Iraqi Security Forces: Weapons Provided by the U.S. Department of Defense Using the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund

SIGIR-06-033
October 28, 2006
MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
UNITED STATES SENATE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ
COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE-IRAQ
COMMANDING GENERAL, JOINT CONTRACTING COMMAND-IRAQ/AFGHANISTAN
COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS-IRAQ
COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND-IRAQ
DIRECTOR, IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT OFFICE


We are providing this report for your information and use. This review was requested by the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate. In his request, the Chairman stated that a critical element of the reconstruction effort in Iraq is the development of logistics support capabilities for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) within the Ministries of Defense and Interior, including providing and maintaining weapons.

We considered comments from the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq on the draft of this report when preparing the final report. Their comments are addressed in the report where applicable, and a copy of their comments is included in the Management Comments section of this report.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. For additional information on this report, please contact Mr. Joseph T. McDermott (joseph.mcdermott@sigir.mil / 703-604-0982, or in Baghdad at 703-343-7926); or Mr. Clifton Spruill (clifton.spruill@iraq.centcom.mil / 703-343-9275). See Appendix D for the report distribution.

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr.
Inspector General

cc: See Distribution
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Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq
Executive Summary

Introduction
The capacity of the Iraqi government to provide national security and public order is partly contingent on arming the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), under the Ministries of Defense and Interior. The United States is supporting the Iraqi ministries by providing arms from a variety of sources, including those captured, donated, and purchased. The United States plans to provide equipment for approximately 325,500 ISF personnel by December 2006. Of these, 277,600 have been issued weapons as of August 2006. Responsibility for determining weapons requirements and the initial equipping and training of ISF personnel primarily rests with the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), a subordinate command of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I).

Objectives
This audit, requested by the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, addresses the type, quantity, and quality of weapons purchased with the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) for the ISF, as well as the ISF’s capability to independently maintain and sustain these weapons.

Although a review of the accountability of the IRRF-funded weapons was not requested, its relevance to sustainment warranted a limited assessment of weapons property records compared to the quantities purchased with IRRF funds. Further, given the importance of controlling these sensitive items—particularly considering the security environment in Iraq—we also reviewed compliance with Department of Defense (DoD) policies for registering weapons’ serial numbers.

Results
About $133 million of the IRRF was used to purchase more than 370,000 weapons through 19 contracts with 142 separate delivery orders. The weapons were small arms, comprising 12 types that ranged from semiautomatic pistols and assault rifles to heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenade launchers. The contracts required that the quality of the weapons either be new or weapons not previously issued.
We identified the following factors as limiting ISF’s capability to independently maintain and sustain these specific weapons, and possibly any identical weapons obtained by other means than IRRF:

- the lack of spare parts to conduct maintenance and repairs for most types of weapons purchased
- the lack of a requirement to provide technical repair manuals to ISF maintenance personnel
- the apparent decision by ISF units not to fill vacant arms maintenance positions
- the questionable accuracy of MNSTC-I inventories for 3 of the 12 types of weapons purchased with IRRF funds

In addition, during our review of contract files, we did not locate sufficient documentation to show that MNSTC-I had fully complied with the requirement to register the serial numbers of all weapons in the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program.

**Material Management Control Weaknesses**

We identified two material management control weaknesses:

- the incomplete accountability of weapons procured by DoD for the ISF
- the apparent non-compliance for the registration of weapons serial numbers under the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program

**Recommendations**

We recommend that the Commanding General, MNSTC-I, direct his staff to take these actions:

1. Determine the requisite spare parts and technical repair manual requirements by weapons type and, if applicable, weapons model and provide this information to the Ministries of Defense and Interior.
2. Review policies and procedures for filling vacant arms maintenance positions and implement corrective actions for sustainment.
3. Establish accurate weapon inventories.
4. Initiate action to provide weapons serial numbers for compliance with the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program.
Management Comments and Audit Response

We received written comments on the draft of this report from MNSTC-I officials who generally concurred with recommendations 1 through 3, but did not concur with recommendation 4. The concurrences were accompanied with comments that identified actions underway or planned relating to the recommendations. MNSTC-I officials non-concurred with recommendation 4, stating that there is no provision or mechanism to register foreign-owned weapons in the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program.

The comments received are responsive to recommendations 1 and 2. However, we do not believe that the actions described in MNSTC-I’s comments for recommendation 3, including a recently established serial number weapons inventory system, will address a method for identifying the inventory of weapons previously purchased and the accountability of such weapons. As for MNSTC-I’s basis for non-concurrence with recommendation 4, we requested an opinion from:

- officials at the U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Agency involved with the DoD Small Arms Registry
- Chairman, DoD Small Arms Coordination Committee
- U.S. Army Executive Agent for Small Arms Logistics at the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command, Rock Island Arsenal

They all agreed with our conclusion that the weapons purchased for the ISF with appropriated funds under a DoD contract and subsequently transferred to a foreign entity should be recorded in the registry. Further, these officials stated that, “weapons bought under a DoD contract may be recorded in the small arms registry after they have physically transferred to a foreign entity to document that they were shipped outside the control of DoD.”

MNSTC-I’s comments are included in the Management Comments section of this report.
Introduction

Background

The capacity of the Iraqi government to provide national security and public order is partly contingent on arming the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), composed of Iraqi security forces under the Ministries of Defense (MoD) and Interior (MoI). The United States is supporting the Iraqi ministries by providing arms from a variety of sources, including those donated, captured, and those purchased. The United States plans to arm some 325,500 ISF personnel by December 2006. Of these, 277,600 have been issued weapons as of August 2006. Responsibility for determining weapons requirements and the initial equipping and training of ISF personnel primarily rests with the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I), a subordinate command of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I).

