Two prominent political leaders in Anbar have expressed a strong desire for some form of continued U.S. military presence in Iraq beyond 2011, emphasizing the need to support the still-immature ISF and guard against regional powers interfering in Iraq’s domestic affairs:

- **Governor Qasim.** “Iraq is not able to secure its borders, not able to secure its cities. I am personally trying, talking to government officials in Baghdad. We have no choice; we should say the facts. If we lose security, we lose everything. I hope the Americans will not leave at the end of your time. All we are talking about will be lost.”290

- **Sheik Abu Risha.** “If you stay, no one will ask you to leave. If you leave, we want you to continue to protect us. So continue your presence in one way or another.”291

Budgeting for the Future
There is near-universal agreement among Anbar officials that anticipated growth in the 2011 provincial budget will help maintain stability once U.S. troops depart at year’s end. Governor Qasim’s adversaries on the Provincial Council are maintaining relationships with him, as they must cooperate to get this money. The 2011 budget will be dramatically larger for three reasons:292

- The Iraq Budget Law of 2011—shepherd through the CoR by the new Minister of Finance Rafi al-Eissawi, a native of Falluja—gives Anbar 100% of customs charges levied in the province, as opposed to the 2010 Budget Law that allowed for the retention of just 5% of such fees.
- Unspent provincial funds from 2008 and 2009 will be rolled over to 2011.
- About $650 million that was not spent on electricity projects in Anbar will be included in the 2011 budget.

According to one Provincial Council member, the priority for 2011 will be improving essential services, whereas the priorities in 2009 and 2010 budgets were finishing old projects. “Everyone thinks this money is coming; there are huge expectations,” said one Anbar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) official. “The governor has promised 12 hours of power for residential customers by July 1,” as opposed to the 5 hours per day they currently receive. The provincial government is also planning to build major water treatment plants in Ramadi, Heet, and Haditha.

Economic Development

**Natural Advantages**
Despite its arid landscape and small population, Anbar possesses distinct advantages that could allow it to reap significant economic benefits from the improved security environment and investment climate. Encompassing most of Iraq’s major western trade routes, Anbar is well positioned to benefit from increased economic ties with the bordering countries of Jordan, Syria, and Saudi Arabia. Anbar is also home to many of the once-lush tourist complexes surrounding Lake Habbaniyah and Lake Tharthar, whose proximity to Baghdad made them a popular destination for Iraqis in more peaceful times. Indicative of its former prominence, Habbaniyah Tourist Village won the 1986 Gold Cup for best tourist city from the World Tourism Organization.293 Currently, the Anbar Investment Commission (AIC) is considering a variety of plans to refurbish the hotels, parks, and recreational facilities serving eastern Anbar’s major lakes.294

Anbar’s natural resources also provide a potential foundation for prosperity. The province contains significant deposits of industrially useful minerals, such as gypsum, dolomite, phosphate, and silica.295 The particular type of silica found in Anbar is especially useful in making high-quality glass products.296 Anbar also may contain extensive, as-yet-untapped oil and gas fields.297 Largely unexplored, no accurate comprehensive estimates exist as to the amount of oil and gas lying beneath Anbar’s deserts. With significant fields easily accessible in the Kurdish north and the Shia south, Iraq’s Sunni west has been neglected by the central government and international firms. To remedy this, the Ministry of Oil has announced that it intends to include additional sites in Anbar province in an auction of exploration blocks, scheduled to be held later this year. This auction would open up unexplored regions of Iraq...
to international oil companies to search for new oil and natural gas deposits. One such gas deposit is the Akkas non-associated natural gas field. Located near the Syrian border, Akkas is estimated to hold about 5.6 trillion cubic feet of gas. In October 2010, a consortium led by Korea Gas Corporation and Kazakhstan’s national KazMunaiGas National Company won the right to develop Anbar’s Akkas gas field. However, Anbar officials, led by Governor Qasim, immediately protested the potential deal on the grounds that Baghdad may prefer to export the gas extracted from Akkas to the lucrative European market instead of using those reserves to meet Anbar’s energy needs.

In late February, it appeared that initial objections to the deal had been overcome and that the consortium would soon sign a final contract with the GOI. But on February 24, Ministry of Oil officials announced that the signing was postponed indefinitely because Anbar officials wanted greater control over how the revenue would be spent, as well as promises of additional jobs for Anbaris.

