TALLIL MILITARY BASE
CAMP UR
NASIRIYAH, IRAQ
SUSTAINMENT ASSESSMENT

SIGIR PA-06-087
SIGIR PA-06-088
APRIL 25, 2007
MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT
OFFICE
COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL
SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-IRAQ
COMMANDING GENERAL, GULF REGION DIVISION,
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS

SUBJECT: Report on Tallil Military Base (Camp Ur) Sustainment, Nasiriyah, Iraq
(Report Numbers SIGIR PA-06-087 and PA-06-088)

The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction is conducting a series
of assessments to assess the current condition of completed projects subsequent to their
transition to the Government of Iraq to determine whether the projects are likely to
remain operational.

We are providing this report for your information and use. It addresses construction work
performed on the Tallil Military Base (Camp Ur) near Nasiriyah, Iraq, to determine if the
project is likely to remain operational after its transition to the Government of Iraq.
These assessments were made to provide you and other interested parties with real-time
information on relief and reconstruction projects to enable appropriate action to be taken,
if warranted.

The coordinated comments received from the Commanding General, Multi-National
Security Transition Command-Iraq in response to a draft of this report addressed the
recommendations, and the actions taken and planned should address the issues we
identified. As a result, comments to this final report are not required.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to our staff. If you have any questions please
contact Mr. Brian Flynn at brian.flynn@sigir.mil or at 914-360-0607. For public or
congressional queries concerning this report, please contact SIGIR Congressional and
Public Affairs at publicaffairs@sigir.mil or at 703-428-1100.

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.
Inspector General
Synopsis

Introduction. The Inspections Directorate of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction is assessing transitioned projects to determine if they are likely to remain operational after transition from the United States Government to the Government of Iraq.

This report addresses our assessment of the Tallil Military Base (Camp Ur) near Nasiriyah, Iraq that was occupied by the Iraqi Armed Forces in June 2006. Camp Ur was constructed to garrison approximately 3,000 personnel, including one brigade. We conducted this project assessment in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. The assessment team included a professional engineer/inspector and an auditor/inspector.

Project Assessment Objectives. This report is being made to provide project information to interested parties to enable timely and appropriate action, when warranted. Our assessment objectives were to determine whether the facility is operating at the designated capacity, if the construction quality was adequate, and if it remains in good operating repair. To address these objectives, we reviewed contract documentation, met with responsible project officials, and visited the site on 31 January 2007. Construction started 23 April 2004 and concluded in November 2005. The contractor delivered Camp Ur to the United States Government on 29 January 2006. Warranty work commenced in January 2006 and was completed in June 2006. The United States Government transferred the base to the Government of Iraq on 24 June 2006. We did not determine if the base was accepted and recorded on the Minister of Finance’s books.

The facility has been occupied and used for its intended purposes to garrison one brigade, a brigade headquarters company, brigade support troops, and a regional training center to support basic training for approximately 750 troops.

Conclusions.

1. In general, the base is meeting its objectives to support the brigade and regional training center. Maintenance of the facilities is generally adequate with exceptions noted regarding the barracks and sidewalks.

2. The number of sinks and toilets installed in some bathrooms was not sufficient to handle the volume of activity for which the buildings were designed. This shortage, combined with workmanship deficiencies, inferior materials, insufficient maintenance, and abusive use caused significant deterioration to the enlisted and transient barracks that the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction inspected. Also, a large percentage of the window air conditioning units installed in the barracks were not operational.
3. The base’s current power demands are adequately supplied by the primary power plant, eight backup generators, and three generators dedicated to powering perimeter security requirements. The generators appear to be adequately maintained by the Garrison Support Unit with the exception of one generator in the primary power plant. This inoperable generator has not been repaired in a timely manner and could impact the plant’s ability to meet base power requirements this summer. The generator may also be covered by the manufacturer’s warranty since it failed within one year.

4. Although the contractor made a number of repairs to sidewalks and storm drains that were poorly constructed or damaged by vehicle traffic, similar problems were evident during the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s site visit.

