SIGIR Special Reports


The purpose of SIGIR's Special Reports series is to provide insight into unique aspects of Iraq reconstruction not covered in SIGIR audits, investigations, lessons learned or quarterly reports.

The first of these reports is Reconstruction Leaders' Perceptions of the Commander's Emergency Response Program in Iraq, released in April, 2012. Two other Special Reports planned for release in FY 2012 are The Human Toll of Reconstruction and Stabilization During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Measuring Reconstruction Effectiveness in the Rusafa Political District.

 

 

Iraq Reconstruction Special Report

Special Report Number 1: Leaders' Perceptions of the Commander's Emergency Response Program in Iraq

In April 2012, SIGIR released its first Special Report: Leaders' Perceptions of the Commander's Emergency Response Program in Operation Iraqi Freedom. This report provides results of a survey SIGIR administered to former Army battalion commanders who served in Iraq about their experiences with the Commander's Emergency Response Program. It also includes perceptions from Marine Corps battalion commanders, US Army Corps of Engineers officers, Provincial Reconstruction Team leaders, and USAID personnel on PRTs who also nominated, executed and monitored reconstruction activities in Iraq.

SIGIR sought information about the processes for project nomination, implementation, management, evaluation and results of CERP projects. Specifically, SIGIR examined the extent to which commanders used CERP; the outcomes commanders tried to achieve with CERP; the measures of effectiveness commanders used to assess projects; the effectiveness of coordination between commanders, their higher headquarters, and other U.S. government agencies involved in reconstruction; and the severity of fraud and corruption in CERP projects.

File Description File Size Date
Leaders' Perceptions of the Commander's Emergency Response Program in Iraq 620KB PDF 4/30/2012
Front Cover (High Resolution) 100KB JPG 4/30/2012
Note: The following comments and tables were edited where necessary to remove personally identifying information such as specific names, locations and dates in order to keep responses confidential. SIGIR did not correct misspelled words, grammar or punctuation. In some cases SIGIR used brackets to explain acronyms or show where specific names had been replaced with general nouns (e.g. [province]).
Comments: Former Army Battalion Commanders 320KB PDF 7/23/2012
Data: Former Army Battalion Commanders 36KB XLS 7/23/2012
Comments: Former Marine Corps Battalion Commander Responses 96KB PDF 7/23/2012
Data: Former Marine Corps Battalion Commander Responses 27KB XLS 7/23/2012
Comments: Former Provincial Reconstruction Team Leader Responses 105KB PDF 7/23/2012
Data: Former Provincial Reconstruction Team Leader Responses 35KB XLS 7/23/2012
Comments: Former US Agency for International Development Leader Responses 114KB PDF 7/23/2012
Data: Former US Agency for International Development Leader Responses 33KB XLS 7/23/2012
Comments: Former US Army Corps of Engineers Responses 120KB PDF 7/23/2012
Data: Former US Army Corps of Engineers Responses 32KB XLS 7/23/2012
Comments: Other Former Provincial Reconstruction Team Member Responses (not included in the report) 208KB PDF 7/23/2012

 

 

Iraq Reconstruction Special Report

Special Report Number 2: The Human Toll of Reconstruction or Stabilization during Operation Iraqi Freedom

In July 2012, SIGIR released its second Special Report: The Human Toll of Reconstruction or Stabilization during Operation Iraqi Freedom.

This report gathers together all available data regarding the human toll of U.S. reconstruction or stabilization efforts during Operation Iraqi Freedom. SIGIR contacted the Department of Defense (DoD); the Departments of the Army, Air Force, and Navy; the Department of State (DoS); the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the Department of Labor (DoL); the United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE); and several insurance carriers and private companies for casualty information. SIGIR focused on the 3,479 hostile deaths and not the 930 non-hostile deaths (those who died because of accident, suicide, or natural causes).

File Description File Size Date
The Human Toll of Reconstruction or Stabilization during Operation Iraqi Freedom 636KB PDF 7/27/2012
Front Cover (High Resolution) 100KB JPG 7/27/2012

 

Iraq Reconstruction Special Report

Special Report Number 3: Interagency Rebuilding Efforts in Iraq: A Case Study of the Rusafa Political District

SIGIR's research identified 1,303 relief and reconstruction projects valued at about $148 million that various U.S. entities executed in Rusafa during Operation Iraqi Freedom. That number is almost certainly low; we found that some project records were missing, especially for those accomplished early in OIF. The number does not include projects that were Baghdad-wide in scope but affected Rusafa. We identified about 228 Baghdad-wide projects totaling about $93 million.

We aggregated Rusafa projects into two categories; construction and non-construction. A construction project was an enduring capital facility constructed or renovated for the Iraqi Government, the Rusafa District Advisory Council, or the citizens of the Rusafa Political District. This included government buildings, police stations, schools, civic facilities, roads, and health facilities. A non-construction project was one that provided a good or service to the Iraqi Government, the Rusafa District Advisory Committee, or the citizens of the Rusafa Political District. Examples of non-construction projects included training, school supplies or equipment, micro grants, security guards, and civic cleanup projects.

Some projects failed to fit neatly into either the construction or non-construction categor755ies. Generators, for example, were often given to Iraqi organizations or institutions to meet shortterm power needs and ranged in cost from $23,100 to $495,000. SIGIR classified generators costing $100,000 or more as construction. Less expensive generators were categorized as nonconstruction goods.

We categorized projects according to the ten reconstruction sectors identified in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction legislation.2 In some cases, CERP projects did not align with the congressionally-mandated sectors. For example, battle-damage repair was an authorized use of CERP funds but was not covered by the congressional sectors. In these cases, we used our judgment to categorize the projects.

File Description File Size Date
Interagency Rebuilding Efforts in Iraq: A Case Study of the Rusafa Political District 1,535KB PDF 2/26/2013
Front Cover (High Resolution) 128KB JPG 2/26/2013