Anbar Investment Commission’s Plans
Created in November 2008 to encourage domestic and foreign investment in the province, the AIC has issued licenses for 40 projects, including 13 in the housing sector, 9 in the industrial sector, 7 tourism projects, 6 projects in the commercial sector, and 5 in other sectors. Of these, the AIC reports that only 13 have begun. Examples of projects that have started include:

- amusement parks in Ramadi, Falluja, and Heet
- three residential housing complexes and a hotel in Ramadi
- factories for making plastics and animal feed
- a new medical complex in Ramadi

In the coming years, the AIC plans to emphasize agricultural redevelopment projects, while continuing to encourage investment in the tourism and housing sectors. Anbari officials and businessmen also emphasized the need for more banks to open outposts in the province, noting that the lack of access to financial institutions contributes greatly to Anbar’s underdevelopment.

The Anbar provincial government also recently formed the Anbar Economic Growth Council to encourage investment. This body is intended to provide foreign investors with an easily accessible source for information on business opportunities in the province.

Minimal Foreign Investment
Deterred by the unsettled security situation, foreign companies have been reluctant to invest in Anbar province. According to one study, projects based in Anbar accounted for less than 1% of all foreign money invested in Iraq between 2003 and 2009. But improved security appears to be luring some foreign investors to Anbar. This quarter, a delegation of companies from the People’s Republic of China visited Anbar to discuss investment opportunities, focusing on potentially refurbishing the large, but archaic, cement production facilities at al-Qaim in the province’s far northwest.

State-owned Enterprises: A Case Study
As of December 2010, 5 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were operating in Anbar province—most at suboptimal levels, relying on old equipment and inefficient management techniques. One example is the Anbar Ceramics Factory. Located in Ramadi, this factory produces wall tiles, floor tiles, and fixtures for health care facilities. Before 2003, the factory employed 700 people and three assembly lines. In 2005, after two years of irregular operations, it closed because of concerns about the security situation.

In 2007, the factory re-opened after the embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team (ePRT) and the Task Force for Business and Stability Operations (TFBSO) installed Italian-made ceramics machines and provided $930,000 worth of training to its employees. As of December 2010, the factory employed 640 personnel, operated at 30% capacity, and concentrated on producing toilets and sinks using the Italian equipment.
does not provide support to the factory, however, and factory managers informed SIGIR officials that they will need assistance from private investors to improve plant performance.304

Agriculture
About 25% of Anbaris with jobs are employed in the agricultural sector, working on farms that grow the province’s main crops: wheat, potatoes, barley, and vegetables. But severe droughts in 2009 and 2010 adversely affected production, and yields for 2011 remain uncertain. Anbar averages about 115 millimeters (mm) of annual rainfall. This places it on a par with Las Vegas—which gets approximately 114 mm per year—and well below the average annual rainfall in Baghdad (155 mm) and Basrah (149 mm), making its agricultural sector especially vulnerable.305 As Iraq’s upstream neighbors continue to construct dams on waterways crucial to irrigating Anbar’s fields, the province’s farms may face increasing difficulties in coming years.

Electricity
Power shortages remain a severe problem in the province. According to a 2009 RAND study, all of the 1,200 Anbar households surveyed experienced either daily power cutoffs or stated that their electricity is off more than half the time—255 MW.307 In a December meeting with SIGIR, Anbar’s Director General for Electricity Distribution, a representative of the MOE, stated that the province requires 900 MW to meet demand, but receives only about 120 MW. He also stated that Anbar’s electricity infrastructure receives inadequate funding from both the national and provincial governments, citing an 80% shortfall in needed funds. According to the Director General, the province requires approximately 400 more transformers. Anbar PRT officials stated to SIGIR that they had provided 186 transformers to the Anbar provincial government along with transmission lines for two substations. PRT officials further stated that the central government had provided only 7 transformers, as of December 2010.308

As part of its plan to expand generating capacity throughout the country over the next five years, the MOE intends to locate one of the GE “Mega Deal” power plants, with a capacity of 250 MW, in Anbar. Three other plants, at various stages of consideration or planning, could add 120 MW to 1,250 MW more during this period, depending on if and when they are built.309

Corruption
In the first nine months of 2010, the Commission of Integrity’s (COI) Anbar field office obtained arrest warrants against 125 GOI officials on charges of corruption, serving 52 of them and detaining 26 suspects. But prosecuting these cases to their conclusion remains as difficult in Anbar as it does in the rest of Iraq. The COI was only able to obtain three corruption convictions against Anbari officials during the first nine months of 2010.310

Living Conditions
Unemployment
The UN estimates Anbar’s unemployment rate at about 14%, somewhat lower than its estimated national average of 18% and significantly lower than USAID’s national estimate of 28%–38%.311 According to the UN, however, more than 50% of all jobs in the province are “unwaged,” with two-thirds of such positions found in the agricultural sector.312