MNSTC-I receives weapons requirement requests from two of its subordinate commands—the Civilian Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) on behalf of MoI forces, and the Coalition Military Assistance Training Team (CMATT) on behalf of MoD forces. Upon receipt of a weapons request, MNSTC-I personnel assess the stockage levels of the existing weapons. If sufficient, a distribution order is submitted and the weapons are distributed; if insufficient, a procurement request is forwarded to the servicing contracting organization following delivery of the procured items, a distribution order is placed. In both instances MNSTC-I receives a copy of the issue document for recording.

In July 2005, to record both MoD and MoI equipment requirements and issues, including weapons, MNSTC-I developed two Excel spreadsheets—hereafter referred to as “property books.” The two property books (one each for MoD and MoI) reflect the equipment provided to each Ministry for their respective ISF units. In the latter part of 2005 and early 2006, MNSTC-I logistics personnel began entering equipment issue data into the spreadsheets, based on file copies of issue documents. Subsequently, at the time of this audit, they were in the process of migrating from Excel to Access; the latter database offering more management utility and versatility for retrieving equipment issue data.

The MNSTC-I Support Division of the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A), is the in-theater servicing contracting organization that provides operational contracting support for non-construction projects, such as this U.S. effort to equip and train the ISF. JCC-I/A was the repository for the majority of the weapons contracts awarded from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). The others were obtained from the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM).

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1 The property books also include some non-equipment items such as uniforms and bedding.
2 The U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command (TACOM) in Warren, Michigan, was the repository for files pertaining to three weapons contracts: W52H09-05-C-0058, W52H09-05-C-0059, and W56HZV-04-D-0181.
IRRF funds, totaling about $133 million, were used to purchase over 370,000 weapons through 19 contracts with 142 separate delivery orders. The first of nineteen contracts for IRRF-funded weapons was awarded on November 15, 2003, and the last known contract awarded was on April 26, 2005. Three organizations—the Coalition Provisional Authority until June 2004, the Project and Contracting Office until November 2004, and thereafter the JCC-I/A—performed the requisite procurement actions in Baghdad, Iraq. TACOM in Warren, Michigan, administered three contracts—one to obtain complete battalion-size sets of equipment, including small arms, and two to procure only weapons.

Table 1—Contracts Containing IRRF-funded Weapons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Delivery Orders</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>W914NS-03-D-0002</td>
<td>IDIQ, IDIQ</td>
<td>11/15/2003</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9,519</td>
<td>$7,015,436</td>
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<tr>
<td>W914NS-04-D-0115</td>
<td>IDIQ, FFP</td>
<td>04/27/2004</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>149,834</td>
<td>$48,820,733</td>
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<tr>
<td>W914NS-04-D-0116</td>
<td>IDIQ, FFP</td>
<td>04/27/2004</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>109,006</td>
<td>$40,385,572</td>
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<tr>
<td>W914NS-05-M-9374</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>04/27/2004</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>801</td>
<td>$531,312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W914NS-04-C-0110</td>
<td>FFP</td>
<td>04/23/2004</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>$111,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W56HZV-04-D-0181</td>
<td>IDIQ, FFP</td>
<td>05/25/2004</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>32,221</td>
<td>$8,240,706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W914NS-04-D-9003</td>
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<td>3</td>
<td>1,598</td>
<td>$2,230,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W914NS-04-M-1204</td>
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<td>09/22/2004</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>$370,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W914NS-05-D-9003</td>
<td>IDIQ, FFP</td>
<td>10/18/2004</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4,050</td>
<td>$3,250,193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W914NS-05-D-9005</td>
<td>IDIQ, FFP</td>
<td>11/15/2004</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>$120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W914NS-05-M-9320</td>
<td>PO</td>
<td>12/14/2004</td>
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<td>30</td>
<td>$15,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W52HO9-05-C-0058</td>
<td>FFP</td>
<td>12/22/2004</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>$1,271,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W52HO9-05-C-0059</td>
<td>FFP</td>
<td>12/22/2004</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>$1,756,550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W914NS-05-C-9047</td>
<td>FFP</td>
<td>02/20/2005</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>$1,820,272</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W914NS-05-C-9048</td>
<td>FFP</td>
<td>02/26/2005</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>$4,429,395</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W914NS-05-D-9010</td>
<td>IDIQ, FFP</td>
<td>04/26/2005</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>18,072</td>
<td>$5,548,965</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W914NS-05-D-9011</td>
<td>IDIQ, FFP</td>
<td>04/26/2005</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,480</td>
<td>$472,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W914NS-05-D-9012</td>
<td>IDIQ, FFP</td>
<td>04/26/2005</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>27,115</td>
<td>$5,652,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W914NS-05-D-9014</td>
<td>IDIQ, FFP</td>
<td>04/26/2005</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td>$1,221,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>142</strong></td>
<td><strong>370,251</strong></td>
<td><strong>$133,264,430</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A and TACOM contract files

* IDIQ: Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity contracts provide for an indefinite quantity, within stated limits, of supplies or services during a fixed period. Orders are placed for individual requirements.

* FFP: Firm Fixed-Price contracts provide for a price that is not subject to any adjustment on the basis of contractor's cost experience in performing the contract. The contractor assumes maximum risk and full responsibility for all costs and resulting profit or loss.

