FIELD COMMANDERS SEE
IMPROVEMENTS IN CONTROLLING AND
COORDINATING PRIVATE SECURITY
CONTRACTOR MISSIONS IN IRAQ

SIGIR 09-022
JULY 28, 2009
Summary of Report: SIGIR 09-022

Why SIGIR Did This Study
Since April 2003, private security companies and individuals, commonly known as private security contractors (PSCs), have provided physical security services to protect U.S. personnel, facilities and property as well as U.S. government contractors, subcontractors, and other parties supporting the U.S. mission in Iraq. The use of contractors, however, has not been without problems, including incidents between PSCs and Iraqis and between PSCs and U.S. forces. In late 2007, the Departments of Defense (DoD) and State (DoS) began making organizational and procedural changes to strengthen their oversight, coordination, and control of PSC activities, including PSC movements in areas of combat operations.

This audit was conducted to determine whether the changes have improved the oversight, coordination, and control of PSC missions in Iraq. It also addresses Section 842 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) which states that audit agencies shall examine one or more of a number of issues relating to the control of PSCs, including (1) the extent to which field commanders were able to coordinate or direct the performance of contractors in an area of combat operations and (2) the nature and extent of any activity by contractor employees that was inconsistent with the objectives of operational field commanders.

What SIGIR Recommends
This report contains no recommendations but reinforces previously identified lessons learned that apply to other contingency operations, such as Afghanistan.

Management Comments
We provided a draft of this report for comment. However, the responsible agencies were not required to provide comments to the draft of this report because there were no recommendations. Agencies chose not to provide written comments but provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate.

July 28, 2009

FIELD COMMANDERS SEE IMPROVEMENTS IN CONTROLLING AND COORDINATING PRIVATE SECURITY CONTRACTOR MISSIONS IN IRAQ

What SIGIR Found
To determine the effect of recent changes to improve the oversight of PSCs, SIGIR interviewed or questioned DoD, DoS, and PSC company officials responsible for the oversight and coordination of PSC security missions. These personnel reported that the recent organizational and procedural changes have improved the control and coordination of PSC missions. For example:

Field Commanders: Nineteen current and former field commanders described the new coordination procedures as effective in exerting their control and oversight over PSC missions. None of the field commanders identified any recent PSC activities that were inconsistent with their military operations, and none identified problems with the current mission oversight process.

Contractor Operations Cells (CONOC) Officials: Officials at all six Contractor Operations Cells, which were established to coordinate the movement of DoD and DoS PSCs with military units and to respond to incidents involving PSCs, uniformly said that the organizational and procedural changes have effectively resolved the coordination and oversight problems that existed prior to their implementation.

DoS Regional Security Officers: DoS Regional Security Office officials also said that coordination between DoD and DoS has improved. These officials provide a unique perspective on the oversight of PSCs because they are responsible for both ensuring the safety of U.S. Mission personnel and ensuring that their PSCs meet contract requirements and abide by all applicable laws and regulations.

Conclusion
Field commanders and CONOC officials generally believe that the new PSC control and coordination procedures have been effective in ensuring that such activities are not inconsistent with ongoing combat operations. In an earlier report on reporting, investigating, and remediating serious incidents involving PSCs, SIGIR similarly found that improved oversight and coordination of serious incidents could be achieved by establishing core standards, policies, and procedures early in a contingency. SIGIR identified this as a lesson learned, and this report provides further evidence of the importance of these activities.
MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
  U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE
  U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ
  COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND
  COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE – IRAQ
  COMMANDING GENERAL, MULTI-NATIONAL CORPS – IRAQ

SUBJECT: Field Commanders See Improvements in Controlling and Coordinating Private Security Contractor Missions in Iraq (SIGIR 09-022)

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. It includes information on the views of military field commanders on the extent to which they are able to coordinate or direct the performance of private security contractors in their respective combat operational areas and whether private security contractors engaged in activities that were inconsistent with the objectives of operational field commanders. This audit was conducted as Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) Project 8031. The audit was performed under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978.

This report does not contain recommendations; accordingly, the addressees were not required to provide comments. However, the Multi-National Corps-Iraq and the Department of State’s Regional Security Office provided technical comments, which we considered in preparing the final report.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on the report, please contact Joan Hlinka, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits (Washington, DC), (703) 604-0945/ joan.hlinka@sigir.mil, or Nancee Needham, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits (Baghdad), (240)-553-0581, ext. 3793/ nancee.needham@iraq.centcom.mil.