Health Care
Anbar suffers from a shortage of medical professionals and health care facilities. As of late 2010, the AIC reported that 11 hospitals and 13 main health care centers were operating in the province. These facilities were staffed by approximately 550 doctors, 850 nurses, and 160 pharmacists.313 Anbar’s ratio of approximately 1 doctor for every 2,700 citizens places it on par with Nicaragua and Burma, near the bottom of all developing nations.314

Notwithstanding its dearth of medical personnel, Anbar slightly exceeds Iraq’s national average in other health care indicators, as measured by the UN’s Millennium Development Goals. For example, Anbar’s under-five mortality rate per 1,000 live births is somewhat lower than the national average (30.0 versus 41.1), while...
the percentage of one-year-old children immunized against measles is slightly higher (85% versus 81%). More than 25% of the province’s children, however, are considered “chronically malnourished.”

Education
Anbar is home to two public universities, one private college, and more than 1,500 other educational institutions. Together they employ about 35,000 staff to serve approximately 650,000 students.

Internally Displaced Persons
More than 50,000 residents of Falluja and Ramadi fled their homes in the aftermath of the February 2006 Samarra mosque bombing. As the security situation has improved, many internally displaced persons (IDPs) have returned home only to find inadequate services to support their families. Ramadi, for example, hosts a large number of returned IDPs in temporary settlements rife with poverty and shortages. Of those returning IDPs polled by the UN, 97% cited food as their primary need, 81% required shelter, and 75% were in need of a job.

U.S. Reconstruction Initiatives
Since 2003, the U.S. government has spent more than $2 billion on reconstruction programs and projects in Anbar province, including funding a Financial Times-affiliated magazine supplement naming Governor Qasim as a “Global Personality of the Year.” On a per capita basis, the United States has spent more money in Anbar than in any of Iraq’s 17 other provinces—about $1,355 per resident. Figure 3.10 shows U.S. expenditures in Anbar province, by project category and fund.

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Examples of recently completed projects by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) include:

- a $21.9 million Iraq Security Forces Fund project to construct an ISF command facility at Habbaniyah, former site of a World War II-era British aerodrome—completed in September 2010
- a $5 million Economic Support Fund (ESF) project to renovate buildings associated with a hospital complex in Haditha—completed in April 2010

Ongoing projects being managed by USACE include building 64 kilometers of border roads, enhancing the facilities at a Saddam-era airbase in western Anbar, and constructing a vehicle maintenance warehouse in Ramadi. These projects are scheduled to be completed by the end of the year.

Iraq Strategic Partnership Office’s Ongoing Projects
This quarter, DoS’s Iraq Strategic Partnership Office (ISPO) reported on three ongoing projects in Anbar province:

- **Hussaiba 33/11-kV substation.** This $2.4 million ESF project is currently in its final stages.
- **Ramadi 132-kV substation.** This $29.2 million IRRF project is undergoing final tests before being commissioned and transferred to the MOE.
- **Al Anbar University accreditation program.** The objective of this $2.5 million ESF program is to attain American Board of Engineering and Technology accreditation for the university. If successful, it would be the first Iraqi school so accredited. The first phase of this project is complete, and the second phase is expected to commence later this year.

USAID Activities in Anbar Province
To date, USAID’s Tijara program has facilitated 13,034 microfinance loans in Anbar province for a total of $27.7 million and helped disburse 133 small- and medium-enterprise (SME) loans through the Bank of Baghdad and North Bank for a total of $3.41 million. The majority of SME loans funded businesses in the trade and agricultural sectors.

USAID’s Inma agricultural-development program has several ongoing initiatives in Anbar province, including projects aimed at increasing the capacities of:

- livestock feedlots
- forage sites
- fruit and vegetable packing facilities
- orchards and vineyards

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**Figure 3.10**

**U.S.-funded Infrastructure Projects in Anbar Province, by Category and Fund**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Category</th>
<th>% of $2,033.82 Million</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ISFF Defense Forces</td>
<td>33.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electrical</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISFF Interior Forces</td>
<td>11.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security &amp; Justice</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Works &amp; Water</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>7.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>5.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Development</td>
<td>5.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private-sector Development</td>
<td>4.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health</td>
<td>3.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buildings</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oil</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---