5. The Garrison Support Unit appears to be providing adequate maintenance to the water treatment plants, the generators, the dining facilities, the laundry, the medical center, and the vehicle maintenance facility. Maintenance in the barracks bathrooms is inadequate, and few, if any repairs were made to broken items in the enlisted barracks that was inspected. Also, damage to sidewalks and storm drains has not been repaired.

6. Construction on four buildings was 85% complete when they were dismantled. At the time of this report, neither Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq nor Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence could account for why the buildings were dismantled and their ultimate disposition.

**Recommendations.**

1. Although Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should insure the barracks’ bathrooms have the required compliment of commercial grade sinks, toilets, and showers, undertaking significant corrective action without insuring the facilities will be properly maintained would not be cost effective. Therefore, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should consider delaying corrective action until operations and maintenance demands are met. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should also determine if the broken air conditioners are warranty issues that should be repaired by the contractor.

2. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should review the sidewalk and storm drain condition and determine if it is still covered by the warranty. If the sidewalk damage is covered under the warranty, the contractor should be required to make the necessary repairs. If the warranty is void due to vehicle damage, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should either fund the repair or notify the Garrison Support Unit that they are responsible for repairing the damage.

3. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should notify the Government of Iraq and Iraqi Joint Headquarters that Garrison Support Unit maintenance on the barracks is inadequate and will significantly shorten the useful life unless immediate repairs are made and the occupants are trained on the proper use of the facilities and adequate oversight is maintained.

5. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should account for the dismantled buildings and demonstrate that they were used on a higher priority project. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq should also demonstrate that the building material costs were not charged to the United States government twice; first on the Tallil contact and second to an unadjusted subcontract at the receiving facility.

Management Comments. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq coordinated the management comments for the affected agencies. Following are replies to each recommendation:

Recommendation #1 Bathroom Facilities and Air Conditioners: Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq and Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence note that the project design conformed to the United States Central Command’s Contingency and Long Term Base Camp Facilities Standards and obtained required approvals. The facilities were constructed as planned, and provided to the Iraqis in satisfactory condition. However, the present condition of the bathroom facilities and air conditioners appear to be the result of inadequate user-level maintenance.

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq continues to review the general requirements for bathroom and related plumbing fixtures, as well as air conditioning equipment, in the region to determine the optimal quality and design for future projects.

Recommendation #2 Sidewalks and Storm Drains: Even though the contractor replaced approximately 150 meters of damaged sidewalk, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq acknowledges that many more meters of damaged sidewalk remain. This condition appears to be the result of inappropriate Iraqi vehicular traffic.

Recommendation #3 Maintenance Responsibilities: Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq is engaged in discussions with the Government of Iraq to establish clear lines of responsibility for maintaining and protecting facilities and equipment provided by Coalition Forces.

Recommendation #4 Generator Turbocharger: Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq is engaged in discussions with the Government of Iraq to establish clear lines of responsibility for maintaining and protecting facilities and equipment provided by Coalition Forces.

Recommendation #5 Relocated Buildings: The maintenance facility and warehouses were moved to the Iraqi Special Operation Forces compound near Baghdad International Airport as part of Task Order 208. Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq reallocated these resources to better conform to changes in mission and conditions at both Tallil and the Iraqi Special Operation Forces compound.

Evaluation of Management Comments. We reviewed the management comments and after further clarification with Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq officials we found them to be responsive to our recommendations. Following are the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s evaluations of each comment:

Recommendation #1 Bathroom Facilities and Air Conditioners: During a follow-up meeting to clarify its response, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq officials indicated that they will advise Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence to modify the Tallil contract to bring the requirements into compliance with the United States Central Command’s Contingency and Long Term Base Camp Facilities Standards. With respect to the remaining recommendation, to delay corrective action until an
appropriate maintenance program is evident at Camp Ur, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq’s comments are responsive.

Recommendation #2 Sidewalks: Based on Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq’s representation that the sidewalks were damaged by vehicle traffic, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction suggests that Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq inform the Garrison Support Unit that they are responsible for all additional repairs.

Recommendation #3 Maintenance Responsibilities: During a follow-up meeting to clarify its response, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq officials said they will notify the appropriate Government of Iraq organizations that the bathroom problems exist and require corrective action.