* PO: Purchase Orders are used for supplies and services that exceed the micro-purchase threshold but do not exceed the simplified acquisition threshold.
Of the nineteen contracts, two accounted for 67% of the weapons cost, and adding a third contract, these three accounted for 73% of the weapons cost. The weapons purchased with IRRF funds were small arms (see Appendix B for descriptions). Typical small arms include 9mm semiautomatic pistols and 7.62mm assault rifles, as well as .50 caliber heavy machine guns and rocket-propelled grenade launchers (RPG-7). The single largest groups of weapons, by type, were the Avtomat Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifle and the Glock™ 9mm semiautomatic pistol, the latter constituting 79% of the pistols purchased.

**Objectives**

This audit, requested by the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, addresses the type, quantity, and quality of weapons purchased with the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) for the ISF, as well as the ISF’s capability to independently maintain and sustain these weapons.

Although a review of the accountability of the IRRF-funded weapons was not requested, its relevance to sustainment warranted a limited assessment of weapons property records compared to the quantities purchased with IRRF funds. Further, given the importance of controlling these sensitive items—particularly considering the security environment in Iraq—we also reviewed compliance with Department of Defense (DoD) policies for registering weapons’ serial numbers.

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology, and a summary of prior coverage, see Appendix A. For photos and specifications of the weapons purchased, see Appendix B. For definitions of the acronyms used in this report, see Appendix C. For the report distribution, see Appendix D. For the audit team members, see Appendix E.

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3 Contract numbers W914NS-04-D-0115 and W914NS-04-D-0116.
4 Contract number W56HZV-04-D-0181.
5 Man-portable, individual, and crew-served weapon systems used mainly against personnel and lightly armored or unarmored equipment.
**Weapons Type, Quantity, and Quality**

**Weapons Type and Quantity**

A total of 370,251 weapons, costing about $133 million, have been purchased with IRRF funds since November 15, 2003. The two most prevalent types of weapons purchased and provided to the ISF personnel in the MoD and MoI were the Avtomat Kalashnikov AK-47 assault rifle and the Glock™ 9mm semiautomatic pistol (Table 2).

**Table 2—IRRF-funded Weapons by Type and Quantity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>MoD</th>
<th>MoI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under Barrel Grenade Launcher</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launcher, RPG-7</td>
<td>1,528</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun, M-2 .50 caliber</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun, MP-5</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun, PKM</td>
<td>5,221</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>4,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun, RPK</td>
<td>14,982</td>
<td>6,310</td>
<td>8,672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, 9mm, Generic®</td>
<td>38,053</td>
<td>15,329</td>
<td>22,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, 9mm, Glock™®</td>
<td>138,813</td>
<td>13,650</td>
<td>125,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, Assault, AK-47</td>
<td>165,409</td>
<td>71,493</td>
<td>93,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, Assault, M1-F</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, Assault, M-4</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotgun</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sniper Rifle</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>370,251</td>
<td>109,145</td>
<td>261,106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A and TACOM contract files*

*The full name of the weapons types are not given because they are not material to the issues discussed in this report.*

*Although two categories of 9-mm pistols were procured, this report discusses all pistols as one type and thus refers to an aggregate total of twelve weapon types in this report.*

*The depicted weapons distribution between MoD and MoI is based on contracts and delivery orders information. Actual distribution may have been different.*

**Weapons Categories**

The weapons purchased generally fell into two categories; Warsaw Pact and non-Warsaw Pact (see Appendix B). Because ISF personnel were generally familiar with Warsaw Pact small arms, a large quantity of the weapons procured with IRRF funds were Warsaw Pact weapons. These weapons accounted for 52% of those purchased with IRRF funds.
funds and 44% of the associated costs. A total of 191,791 Warsaw Pact weapons were obtained on 13 of the 19 contracts (Table 3).

Table 3—IRRF-funded Warsaw Pact Weapons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>MoD</th>
<th>MoI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Launcher, Grenade, Under Barrel</td>
<td>3,900</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>3,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launcher, RPG-7VM</td>
<td>1,528</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>1,428</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun, PKM</td>
<td>5,221</td>
<td>1,170</td>
<td>4,051</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun, RPK</td>
<td>14,982</td>
<td>6,310</td>
<td>8,672</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, Assault, AK-47</td>
<td>165,409</td>
<td>71,493</td>
<td>93,916</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, Assault, M1-F</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>191,791</strong></td>
<td><strong>79,824</strong></td>
<td><strong>111,967</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A and TACOM contract files

* The depicted weapons distribution between MoD and MoI is based on contracts and delivery orders information. Actual distribution may have been different.

A total of 178,460 non-Warsaw Pact weapons were procured with IRRF funds (Table 4), accounting for 48% of those purchased with IRRF funds and 56% of the associated costs. The Glock™ 9mm semiautomatic pistol constituted the largest procurement of the non-Warsaw Pact weapons; 138,813 were purchased primarily on 6 of the 19 contracts, with 2 contracts accounting for 85%. The Glock™ 9mm pistol, the weapon selected by MNSTC-I as the sidearm for the Iraqi police forces, is widely used by police departments within the United States because of its safety and reliability features.

Table 4—IRRF-funded Non-Warsaw Pact Weapons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Quantity</th>
<th>MoD</th>
<th>MoI</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun, M-2 .50 caliber</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun, MP-5 A3</td>
<td>518</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>518</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, 9mm, Generic</td>
<td>38,053</td>
<td>15,329</td>
<td>22,724</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pistol, 9mm, Glock™</td>
<td>138,813</td>
<td>13,650</td>
<td>125,163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, Assault, M-4</td>
<td>620</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotgun</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sniper Rifle</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>178,460</strong></td>
<td><strong>29,321</strong></td>
<td><strong>149,139</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SIGIR analysis of JCC-I/A and TACOM contract files

* The depicted weapons distribution between MoD and MoI is based on contracts and delivery orders information. Actual distribution may have been different.
Weapons Quality

The contracts that procured weapons with IRRF funds specified that either new weapons or weapons that had not been issued were to be acquired. In spite of the harsh environment in Iraq that exposes weapons to dust, sand, and high temperatures, we found no reported problems with the quality of any of the weapon types, including the more prevalent AK-47 assault rifle and Glock™ 9mm pistol. The latter weapons are widely recognized as weapons of proven design and reliability.
Sustainment Capabilities and Accountability Issues

The effective and efficient sustainment of any piece of equipment is dependent upon a few key factors: the availability of spare parts needed to replace broken, worn, or defective parts, as well as a means to obtain and distribute them; technical information, normally in the form of maintenance and repair manuals, that provides the equipment’s design and identifies the component parts; the availability/assignment of trained maintenance personnel; and a process for determining maintenance and repair requirements (typically based on inventory quantity).

Repair Parts

Repair parts were not procured for all weapons. For those parts procured, none was available at any of the seven ISF units from which we obtained information. Further, the property books did not reflect all procured parts. Specifically,

- Nearly $269,000 was spent to obtain parts for only 5 of the 12 types of weapons procured with IRRF funds. For example, over 5,700 spare parts kits were purchased to support the 22,000 PKM and RPK machine guns, but no spare parts were procured for the 140,000 Glocks™.

- None of the parts procured for the 5 weapon types was available at any of the seven MoD and MoI units we contacted. Also, the units did not have any existing procedures to requisition and obtain parts.

- Neither the MoD nor the MoI property books even listed the parts nomenclature for 3 of the 5 weapon types for which parts were procured.
  - Generic 9mm pistol -- no listing but 2,163 kits procured
  - AK-47 assault rifle -- no listing but 26,032 kits procured
  - Shotguns -- no listing but 180 kits procured

- For the 2 procured parts kits reflected in the property books (the RPK and PKM machine guns, a total of 5,700 parts kits), the MoD property book showed no issues for either type of part kit, and the MoI property book identified only 1,133 kits issued.

Repair Manuals

We did not identify any contract requirements to acquire weapons repair manuals. The nine MoD and MoI units that responded to our inquiries reported that they had no repair manuals for any weapons, with the exception of one ISF unit. The latter had a user’s manual, written in Kurdish, for the Glock™ pistol that did not include technical repair information.

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7 The weapons were RPK and PKM machine guns, AK-47 rifles, one model of Bernelli™ semiautomatic shotguns, and the 9mm generic semiautomatic pistols purchased under contract W56HZV-04-D-0181.
Based on the decision to obtain Warsaw Pact weapons, it would be reasonable to expect that the ISF personnel would not be familiar with the maintenance and repair of the Glock™ pistol or any other non-Warsaw Pact weapon. Without repair manuals and the spare parts lists normally contained in repair manuals, the ability of the ISF maintenance personnel to efficiently and effectively repair the weapons is in question.

**Maintenance Personnel**

Feedback from eight MoD and MoI units indicated that they had no assigned weapons maintenance personnel. However, MNSTC-I officials provided data that over 200 MoD personnel had received armorer maintenance training as of the end of April 2006. The data did not identify any training of MoI arms maintenance personnel.

**Accountability**

Weapons accountability, as reflected in the property books maintained by MNSTC-I for MoD and MoI equipment and issues, was questionable. Specifically, the property books did not contain a combined inventory of sufficient quantities for three weapons types to account for the quantities procured using IRRF funds (see Table 5).

- 751 M1-F assault rifles were purchased with IRRF funds, but none of these rifles were listed in either the MoD or MoI property book—a variance of 100%.
- 176,866 9mm semiautomatic pistols were acquired with IRRF funds, but only 163,386 were recorded in the property books and warehoused on-hand quantities—a difference of 13,180 pistols, or a variance of over 7%.
- 518 MP-5 machine guns were acquired with IRRF funds, but property book totals were 419—a difference of 99 weapons, or a variance of 19%.

It is important to note that the combined quantities of these three items from the MoD and MoI property books could reasonably be expected to also include arms from a variety of sources, including those donated, those captured, and those purchased with other than IRRF funds. Considering this, it would be reasonable to view the IRRF-funded weapons as a subset of the total weapons reflected in the property books.

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8 Our use of the term “combined quantities” includes the total amounts, by weapon type, reflected in each of the two property books as well as any warehoused quantities that are on-hand pending issue and identified for either MoD or MoI distribution.
Table 5—Comparison of Weapons Issued and On-hand to those Procured with IRRF

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Weapon Type</th>
<th>MoD Issued</th>
<th>MoI Issued</th>
<th>Total Issued</th>
<th>Quantity On-hand at PWC Warehouse</th>
<th>Total Issued and Warehoused</th>
<th>Total Weapons Procured with IRRF</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under Barrel Grenade Launcher</td>
<td>782</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>804</td>
<td>3,534</td>
<td>4,537</td>
<td>3,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Launcher, RPG-7</td>
<td>2,724</td>
<td>572</td>
<td>3,296</td>
<td>4,132</td>
<td>7,428</td>
<td>1,528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun, M-2, 50 caliber</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine Gun, MP-5</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>234</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>419</td>
<td>518</td>
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<tr>
<td>Machine Gun, PKM</td>
<td>8,953</td>
<td>4,839</td>
<td>13,792</td>
<td>3,342</td>
<td>16,435</td>
<td>5,221</td>
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<tr>
<td>Machine Gun, RPK</td>
<td>12,207</td>
<td>138,742</td>
<td>151,949</td>
<td>2,808</td>
<td>16,046</td>
<td>17,554</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pistol, .9mm (all)</td>
<td>22,136</td>
<td>140,534</td>
<td>162,670</td>
<td>4,862</td>
<td>160,878</td>
<td>165,742</td>
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<td>Rifle, Assault, AK-47</td>
<td>139,267</td>
<td>214</td>
<td>192,481</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>279,801</td>
<td>1,007</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rifle, Assault, M-16</td>
<td>4,711</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>7,416</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>868</td>
<td>1,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rifle, Assault, M-4</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>4,711</td>
<td>5,365</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>866</td>
<td>1,207</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shotgun</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>1,121</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>139</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sniper Rifle</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>922</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>192,752</strong></td>
<td><strong>292,925</strong></td>
<td><strong>485,677</strong></td>
<td><strong>19,217</strong></td>
<td><strong>505,093</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| IRRF-procured Quantity Exceeding Total Issued and Warehoused | 99 | 13,180 | 751 | 14,030 |
| **TOTAL** | 370,251 |