**Note:** Numbers affected by rounding.

**Source:** IRMS, Global Benchmark, 9/3/2010.
• potato, mushroom, and strawberry fields

In addition to these programs, Inma also provides training to Anbari farmers at its nine Field-Based Learning Centers and supports industry roundtables that bring farmers together with vendors, wholesalers, and marketers.324 USAID was also active in other sectors, supporting the 2009 provincial elections and the 2010 national elections, providing employment opportunities for Anbari youth, and working with local civil-society organizations. Moreover, as part of the overall U.S. counterinsurgency effort, USAID’s Community Stabilization Program (CSP) began operating in Anbar in November 2006, concluding operations there in March 2009. During that period, the program issued 940 grants totaling $6.1 million. Some of the most notable CSP projects included the establishment of educational training centers and the Ramadi Public Library.325

Anbar Provincial Reconstruction Team
Established in 2006, the Anbar Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is scheduled to cease operations in September 2011. As of March 1, PRT Anbar had 32 projects left to complete, including projects in the water, transportation, education, and sewage treatment sectors. Tables 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7 summarize the completed and ongoing work of the Anbar PRT.326

The Anbar PRT has the most seamless coordination between civilian and military components of any visited by SIGIR in the past four years. For example, CERP funds here are executed and managed by the PRT in coordination with seven PRT staff provided by the military. Moreover, some team members have spent 3–5 years in the same location. There are also several U.S. military and civilian personnel embedded with provincial government officials at their offices. According to PRT officials, all recent CERP projects and nearly all Quick Response Fund projects receive about 50% of their financing from Iraqi sources. In addition, these projects have Iraqi support from the start since they originate with local communities, nongovernmental organizations, or provincial government officials.

Anbari Perceptions of U.S. Reconstruction Effort
Notwithstanding this substantial expenditure of U.S. funds, many Anbaris lament that these projects have not led to tangible improvements in their lives—often contrasting the United States unfavorably with Iraq’s former colonial masters, the British. However, most Anbari officials expressed gratitude to SIGIR for the U.S. expenditure in blood and treasure, noting that U.S.-created institutions of democratic governance democracy appear to have taken root in Anbar, with popular discontent increasingly channeled through non-violent channels.327

In a recent meeting with SIGIR officials, Governor Qasim compared the U.S. rebuilding program with projects built by the British during the first half of the twentieth century, declaring “What have the Americans built in Anbar? The British left a legacy in 1958—the Americans will not leave a physical legacy in Anbar.”328 The Governor cited a railway, bridge, and the University of Baghdad as major British contributions that have left a lasting legacy in Iraq. By comparison, the Ramadi library is the most visible U.S. project in Anbar.329 PRT officials later noted that the United States intentionally did not brand its projects because of security concerns and a desire to build support for the provincial government among the local populace.320 Consequently, U.S. officials point out, many local residents may be unaware of the size and scope of the U.S. commitment to Anbar since 2003.

The Director General for Water in Anbar province stated that, before the chaos

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### Table 3.5
**Anbar PRT Activities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective 1: Build the capacity of Anbar’s provincial government.</th>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>In execution phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sectors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water supply, treatment, and distribution</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sanitary wastewater treatment</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sewers</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safety and security</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective 2: Support GOI activities to sustain essential services.</th>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>In execution phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sectors</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Initiatives in Water, Sewer, Power &amp; Transportation</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic development, governance, agriculture &amp; rule of law</td>
<td>183</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objective 3: Mentor and advise GOI officials to promote long-term essential services solutions for all Anbaris.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Activities include: Conducting planning and strategy meetings with all technical directorates and mentoring both provincial and national government staff members.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FOCUS ON ANBAR

TABLE 3.6
ANBAR PRT, REMAINING PROJECTS,

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROJECTS LEFT</th>
<th>VALUE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March</td>
<td>$2,490,075</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April</td>
<td>$2,688,599</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June</td>
<td>$3,267,636</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July</td>
<td>$4,693,496</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 3.7
ANBAR PRT TOTAL SPENDING
FY 2010

| Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) | $77 million |
| Quick Response Fund (QRF)                   | $7 million |
| Provincial Reconstruction Development Committee | $5 million |
| Total                                       | $69 million |

of 2003, there were laws; people did not illegally tap into water lines. But he also conceded that prior to 2003, there was not a single water treatment plant in the villages. Today, “there is not a single village without water treatment.” In commenting on the inherent messiness of democracy, he stated that he “now has more sheiks in his office than employees,” and they all have unrealistic demands about what he can provide to them. He added that all the U.S. money and projects have “spilled them rotten,” adding that he cannot keep up with those demands.331