Recommendation #4 Generator Turbocharger: During a follow-up meeting to clarify its response, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq officials noted that they will contact the Base Support Unit at Tallil and offer assistance to expedite the delivery of the turbocharger.

Recommendation #5 Regarding Relocated Buildings: Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq’s reply is responsive to the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s recommendation regarding the disposition of the building. During a follow-up meeting to clarify its response, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq officials noted that Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence informed them that the contractor represented to them that the materials were not double charged to the United States Government.
## Table of Contents

**Synopsis**  

**Introduction**  
- Objective of the Project Assessments  
- Background  
- Site Assessment  

**Conclusions**  

**Recommendations**  

**Management Comments**  

**Evaluation of Management Comments**  

**Appendixes**  
- A. Scope and Methodology  
- B. Acronyms  
- C. Report Distribution  
- D. Assessment Team Members
Introduction

Objective of the Project Assessments

These project assessments are intended to provide information to interested parties in order to enable timely and appropriate action, when warranted. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) assessment objectives were to determine whether the facility was operating at the designated capacity, if the construction quality was adequate, and if it remained in good operating repair.

Background

The Tallil Military Base, subsequently renamed by the Government of Iraq (GoI) as Camp Ur, was built over an existing facility that was neglected for over ten years and severely damaged from looting during and after the war.

Camp Ur was designed to garrison approximately 3,000 personnel, including one brigade. Construction included twenty-two barracks, thirty-two headquarters buildings, three dining facilities, seven warehouses, seven maintenance facilities and twenty-nine other support buildings such as a fire house, jail, mosque and other buildings. Utility construction included a waste water treatment plant, a water treatment plant, an electrical generation plant, a fire protection system, and perimeter security. The base grounds included four athletic fields, a parade ground, sidewalks, paved roads and street lighting. A regional training center and a firing range were located adjacent to the base to provide basic training for approximately 750 troops.

Base construction started on 23 April 2004 and completed on 29 January 2006. Camp Ur was officially transferred to the IA on 24 June 2006. Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) was the funding agency responsible for defining the general requirements for Camp Ur. Camp Ur was designed and built under Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity (IDIQ) contract# FA8903-04-D-8681 issued by AFCEE to Weston Solutions, Inc (Weston). AFCEE issued three task orders under the contract:

- Task Order # 24 dated 14 April 2004 to renovate, replace, and construct facilities for the new Iraqi Army. Requirements included civil site work, architectural work and special construction. The task order was initially valued at $49.8 million and modified five times adding $46.1 million, bringing the total value to $95.9 million.

- Task Order # 126 dated 9 September 2004 added the consolidation of the generator facilities, construction of a perimeter fence, a vehicle search area, a guard area including guard houses and towers, a preventative maintenance plan and training manuals. The task order was initially valued at $4.9 million and modified once adding $7.5 million, bringing the total value to $12.4 million.

- Task Order # 193 dated 30 September 2005 added facilities to the firing range, an electrical generating plant, a water treatment plant, a maintenance facility, a dining facility, a helipad, fuel for the generating plant and additional security and life support. The task order was initially valued at $8.1 million and modified once adding $3.1 million bringing the total value to $11.2 million.
The total value of the combined task orders was $119.5 distributed as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Task Order</th>
<th>Total Contract Cost</th>
<th>Subcontract Costs</th>
<th>Estimated Cost</th>
<th>Fee</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>$ 87,097,972</td>
<td>$ 72,668,367</td>
<td>$ 14,429,605</td>
<td>$ 8,772,343</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>126</td>
<td>10,980,023</td>
<td>9,551,441</td>
<td>1,428,582</td>
<td>1,419,355</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>193</td>
<td>10,511,802</td>
<td>8,686,908</td>
<td>1,824,894</td>
<td>729,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$ 108,589,797</td>
<td>$ 90,906,716</td>
<td>$ 17,683,081</td>
<td>$10,920,756</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Weston transferred the project to the U.S. Government (USG) with a Transfer and Acceptance of Military Real Property (DD Form 1325) signed on 29 January 2006. Camp Ur was officially transferred to the GoI local representative on 24 June 2006. Quality assurance was provided by Title II under contract to AFCEE. An onsite quality assurance representative performed daily inspections and submitted daily reports during the construction period.