Stuart W. Bowen
Inspector General
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Field Commanders See Improvements In Controlling And Coordinating Private Security Contractor Missions In Iraq

SIGIR 09-022  July 28, 2009

Introduction

Since April 2003, private security companies and individuals, commonly known as private security contractors (PSCs), have provided physical security services to protect U.S. personnel, facilities, and property as well as U.S. government contractors, subcontractors, and other parties supporting the U.S. mission in Iraq. The use of contractors, however, has not been without problems, including incidents between PSCs and Iraqis and between PSCs and U.S. forces. The most widely reported of these was a September 2007 incident in Baghdad involving contractors working for the Department of State (DoS) that resulted in the death of 17 Iraqi civilians. In the aftermath of this incident, the Department of Defense (DoD) and DoS made organizational and procedural changes to strengthen their oversight, coordination, and control of PSC activities, including PSC missions in areas of combat operations.

The objective of this review was to assess whether the new DoD and DoS organizational and procedural changes have improved field commanders’ oversight, coordination, and control of PSC security missions in Iraq. The review also addresses Section 842 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110-181) which states that audit agencies shall examine one or more of a number of issues related to the control of PSCs, including (1) the extent to which field commanders were able to coordinate or direct the performance of contractors in an area of combat operations and (2) the nature and extent of any activity by contractor employees that was inconsistent with the objectives of operational field commanders.

SIGIR recognizes that the recent U.S.-Iraq Security Agreement on the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq that went into force on January 1, 2009,1 will change how PSCs operate in Iraq. Nevertheless, the lessons learned in Iraq may prove valuable in managing PSCs in other contingencies.

To assess how the new organizational and procedural changes have affected field commanders’ oversight, coordination, and control of PSC missions, SIGIR reviewed relevant documents from the Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) and the DoS’ Regional Security Office (RSO). SIGIR officials also interviewed or questioned officials at the Contractor Operations Cells (CONOC), field commanders, and RSO officials who were directly involved in coordinating and controlling PSC operations and who had first-hand knowledge of security mission-related incidents involving PSCs to obtain their views of the effectiveness of the new procedures.

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1 The agreement was signed on November 17, 2008.
Background

In a report on October 30, 2008, SIGIR identified 77 companies that had provided PSC services to U.S. agencies in Iraq since 2003. The services included guarding coalition bases and work sites, escorting individuals and equipment convoys, and providing security advice and planning. According to an October 2008 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, complete and reliable data was not available to determine the number of contractor personnel performing security functions. However, an August 2008 Congressional Budget Office report estimated that approximately 25,000 to 30,000 employees of private security companies were operating in Iraq. SIGIR’s report identified the estimated cost of these services as approximately $6 billion from 2003 through March 2008. This high level of dependence on private contractors to provide security, along with incidents attributed to their activities, raised concerns in the Congress and elsewhere about the ability of the U.S. government to oversee and effectively manage PSCs.

Over the last five years, DoD and DoS have been the two primary U.S. government organizations contracting for PSC services in Iraq. DoD employs most of the U.S. contracted PSCs, primarily for static protection of military facilities and to protect the movements of senior military officials and supply convoys. DoS uses PSCs for two types of missions:

- **Tier 1 missions** augment and support U.S. government security operations protecting personnel and facilities under Chief of Mission authority, high-level government officials visiting Iraq, U.S. Agency for International Development personnel, and other U.S. government agencies.

- **Tier 2 missions** support all other embassy operations.