SIGIR Oversight

Since 2004, SIGIR has published 17 reports on U.S.-funded programs and projects in Anbar province, including the Falluja Wastewater Treatment Plant, the Anbar Rule of Law Complex, and the 132-kV substation in Ramadi. Table 3.8 summarizes SIGIR’s oversight findings, and the following provide further details:

- **Falluja Waste Water Treatment Plant.** Begun in 2004, construction of the system has been subject to multiple delays due to security problems and a lack of local skilled labor. Funded by the Development Fund for Iraq, IRRF, and CERP, the project was originally supposed to cost $32.5 million, be completed in 18 months (January 2006) by one contractor, and serve all homes in Falluja. However, a series of SIGIR inspections found that it will ultimately cost about $98 million, under at least 46 separate contracts, and serve only 38% of Falluja’s homes. In an April 2011 follow-up visit to the facility, SIGIR learned that while complete, the plant is still not serving a single Falluja resident. Its future remains contingent on finding enough qualified engineers to operate the facility. Moreover, it will still be several months before there are enough homes hooked up to provide the sewage necessary to run the plant, but this will occur only if the plant is connected to the main power grid or receives enough fuel to run the temporary generators.

- **Anbar Rule of Law Complex.** This $21.4 million project was funded from the IRRF, ISFF, and Iraq Interim Government Fund. The objective was to design and construct a secure facility for Iraqi criminal justice officials operating in Anbar province. SIGIR’s assessment of the complex did not find any significant deficiencies, concluding that the project provided three separate courthouses for judges to hear cases, a pre-trial detention facility, and training and office facilities.

- **Ramadi 132-kV Substation.** The objective of this unfinished $29 million, IRRF-funded project was to provide a fully functional substation compatible with the MOE’s transmission system. SIGIR’s review determined that construction work associated with the substation appeared to meet the standards of the contract; however, the inspection provided recommendations for improvements in the contractor’s quality-control systems.
## Table 3.8
**SIGIR Oversight in Anbar Province**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment Number</th>
<th>Project Name</th>
<th>Project Funding</th>
<th>Contractor</th>
<th>Met Contract Specs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-08-144</td>
<td>Falluja Waste Water Treatment Plant</td>
<td>$83,297,392 (IRRF)</td>
<td>Fluor/AMEC</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-08-153</td>
<td>Ramadi 132-kV Substation</td>
<td>$28,789,029 (IRRF)</td>
<td>Symbion-Ozdil-Al Namraq Joint Venture</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-08-152</td>
<td>Anbar Rule of Law/Judicial Complex</td>
<td>$21,461,905 (IRRF, ISFF, IIGF)</td>
<td>ALMCO Limited</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-08-146</td>
<td>Falluja Waste Water Treatment Plant, Pump Station 1 and 2</td>
<td>$7,223,472 (CERP)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-09-191</td>
<td>Al-Qaim 33/11kV Electrical Mobile Substation</td>
<td>$6,460,630 (ESF)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-08-132</td>
<td>Haditha General Hospital</td>
<td>$5,033,791 (ESF)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-09-172</td>
<td>Abu Ghraib Dairy</td>
<td>$3,400,000 (IFF)</td>
<td>State Company for Dairy Products</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-08-145</td>
<td>Falluja Waste Water Treatment Plant, Area A Construction and Repair</td>
<td>$2,906,420 (IRRF)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-08-148</td>
<td>Falluja Waste Water Treatment Plant, Earthwork for the Treatment Plant</td>
<td>$2,768,877 (DFI)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-08-147</td>
<td>Falluja Waste Water Treatment Plant, Force Main for the Falluja Sewer</td>
<td>$1,803,949 (DFI)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-09-170</td>
<td>Mujarrah Canal Bridge</td>
<td>$1,261,500 (CERP)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-09-192</td>
<td>Haditha Dam Perimeter Security</td>
<td>$997,500 (ESF)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-08-134</td>
<td>Haditha Primary Health Care Center</td>
<td>$537,780 (IRRF)</td>
<td>Parsons/Local</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-08-133</td>
<td>Heet Primary Health Care Center</td>
<td>$412,130 (IRRF)</td>
<td>Parsons/Local</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-08-140</td>
<td>Rebuilding of the Sagrah School</td>
<td>$399,050 (CERP)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-08-142</td>
<td>Refurbishment of the Al Shurhabil School</td>
<td>$268,000 (CERP)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR PA-08-141</td>
<td>Refurbishment of Al Iqitadar School (RAWG)</td>
<td>$200,000 (CERP)</td>
<td>Local</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>