**Site Assessment**

The SIGIR team consisting of a professional engineer and an auditor visited Camp Ur on 31 January 2007.

SIGIR’s inspection of the following facilities found them to be operational and in adequate repair:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HQ buildings</th>
<th>Water treatment plant</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dining facilities</td>
<td>Medical center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry</td>
<td>Jail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fire house</td>
<td>Telecom center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle maintenance center</td>
<td>Mosque</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The SIGIR inspectors noted deficiencies at the following facilities:

1. **Enlisted Barracks**

   Eighteen enlisted/transient barracks were built on the base. Each has a maximum capacity of 156 soldiers, 72 on the ground floor and 84 upstairs. The inspection found that leaks from the upstairs floor caused damage to floor tiles and ceiling damage to the ground floors. Also, fixtures, toilets, showers and sinks were damaged. The design provided for fewer sinks than required for the upstairs bathrooms. The inadequate design, combined with low quality fixtures and poor quality workmanship made the facilities too fragile for the volume of use they experienced. The problem was compounded by poor maintenance and abuse by the tenants.

   The contract required one shower, sink and toilet for every ten soldiers. The ground floor design met the contract requirements; however, the contractor installed only five of the eight sinks required by the building design for the two barracks SIGIR inspected. The upstairs design provided for enough showers; however its provision for eight sinks and seven toilets to accommodate eighty-four soldiers was short by one sink and two toilets. Furthermore, the contractor installed only five sinks, which increased the shortage to four sinks. Although time limitations prevented the review of all barracks, their similarity in design and construction would indicate similar shortages exist in all enlisted and transient barracks.
The shortage problem was compounded by using plumbing and fixtures that are closer to household grade than commercial grade. The fixtures, supply lines and valves were flimsy and easily broken after being exposed to the volume of use. Floor tile was installed over a sand base and not adequately sealed. Water seeped through the joints causing tile breakage and damage to the ceiling on the ground level. These problems were also identified during the warranty period where seven of thirty-two work requests involved repairs to bathrooms. Also, during a February 2006 site inspection an AFCEE representative noted eighteen warranty items associated with bathroom floors and fixtures.

Inadequate maintenance and apparent abuse by the occupants further compounded the problem. Un-repaired water leaks damaged floors and ground floor ceilings. Broken fixtures left sinks, showers and toilets unusable. Abusive use such as standing on western toilet seats, slamming shower doors, and stuffing water bottles down toilet drains damaged plumbing and fixtures. These abuses were also noted in an AFCEE representative’s site visit report dated 2 February 2006 which cited eighteen examples of soldier abuse to the bathrooms including drains filled with debris, discarded drain covers and cracked toilets. The report commented that the abuse started when the Iraqi soldiers occupied the facility. Site Photos 1 though 7 show the damage to the facilities SIGIR inspected.

Site Photo 1. Example of bathroom sinks immediately after construction (From Weston photo log)  
Site Photo 2. Bathroom floor and sinks at inspection

Site Photo 3. Example of a finished shower immediately after construction (From Weston photo log)  
Site Photo 4. Dislodged shower floor pan at inspection
Site Photo 5. Ground floor ceiling water damage caused by leak and excess water from the bathroom above. The bed frame was apparently used to protect the person below in case the ceiling collapsed.

Site Photo 6. Closed toilet door frame with missing center panel
Although we noted minor damage to doors and some broken or missing door handles, the bedrooms, utility rooms, staircases, and hallways in the billeting areas were in reasonably adequate condition. Electrical wiring, panels, and lighting were intact and not tampered with. We could not test the electricity because the power was off. However, the billeting manager confirmed that the lights and electrical outlets were working.

The billeting manager said that eight of sixteen air conditioning units in building #670 were not operational. We could not determine if the units were not operating because of poor maintenance or warranty problems.