- These are the total issued quantities, by weapons type, as reflected in the MoD and MoI property books as of September 4, 2006. The property books reflect all weapons regardless of funding source; therefore, these counts are not exclusive to IRRF-procured weapons.
- This is the quantity identified as on-hand for issuance to MoL or MoD organizations, as listed in the Public Warehousing Company database inventory report, as of September 4, 2006, regardless of funding source.
- The quantity of weapons procured for ISF with IRRF funding was determined by a review of delivery orders and other expenditure documents in contract files and financial information generated from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System.

### Recording and Maintaining Weapons Serial Numbers

All serial numbers for the weapons purchased by DoD and provided to the ISF were not registered in the DoD Registry of the Small Arms Serialization Program. Specifically, only two of the nineteen contracts for IRRF-funded weapons contained a contract data requirements list specifying that the contractor provide weapon serial numbers for the Small Arms Serialization Program. This information suggests that only about 10,000 of the over 370,000 IRRF-funded weapons, or about 2.7%, may have been registered in the DoD Registry of the Small Arms Serialization Program.

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9 The Chairman, DoD Small Arms Coordination Committee, the Army Executive Agent for Small Arms Logistics, and a representative for the U.S. Army Materiel Command, Logistics Support Agency, Redstone Arsenal, Alabama; identified the following DoD small arms policies and procedures, including serial number registration, as applicable to these weapons: DoD 4140.1-R, DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Regulation, May 23, 2003; DoD 4000.25-M, Defense Logistics Management System (DLMS), March 10, 2003; DoD 400.25-2-M, Military Standard Transaction Reporting and Accounting Procedures (MILSTRAP), October 20, 2003.
10 The U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command issued contracts W52HO9-05-C-0058 and W52HO9-05-C-0059, each for 5,000 9mm semiautomatic pistols.
However, MNSTC-I did have many file copies of equipment issue documents, and most appeared to contain the serial numbers of weapons issued to various ISF organizations. Further, the property books contained serial numbers for only 12,128 of the 505,093 total weapons issued and warehoused, or only about 2% of weapons provided from all funding sources for both MoD and MoI. The sensitivity of weapons accountability, as specified in DoD guidance, requires DoD components to register all small arms in the DoD Registry of the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program, to include those transferred outside their inventories.
Conclusion and Recommendations

Conclusion
We identified the following factors as limiting ISF’s capability to independently maintain and sustain the 370,251 IRRF-funded weapons:

- the lack of spare parts to conduct maintenance and repairs for most types of weapons purchased
- the lack of a requirement to provide technical repair manuals to ISF maintenance personnel
- the apparent decision by ISF units not to fill vacant arms maintenance positions

Complicating the ability to sustain the weapons is the issue of equipment accountability, as indicated in the disparity between the recorded property book and warehouse inventory balances for 3 of the 12 weapons types and quantities procured with IRRF funds.

Furthermore, MNSTC-I has not complied with the requirement to register the serial numbers of all weapons in the DoD Registry of the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program. Most importantly, information in contract records suggests that only about 10,000 of the over 370,000 IRRF-funded weapons may have been registered in the program.

Material Management Control Weaknesses
We identified two material management control weaknesses:

- Not all weapons procured by the DoD for the ISF were properly accounted for, which hampers effective sustainment planning and could also indicate physical security concerns over weapons.
- Not all weapons procured with IRRF funds were registered in the DoD Registry of the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program. This registry serves as a ready means to track and maintain visibility of small arms, to include those transferred from the organization’s inventory.

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11 The sustainment assessment was limited to the IRRF-funded weapons, but the findings may indicate a problem of wider scope. SIGIR addressed U.S. government plans for transitioning a sustainable and maintainable logistics operation to the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior in a separate report, “Iraqi Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities,” (SIGIR-06-032, October 28, 2006).
**Recommendations**

We recommend that the Commanding General, MNSTC-I, direct his staff to take these actions:

1. Determine the requisite spare parts and technical repair manual requirements by weapons type and, if applicable, weapons model and provide this information to the Ministries of Defense and Interior.

2. Review policies and procedures for filling vacant arms maintenance positions and implement corrective actions for sustainment.

3. Establish accurate weapons inventories.

4. Initiate action to provide weapons serial numbers for compliance with the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program.

**Management Comments and Audit Response**

We received written comments on the draft of this report from MNSTC-I officials who generally concurred with recommendations 1 through 3, but did not concur with recommendation 4. The concurrences were accompanied with comments that identified actions underway or planned relating to the recommendations. MNSTC-I officials non-concurred with recommendation 4, stating that there is no provision or mechanism to register foreign-owned weapons in the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program.

The comments received are responsive to recommendations 1 and 2. However, we do not believe that the actions described in MNSTC-I’s comments for recommendation 3 will achieve the desired outcome, and we disagree with the basis for the non-concurrence to recommendation 4.