DoD and DoS Have Adopted New Control Procedures

Following the September 2007 incident, DoD and DoS took steps to improve oversight, coordination, and control of PSC missions in battle areas in Iraq. These steps are discussed in detail in DoS Inspector General and GAO reports (cited in Appendix A). The Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) established the Armed Contractor Oversight Division, and it became operational in May 2008, to provide oversight and serve as its overall point of contact on policies that govern DoD’s PSC incidents. MNF-I also published comprehensive guidance related to the oversight of DoD’s PSCs and made military units more responsible for providing oversight of PSC missions, incident reporting, investigations, and contract management. In December 2007, DoD and DoS signed a Memorandum of Agreement to define the agencies’ authority and responsibility for the accountability and operations of PSCs in Iraq. In addition to establishing common rules for the use of force and preparing serious incident reports and investigations, the agreement also established coordination and control procedures for PSC missions and assigned

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2 *Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors* (SIGIR-09-005, 10/30/2008)
5 DoS also uses PSCs to provide security to affiliated activities and refers to these as Tier 3 missions; these missions operate within the MNC-I/CONOC system. For the purpose of this report, SIGIR has included these missions in its discussion of Tier 2 missions.
6 In April 2009, the Division was renamed the Armed Contractor Oversight Branch.
liaison officers to monitor and coordinate the operations of their separate PSCs. In accordance
with the agreement, RSO and MNC-I exchanged liaison officers who are now embedded in the
MNC-I/CONOC and the RSO Tactical Operations Center, respectively.

Early in 2008, MNC-I established six CONOCs throughout Iraq to coordinate the movement of
DoD and DoS PSCs with military units; the central CONOC is located at MNC-I headquarters at
Camp Victory, and the other five are located at the five divisions that control the battle spaces in
Iraq. These CONOCs also respond to incidents involving PSCs. Under DoD’s new rules, PSCs
are required to give the central CONOC at least 72- hours advance notice prior to entering its
area of responsibility. Additionally, DoD gave field commanders the authority to approve, alter,
or deny most PSC mission requests in their area of responsibility.

The MNC-I/CONOC has become the critical link between most PSCs and the battlefield
commanders, and it plays a critical role in overseeing and coordinating PSC activities within
Iraq. Because officials working in the CONOCs are now integrated with and report to the
tactical operations centers in each of the divisions that control the corresponding battle space,
and because they have visibility over RSO missions and coordinate with MNC-I’s Commercial
Movement Division,7 they can view PSC movement requests in context with other battle space
activities. In addition, CONOC officials receive and distribute daily DoD PSC movement
requests and other reports, coordinate Quick Reaction Forces, and support post-incident
consequence management activities. Figure 1 shows the current process for handling and
controlling DoD and DoS-managed Tier 2 PSC movement requests, and the key role played by
the CONOCs in the process.

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7 Formerly the Gulf Region Division’s Logistical Movement Coordination Center.
DoS also made a number of changes to its management and oversight of its PSCs. In early 2008, DoS issued new directives to improve PSC mission coordination. The new directives established separate PSC movement reporting requirements for its two types of missions. Tier 1 missions support the Chief of Mission or provide security to other DoS personnel, diplomats, and senior government officials. Tier 2 missions support all other embassy operations. Tier 1 missions are approved by the RSO in Baghdad and do not require DoD approval to proceed. Instead, the RSO is to forward information on the mission to the MNC-I Liaison Officer and the field commander where the movement will take place, a minimum of 24 hours in advance. The Liaison Officer then shares this information with the MNC-I Joint Operations Center. Although DoD approval is not required, field commanders can recommend that the movement be altered or cancelled based on their own battle area information.

DoS Tier 2 missions operate within the MNC-I/CONOC system and follow the same procedures as the DoD-managed PSCs. Tier 2 PSCs must submit their movement requests to the central CONOC at least 72 hours in advance of the movement. The central CONOC performs quality assurance on the request and forwards it to the responsible regional CONOC and the applicable field commander for their approval.
Officials With Knowledge of PSC Activities See Improvements in Coordination and Control

Key DoD and DoS officials responsible for controlling and coordinating PSC operations and managing the incident reporting system generally reported to us that the recent procedural changes have improved their oversight, coordination, and control of PSC activities. PSC officials also believe that their coordination with the military has improved.

Contractor Operations Cells Officials

We interviewed or received requested written responses to our questions from officials at all six CONOCs in Iraq. As discussed earlier, the CONOCs are integrated with and report to the tactical operations centers in each of the divisions that control the corresponding battle space. CONOC officials receive and distribute daily PSC movement requests, coordinate Quick Reaction Forces, and support post-incident consequence management activities. As such, their responses are based on first-hand knowledge of PSC activities.