2. Electrical Power Generation

The base’s primary electrical generating plant was designed to house nine 1.5 Mega Watt (MW) generators to power base facilities. Although nine generators were originally installed, five were subsequently removed and taken to the Iraqi Special Operation Forces (ISOF) facility in Baghdad. MNSTC-I and AFCEE representatives informed SIGIR that Camp Ur’s power requirements were reduced when a decision was made to locate the Regional Support Unit (RSU) at Basra rather than Camp Ur. Also, plans to provide supplemental power to Nasiriyah and an adjacent Iraqi Army (IA) camp were eliminated. The reduced power requirement at Camp Ur made the generators excess equipment and available to meet the power shortage at the ISOF facility. MNSTC-I and AFCEE provided pictures, site reports, and Statements of Work, supporting the movement of the five generators to ISOF. SIGIR did not physically observe the generators at ISOF due to scope limitations however our review of the supporting documentation provided reasonable support for the MNSTC-I and AFCEE representations.

Three of the four remaining generators were operational. The fourth had been waiting for a replacement turbocharger that was ordered in July 2006. The plant manager said that the three generators are sufficient to supply power to the base in the winter but higher demand for air conditioning will pose a problem during the summer. The fourth generator will be needed to supplement power during routine maintenance. The generators were not operating at the time of our inspection due to fuel shortages at the base. The plant manager said the generators operate from ten to
twelve hours per day beginning in late afternoon. Site Photo 8 shows the condition of the generators at the time of our inspection.

Site Photo 8. Remaining base plant generators.

3. Sidewalks and Ground Drainage

SIGIR’s inspection disclosed a number of sidewalks and drain cleanout holes with un-repaired damage from inadequate workmanship and vehicle traffic. The sidewalks and cleanout holes were designed for pedestrian traffic. Quality issues existed at the time the base was delivered to the USG. An AFCEE warranty inspector visited the site on February 2 and 3, 2006 and noted that approximately 70% of the concrete work done on sidewalks was of poor quality and would need to be replaced. Warranty requests provided by AFCEE show that repairs were made to sidewalks in the 100, 200, 600, 700 and 800 complex areas from May 25, 2006 to June 3, 2006. Our inspection showed that quality and damage issues still existed at the facility. Site photos # 9 and #10 show the sidewalks and drain cleanout holes at the time of our inspection.

Site Photo 9. Broken drain cleanout hole  
Site Photo 10. Drainage cleanout holes and standing water that should drain into the system
4. Operation and Maintenance

a. Base Support Units (BSU)

Since 2005, MNSTC-I has been working with the GoI Joint Headquarters (JHQ) to implement a base support maintenance program. The objectives of the program are to develop effective facility management organizations at all installations and to ensure all types of infrastructure are sustained by early 2008. The BSU organization structure includes five Regional Support Units (RSUs) and seventy-eight Garrison Support Units (GSU) for a total of eighty-three bases throughout Iraq. RSUs will accomplish GSU functions at their respective installation, support GSUs for work outside the GSU scope, and work with JHQ to establish service contracts. GSUs respond to local work requests, oversee service contracts and quality assurance programs, and provide labor to support unscheduled repairs and maintenance. The following chart illustrates the base support organization structure.

The third phase of the BSU plan is expected to end in early 2008 and will provide support for over nineteen maintenance categories shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Base Support Unit Implement Phasing Plan</th>
<th>Implementation Phase</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>I</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Electrical power generation</td>
<td>✔</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Building or infrastructure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Electrical distribution (exterior)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Electrical distribution (Interior)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 Finishes (paint, flooring, tile, carpet, etc)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 HVAC</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Most maintenance categories in phase I were funded by the GoI which used service contracts to meet requirements. Phase I started in April 2006 and ended December 2006. Phase II started in January 2007 and is expected to be completed by June 2007. Phase II will continue to use predominately GoI funded service contracts to meet requirements. Phase III will begin in June 2007 to add the remaining maintenance categories and to institutionalize the BSU structure by eliminating service contracts and replacing them with Iraqi civil servants or military personnel. The BSU program is expected to be fully operational by early 2008.

b. Maintenance is performed on three levels:

- Level 1 is recurring maintenance such as minor plumbing repairs, janitorial service, street cleaning, etc. This maintenance is performed by personnel assigned to the GSU.

- Level 2 is unforeseen repairs such as failures to sewer lines, water supply lines, electrical power, etc. Replacement parts are funded by the RSU and the labor to perform the work comes from the local GSU labor pool.