In response to recommendation 3 regarding accountability, MNSTC-I concurred and stated, in part,

“…MNSTC-I has established a serial number weapons inventory system to maintain accountability. MNSTC-I has a process to accurately issue weapons by quantity and serial number listing….”

However, the process it describes was not developed and implemented until after weapons purchased for the ISF had begun to arrive and were issued. Consequently, reliance on a process that did not exist prior to the procurement, receipt, and issue of the weapons will not result in establishing and maintaining accountability of all weapons purchased and provided to the ISF prior to that process. MNSTC-I’s comments regarding weapon accountability also state,

“…The weapons are then hand receipted to the appropriate unit [ISF]. Any hand receipts created before the establishment of this property book are also used to update and improve the accuracy of the record keeping.”
Without first determining how many weapons were in fact purchased and received (IRRF-funded or otherwise) there is no assurance full accountability is established for all weapons. For example, there could have been undetected losses prior to issuance to the ISF, thereby resulting in no issue documents and hand receipts. In effect, management’s comments do not recognize that accountability was not established upon receipt for all weapons purchased and that any procedures implemented subsequent to the receipt of the first weapons will not account for all small arms. A fundamental principal of accountability is to establish and maintain accountability from point of purchase/receipt to the point of transfer beyond control of DoD. The management comments and stated actions will not result in accountability of all weapons purchased.

In response to recommendation 4, pertaining to compliance with the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program, MNSTC-I non-concurred and stated, in part,

“The recommendation requires MNSTC-I to comply with the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program. MNSTC-I contacted the U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Agency (LOGSA). The DoD Small Arms Serialization Program provides a national registry of DoD weapons. Only DoD weapons are included in this registry. There is currently no provision or mechanism to register foreign owned weapons in this program. Therefore, the recommendation to comply with the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program is unattainable…”

We do not agree. MNSTC-I fails to recognize U.S. ownership of the weapons prior to transfer to the ISF. The weapons were owned by the Department of Defense, obtained using DoD contracts, and were received by DoD employees or contractors. According to officials at LOGSA, located at the Redstone Arsenal, Alabama, who are involved with the DoD Small Arms Registry; along with the Chairman, DoD Small Arms Coordination Committee; and the U.S. Army Executive Agent for Small Arms Logistics at the U.S. Army Tank-Automotive Command, Rock Island Arsenal, the weapons purchased with appropriated funds under a DoD contract and subsequently transferred to a foreign entity should be recorded in the registry. Further, these officials stated that, “weapons bought under a DoD contract may be recorded in the small arms registry after they have physically transferred to a foreign entity to document that they were shipped outside the control of DoD.”

These officials identified the relevant DoD policy regarding the Small Arms Registration Program to include DoD 4000.25-M, Defense Logistics Management System Manual, Volume 2 – Supply Standards and Procedures, Chapter 18 – Small Arms Serial number Registration and Reporting. This policy states:

“Shipments Outside the Control of the Department of Defense. When small arms are selected for shipment outside the control of the Department of Defense, or when a DoD agency assumes title and accountability for U.S. weapons purchased or produced under a DoD contract then shipped directly to Security Assistance or other customers outside DoD, the shipping activity shall provide DS 140A with Small Arms Transaction Code N (Shipment to Other Agencies) or Small Arms Transaction Code F (Shipment to FMS/GA) (depending on type of shipment) to the shipping DoD Component Registry.”
The shipping DoD Component Registry shall code each weapon in the shipment and enter the small arms shipment data into the inactive file.”

Also identified as applicable was DoD 4140.1-R, DoD Supply Chain Material Management Regulation, which states:

“The DoD Components shall establish, control, and fund the automated registration of all small arms and Category 1 missile and rockets in their inventories, including all small arms transferred outside their inventories, such as those released to the GSA and those released under foreign military sales arrangements.”

All of the weapons included in our review were purchased with appropriated funds under DoD procurement contracts. The weapons fit the classification as DoD property from procurement to receipt by personnel authorized to receive the weapons on behalf of the U.S. government and until the point in time they were physically transferred/issued to representatives of the Iraqi government. Therefore, all ISF small arms received as a result of these contracts should be registered in the DoD Small Arms Registry Program.

MNSTC-I comments to recommendation 4 did propose an alternative action and stated,

“We are in effect moving forward to establish our own automated registry to meet the intent of your recommendation.”

We believe both the time and effort MNSTC-I personnel will spend to “...establish our own registry to meet the intent of your recommendation.” will neither meet the intent of our recommendation nor would be necessary to satisfy the DoD weapons registration policy.

MNSTC-I’s comments are included in the Management Comments section of this report.
Appendix A–Scope and Methodology

This review was requested by the Chairman of the United States Senate Armed Services Committee. This audit was announced on June 26, 2006, (Project No. 6021) to ascertain the type, quantity, and quality of weapons purchased with the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund (IRRF) and provided to the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), as well as the ISF’s capability to independently maintain and sustain these weapons.

To perform this audit, we discussed with and received information from representatives from the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) and the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) regarding weapons procurement, and also from the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) for field assessment of weapons quality and sustainment aspects.

To identify the types and quantities of weapons purchased, we obtained from MNSTC-I a listing of all IRRF-funded weapons procurements; cross-checked the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers financial management reports of IRRF non-construction expenditures to identify any weapon purchases not recorded as weapon purchases in the MNSTC-I data; and researched applicable JCC-I/A and U.S. Army Tank-Automotive and Armaments Command contract files for each contract and delivery order associated with the IRRF-related expenditures to determine the actual number of weapons obtained, relying on either contract documents or financial information contained in the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System (CEFMS).