The CONOC officials uniformly said that the recent organizational changes have effectively resolved the coordination and oversight problems that existed prior to the September 2007 incident in Baghdad. The CONOCs are receiving mission request forms from the PSCs and forwarding them to the units operating in the area, and the responsible CONOC is provided a copy of every e-mail that is sent to a PSC and to the field commanders. In addition, because all U.S. government PSCs (except those supporting Tier 1 missions) must receive DoD approval prior to a mission, the PSCs and the CONOCs are now communicating more frequently. One CONOC official also said that the PSCs’ 72-hour movement notification requirement and the required approval of such movements by appropriate subordinate brigade and battalion formations were particularly important. These changes have been key to improving control.

All of the CONOC officials reported that the PSCs’ rules and responsibilities are now more clearly defined and that, other than some traffic issues, they were unaware of any recent serious PSC operations that have been inconsistent with military objectives. As one CONOC official stated, the CONOCs are now able to proactively track all PSC movements and maintain an overall situational awareness throughout the day.

DoD Field Commanders

We interviewed or received written responses to our questions from 19 current and former DoD field commanders. DoD field commanders are particularly affected by PSC activities in their areas of operation. As such, a significant concern has been whether PSC activities were inconsistent with the objectives of these commanders. MNC-I field commanders who had been involved with PSC activities in 2007 but had redeployed noted that there had been significant problems in PSC oversight and control. They said that prior to the new rules, the PSC mission-tracking process lacked structure and control, and commanders had no authority to limit, modify, or deny such movements. Nonetheless, field commanders were unable to identify any PSC activities that were inconsistent with their military operations. However, they almost
unanimously complained of traffic-related incidents and the PSCs’ bad behavior on the roads. Two officials noted that although most PSCs did not cause problems, other PSCs drove aggressively and abused the rules of the road.

More recent MNC-I field commanders who responded to our questions described the new procedures as generally effective in giving them the necessary control and oversight of PSC activities. None of the field commanders identified any recent PSC activities that were inconsistent with their military operations, and none identified problems in the current mission movement oversight process. The commanders also believe that DoD and DoS currently exercise sufficient control over PSC missions. As one official noted, the current system “is effective and does not require additional changes.” Field commanders highlighted a number of changes as especially effective in improving the operating environment, including the requirement that PSCs submit movement notifications no later than 72 hours prior to the planned movement and the establishment of both the liaison officers the DoS Tactical Operations Center and the DoD Joint Operations Center. The establishment of liaison officers was identified as critical in improving communication and coordination.

DoS Regional Security Office Officials

RSO officials also told SIGIR that coordination between DoD and DoS has improved. These officials provide a unique perspective on the oversight of PSCs because they are responsible for ensuring the safety of U.S. Mission personnel and also ensuring that their PSCs meet contract requirements and abide by all applicable laws and regulations of the U.S. and Iraqi governments.

RSO officials stated that they have enhanced their procedures for sharing information on PSC missions with DoD and have improved the accuracy and utility of data regarding movements through the battle space. Although information on their Tier 1 PSC operations that directly support Mission personnel is not required to be vetted through the CONOCs, RSO officials now distribute this information to the MNC-I liaison officer who then forwards the data to the field commanders, and coordinate daily with the Tactical Operations Center. When possible, the RSO provides information on its Tier 1 missions through DoD’s central information system at least 24 hours in advance of any movement. Also, RSO officials, through the RSO liaison officer, provide daily briefings on the movement of Tier 1 PSCs to the DoD strategic and joint operations centers. In this manner, field commanders are informed of the missions and are given the opportunity to recommend whether or not the missions should proceed. Although the ultimate decision on whether Tier 1 missions should proceed rests with the Chief of Mission, RSO officials said that when MNC-I officials have recommended that a planned Tier 1 mission not take place, they have cancelled the mission.

Private Security Contractors

We interviewed five officials representing five private security companies. These officials stated that since the new procedures were put in place, mission coordination has improved. One official noted that prior to establishing the CONOCs, unlicensed PSCs could travel through the country without being monitored or controlled. Another official noted that PSCs performed their missions based on their own company culture, and some were more aggressive than others. A representative from the Professional Services Council, a national trade association that supports
PSCs, noted that prior to the changes, no military entity had the authority to direct movements and that communications were dependent on personal relationships.