- Level 3 is urgent maintenance that affects the life and health of soldiers such as generator failure, fuel supply, etc. Replacement parts are funded by the RSU and the labor to perform the work comes from the local GSU labor pool.

The GoI, in conjunction with the JHQ, funded maintenance with an annual budget of $480 million, plus approximately $104 million in replacement parts and supplies to accomplish level 2 and 3 maintenance.

c. Operation and Maintenance Assessment

Representatives from the Australian Army Training Team (AATT) assigned to provide support to the IA Regional Training Center informed us that a GSU has been set up at Camp Ur. It provides Level 1 O&M on base facilities, including the buildings and facilities for dining, power generation, laundry, water treatment, and waste water treatment.

The GSU appears to be adequately maintaining the buildings with the exception of the barracks bathrooms. The water treatment plant, waste water treatment plant, generator plant, and vehicle maintenance facility are maintained under service contracts. These facilities were operational and adequately maintained.
5. Turnover Process

Weston delivered the completed buildings and facilities to the USG from 1 May 2005 to 29 January 2006. Deliveries were made at the completion of each task order. Warranty work commenced in January 2006 and was completed in June 2006. The USG transferred the base to the GoI local representative on 24 June 2006. SIGIR did not determine if the base was accepted and recorded on the Minister of Finance’s books.

6. Dismantled Modular Buildings

The project required constructing three modular steel frame warehouses and a 20-bay modular steel frame maintenance facility. The construction work started in September 2005 and was stopped in November 2005 with approximately 85% of the effort completed. At the time of this report neither MNSTC-I nor AFCEE could provide the reason for dismantling the buildings nor could they identify their ultimate disposition. Based on the contractor’s cost to complete reports, the total cost of the building construction and dismantling charged to the contract is summarized below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>% Complete</th>
<th>Subcontract Price</th>
<th>Total Paid to the Subcontractor</th>
<th>Price Reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>20 Bay Maintenance Bldg</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>$885,000</td>
<td>$52,250</td>
<td>$132,750</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Warehouses</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>$921,000</td>
<td>$773,640</td>
<td>$147,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Construction costs</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>$1,806,000</td>
<td>$1,525,890</td>
<td>$280,110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dismantle Buildings</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>$4,800</td>
<td>$4,800</td>
<td>$0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>$1,810,800</td>
<td>$1,530,690</td>
<td>$280,110</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 A cost element breakdown by labor, materials, etc. by the subcontractor was not available

Critical requirements elsewhere could justify disassembling buildings that were virtually complete; however, it is important that MNSTC-I provide the basis for the decision and demonstrate that they were reassembled at another location. It is also important to insure that the government did not pay for the building materials twice; first when purchased for the Tallil base and second, as a fixed price deliverable on a firm fixed price subcontract that was not adjusted for the materials furnished by the government.

Conclusions

1. In general, the base is meeting its objectives to support the brigade and regional training center. Maintenance of the facilities is generally adequate with the exceptions noted regarding the barracks and sidewalks.

2. The number of sinks and toilets installed in some bathrooms was not sufficient to handle the volume of activity the buildings were designed for. This shortage, combined with workmanship deficiencies, inferior materials, insufficient maintenance, and abusive use caused significant deterioration to the enlisted and transient barracks that SIGIR inspected. Also, a large percentage of the window air conditioning units installed in the barracks were not operational.

3. The base’s current power demands are adequately supplied by the primary power plant, eight backup generators, and three generators dedicated to powering perimeter
security requirements. Except for one generator in the primary power plant, the
generators appear to be adequately maintained by the Garrison Support Unit with the
exception of one generator in the primary power plant. The inoperable generator has
not been repaired in a timely manner and could impact the plant’s ability to meet base
power requirements this summer. The generator may also be covered by the
manufacturer’s warranty since it failed within one year.

4. Although the contractor made a number of repairs to sidewalks and storm drains that
were poorly constructed or damaged by vehicle traffic, similar problems were evident
during SIGIR’s site visit.

5. The GSU appears to be providing adequate maintenance to the water treatment plants,
the generators, the dining facilities, the laundry, the medical center, and the vehicle
maintenance facility. Maintenance in the barracks bathrooms is inadequate and few if
any repairs were made to broken items in the enlisted barracks that were inspected.
Also, damage to sidewalks and storm drains has not been repaired.

6. Construction on each of four buildings was 85% complete when they were dismantled.
At the time of this report neither MNSTC-I nor AFCEE could account for why the
buildings were dismantled and their ultimate disposition.

**Recommendations**

1. Although MNSTC-I should insure the barracks’ bathrooms have the required
compliment of commercial grade sinks, toilets, and showers, undertaking significant
corrective action without insuring the facilities will be properly maintained would not
be cost effective. Therefore, MNSTC-I should consider delaying corrective action
until Operations and Maintenance (O&M) demands are met. MNSTC-I should also
determine if the broken air conditioners are warranty issues that should be repaired by
the contractor.

2. MNSTC-I should review the sidewalk and storm drain conditions and determine if
they are still covered by the warranty. If the sidewalk damage is covered under the
warranty, the contractor should be required to make the necessary repairs. If the
warranty is void due to vehicle damage, MNSTC-I should either fund the repair or
notify the GSU that they are responsible for repairing the damage.

3. MNSTC-I should notify the GoI and JHQ that GSU maintenance on the barracks is
inadequate and will significantly shorten the useful life unless immediate repairs are
made and the occupants are trained on the proper use of the facilities and adequate
oversight is maintained.

4. MNSTC-I, AFCEE, and Weston should assist the GSU to expedite delivery and
installation of the turbocharger on the fourth generator in the base power plant.

5. MNSTC-I should account for the dismantled buildings and demonstrate that they were
used on a higher priority project. MNSTC-I should also demonstrate that the building
material costs were not charged to the U.S. Government twice, first on the Tallil
contact and second to an unadjusted subcontract at the receiving facility.
Management Comments

MNSTC-I coordinated the management comments for the affected agencies. Following are replies to each recommendation:

Recommendation #1 Bathroom Facilities and Air Conditioners: MNSTC-I and AFCEE note that the project design conformed to the USCENTCOM’s Contingency and Long Term Base Camp Facilities Standards and obtained required approvals. The facilities were constructed as planned, and provided to the Iraqis in satisfactory condition. However, the present condition of the bathroom facilities and air conditioners appear to be the result of inadequate user-level maintenance.

MNSTC-I continues to review the general requirements for bathroom and related plumbing fixtures, as well as air conditioning equipment, in the region to determine the optimal quality and design for future projects.

Recommendation #2 Sidewalks: Even though the contractor replaced approximately 150 meters of damaged sidewalk, MNSTC-I acknowledges that many more meters of damaged sidewalk remain. This condition appears to be the result of inappropriate Iraqi vehicular traffic.

Recommendation #3 Maintenance Responsibilities: MNSTC-I is engaged in discussion with the Government of Iraq (GoI) to establish clear lines of responsibility for maintaining and protecting facilities and equipment provided by Coalition Forces.

Recommendation #4 Generator Turbocharger: Regarding Maintenance Responsibilities (Turbocharger): MNSTC-I is engaged in discussions with the GoI to establish clear lines of responsibility for maintaining and protecting facilities and equipment provided by Coalition Forces.

Recommendation #5 Relocated Buildings: The maintenance facility and warehouses were moved to the ISOF compound near BIAP as part of Task Order 208. MNSTC-I reallocated these resources to better conform with changes in mission and conditions at both Tallil and the ISOF compound.

Evaluation of Management Comments

We reviewed the management comments and found them to be responsive to our recommendations. The following are SIGIR’s evaluations of each comment:

Recommendation #1 Bathroom Facilities and Air Conditioners: During a follow-up meeting to clarify its response, MNSTC-I officials indicated that they will advise AFCEE to modify the Tallil contract to bring the requirements into compliance with the USCENTCOM’s Contingency and Long Term Base Camp Facilities Standards. With respect to the remaining recommendation, to delay corrective action until an appropriate maintenance program is evident at Camp Ur, MNSTC-I’s comments are responsive.

Recommendation #2 Sidewalks: Based on MNSTC-I’s representation that the sidewalks were damaged by vehicle traffic, SIGIR suggests that MNSTC-I inform the Garrison Support Unit (GSU) that they are responsible for all additional repairs.
Recommendation #3 Maintenance Responsibilities: During a follow-up meeting to clarify its response, MNSTC-I officials said they will notify the appropriate GoI organizations that the bathroom problems exist and require corrective action.

Recommendation #4 Generator Turbocharger: During a follow-up meeting to clarify its response, MNSTC-I officials noted that they will contact the Base Support Unit at Tallil and offer assistance to expedite the delivery and installation of the turbocharger.

Recommendation #5 Regarding Relocated Buildings: MNSTC-I’s reply is responsive to SIGIR’s recommendation regarding the disposition of the building. During a follow-up meeting to clarify its response, MNSTC-I officials noted that AFCEE informed them that the contractor represented to them that the materials were not double charged to the U. S. Government.
Appendix A. Scope and Methodology

SIGIR performed this project sustainment inspection in accordance with the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency. The assessment team included a professional engineer/inspector and an auditor/inspector. In performing this Project Sustainment Inspection we:

- Reviewed contract documentation including the Contract, Contract Modifications, Contract documentation, and Statement of Work;

- Reviewed available turnover documents (e.g., Contractor transmittal documents, Spare Part List, etc.);

- Interviewed representatives from the Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence (AFCEE), Australian Advisory Transition Team (AATT), and facilities managers at the Tallil Military Base (Camp Ur); and

- Conducted an on-site inspection at the Tallil Military Base (Camp Ur) on 31 January 2007.
## Appendix B. Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AATT</td>
<td>Australian Advisory Training Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFCEE</td>
<td>Air Force Center for Environmental Excellence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BSU</td>
<td>Base Support Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAC</td>
<td>Dining Facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GoI</td>
<td>Government of Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GSU</td>
<td>Garrison Support Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IA</td>
<td>Iraqi Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDIQ</td>
<td>Indefinite Delivery Indefinite Quantity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRRF</td>
<td>Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISOF</td>
<td>Iraqi Special Operation Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JHQ</td>
<td>Iraqi Joint Headquarters</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNSTC-I</td>
<td>Multi National Security Transition Command-Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoD</td>
<td>Iraqi Ministry of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MW</td>
<td>Mega Watt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Operation and Maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSU</td>
<td>Regional Support Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCO</td>
<td>Project and Contracting Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOW</td>
<td>Statement of Work</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TO</td>
<td>Task Order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACE</td>
<td>United States Army Corps of Engineers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C. Report Distribution

Department of State
Secretary of State
  Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq
  Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance/Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development
    Director, Office of Iraq Reconstruction
  Assistant Secretary for Resource Management/Chief Financial Officer,
    Bureau of Resource Management
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq
  Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
  Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development
Inspector General, Department of State

Department of Defense
Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
  Deputy Chief Financial Officer
  Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense-Middle East, Office of Policy/International Security Affairs
Inspector General, Department of Defense
Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency
Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service
Director, Defense Contract Management Agency

Department of the Army
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
  Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
  Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement)
Director, Project and Contracting Office
Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller
Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
  Commanding General, Gulf Region Division
  Chief Financial Officer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
Auditor General of the Army

U.S. Central Command
Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq
  Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq
  Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central
Other Federal Government Organizations

Director, Office of Management and Budget
Comptroller General of the United States
Inspector General, Department of the Treasury
Inspector General, Department of Commerce
Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services
Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development
President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
President, U.S. Institute for Peace

Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member

U.S. Senate

Senate Committee on Appropriations
  Subcommittee on Defense
  Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
  Subcommittee on International Operations and Organizations, Democracy and Human Rights
  Subcommittee on International Development and Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs and International Environmental Protection
  Subcommittee on Near East and South and Central Asian Affairs
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
  Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations
  Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia

U.S. House of Representatives

House Committee on Appropriations
  Subcommittee on Defense
  Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
House Committee on Armed Services
House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform
  Subcommittee on Government Management, Organization, and Procurement
  Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs
House Committee on Foreign Affairs
  Subcommittee on Middle East and South Asia
  Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight
Appendix D. Project Assessment Team Members

The Office of the Assistant Inspector General for Inspections, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, prepared this report. The principal staff members who contributed to the report were:

Timothy Baum
Wesley Snowden. P.E.