To determine weapons quality, we identified contract specifications for weapons quality factors and obtained field assessments from MNC-I coalition forces embedded with the ISF units.

To determine the ISF’s capability to independently maintain and sustain the weapons, we identified if weapons procurement contracts included either spare parts or repair manuals, if property books reflected the procured parts, and the number of trained arms maintenance personnel. In addition, the team requested and obtained statements from nine Iraqi Ministry of Defense (MoD) and Ministry of Interior (MoI) ISF units regarding the availability of spare parts, repair manuals, and trained maintenance personnel.

To obtain a limited assessment of weapons accountability, we compared the weapon quantities, by weapon type, listed in the MNSTC-I property books for MoD and MoI or in the warehouse inventories maintained by the Public Warehousing Company (that operates the U.S government-controlled warehouse) to the weapon quantities procured with IRRF funds. The limited assessment provided sufficient information to question

12 This is the quantity identified for MoD or MoI organizations as listed in the Public Warehousing Company database inventory report as of September 4, 2006.
accountability and was consistent with previously reported accountability concerns, raised by the Departments of State and Defense Offices of the Inspector General.

To conduct a limited test of weapons serial number requirements, we contacted the Army Executive Agent for Small Arms Logistics to determine applicable policies and requirements; reviewed both the IRRF-funded weapons contracts for serial number requirements and the MNSTC-I property books for serial numbers of issued weapons; and performed a cursory review of issue documents for any evidence of recorded serial numbers.

This audit was conducted from July 2006 through September 2006, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

**Use of Computer-Processed Data**

To perform this audit we used data that originated in CEFMS. However, we did not test the general and application controls of CEFMS, determining data validity by comparing the system data to source documents (contract delivery orders, shipment receiving documents, and contractor invoices). This assessment indicated the data was sufficiently reliable to fairly portray the cost of weapons purchased for ISF personnel with IRRF funds.

**Prior Coverage**

We found no prior audits addressing procurement of IRRF-funded weapons for ISF units. However, we conducted an audit of the ISF logistics capabilities, which included a review of U.S. government plans and processes underway for the transition of equipment, including weapons, to the Iraqi Ministries of Defense and Interior. Our conclusion and recommendations included the need to complete and implement the plans, ensure an adequate number of logistics personnel are trained, and ensure adequate budgets are established to sustain and maintain logistics capabilities. See *Iraqi Security Forces: Review of Plans to Implement Logistics Capabilities*, (SIGIR-06-032, October 28, 2006).

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued, *Stabilizing Iraq: An Assessment of the Security Situation* (GAO-06-1094T, September 11, 2006), which includes a discussion of DoD and DoS progress reports on the development of ISF. GAO found that these reports did not provide detailed information on specific capabilities that affect individual ISF units’ readiness levels.

The *Interagency Assessment of Iraq Police Training*, issued jointly by the DoS and DoD Inspectors General, contained one recommendation related to areas covered in our audit. Specifically, the report recommended coalition authorities should establish internal controls to track transfer and accountability of equipment to the Iraqi Police Service.

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## Appendix B–Weapons Photos and Specifications

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPONS TYPE</th>
<th>SPECIFICATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Launcher, Grenade, Under Barrel (on AK-47) | Caliber: 40mm  
Launcher Capacity: 1 grenade  
Rate of Fire: 5-6 per minute  
Maximum Effective Range: 400 meters |
| Launcher, RPG-7VM (with rocket loaded) | Caliber (launcher): 40mm  
Warhead Caliber: 72mm to 105mm  
Magazine Capacity: N/A  
Rate of fire: 6 rounds/minute  
Maximum Effective Range: 300-500 meters |
| Machine Gun, PKM | Caliber: 7.62mm  
Magazine Capacity: 100-250 rounds  
Rate of fire: 250-650 rounds/minute  
Maximum Effective Range: 1,000 meters |
| Machine Gun, RPK (with bipod folded under barrel) | Caliber: 7.62mm.  
Magazine Capacity: 40 rounds  
Rate of fire: 150-600 rounds/minute  
Maximum Effective Range: 800 meters |
| Rifle, Assault, AK-47 | Caliber: 7.62mm x 39mm  
Magazine Capacity: 30 rounds  
Rate of fire: Up to 600 rounds/minute  
Maximum Effective Range: 300 meters |
| Rifle, Assault, M1-F | Caliber: 5.56mm  
Ammo Box Capacity: 30 rounds  
Rate of fire: 700 rounds/minute  
Maximum Effective Range: 600 meters |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>WEAPONS TYPE</th>
<th>SPECIFICATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Machine Gun, M2 .50-caliber        | Caliber: .50-inches (12.7-mm)  
                                   | Magazine Belt Feed, varies                                                  |
|                                   | Rate of Fire: 550 rounds per minute                                          |
|                                   | Maximum Effective Range: 2,000 meters                                         |
| MP-5                              | Caliber: 9mm x 19mm                                                          |
|                                   | Magazine Capacity: 30                                                        |
|                                   | Rate of Fire: 800 rounds per minute                                          |
|                                   | Maximum Effective Range: 100 meters                                          |
| Pistol, Semiautomatic, Glock™      | Caliber: 9mm x 19mm                                                          |
|                                   | Magazine Capacity: 15                                                        |
|                                   | Rate of Fire: 800 rounds per minute                                          |
|                                   | Maximum Effective Range: 100 meters                                          |
|                                   | Note: 85% of the pistols purchased                                           |
| M-4 Assault Rifle                  | Caliber: 5.56mm                                                              |
|                                   | Magazine Capacity: 30 rounds                                                  |
|                                   | Rate of fire: 700-950 rounds/minute                                          |
|                                   | Maximum Effective Range: 600 meters                                          |
| Shotgun                            | Gauge: 12 gauge                                                              |
|                                   | Magazine Capacity: 4 (plus 1 in chamber)                                     |
|                                   | Rate of fire: N/A                                                            |
|                                   | Maximum Effective Range: N/A                                                 |
| Sniper Rifle (telescopic sight below) | Caliber: 7.62mm                                                          |
|                                   | Magazine Capacity: 4 rounds                                                  |
|                                   | Rate of fire: Single or automatic up to 600 rounds/minute                    |
|                                   | Maximum Effective Range: 1,350 meters                                         |

Source: JCC-I/A contract files and DoD
### Appendix C–Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>CEFMS</td>
<td>Corps of Engineers Financial Management System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMATT</td>
<td>Coalition Military Assistance Training Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPATT</td>
<td>Civilian Police Assistance Training Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<tr>
<td>GAO</td>
<td>U.S. Government Accountability Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>ISF</td>
<td>Iraqi Security Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRRF</td>
<td>Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund</td>
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<td>U.S. Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Agency</td>
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<td>MNSTC-I</td>
<td>Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Ministry of Interior</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGIR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction</td>
</tr>
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Appendix D–Report Distribution

Department of State
Secretary of State
  Senior Advisor to the Secretary and Coordinator for Iraq
U.S. Ambassador to Iraq
  Director, Iraq Reconstruction Management Office
  Mission Director-Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development
Inspector General, Department of State

Department of Defense
Secretary of Defense
Deputy Secretary of Defense
  Director, Defense Reconstruction Support Office
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
  Deputy Chief Financial Officer
  Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Inspector General, Department of Defense
Director, Defense Contract Audit Agency
Director, Defense Finance and Accounting Service
Director, Defense Contract Management Agency

Department of the Army
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology
  Principal Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
    Logistics, and Technology
  Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement)
  Director, Project and Contracting Office
Commanding General, Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller
Chief of Engineers and Commander, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
  Commanding General, Gulf Region Division
Auditor General of the Army

U.S. Central Command
Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq
  Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq
  Commanding General, Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq*
  Commander, Joint Area Support Group-Central

Other Federal Government Organizations
Director, Office of Management and Budget
Comptroller General of the United States
Inspector General, Department of the Treasury
Inspector General, Department of Commerce
Inspector General, Department of Health and Human Services
Inspector General, U.S. Agency for International Development
President, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
President, U.S. Institute for Peace

* Recipient of the draft audit report.
Congressional Committees and Subcommittees, Chairman and Ranking Minority Member

U.S. Senate

Senate Committee on Appropriations
  Subcommittee on Defense
  Subcommittee on State, Foreign Operations and Related Programs
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
  Subcommittee on International Operations and Terrorism
  Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs
  Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information and International Security
  Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia

U.S. House of Representatives

House Committee on Appropriations
  Subcommittee on Defense
  Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing and Related Programs
  Subcommittee on Science, State, Justice and Commerce and Related Agencies
House Committee on Armed Services
House Committee on Government Reform
  Subcommittee on Management, Finance and Accountability
  Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations
House Committee on International Relations
  Subcommittee on Middle East and Central Asia
Appendix E–Audit Team Members

This report was prepared and the review was conducted under the direction of Joseph T. McDermott, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report include:

Mark Comfort
Walt Keays
Larry Monson
Jack Van Meter
MEMORANDUM FOR Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 4 October 2006

SUBJECT: Draft audit Report on Review of Iraqi Security Forces Weapons Provided by the Department of Defense (Project No. 6021)

Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) COMMENTS ON SIGIR-06-33 Dated 19 September 2006

1. The draft audit report of the Iraqi Security Forces Weapons provided by the Department of Defense was forwarded to MNSTC-I to comment on recommendations.

MNSTC-I comments on the recommendations of the SIGIR-06-33 Report:

Recommendation 1. Concur with Comment. MNSTC-I will assist the Iraqis to determine the ASL for weapons purchased with IRRF.

Recommendation 2. Concur with Comment. A Manning Process Action Team under the auspices of the Logistic Concept Implementation Committee has been established to address the shortage of staff.

Recommendation 3. Concur with Comment. MNSTC-I has established a serial number weapons inventory system to maintain accountability. MNSTC-I has a process to accurately issue weapons by quantity and serial number listing. Weapons are being moved to the RSU or LDI warehouse in the manufacturers’ sealed shipping crates. They are not opened prior to arrival at the unit to preclude theft or loss of weapons. At the RSU or LDI warehouses, the Iraqis break open the sealed crates, clean the weapons to reveal the serial numbers and then record the weapons serial number into a property book. The weapons are then hand receipted to the appropriate unit. Any hand receipts created before the establishment of this property book are also used to update and improve the accuracy of the record keeping.

Recommendation 4. Non-Concur. The recommendation requires MNSTC-I to comply with the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program. MNSTC-I contacted LOGSA to determine the procedures required to comply with the program. The DoD Small Arms Serialization Program provides a national registry of DoD weapons. Only DoD weapons are included in this registry. There is currently no provision or mechanism to register foreign owned weapons in this program. Therefore, the recommendation to comply with the DoD Small Arms Serialization Program is unattainable. MNSTC-I is in the process of consolidating all manual systems of serial number accountability and automating these records. We are in
effect moving forward to establish our own automated registry to meet the intent of your recommendation.

2. My point of contact for additional information is LTC Keith Gafford, DSN (318) 852-1359, e-mail: Keith.Gafford@MNSTCI.Iraq.CENTCOM.Mil

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