Four of the five PSC officials said that the new rules and procedures have addressed these past problems. Specifically, they noted that the rules and responsibilities surrounding missions are now clearly defined in written documents and that the new procedures have improved the field commanders’ visibility of PSC movements. In general, the PSC officials said that planning and interaction with the CONOCs and MNF-I has improved and that the improved military visibility over their movements will benefit the PSC industry by providing a quicker military response when incidents occur and medical assistance is needed.
Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusion
Field commanders and CONOC officials generally believe that the new PSC control and coordination procedures have been effective in ensuring that PSC activities are not inconsistent with the objectives of operational field commanders. In an earlier report on reporting, investigating, and remediating serious incidents involving PSCs, SIGIR similarly found that improved oversight and coordination of serious incidents could be achieved by establishing core standards, policies, and procedures early in a contingency. SIGIR identified this as a lesson learned, and this report provides further evidence of the importance of these activities.

Recommendations
This report contains no recommendations but reinforces previously identified lessons learned that apply to other contingency operations, such as Afghanistan.

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8 Opportunities To Improve Processes for Reporting, Investigating, and Remediating Serious Incidents Involving Private Security Contractors in Iraq (SIGIR 09-019, 4/30/2009)
Appendix A—Scope and Methodology

Section 842 of Public Law 110-181 requires the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) to develop a comprehensive plan for audits of private security contractors (PSCs). These audits are to examine a number of issues, including the extent to which operational field commanders are able to coordinate or direct the performance of contractors in an area of combat operations and whether contractor activities were inconsistent with the objectives of operational field commanders. This audit, conducted as SIGIR Project 8031, was conducted to address these objectives and was performed under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. For a list of acronyms used in this report, see Appendix B. For a list of the audit team members, see Appendix C.

To understand the changes in organization and processes beginning in late 2007, SIGIR obtained and reviewed Department of Defense (DoD), Department of State (DoS), Government Accountability Office (GAO), Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I), and Multi-National Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) reports and other public documents. SIGIR reviewed available information from the U.S. government and other sources on PSC activities in Iraq throughout 2008 and interviewed current and former field commanders to assess the effectiveness of current military efforts to oversee and coordinate PSC missions. Background information was obtained from several databases, including the one compiled by SIGIR in preparing its October 2008 report on the need for improved financial data reporting for PSCs.9

To identify the organizational and procedural changes that have taken place since September 2007, SIGIR relied on a number of reports and audits, including a GAO report, Rebuilding Iraq, DOD and State Department Have Improved Oversight and Coordination of Private Security Contractors in Iraq, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain Improvements (GAO-08-966, 7/2008). SIGIR also obtained information on these changes from MNF-I and DoD documents.

To obtain viewpoints on the effectiveness of the new procedures, SIGIR interviewed or received responses to questions from 19 field commanders who are now or had recently been involved with PSC missions in Iraq. Because of the central role played by the Contractor Operations Cells (CONOC) in the incident and movement processes, SIGIR interviewed or received written comments from senior officials at the central CONOC and at each of the five regional CONOCs. SIGIR also interviewed or received written comments from officials of five PSCs. SIGIR also interviewed DoS officials assigned to the Regional Security Office (RSO) and MNC-I officials at the Armed Contractor Oversight Division. MNC-I field commanders who had been in Iraq in 2007 gave us their views of the oversight procedures in place at that time and the problems they created. From MNC-I field commanders who were involved after the changes were made, SIGIR obtained information about their experiences overseeing PSC missions and their views on the effectiveness of the changes made to enhance control of PSC movements. To obtain information on the effectiveness of these procedures as they relate to controlling PSC movements, SIGIR prepared and submitted questions to MNC-I and asked that they be given to field commanders who had recently been involved with such movements. In total, officials from

9 Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors (SIGIR-09-005, 10/30/2008).
nine battalion-sized units responded. Although the data we gathered from all of these officials was insufficient to draw broad conclusions, especially on the impact of changes on military officials in the field, we believe that the information adds to the body of knowledge on the issue and addresses an area of congressional interest. Moreover, the experiences of DoD and DoS officials in Iraq can provide key lessons for oversight of PSCs in Afghanistan and other contingency operations. We are therefore providing it for the use of Congress and program managers as appropriate.

The field work on this audit was conducted from November 2008 through March 2009 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that SIGIR plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for its findings and conclusions based on the audit objectives. SIGIR believes that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for the conclusion reached based on our audit objective.

**Use of Computer-processed Data**

Computer data used to compile this report was obtained for background and informational purposes only and is not considered relevant to the audit results. All computer-based data was provided by DoD and MNC-I, and SIGIR considers it sufficiently reliable to support the audit objectives.

**Internal Controls**

To achieve the project’s objectives, SIGIR identified the procedures that DoD and DoS established in late 2007 and 2008 to strengthen oversight and control of PSC movement, but did not evaluate DoD’s internal controls for those processes. SIGIR did not assess MNC-I or CONOC procedures to oversee and coordinate activities. SIGIR did not examine the extent to which DoD controls its management activities, information systems, or human capital and other assets to administer the program. SIGIR also did not assess the extent to which DoD monitored the quality of performance of its program. To test the accuracy of the agency data provided, whenever possible, SIGIR identified different sources of agency information and other federal and private security contractor data to verify the information for accuracy and completeness.

**Related Reports by SIGIR and Others**

SIGIR reviewed the following reports issued by SIGIR, GAO, the Department of State Inspector General, the Congressional Budget Office, and the Congressional Research Service:

**Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction**


- *Oversight of Aegis’s Performance on Security Services Contracts in Iraq with the Department of Defense* (SIGIR-09-010, 1/14/2009).
• Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors (SIGIR-09-005, 10/30/2008).

• Quarterly Reports to Congress (SIGIR, 1/30/2003 through 7/30/2008).

• Key Recurring Management Issues Identified in Audits of Iraq Reconstruction Efforts (SIGIR-08-020, 7/27/2008).

• Fact Sheet on Major U.S. Contractors’ Security Costs Related to Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Contracting Activities (SIGIR-06-044, 1/30/2007).

• Challenges Faced in Carrying Out Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Activities (SIGIR-05-029, 1/26/2006).

**Congressional Budget Office**

• Contractors’ Support of U.S. Operations in Iraq (Congressional Budget Office, 8/2008).

**Congressional Research Service**

• Private Security Contractors in Iraq: Background, Legal Status, and Other Issues (Congressional Research Service, 8/25/2008).

**Department of State**

• Status of the Secretary of State’s Panel on Personal Protective Services in Iraq Report Recommendations (Department of State and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Office of the Inspector General Report Number MERO-IQO-09-01, 12/2008).

**Government Accountability Office**

• Rebuilding Iraq: DoD and State Department Have Improved Oversight and Coordination of Private Security Contractors in Iraq, but Further Actions Are Needed to Sustain Improvements (GAO-08-966, 7/31/2008).


# Appendix B—Acronyms

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CONOC</td>
<td>Contractor Operations Cells</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DoS</td>
<td>Department of State</td>
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<td>GAO</td>
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<td>MNC-I</td>
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<td>MNF-I</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Private Security Contractor</td>
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<td>RSO</td>
<td>Regional Security Office</td>
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<td>SIGIR</td>
<td>Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction</td>
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Appendix C—Audit Team Members

This report was prepared, and the audit work conducted, under the direction of David R. Warren, Assistant Inspector General for Audit, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. Staff members who contributed to the report include:

Daniel Chen
Whitney Havens
George Salvatierra
Charles Thompson
Jack VanMeter
Lovell Walls
Appendix D—Management Comments

We provided a draft of this report for comment. However, the responsible agencies were not required to provide comments to the draft of this report because there were no recommendations. Agencies chose not to provide written comments but provided technical comments which we incorporated as appropriate.
**SIGIR’s Mission**
Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction provides independent and objective:
- oversight and review through comprehensive audits, inspections, and investigations
- advice and recommendations on policies to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness
- deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and detection of fraud, waste, and abuse
- information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American people through Quarterly Reports

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- Toll Free:  866-301-2003

**Congressional Affairs**
Hillel Weinberg  
Assistant Inspector General for Congressional Affairs  
Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction  
400 Army Navy Drive  
Arlington, VA  22202-4704  
Phone: 703-428-1059  
Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil

**Public Affairs**
Daniel Kopp  
Office of Public Affairs  
Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction  
400 Army Navy Drive  
Arlington, VA  22202-4704  
Phone: 703-428-1217  
Fax: 703-428-0818  
Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil