Chapter 1

1 For an account of the September 13, 2001, National Security Council (NSC) meetings and several follow-on sessions concerning the debate over Iraq war plans, see Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 13-15, 47-49.

2 SIGIR interviews with Brigadier General (Ret.) Mark Scheid, former CENTCOM logistics planner; Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner; and Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans.


11 Kuwaiti political structures remained intact after the nation’s leadership fled in 1990. This enabled negotiations with the United States before military action restored the Kuwaitis to power, a very different situation than in 2002 and early 2003 when the Iraqi exile leadership was fractious and could not provide a unified front with which to negotiate plans. Nevertheless, the condition of Kuwait’s infrastructure proved worse than anticipated, just as would happen in Iraq in 2003. Sewage, water, and electricity plants in Kuwait failed in 1991. The effort ultimately repaired 10,000 kilometers of electrical lines and restored more than 145 schools, 1,000 public buildings, and hundreds of other facilities. The Army Corps of Engineers alone completed 1,200 task orders with the help of international contractors. Janet A. McDonnell, After Desert Storm: The United States Army and the Rebuilding of Kuwait (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1999), 31, 129-131, 176-185.

12 See: United Nations Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) 661, 687, 706, 712, 986, and 1051. UNSCR 661 of August 6, 1990, imposed comprehensive economic sanctions on Iraq, exempting food and medicine, and established a committee to oversee implementation of the sanctions; UNSCR 687 of April 3, 1991, set terms for a cease-fire and maintained the terms of the embargo; UNSCR 706 of August 15, 1991, set out a mechanism for an oil-for-food program and authorized an escrow account to be established by the Secretary-General (to fund an oil-for-food program, $1.6 billion was to be raised in six months by the sale of Iraqi oil); UNSCR 712 of September 19, 1991, confirmed the sum of $1.6 billion to be raised by the sale of Iraqi oil in a six-month period to fund the Oil-for-Food program; UNSCR 986 of April 14, 1995, enabled Iraq to sell oil worth up to $1 billion every 90 days and use the proceeds for humanitarian supplies (it also set terms of reference for the Oil-for-Food program); and UNSCR 1051 of March 27, 1996, established the export/import monitoring system for Iraq.


16 To make up the additional intake necessary to survive, the very poor relied on wheat flour and bread, the only foodstuff whose prices remained low. Independent Inquiry Committee, “The Impact of the Oil-for-Food Programme on the Iraqi People,” September 7, 2005, 18, 20.


20 For an overview of international aid provided to Iraq in the 1990s, see GAO Report 03-792R, “Rebuilding Iraq,” May 15, 2003.

21 SIGIR interview with William Orme, Director of Communications, UN Development Program, September 8, 2006.


23 The cell’s members included Major General Victor Renuart, CENTCOM Director of Operations (J3); Brigadier General John F. Kimmons, CENTCOM Director of Intelligence (J2); Colonel David D. Halverson, Chief of Operations Plans Division, CENTCOM (J3); and Colonel Mark Scheid, Chief of Logistics Plans Division, CENTCOM (J4). SIGIR interview with Brigadier General (Ret.) Mark Scheid, former CENTCOM logistics planner, September 20, 2006.

24 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans, May 30, 2008; SIGIR interview with Brigadier General (Ret.) Mark Scheid, former CENTCOM logistics planner, September 20, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, May 22, 2008. Secretary Rumsfeld later stated, “I do not recall, nor do others present in the numerous discussions with General Franks, giving any guidance that could be interpreted as requesting CENTCOM not plan for Phase IV postwar operations, as General Franks will attest. Nor would I have minimized its importance.” Donald Rumsfeld, written comments to SIGIR, November 5, 2008. Michael Fitzgerald, CENTCOM Chief of War Plans, attests that, “We, CENTCOM, were not in charge of designating and developing the government, determining who would be responsible in immediate post-conflict.” Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans, May 30, 2008.

25 SIGIR interviews with Brigadier General (Ret.) Mark Scheid, former CENTCOM logistics planner, September 20, 2006; and Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, May 22, 2008. The notation used for campaign phases changes over the years as military doctrine evolves. From 2001 to 2006, the phases were: 1-Deter/Engage; 2-Seize; 3-Decisive Operations; and 4-Transition. Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 3-0, “Joint Operations,” III-18-III-21, http://www.bits.de/NRANEU/others/jp-doctrine/jp3_0(01).pdf. In 2006, the phases were changed to 0-Shape; 1-Deter; 2-Seize Initiative; 3-Dominate; 4-Stabilize; and 5-Enable Civil Authority. Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Publication 3-0, “Joint Operations,” IV-26-IV-30, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf. The phases represent general guidance to combatant commanders and may be changed for specific plans. For purposes of this book, Phase IV refers to the establishment of self-sustaining peace, civil control, and the rule of law.

27 Warrick initially discussed this evaluation with State Department officials Steve Beecroft, Alan Limpert, and others from the Iraq desk. ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Thomas S. Warrick, former Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, November 10, 2004. Dr. Gordon Rudd was the staff historian for both the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA). All of Rudd’s interviews will be identified as “ORHA/CPA Historian.” The groups were: Democratic Principles and Procedures; Economy and Infrastructure; Defense Policy and Institutions; Education; Public Health and Humanitarian Needs; Civil Society Capacity Building; Transitional Justice; Water, Agriculture and Environment; Preserving Iraq’s Cultural Heritage; Public Finance; Oil and Energy; Local Government; Anti-Corruption Measures; Foreign and National Security; Free Media; Migration; and Public Outreach. DoS, “Future of Iraq Project,” May 12, 2003, Overview, 4, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/FOI%20Overview.pdf.

28 These meetings, held in the White House situation room, included Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, Under Secretary of State Marc Grossman, Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Peter Pace, Chief of Staff to the Vice President I. Lewis “Scooter” Libby, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence John McLaughlin, and Deputy National Security Advisor Steven Hadley. General Wayne Downing—then Zalmay Khalilzad and later Frank Miller—attended as staff representatives from the NSC. The internal NSC calendar referred to the Deputies gatherings as ‘regional affairs’ meetings, obscuring their purpose from the wider NSC staff. ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Douglas Feith, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, December 17, 2004. For a general description of the “Deputies Lunches,” see Douglas Feith, *War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror* (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 237-298.


40 SIGIR interviews with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, June 26, 2008; and February 4, 2008; and Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 276-77.


42 Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, multiple interviews with ORHA/CPA Historian and SIGIR; and DoD IG Report 07-INTEL-04, “Report on the Pre-Iraqi War Activities of the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy,” February 9, 2007. Douglas Feith disputes the assertion that the name of the office was chosen as a deliberate deception and that its products were not widely shared, saying that “The Office of Special Plans was one of the most transparent offices in the United States Government.” Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 7, 2009.

43 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, August 19, 2008.


46 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, October 11, 2006.


48 According to Frank Miller, to whom the Humanitarian Working Group reported, it was not originally charged to do any reconstruction planning. SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, June 26, 2008.


50 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, October 11, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, June 26, 2008.


52 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, October 11, 2006.

53 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, October 11, 2006.


56 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, October 11, 2006.

57 The “Karzai” comment refers to how Hamid Karzai emerged in Afghanistan as a national leader around whom the nation could generally rally. Karzai, an Afghan exile leader, was named as the country’s president after the overthrow of the Taliban.
Chapter 1


60 SIGIR interview with General George Casey, former Director of the Joint Staff and former Commander of MNF-I, July 30, 2008.

61 This subdivision of Phase IV had long been CENTCOM’s preferred concept of operations, and was taken from OPLAN 1003-98, a standing plan for war in Iraq that had been approved by the Secretary of Defense in 1998. SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, former CENTCOM J5 Chief of War Plans, May 30, 2008.


65 The strategy paper was circulated on October 29, 2002. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, Memorandum to the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Chief of Staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Principals’ Committee Review of Iraq Police Paper,” October 29, 2002, as reproduced in Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 541-43.


67 SIGIR interview with Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, December 12, 2008.


69 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State and Richard Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State, February 4, 2008; and SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, August 19, 2008.


75 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, August 19, 2008.


80 The project’s first meetings, held April 9 and 10, 2002, under the auspices of the Middle East Institute, a nonpartisan research center in Washington, DC, opened with the discord that was to mark its findings and Iraqi exile politics more generally. Ahmed Chalabi, the prominent Iraqi exile and leader of the Iraqi National Congress, raised concerns about the Middle East Institute’s participation. He viewed the think tank as an unnecessary intermediary between the Iraqi National Congress and the State Department. Acceding to Chalabi’s concerns, the State Department agreed to be the project’s sole sponsor, with meetings resuming in early July. ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Thomas S. Warrick, former Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, November 10, 2004. The three groups that did not meet were Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons; Foreign and National Security Policy; and Preserving Iraq’s Cultural Heritage. DoS, “The Future of Iraq Project,” May 12, 2003, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/index.htm.

81 Four of the groups (Education; Free Media; Transparency and Anti-Corruption Measures; and Civil Society Capacity Building) did not begin meeting until after the start of the new year. DoS, “Future of Iraq Project,” Overview, 7-8, May 12, 2003, http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/FOI%20Overview.pdf. For details on updates sent to the Executive Steering Group, see ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Thomas S. Warrick, former Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, November 10, 2004.
82 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Thomas S. Warrick, former Senior Advisor to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, November 10, 2004.

83 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, August 19, 2008.


85 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, August 19, 2008.

86 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Ryan Crocker, United States Ambassador to Iraq, February 24, 2008.


Essential Services Overview – Prewar Levels in Iraq

89 There were an estimated 500,000 people working in various intelligence, security and police organizations. With the inclusion of the armed forces and paramilitary units, the estimate for the total Iraqi Security Forces is 1.3 million. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for Invading Iraq (New York: Random House, 2002), 116-117.


4 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, May 3, 2006.

5 Chamberlin had just stepped down as Ambassador to Pakistan, and knew White House planners from her long career at the Department of State. SIGIR interviews with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, April 18, 2007 and May 3, 2006.


7 Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, email to SIGIR, October 25, 2008.

8 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, March 29, 2007.

9 SIGIR interviews with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006 and March 27, 2007.


11 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.

12 USAID, Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq, February 19, 2003. Although not released to the public until February 2003, a working draft of this document was produced by members of the Humanitarian Working Group in the fall of 2002.

13 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.


17 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, March 29, 2007.


20 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, March 29, 2007.

21 Interestingly, the group was not directed to meet by the Joint Staff Political-Military Cell, but rather arose more spontaneously from contacts of lower and mid-level staff members on the NSC and at CENTCOM. ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major Ray Eiriz, former CENTCOM planner, December 7, 2006.

22 SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interviews with CENTCOM planners Colonel (Ret.) Michael Fitzgerald, Colonel John Agoglia, Major Thomas Fisher, and Major Ray Eiriz.

23 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006.

24 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, March 27, 2007.
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25 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006; Joshua B. Bolten, OMB Director, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, July 29, 2003; and USAID, "Vision for Post-Conflict Iraq," February 19, 2003. Shelter and payroll management assistance sectors had been considered but were ultimately dropped.

26 Milligan, a USAID official, had worked in Ecuador, Zimbabwe, and finally Indonesia, where Agency personnel were evacuated after the Bali bombing. Shortly thereafter, Wendy Chamberlin included him in planning.


28 SIGIR interviews with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006; Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, March 27, 2007; Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, March 29, 2007; and Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, April 18, 2007.

29 Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor, Memorandum to the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, Chief of Staff to the President, Director of Central Intelligence, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Principals' Committee Review of Iraq Police Paper," October 29, 2002, as reproduced in Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 541-43.


34 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006.

35 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006.


38 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, March 27, 2007.

39 SIGIR interviews with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, April 14, 2006; and March 27, 2007.

40 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the National Security Council, August 19, 2008.

41 SIGIR interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, April 18, 2007. The military also uses this term to denote large depictions of plans, schedules or programs.

42 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, April 18, 2007.

43 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, March 29, 2007; and SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, November 2, 2005.

44 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006.

46 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.
47 For current provisions for the FAR, see Acquisition Central, “Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR),” http://www.acqnet.gov/FAR/.
51 Under a pre-authorization letter, contractors proceed “at risk,” which means that they will only be reimbursed for expenses later deemed by USAID to have been appropriate given the nature of the pending task.
54 SIGIR interview with Bruce Spake, Vice President of DAI, November 2, 2006.
58 For examples of USAID’s Statements of Work see RTI, USAID contract EDG-C-00-03-00010-00, Section C, April 11, 2003; Abt Associates, USAID contract RAN-C-00-03-00010-00, Section C, April 30, 2003; and CAI, USAID contract EDG-C-00-03-00011-00, Section C, April 11, 2003.


60 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006.


62 For final amounts of USAID contracts, several of which were increased multiple times, see USAID, “Assistance for Iraq Contracts and Grant,” http://www.usaid.gov/iraq/contracts/.

63 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006.


69 “There’s a lot of money to pay for this that doesn’t have to be U.S. taxpayer money … the oil revenues of that country could bring between $50 billion and $100 billion over the course of the of the next two or three years … We’re dealing with a country that can really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon.” Paul Wolfowitz, Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a hearing before the House Appropriations Committee, March 27, 2003.

70 Iraq contains 115 billion barrels of proven oil reserves, the third largest in the world. Since only 10 percent of the country has been explored, analysts believe that there is much more to be found. Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “Country Analysis Briefs: Iraq,” August 2007.


74 Members included Mike Mackowski, Senaca Johnston from State, Barbara Glotfelty from DoD Contracting, Matt Armitrano, a consultant, and a CIA representative. SIGIR interview with Gary Vogler, CPA Senior Advisor to Oil, May 10, 2006.


76 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005.

Endnotes


84 SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Contracting and Procurement, Washington, DC, December 5, 2005.


89 Although the contingency plan that violated contracting regulations was used as justification for the sole-source contract to Kellogg Brown & Root, GAO found that the award of the contract generally complied with applicable legal standards. GAO Report 04-605, “Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management Challenges,” June 2004, 19-21.


92 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the National Security Council, August 19, 2008.

94 Iraqi currency printed before 1990 in Switzerland is referred to as the Swiss dinar, which was still used in the Kurdish region at the time of the 2003 invasion even though the Iraqi Central Bank began printing a new currency, known as the Saddam dinar, in 1991. Iraq, as a result, had two systems of currency, one of which—the Saddam dinar—had been subject to inflation, and another—the Swiss dinar—which had not lost nearly as much of its value, even though it had technically ceased to be legal tender. For a description of how the Treasury team approached this problem, see Chapters 7, 8 and 9 in John B. Taylor, *Global Financial Warriors: The Untold Story of International Finance in the Post-9/11 World* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2007).

95 For supplementary accounts, see USIP and ORHA/CPA Historian interviews with David Nummy, former Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Finance, October 14, 2004, and June 23 and 27, 2003.


97 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, April 14, 2006.

98 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, June 26, 2008.

99 SIGIR interview with Jonathan Dworken, former Director for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Response for the NSC, March 29, 2007.

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**Chapter 3**


3 SIGIR interview with Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, May 22, 2008.


6 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Fisher, former CENTCOM planner, email to SIGIR, October 20, 2008.


8 SIGIR interview with General George Casey, former Director of the Joint Staff and former Commander of MNF-I, July 30, 2008. For an early history of JTF-4, see Chapter 4 of Nora Bensahel et. al., *After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008).


10 Powell explained his concurrence in the following terms: “People say, ‘Well it should have been State.’ State does not have the personnel, the capacity, or the size to deal with an immediate postwar situation in a foreign country that’s eight thousand miles away from here, so there was never a disagreement about this. It made sense. I point out to people that Douglas MacArthur was not a Foreign Service Officer … neither was Lucius Clay a Foreign Service Officer.” SIGIR interview with Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.

11 SIGIR interview with Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.
12 SIGIR interview with Douglas Feith, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, March 21, 2008; and Douglas Feith, War and Decision: Inside the Pentagon at the Dawn of the War on Terror (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 347-50. Frank Miller disputes that the discussion of the Defense Department’s takeover of the reconstruction mission was as clear as Feith characterized it. SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, February 4, 2008.


14 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.


16 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, February 4, 2008.


18 For an overview of how the war plan developed, see Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006).


23 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, December 12, 2005.


30 SIGIR interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, April 18, 2007.


34 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, March 30, 2004; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel (Ret.) Paul Hughes, former ORHA/CPA Director of Strategic Policy, June 29, 2006.


36 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006.


39 Secretary Rumsfeld characterizes this exchange differently. “As I recall, the issue with General Garner was not whether Defense should staff every position at ORHA, but over several individuals whom the White House believed would not be a good fit with ORHA.” Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, written comments to SIGIR, November 5, 2008.

40 USAID Assistant Administrator Wendy Chamberlin had called Lucke—formerly AID’s mission director in Jordan, the agency’s second largest mission—out of retirement in October when she learned he spoke some Arabic. SIGIR interview with Wendy Chamberlin, former USAID Assistant Administrator, Near East Bureau, April 18, 2007.


42 Mobbs was not Feith’s first choice. Feith’s first candidate was ineligible to serve. His second, David Kay, was appointed to ORHA, but resigned after two days. Kay would eventually lead the Iraq Survey Group, a task force that searched for weapons of mass destruction at the war’s end. Although Mobbs had served in the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in the 1980s, much of his professional experience was as a lawyer specializing in corporate and commercial matters in Russia and Eastern Europe. Fox News, “Bio: Michael H. Mobbs,” provided by ORHA, April 23, 2003.


Title X of the U.S. Code obliges the Joint Chiefs to provide military advice to the President. A staff larger than that working for the Secretary of Defense backs the Joint Chiefs. These different echelons of planning—the Joint Staff in Washington, combatant commanders in the field, and civilian staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense—are collaborative, at least in theory. Some analysts note that Rumsfeld's tenure strained this system of civil-military cooperation. Michael C. Desch, “Bush and the Generals,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 3 (May/June 2007). Secretary Rumsfeld himself, however, disputes this characterization. “Relationships with the Joint Chiefs during my tenure were professional. As is their statutory obligation, they provided useful and constructive advice to the President and to me.” Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, written comments to SIGIR, November 5, 2008. Rumsfeld notes that Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Richard Meyers and Richard H. Kohn wrote a rebuttal to Desch’s article. See: Richard B. Myers and Richard H. Kohn, “The Military’s Place,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 5 (September/October 2007).

Milligan sent a memorandum to Lieutenant General (Ret.) Garner summarizing progress across eleven sectors and highlighting outstanding issues for his action. Christopher Milligan, Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance Group, memorandum to Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, Director of ORHA, “Status of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance Preparations,” January 26, 2003. Bernoulli’s equation is used by engineers to describe the relationship between air pressure and velocity in fluid dynamics.


71 SIGIR interview with Leonard Hawley, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Peacekeeping, February 12, 2008.


73 An inherently governmental activity involves: (1) binding the United States to take or not to take some action by contract, policy, regulation, authorization, order, or otherwise; (2) determining, protecting, and advancing economic, political, territorial, property, or other interests by military or diplomatic action, civil or criminal judicial proceedings, contract management, or otherwise; (3) significantly affecting the life, liberty, or property of private persons; or (4) exerting ultimate control over the acquisition, use, or disposition of United States property (real or personal, tangible or intangible), including establishing policies or procedures for the collection, control, or disbursement of appropriated and other federal funds. White House Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 (Revised), “Performance of Commercial Activities,” May 29, 2003; and FAR, Subpart 7.5, “Inherently Governmental Functions,” http://www.acquisition.gov/far/current/html/Subpart%207_5.html.


75 The statutory provision used was Title 5, Section 3161, of the U.S. Code, under 5 CFR 213.3199.


77 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Thomas Baltazar, C3 Operations Officer for ORHA, June 10, 2003.

78 General Garner dictated notes for the record on February 28, March 3, and March 10, 2003 about the general status of ORHA preparations and his meetings with Secretary Condoleezza Rice, President Bush, and the United Nations. ORHA/CPA Historian and SIGIR interviews with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner.


80 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, April 5, 2006.

81 A spreadsheet of Rock Drill attendees was maintained by ORHA staff. ORHA, “Rock Drill,” undated. During military operations undertaken with other countries, officers from the coalition countries typically join the headquarters staff in various capacities.


89 SIGIR interview with Ross Wherry, former USAID Director of the Office of Iraq Affairs, April 5, 2006.
91 Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, follow-up interview notes to ORHA/CPA Historian, March 10, 2003; and SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interviews with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner.
93 Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, follow-up interview notes to ORHA/CPA Historian, March 3, 2003; and SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interviews with Lieutenant General Garner.
95 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, December 12, 2005; and Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (Pantheon Books, 2006), 160-63.

Chapter 4
1 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Paul Hughes, former ORHA/CPA Director, Strategic Policy Office, May 2, 2007.
3 Gordon Rudd, ORHA/CPA Historian, compiled a list of language skills of ORHA personnel. SIGIR conversations with Gordon Rudd, ORHA/CPA Historian, Summer 2007.
5 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Paul Hughes, former ORHA/CPA Director, Strategic Policy Office, May 2, 2007.
6 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Robert D. Costello, Jr., ORHA Chief of Logistics, June 15, 2003; and SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, October 27, 2008.
7 SIGIR interview with Colonel (Ret.) Paul Hughes, former ORHA/CPA Director, Strategic Policy Office, May 2, 2007.
9 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Elliott, Contracting Officer for ORHA as part of DCMA’s Contingency Contracting Administration Services Mission, July 12, 2003.
10 Some question remains about the purpose of this funding. Some say it was strictly for the ORHA staff and translators; the ORHA/CPA comptroller says the purpose was more expansive. Gary Minor, "Financing the Fight—From the Front,” Air Force Comptroller (January 2004).
11 The war started on March 20 in Iraq, late evening on March 19 in the United States. The date of the event in local time is used for this report.
13 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, April 5, 2006. For a chronology of JTF-4’s dissolution, see Nora Bensahel et al., After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2008), 51-52.
15 ORHA’s leaders did not give it credence, and it was never formally issued. ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ronald E. Adams, Deputy Director of ORHA, September 29, 2006.
17 Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, Director of ORHA, memorandum to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, passed through Larry Hanauer, Special Assistant to the Director of ORHA, March 21, 2003.
19 Colin Powell, Secretary of State, memorandum to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, untitled, March 26, 2003.
22 For background on the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) and for an articulation of NGO reticence, see Refugees International, “Humanitarian Coordination for Iraq: A Job for the United Nations,” April 9, 2003. The article notes that, “Even as they rely on the HOC for access, the view of most aid agencies is that close association with the military forces of a belligerent compromises the impartiality that lies at the core of their mission. The aid agencies provide humanitarian assistance based on need, not politics; the idea of using aid strategically to win “hearts and minds” is anathema to the humanitarian community. Yet while the principles espoused by most aid organizations would seem to dictate distance from the HOC, pragmatism seems to have dicted association.”


26 SIGIR interview with Bruce Spake, Vice President of DAI, and Steve Connolly, Task Order Manager, DAI, November 2, 2006.


28 CENTCOM, "Governorate Support Team (GST) Concept," briefing slides; and Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Fisher, former CENTCOM planner, email to SIGIR, October 20, 2008.


34 Some of that staff included personnel who provided security but were not assigned specifically to ORHA. ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Elliot, Contracting Officer for ORHA as part of DCMA’s Contingency Contracting Administration Services Mission, July 12, 2003; and Director for Operations and Personnel memorandum to Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “Questions from Jaymie Durnan—Why the Huge Increase in [ORHA] Staff?” attachment to email from Larry Hanauer, Special Assistant to the Director of ORHA, to Gretchen Anderson, of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), “ORHA Personnel Growth,” April 18, 2003.


36 Two could write them for up to $5 million; the other could write contracts for up to $1 million. SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 21; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Elliot, Contracting Officer for ORHA as part of DCMA’s Contingency Contracting Administration Services Mission, July 12, 2003.

37 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Elliot, Contracting Officer for ORHA as part of DCMA’s Contingency Contracting Administration Services Mission, July 12, 2003.


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2 SIGIR interview with Sinan al-Najaar, former senior manager in an Iraqi ministry, November 30, 2006.


5 SIGIR conversations with Barbara Lewis, former Senior Advisor to the Rafidain Bank, Summer 2007.

6 Robin Raphel, former Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Trade, email to SIGIR, April 11, 2007.


8 For a description of ordinary life in Iraq in the weeks preceding the invasion, see Anthony Shadid, Night Draws Near: Iraq’s People in the Shadow of America’s War, Part One: Before (New York: Henry Holt, 2005).


11 For an account of the war plan, see Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006).


13 For a representative account of a clash between coalition and irregular forces, see Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006), 217-221.


15 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, April 1, 2006.


17 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General David Blackledge, Commander of the 354th Civil Affairs Brigade, January 2, 2004; ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Mike Gfoeller, former Deputy Director of ORHA Region-South, August 10, 2003; and USAID, “Assistance for Iraq: DART Assessment of Umm Qasr and Relief Efforts,” March 27, 2003.


20 During the invasion’s initial phase, FEST teams helped shut down a hydroelectric dam that would have impacted the operations of the Third Infantry Division if it had failed. The FEST teams also ensured bridges over the Euphrates River could support M-1 tanks waiting to cross. Tele-engineering kits enabled them to relay real-time images to the reach-back center in the United States, where Farsi and Arabic-speaking engineers stood ready to translate diagrams and control panel labels. This capacity to draw on reach-back expertise brought new levels of engineering know-how to the battlefield. Once combat needs were met, the FEST teams moved on to assessing oil, water and electricity infrastructure. Two fully outfitted FEST-Main teams, larger units augmented with more engineers, worked with Task Force Restore Iraqi Oil. As the restoration of power became a major need, FEST teams later assisted Task Force Restore Iraq Electricity. By the end of May, eighteen teams were in country working for ORHA through a USAID-USACE agreement. SIGIR interview with William Fritz, USACE Assistant Deputy G-3 (Operations), Chief, Concepts, Plan and Doctrine Branch, March 1, 2006.

21 The USACE operations center and Infrastructure Assessment Team completed the assessment in the fall of 2002. Estimates for three scenarios were drawn: no damage, middle-range damage, extensive damage. $35 billion was the middle-range scenario. SIGIR interview with William Fritz, USACE Assistant Deputy G-3 (Operations), Chief, Concepts, Plans and Doctrine Branch, March 1, 2006.


23 Only a two-man contingent from the DART team remained in Umm Qasr after March 27, 2003. The rest of the team made follow-up trips from Kuwait on April 2 and April 5, 2003. USAID, “Assistance for Iraq: DART Assessment of Umm Qasr and Relief Efforts,” April 7, 2003.


26 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.

27 In a letter to Secretary Rumsfeld on the relationship between DART and ORHA, Secretary Powell wrote, “if operational disagreements arise between DART and ORHA and cannot be resolved … the final resolution of the matter will come to us.” Later that day, Powell wrote another letter regarding the selection of ORHA staff, claiming “these individuals may not be acceptable to you and that you have your own list of candidates to fill these positions. We have frozen these assignments until you and I deal with this.” Colin Powell, Secretary of State, letters to Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, March 26, 2003. In response Rumsfeld wrote, “If you agree to this common sense approach, our involvement in subsequent disputes will be kept to a minimum.” Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense, letter to Colin Powell, Secretary of State, “Disaster Assistance Response Team and the Garner Group,” March 31, 2003.


30 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Mike Gfoeller, former Deputy Director of ORHA Region-South, August 10, 2003.


33 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General David Blackledge, Commander of the 354th Civil Affairs Brigade, January 2, 2004.

34 For contemporaneous accounts of Garner’s visits to Umm Qasr and developments there, see CNN, “U.S. Interim Administrator Visits Iraq,” April 12, 2003.


38 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General David McKiernan, former Commander of Coalition Forces Land Component Command, December 5, 2006.


41 The military grid used by NATO militaries is based on the Universal Transverse Mercator coordinate system, not longitude and latitude. SIGIR interview with Dustin Felix, Civil Affairs Officer in the 5th Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, December 21, 2005.


46 Lieutenant General Garner recalls that Colonel Colin Boag, a British colonel, informed him of two possible locations to house ORHA: the Rashid Hotel or the Republican Palace. Since the media was already in the hotel, and Garner was concerned about the security risks of a vertical structure, he elected to house ORHA in the palace. SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, October 27, 2008.


50 Richard Miller, “A Brief History of CPATT,” unpublished manuscript, May 15, 2005, 1. CPATT stands for the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team. Chapter 12 explains the creation of CPATT and other Iraqi security forces, both police and military.


53 SIGIR interview with Bruce Spake, Vice President of DAI, and Steve Connolly, QRF Coordinator, DAI, November 2, 2006.

54 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Christopher Spear, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, July 15, 2003; and SIGIR interview with James Haveman, former Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Health, and Robert Goodwin, former Chief of Staff, Ministry of Health, December 22, 2005.

55 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Christopher Spear, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, July 15, 2003.

56 SIGIR conversations with Barbara Lewis, former Senior Advisor to the Rafidain Bank, Summer 2007.
57 SIGIR interview with Samir Sumaida’ie, Iraqi Ambassador to the United States, March 11, 2008.
58 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major General Donald F. Campbell, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Justice, July 14, 2003.
61 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
64 ORHA/CPA Historian and SIGIR interviews with Steven Browning, Task Force RIO Advisor, June 21, 2003 and April 26, 2006.
66 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
68 Colonel (Ret.) Gregory Fontenot, Lieutenant Colonel E.J. Degen, and Lieutenant Colonel David Tohn, On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2005).
71 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel John Agoglia, former CENTCOM planner, September 22, 2006.
72 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, April 1, 2006.
80 SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, October 27, 2008.
81 Different iterations of this list exist. See: annotated briefing slide, “ORHA’s Key Tasks (Complete by 15 Jun 03),” undated; and another annotated slide by the same title, also undated.
82 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
84 Michael Mobbs left ORHA shortly after its arrival in Baghdad. SIGIR conversations with Gordon Rudd, ORHA/CPA Historian, Summer 2007.
85 Lieutenant General Garner notes that Iraqis and the military were cooperative, and that the coordination between Washington and ORHA was most problematic. SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, October 27, 2008.
88 For Bremer’s own account of his selection, see L. Paul Bremer III, My Year in Iraq, The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).
89 Garner notes that he asked Rumsfeld to consider delaying Bremer’s arrival until July 1, 2003, by which time he felt he could prepare for a transition. Rumsfeld disagreed. SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, April 1, 2006; and SIGIR and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, former Director of ORHA, October 27, 2008.
90 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, former Presidential Envoy to the Free Iraqis, March 19, 2008.

Essential Services – The Effects of Invasion
92 CPA Orders 1 and 2 greatly impacted the security forces as the Army was disbanded and many others loyal to Saddam deserted. The Iraqi Army post-invasion did not exist. The numbers available for the Iraq Security Force only includes the Iraqi Police. CPA Order Number 1, “De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society,” May 16, 2003; and CPA Order Number 2, “Dissolution of Entities,” May 16, 2003.
93 The exact number of civilian contractor deaths are unknown and only include those which have been reported to the Department of Labor and the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count. This probably underestimates civilian casualties.
94 International Monetary Fund, ”Iraq: Statistical Appendix,” August 2007.
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5 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.

6 Donald Rumsfeld, for Secretary of Defense, written comments to SIGIR, January 7, 2009.


11 Two international laws—The 1907 Hague Regulation and the Geneva Conventions of 1949—pertain to occupations. Article 42 of the 1907 Hague Regulations states that a “territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised.” According to their common Article 2, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 apply to any territory occupied during international hostilities. They also apply in situations where the occupation of state territory meets with no armed resistance.


13 CPA Regulation Number 1, May 16, 2003.


17 L. Paul Bremer, III, former CPA Administrator, written comments to SIGIR, December 19, 2008.

18 L. Paul Bremer, III, former CPA Administrator, written comments to SIGIR, December 19, 2008.


20 Major General Sanchez had been nominated for appointment to the grade of Lieutenant General on May 5, 2003. His appointment was for the command of V Corps in Europe. DoD Press Release, “Flag and General Officer Announcements,” May 5, 2003. A Corps headquarters, which would be the basis for CJTF-7, is much smaller and more tactically oriented than an Army headquarters, which was the basis for the Coalition Forces Land Component Command.

21 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ricardo Sanchez, former CJTF-7 Commander, October 26, 2007; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with L. Paul Bremer III, former CPA Administrator, January 7, 2008.


26 “Senior Party Members” were Regional Command Members, Branch Members, Section Members, and Group Members. CPA Order Number 1, “De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society,” May 16, 2003.

27 More junior ranks included Member and Active Member. CPA Order Number 1, May 16, 2003.

28 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with J. Scott Carpenter, Governance Director of the CPA, June 18, 2004.


30 ORHA/CPA Historian interviews with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Jay Garner, Director of ORHA; Robin Raphel, Coordinator for Civil Administration; David Nummy, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Finance; Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil; and Major General David Petraeus, Commander of the 101st Airborne Division.


33 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, February 4, 2008.


41 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, February 4, 2008.

42 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.

43 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.


46 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Meghan O’Sullivan, CPA Governance Team Member, December 29, 2003.

47 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ricardo Sanchez, former CJTF-7 Commander, October 26, 2007.
48 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General David McKiernan, former Commander of Coalition Forces Land Component Command, December 5, 2006; SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General (Ret.) Ricardo Sanchez, former CJTF-7 Commander, October 26, 2007; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major General David Petraeus, Commander of the 101st Airborne Division, July 28, 2003.


50 Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, former CJTF-7 Commander, written comments to SIGIR, October 26, 2008.


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2 Most contracts were indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (IDIQ) contracts. U.S. government agencies use IDIQ contracts when exact quantities of supplies and/or services to be obtained through the contract cannot be precisely determined. Task orders are then issued as more detail becomes available. FAR, Subpart 16.5, “Indefinite-Delivery Contracts,” June 12, 2008, http://www.arnet.gov/far/current/html/Subpart%2016_5.html.

3 This estimate includes cumulative deposits to fund Iraqi government operations and reconstruction programs. CPA-IG, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2004, 59-60. A smaller portion of these funds, approximately $7 billion, was allocated for relief and reconstruction projects. GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 2.

4 The humanitarian and reconstruction sectors established by the legislation were: (1) Water/sanitation infrastructure; (2) feeding and food distribution; (3) supporting relief efforts related to refugees, internally displaced persons, and vulnerable individuals, including assistance for families of innocent Iraqi civilians who suffer losses as a result of military operations; (4) electricity; (5) health care; (6) telecommunications; (7) economic and financial policy; (8) education; (9) transportation; (10) rule of law and governance; (11) humanitarian demining; (12) agriculture. P.L. 108-11, Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2003, April 16, 2003. The Department of Health and Human Services never received any IRRF 1 funding.


6 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, Deputy Director of USAID in Iraq, February 9, 2006; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Christopher Milligan, Deputy Director of USAID in Iraq, August 13, 2003.


13 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with James D. Warlick, Consular for Oil-for-Food program, June 13, 2004.


15 CPA Regulation Number 2, June 10, 2003.


17 McPherson had taken leave from his job as president of Michigan State University to serve with the CPA. He chaired the PRB for the first two months and then turned over chairmanship to Oliver. Dave Oliver, “Restarting the Economy in Iraq,” November 2003, 9.

18 CPA Regulation Number 3, June 18, 2003.


20 CPA Regulation Number 3, June 18, 2003.


22 CPA Memorandum Number 4, August 19, 2003.


24 Mark S. Martins, “The Commander’s Emergency Response Program,” Joint Force Quarterly 37 (2nd Quarter 2005). Martins was deputy legal counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time he wrote this article. A Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) is a change or amendment to a previous operational order.


29 ORHA was mentioned in the memorandum, but it had already been subsumed by CPA by this time. The executive agency for ORHA was transferred seamlessly to CPA until ORHA officially dissolved in mid-June. SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 24.
30 SIGIR refers to HCA as the “HCA office” when speaking of HCA as an organization and “HCA” when referring to the person in charge of the HCA office. The HCA office acted as the contracting organization for the CPA, and later for the CPA’s Project Management Office (PMO) after the PMO was created in the fall of 2003. When the CPA dissolved, the HCA office continued its contracting support for the Project and Contracting Office (PCO), which took over many of the PMO’s responsibilities. This distinction is noted in SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 119.


42 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Human Capital Management,” January 2006, 10. According to Colonel DeGraff, the U.S. government relied on the 3161 special hiring authority because most federal agencies did not respond to repeated requests for personnel. The Secretary of Defense sent letters to his cabinet-level counterparts asking them to help staff the CPA, but by late fall 2003, few had provided adequate numbers of personnel. In November 2003, the NSC appealed to the federal agencies for assistance, but this plea was similarly ineffective. ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Colonel Dennis J. DeGraff, CPA Director of Personnel, June 25, 2004.


44 GAO Report 04-902R, “Rebuilding Iraq: Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,” June 2004, 39. The number of military and civilian staff provided to the CPA by the Defense Department varied from month to month. For example, in March 2004, the Defense Department provided 293 military and 168 civilian personnel, or 461 of the 1,196 on the CPA personnel roster. When the CPA ended, 384 of the CPA’s 1,050 staff were either members of the U.S. military or civilians from the Defense Department.


47 USIP interview with Rodney Bent, former OMB Director, September 14, 2004.


Chapter 8

1 SIGIR conversations with Barbara Lewis, former Senior Advisor to the Rafidain Bank, Summer 2007.

2 John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 4, 2003. The Treasury team found that looters, frustrated by their inability to break into the vaults, had opened a sewer main and flooded the central bank. ORHA/CPA Historian interview with David Nummy, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Finance, June 23, 2003.


5 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with David Nummy, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Finance, June 27, 2003.

6 Joseph A. Christoff, GAO Director of International Affairs and Trade and Davi M. D’Agostino, GAO Director of Financial Markets and Community Investment, Testimony before the House Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, March 18, 2004; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with George B. Wolfe, Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Treasury Department, June 13, 2004.

7 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Memorandum, “Cash Transfers to the Coalition Provisional Authority,” February 6, 2007, 6.


10 SIGIR conversations with Barbara Lewis, former Senior Advisor to the Rafidain Bank, Summer 2007.

11 SIGIR conversations with Barbara Lewis, former Senior Advisor to the Rafidain Bank, Summer 2007.

12 John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 4, 2003.


15 House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Memorandum, “Cash Transfers to the Coalition Provisional Authority,” February 6, 2007, 6.

16 Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Statement before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, February 6, 2007; and Robert Kraus email to Joseph Botta, “DFI-Cash00220,” December 12, 2003, as cited in: House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform Memorandum, “Cash Transfers to the Coalition Provisional Authority,” February 6, 2007, 6-7.

18 John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 4, 2003.


22 USIP interview with Brigadier General Hugh Tant, former Director of Iraqi Currency Exchange Program, October 22, 2004.


26 John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 4, 2003.


34 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 7, 2009.


37 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 3, 2009.

38 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 3, 2009.
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39 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 3, 2009 and August 19, 2008.
40 The $2 billion in recorded deposits included $1 billion from SOEs and $1 billion from private depositors. Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 7, 2009.
41 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 7, 2009.
42 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 3, 2009.
43 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 3, 2009.
44 Peter McPherson, former CPA Director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, August 19, 2008.
45 Peter McPherson, former CPA Director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, August 19, 2008.
46 The Geneva Conventions require an occupying power to protect the assets of the state, but there is little precedent for determining if state-owned industries are included in this provision of the Conventions. Christopher Foote, William Block, Keith Crane, and Simon Gray, "Economic Policy and Prospects in Iraq," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 18, no. 3 (Summer 2004).
49 SIGIR interview with Dr. Sami Al-Araji, Deputy Minister of Industry and Minerals, May 2007.
50 John B. Taylor, Under Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 4, 2003.
54 Peter McPherson, former CPA director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, January 3, 2009.
57 Peter McPherson, former CPA Director of Economic Policy, written comments to SIGIR, August 19, 2008.
59 Anne Ellen Henderson, USIP Special Report 138, "The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Economic Reconstruction in Iraq," April 2005. Under the Oil-for-Food program, the United Nations assisted the government of Iraq in providing a "food basket" for all Iraqis. An estimated 60 percent of the population depended on the food and supplies provided by the UN. This social safety net cost the Iraqi government about $4.9 billion per year. International Monetary Fund, "Iraq: Macroeconomic Assessment," October, 21, 2003.
14 The Office of Strategic Planning was later renamed the Office of Policy, Planning, and Analysis. Dayton Maxwell, “Deliberate and Development Post-Conflict Planning in Iraq: The Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis, Coalition Provisional Authority, A USAID Perspective,” unpublished manuscript, July 23, 2004, 5.
34 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006.
35 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, March 17, 2008.
36 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, March 17, 2008.
37 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006.
40 SIGIR interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, March 3, 2006; SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Dayton Maxwell, USAID Official assigned to the CPA Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis, November 3, 2005.
43 Questions from the House and Senate Staffs and Answers attached to an email to Adm. (Ret.) David Oliver, CPA Director, Management and Budget Office, October 4, 2003.
44 Questions from the House and Senate Staffs and Answers attached to an email to Adm. (Ret.) David Oliver, CPA Director, Management and Budget Office, October 4, 2003.
45 Questions from the House and Senate Staffs and Answers attached to an email to Adm. (Ret.) David Oliver, CPA Director, Management and Budget Office, October 4, 2003.
Chapter 10

1 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004; and SIGIR Lessons Learned Forum: Program and Project Management, April 12, 2006.


5 Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, Director of the Iraq PMO, email to Peter Andrew Bearpark, CPA Director of Operations, "Re: Establishing Communications," September 18, 2003.

6 DoD Cover Brief, "Project from the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)—Iraq Project Management Office (PMO)," September 9, 2003; and SIGIR interview with Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the "Baker-Stanley" team and former PMO Program Engineer, March 9, 2006.

7 CPA/Department of the Army, letter to Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting (PARC), September 15, 2003.

8 SIGIR interview with Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the "Baker-Stanley" team and former PMO Program Engineer, March 9, 2006; and Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the "Baker-Stanley" team and former PMO Program Engineer, written comments to SIGIR, November 4, 2008.


10 USACE, comments to SIGIR, November 4, 2008. A design-build contractor is responsible for every phase of a project from design to completion, although it may subcontract pieces of a project to other contractors. SIGIR, "Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Program and Project Management," March 2007, 56.


17 SIGIR interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, January 13, 2006.


20 PMO/PCO Historian interview with Tina Ballard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, November 17, 2004.


22 PMO/PCO Historian interview with Tina Ballard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, November 17, 2004.

23 Paul Wolfowitz, "Determination and Findings," December 5, 2003; and GAO Report 04-605, "Rebuilding Iraq: Fiscal Year 2003 Contract Award Procedures and Management Challenges," June 2004, 28-46. GAO identified two issues with the memorandum. First, GAO concluded that the memorandum constituted a class determination and finding, which is prohibited by the Federal Acquisition Regulation. Additionally, GAO noted that the waiver to competition requirements was based on a public interest exception, which can only be issued by the Secretary of Defense. GAO noted that while the Deputy Secretary has broad authority to act on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, he did not have authority to do so in this instance.


27 SIGIR interview with Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and former PMO Program Engineer, March 9, 2006; and Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and former PMO Program Engineer, written comments to SIGIR, November 4, 2008.

28 SIGIR interview with Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and former PMO Program Engineer, March 9, 2006.

29 SIGIR interview with James Haveman, former Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Health, December 22, 2005; and SIGIR interview with Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and former PMO Program Engineer, March 9, 2006.

30 SIGIR interview with Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and former PMO Program Engineer, March 9, 2006.

31 Craig Johnson, Stanley Consultants, spokesman for the “Baker-Stanley” team and former PMO Program Engineer, written comments to SIGIR, November 4, 2008.


34 SIGIR interview with Rear Adm. (Ret.) David Nash, former Director of the Iraq PMO, January 13, 2006.

35 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, March 17, 2008.

36 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.

37 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.
38 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.

39 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004. The decision to transfer sovereignty earlier than originally envisioned by Ambassador Bremer is discussed in detail in subsequent chapters. The CPA—and the U.S. Embassy that replaced it in June 2004—repeatedly re-aligned money in the supplemental to meet changing needs on the ground in Iraq. Part III of this book looks at re-programming in more depth.


56 OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, Funding Table.

Chapter 11


2 For Umm Qasr and South-Central, see ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Mike Gi foeller, former Deputy Director of ORHA Region-South, August 10, 2003; Amatzia Baram, “Post-Saddam Iraq: The Shiite Factor,” The Brookings Institution, April 30, 2003; and Ken Pollack, “The Seven Deadly Sins of Failure in Iraq: A Retrospective Analysis of the Reconstruction,” The Brookings Institution, December 1, 2006.


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5 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Major General David Petraeus, Commander of the 101st Airborne Division, July 28, 2003.


7 L. Paul Bremer, III, former CPA Administrator, written comments to SIGIR, December 19, 2008.


9 SIGIR, “Iraq Reconstruction: Lessons in Contracting and Procurement,” July 2006, 32; and Research Triangle Institute, USAID contract EDG-C00-03-00010-00, Section C, April 11, 2003.

10 SIGIR interview with Dr. Ronald Johnson, Senior Vice President for International Development, RTI International, March 2, 2006.

11 USIP interview with Aaron Williams, Vice President for International Business Development, RTI International, October 1, 2004.


13 USIP interview with Aaron Williams, Vice President for International Business Development, RTI International, October 1, 2004.

14 USIP interview with Aaron Williams, Vice President for International Business Development, RTI International, October 1, 2004.


16 USIP interview with Aaron Williams, Vice President for International Business Development, RTI International, October 1, 2004; SIGIR interview with Dr. Ronald Johnson, Senior Vice President for International Development, RTI International, March 2, 2006; and USIP interview with Charles “Chuck” Costello, Deputy Chief of Party in the Local Governance Support Project with RTI International, October 14, 2004.


20 SIGIR interview with Steve Connolly, QRF Coordinator for DAI, December 21, 2006.


25 According to Carpenter, the Council consisted of 25 members so each could select a cabinet minister. ORHA/CPA Historian interview with J. Scott Carpenter, CPA Director of Governance, June 29, 2004.


27 Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, written comments to SIGIR, November 5, 2008.
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34 SIGIR interview with Richard Armitage, former Deputy Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.


36 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, February 4, 2008.


40 Iraq’s eighteen major federal units are called governorates or provinces. The terms are used interchangeably, but this book will exclusively use the term “province.” Sharon Otterman, Iraq: The Changing Plan,” Council on Foreign Relations, December 1, 2003.


4 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, February 4, 2008.

5 Even if an organized insurgency had not begun, the Iraqi police would probably have had difficulty maintaining order. At the eve of the invasion, a web of secret police, paramilitary organizations, and intelligence services were the main providers of public order. However, these groups were guilty of many human rights abuses committed under Saddam, and DoD prewar planning called for their dissolution. In contrast, the Iraqi police service only ventured out of their stations “to round up possible suspects, extract confessions by force, and extort bribes from family members for release of the suspects.” Seth G. Jones, Jeremy M. Wilson, Andrew Rathmell, and K. Jack Riley, *Establishing Law and Order after Conflict* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 109-110; and Robert Perito, USIP Special Report 137, “The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience with Public Security in Iraq: Lessons Identified,” April 2005, 2-3. DoD Briefing, “Rebuilding the Iraqi Military,” January 21, 2003, declassified March 12, 2007.

6 SIGIR interview with Frank Miller, former Chairman of the Executive Steering Group of the NSC, February 4, 2008. CIA officials denied Frank Miller’s claim that they provided intelligence assessments suggesting Iraq’s police were capable of maintaining order. Michael Gordon, "For Training Iraq’s Police, the Main Problem Was Time," *New York Times*, October 21, 2004.

7 SIGIR interview with Gerald Burke, Advisor to the Baghdad police, June 14, 2007.


10 SIGIR interview with Gerald Burke, Advisor to the Baghdad police, June 14, 2007.


17 SIGIR interview with John Meiklejohn, Advisor for police academies and curriculum, June 14, 2007.


23 Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, and Keith Crane, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 46.


25 U.S. troops deployed as immigration inspectors received a three-hour training module. In the United States, training for immigration duties takes four months, followed by extensive field training, and an immigration officer in the United States would not be considered proficient at reviewing documents for at least three years. USIP interview with Larry G. Hines, Advisor for customs and border enforcement, October 3, 2004.


29 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, June 2007, 36.


32 Combat Studies Institute interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, August 3, 2006; and CPA Order Number 22, August 7, 2003.

33 Combat Studies Institute interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, August 3, 2006.

34 Combat Studies Institute interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, August 3, 2006.


36 SIGIR interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, May 20, 2008.


38 Combat Studies Institute interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, August 3, 2006.


40 Combat Studies Institute interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, August 3, 2006.
41 SIGIR interview with General John Abizaid, former CENTCOM Commander, February 4, 2008.


44 Combat Studies Institute interview with Lieutenant Colonel Blaise Cornell-d’Echert, former CMATT official, October 31, 2006.


53 The concern for ethnic balance also extended to the other “power ministries” involved in national security, including the Ministries of Interior, Finance, Foreign Affairs, and Justice. USIP interview with Frederick Smith, former Deputy Senior Advisor for National Security Affairs, August 4, 2004.

54 Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, and Keith Crane, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 30.


57 USIP interview with Frederick Smith, former Deputy Senior Advisor for National Security Affairs, August 4, 2004.


60 Gerald Burke, Advisor to the Baghdad police, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, April 25, 2007.
61 The relative peace, however, was short-lived. Fewer in number, the 101st Airborne Division’s successors could not prevent Mosul from succumbing to increased violence. Amatzia Baram, USIP Special Report 134, “Who Are the Insurgents? Sunni Arab Rebels in Iraq,” April 2005, 7-9.


63 OMB, Section 1506 Report, October 2003, 3.

64 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.

65 Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, SIGIR interview, December 12, 2008.


68 SIGIR interview with General John Abizaid, former CENTCOM Commander, February 4, 2008.


70 SIGIR interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, May 28, 2008.


72 Operational control was ceded to the military, although the CPA retained administrative control of budgets and policy direction came from CPA advisors. SIGIR interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, May 28, 2008.

73 Gerald Burke, Advisor to the Baghdad police, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, April 25, 2007.


77 Andrew Rathmell, Olga Oliker, Terrence K. Kelly, David Brannan, and Keith Crane, Developing Iraq’s Security Sector: The Coalition Provisional Authority’s Experience (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2005), 36.


82 SIGIR interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, May 28, 2008.

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4 Norm Kent, ITAO Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, written comments to SIGIR, June 4, 2008.
6 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
10 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
13 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
15 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
16 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.
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17 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.

18 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.

19 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.

20 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.

21 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.

22 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.

23 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.


25 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.


27 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Clark D. Turner, Member of the Energy Infrastructure Planning Group in the Pentagon and Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 24, 2003.


29 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.

30 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.


39 ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Gary Vogler, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.


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5 Major General Carl Strock, USACE Director of Civil Works, Testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform, March 11, 2004. Strock was one of the original members of ORHA and became Deputy Director for Operations and Infrastructure for the CPA. He later served as Commanding General of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.


9 Republic of Iraq, Ministry of Electricity, “About the Minister,” Biography of Dr. Kareem Waheed al-Aboudi. He became Minister of Electricity under Prime Minister Maliki.


12 Colonel Mike Moon, USACE, formerly with GRD, email to SIGIR, July 3, 2008.


21 Major General Carl Strock, USACE Director of Civil Works, Testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform, March 11, 2004.

22 USIP interview with Thomas Wheelock, Chief of Party for USAID’s contractor International Resources Group, September 8, 2004.


28 Major General Carl Strock, USACE Director of Civil Works, Testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform, March 11, 2004.


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32 ORHA/CPA historian interview with Gary Vogler, advisor to the Ministry of Oil, June 18, 2003.

33 Issam Chalabi, “Iraq’s Uncertain Oil and Political Prospects,” *Middle East Economic Survey* L, no. 48 (November 26, 2007).


35 Colonel Mike Moon, USACE, formerly with GRD, email to SIGIR, July 3, 2008; and Energy Information Administration, Department of Energy, “Country Analysis Brief: Iraq,” August 2007, 6-10.

36 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007; and SIGIR interview with Stephen Browning, former Deputy Director of Infrastructure, October 3, 2007.

37 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007; and ORHA/CPA Historian interview with Brigadier General Steven Hawkins, former Commander, JTF-4, June 23, 2003.

38 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.


40 CPA, Program Review Board Minutes, August 19, 2003.


47 Browning was the Senior Advisor to the Ministries of Health; Religious Affairs; and Transportation and Communications. MWH Press Release, “Stephen Browning Joins MWH Executive Team,” April 25, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Stephen Browning, former Task Force RIO Advisor, October 3, 2007.

48 SIGIR interview with Stephen Browning, former Deputy Director of Infrastructure, October 3, 2007; and SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.

49 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.

50 SIGIR interview with Stephen Browning, former Deputy Director of Infrastructure, October 3, 2007.


52 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.

53 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.
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16 OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, 70.


33 A complete listing of the various orders, regulations and memoranda promulgated by CPA can be found at www.cpa-iraq.org.


The Marshall Plan and Iraq Reconstruction


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44 This estimate only includes the number of trained personnel. Although an estimated 74,000 Facilities Protection Service members were listed as part of the security forces, in August 2004 they were deemed unfit as a whole and no longer included in estimates. DoD, *Iraq Status Report*, June 15, 2004, 29-30; and DoS, *Weekly Status Report*, August 25, 2004, 24.


5 SIGIR interview with William B. Taylor, former Director of IRMO, April 3, 2008.


9 OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, 15; Claude M. Bolton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support on Iraq Reconstruction and Contracting, February 7, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Charles Hess, former Director of PCO, April 24, 2006.


13 SIGIR interview with Gen. George Casey, former Director of the Joint Staff and former MNF-I Commander, July 30, 2008.

14 The ten sectors were: Security and Law Enforcement; Justice, Public Safety Infrastructure, and Civil Society; Electricity; Oil Infrastructure; Water Resources and Sanitation; Transportation and Telecommunications; Roads, Bridges, and Construction; Health Care; Education, Refugees, Human Rights, Democracy and Governance; and Private Sector Development. For an overview of the changes, see: OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, 17-20

15 SIGIR interview with Ambassador William B. Taylor, former Director of IRMO, April 3, 2008.


19 SIGIR interview with Ambassador William B. Taylor, former Director of IRMO, April 3, 2008.


26 SIGIR interview with Charles Hess, former Director of PCO, April 24, 2006.


30 SIGIR interview with Ambassador William B. Taylor, former Director of IRMO, April 3, 2008.

31 Charles Hess, Director of PCO, memorandum to Claude M. Bolton, Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology, March 2005.


Chapter 17

1 Brig. Gen. Stephen Seay, Head of Contracting Activity, comments to SIGIR, October 23, 2008.


4 USACE, comments to SIGIR, November 4, 2008.


7 SIGIR interview with Andy Bailey, Vice President of Louis Berger, March 14, 2006.


15 The PMO and the succeeding PCO had tried to simplify tracking of design-build contractors' overhead costs through administrative task orders. These task orders were supposed to capture all the administrative costs separately from the direct costs of the task orders for project construction. Administrative task orders were only issued to five of the design-build firms, though, and “only one of the contractors had adequate accounting and billing systems to capture administrative costs.” SIGIR Audit 06-028, "Review of Administrative Task Orders for Iraq Reconstruction Contracts," October 23, 2006, ii.

17 The Defense FAR Supplement defines "undefinitized contract action" as "any contract action for which the contract terms, specifications, or price are not agreed upon before performance is begun under the action." Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS), Subpart 217.7401 (d), revised May 12, 2006.


24 See, for example: Miriam Pemberton and William D. Hartung, eds. Lessons From Iraq: Avoiding the Next War (Boulder, CO: Paradigm, 2008).


31 USACE, comments to SIGIR, November 4, 2008.


8 More than $662 million was obligated to contracts for another 233 companies for tasks that could have included physical security, but the descriptions of work were too general to ensure that the funds did not go for other services. SIGIR Audit 09-005, “Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors,” October 30, 2008, i-ii, 3.


11 DoS, Section 2207 Reports, July 2005, 11-12; April 2005, 9-10; and January 2005, 4-5.


13 DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, I-47; and GAO Report 05-876, “Rebuilding Iraq: Status of Funding and Reconstruction Efforts,” July 2005, 14. The gas-oil separation plants, or GOSPs, separate crude oil from natural gas liquids at well sites. Some of these liquids are processed to produce liquefied petroleum gas, used primarily for cooking and heating in Iraq.


19 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2006, 34.


35 OMB, Section 2207 Report, April 2004, 45-49.
44 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.
46 SIGIR interview with Dick Dumford, Program Manager for USAID, May 18, 2007.
47 SIGIR Inspection PA-07-103, “Doura Power Station Units 5 and 6, Baghdad, Iraq,” July 18, 2007, i.
54 SIGIR Audit 08-011, “Outcome, Cost, and Oversight of Electricity-Sector Reconstruction Contract with Perini Corporation,” April 29, 2008, ii, 1, 3-4. SIGIR auditor Paul Converse provided significant work on this audit before he was killed in Iraq on March 24, 2008.
57 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004, Funding Table; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, July 2005, Funding Table.


69 The initial completion date was set to three and a half years but the CPA chose to accelerate the date to eighteen months. SIGIR Inspections PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq.” October 27, 2008, 9.

70 SIGIR Inspections PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq.” October 27, 2008, 8-9.

71 SIGIR Inspections PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq.” October 27, 2008, 11, 14.

72 SIGIR Inspections PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq.” October 27, 2008, 11-12.

73 SIGIR Inspections PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq.” October 27, 2008, 16.

74 SIGIR Inspections PA 08-144, PA08-145, PA08-146, PA08-147, PA 08-148, “Fallujah Waste Water Treatment System, Falluja, Iraq.” October 27, 2008, i.


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3 SIGIR interview with Col. Chris King, former MNSTC-I Deputy J5, June 12, 2008.


7 OMB, Section 2207 Report, July 2004, 17.


15 DoS, Section 2207 Report, October 2004, I-14


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37 By January 2005, the IIF comprised twelve of the army’s 27 battalions and was integrated as the 1st Division of the IAF. DoS, *Section 2207 Report*, January 2005, 1-3, 1-18.


56 Joseph A. Christoff, GAO Director, International Affairs and Trade, Testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, March 14, 2005. “Geographic areas secured by ISF forces” was added as a third indicator of progress by October 2005. This came to be known as the Provincial Iraqi Control (PIC) Process. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, October 2005, 27.


59 DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, October 2005, 30. DoD provided aggregate information on unit readiness to oversight agencies, but did not release unit-level reports, despite repeated requests by GAO. Questions remained about how TRAs influenced training and equipping policy. GAO Report 07-308SP, “Securing, Stabilizing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight,” January 2007, 31. TRAs were first used to assess the Iraqi Armed Forces, and a law-enforcement analogue was later developed for the Special Police Forces. The lack of consistent MNC-I presence at local police stations prevented systematic operational assessments of the IPS during this period. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, July 2005, 14-19; and DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, October 2005, 29.


63 SIGIR interview with Col. Chris King, former MNSTC-I Deputy J5, July 24, 2008.


80 IAF recruits signed a national service contract that required them to serve anywhere they were assigned, although there was no legal penalty for dropping out of the military. DoD, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, July 2005, 17.


89 Joseph A. Christoff, GAO Director, International Affairs and Trade, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, March 13, 2007, 11-12.


95 James D. Fearon, “Iraq’s Civil War,” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 2 (March/April 2007).

Chapter 20

1 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004, 45.


4 OMB, Section 2207 Report, January 2004, 45-47.


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42 Senator Byron L. Dorgan, Chairman, Statement before the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, September 22, 2008, 2.


50 Judge Daniel L. Rubini, Senior Advisor to the Ministry of Justice, memorandum to Ambassador Richard Jones, Deputy Administrator, November 29, 2003.


56 Stuart Bowen, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs’ Subcommittees on International Relations, Human Rights, and Oversight, and on the Middle East and South Asia, March 27, 2007.

57 Danny L. Athanasaw and Christopher M. Griffith, “Iraq Inspectors General: A Work in Progress,” unpublished, 2008, 5. (The authors served with the U.S. Department of State in Embassy Baghdad’s anticorruption office, where their portfolio including advising Iraq’s Inspectors General.)


60 “The oil is being smuggled from Sunni militias and in Basra through the Shi’ite militia and… they use this to purchase weapons,… These monies will target the killing of Iraqis and Americans.” Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi, former Commissioner, Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Appropriations, March 11, 2008.

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62 USIP interview with Charles Grinnell, Senior Advisor to the Commission on Public Integrity, October 22, 2004; and Stuart Bowen, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittees on International Relations, Human Rights, and Oversight and The Middle East and South Asia, March 27, 2007.


64 The money was for “personnel costs and to ramp up its information collection, administration, and community outreach responsibilities.” OMB, Section 2207 Report, April 2004, 29-30.

65 SIGIR interview with Charles B. Johnson, CPA Trainer and proponent of building the IG system, October 9, 2007; and USIP interview with Charles Grinnell, Senior Advisor to the Commission on Public Integrity, October 22, 2004.


68 Radhi, a Shi’a, had refused to join the Ba’ath Party. USIP interview with Charles Grinnell, Senior Advisor to the Commission on Public Integrity, October 22, 2004.


71 Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi, Commissioner, Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, October 4, 2007.


73 Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi, Commissioner, Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, October 4, 2007.


76 Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi, Commissioner, Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, Testimony before Senate Committee on Appropriations, March 12, 2007. He added, “There was pressure put on the judiciary not to prosecute cases on behalf of individuals. Many of Iraq’s judges live in fear of torture and assassination of themselves and their family members if they adjudicate cases of senior government officials.” Currency converted at XE Universal Currency Converter, http://www.xe.com/ucc/convert.cgi, accessed July 2008.

77 Judge Radhi Hamza al-Radhi, Commissioner, Iraqi Commission on Public Integrity, Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, October 4, 2007.


79 Appointment of an Inspector General is subject to confirmation by Iraq’s national legislature, the Council of Representatives. CPA Order 57, “Iraqi Inspectors General,” February 5, 2004.

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81 CPA Order 57, Section 6(1) details the IGs’ powers. CPA Order 57, “Iraqi Inspectors General,” February 5, 2004. Subpoena power is better understood as “request” power. Oftentimes, the individual suffers no legal consequences for failing to provide the documents or show up for interviews.


85 SIGIR interview with Charles B. Johnson, CPA Trainer and proponent of building the IG system, October 9, 2007. Johnson later said that the decision to overturn the vote was done literally at the last minute, in an email at 2300 hours to the CPA Treasury Advisor.


88 Stuart Bowen, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Testimony before the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, October 4, 2007.


90 USIP interview with Charles Grinnell, Senior Advisor to the Commission on Public Integrity, October 22, 2004.


Chapter 21


2 SIGIR interviews with Brian Flynn, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections; Kevin O’Connor, SIGIR Auditor; and Special Agent Erick Vail, SIGIR Investigator, May 2007. Brian Flynn was the Assistant Inspector General for Audit from 2004-2005.


6 SIGIR interviews with Brian Flynn, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections; Kevin O’Connor, SIGIR Auditor; and Special Agent Erick Vail, SIGIR Investigator, May 2007.
7 SIGIR interviews with Brian Flynn, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections; Kevin O’Connor, SIGIR Auditor; and Special Agent Erick Vail, SIGIR Investigator, May 2007.

8 SIGIR interviews with Brian Flynn, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections; Kevin O’Connor, SIGIR Auditor; and Special Agent Erick Vail, SIGIR Investigator, May 2007.


10 SIGIR interviews with Brian Flynn, Assistant Inspector General for Inspections; Kevin O’Connor, SIGIR Auditor; and Special Agent Erick Vail, SIGIR Investigator, May 2007.


15 SIGIR Audit 05-020, “Management of Contracts, Grants, and Micro-Purchases Used to Rehabilitate the Kerbala Library,” October 26, 2005, 10-12, 18, 34, Appendix I.


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Chapter 22


7 SIGIR conversations with Philip Zelikow, former Counselor, U.S. State Department, August and September 2008; and SIGIR interview with Celeste Ward, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities, September 9, 2008.


10 Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, Statement before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, June 7, 2005.

11 Krepinevich briefed Khalilzad in Washington, D.C. Krepinevich’s subsequent article in Foreign Affairs was derived from these briefings. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., “How to Win Iraq,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 2005). Some military officials also refer to this as the “ink-spot” strategy.


14 SIGIR interview with David Satterfield, former Deputy Chief of Mission, April 14, 2008.


The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) reallocated the $18.44 billion of IRRF 2 funds as follows: DoD, $12.98 billion (70.4%); USAID, $3.10 billion (16.8%); DoS, $1.20 billion (6.5%); Treasury $390 million (2.12%); USIP, $10 million (.05%). SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2005, 24-25.

For a summary of reconstruction metrics, see SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2005, 29-35.

Oil production was 16 percent below the Ministry of Oil target of 2.5 million barrels per day. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, July 2005, 30.


Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, comments to SIGIR, October 27, 2008.

SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, former Commander of MNC-I, February 19, 2008.

SIGIR Audit 09-005, “Agencies Need Improved Financial Data Reporting for Private Security Contractors,” October 30, 2009, 3; SIGIR Audit 06-044, “Fact Sheet on Major U.S. Contractors’ Security Costs Related to Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Contracting Activities,” January 30, 2007, 2; and DoS, Section 2207 Report, January 2006. The January 2006 Section 2207 Report also listed water, health care, and roads/bridges/construction projects that were canceled because funds were shifted to security. In addition to reducing funds available for construction projects, rising security costs made it more challenging to estimate the costs to complete projects. PCO management advised SIGIR that, as of March 31, 2005, the estimated cost for project security had risen from the original program baseline of $1.2 billion to more than $2 billion. SIGIR believes that actual costs (e.g., delays caused by security problems, higher force levels than expected) may be much higher. SIGIR Audit 05-011, “Cost-to-Complete Estimates and Financial Reporting for the Management of the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund,” July 26, 2005, 4; and GAO Testimony 06-179T, “Rebuilding Iraq: Enhancing Security, Measuring Program Results, and Maintaining Infrastructure Are Necessary to Make Significant and Sustainable Progress,” October 18, 2005.


38 SIGIR interviews with several anonymous Iraqi firms headquartered in Amman, Jordan in June and July 2006.

39 SIGIR interview with Daniel Speckhard, former IRMO Director and former Deputy Chief of Mission, April 29, 2008.


41 The term “reconstruction gap” denotes the differences between what was expected to be built and what was actually built. It was first discussed in SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2005, 3.


46 SIGIR conversations with Dana Eyre, former USAID consultant, Summer 2006; and Terrence K. Kelly, former JSPA director, August 13, 2007.

47 SIGIR conversations with Dana Eyre, former USAID consultant, Summer 2006; and Terrence K. Kelly, former JSPA director, August 13, 2007.

48 SIGIR interview with Marin Strmecki, Senior Advisor to Ambassador Khalilzad, January 21, 2008.

49 SIGIR interview with Marin Strmecki, Senior Advisor to Ambassador Khalilzad, January 21, 2008.


51 When the strategic communications portfolio was added to PME in 2005, the incumbent became the Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Effects. Henry W. Stratman, “Orchestrating Instruments of Power for Nationbuilding,” Joint Forces Quarterly 41 (2nd quarter 2006), 35.

52 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, comments to SIGIR, October 27, 2007.

53 Although the Joint Strategic Planning and Assessment office was approved in late 2005, it was not fully operational until mid-2006. For details of its formation, see SIGIR interview with Terrence K. Kelly, former JSPA director, August 13, 2007.

54 SIGIR interview with Daniel Speckhard, former IRMO Director and former Deputy Chief of Mission, April 29, 2008.


56 SIGIR Interview with John Bowersox, former Senior Advisor for Health, November 1, 2006.


61 SIGIR interview with Marin Strmecki, Senior Advisor to Ambassador Khalilzad, January 21, 2008.

62 SIGIR interview with Andrew Rathmell, former Director of CPA Office of Planning and Analysis and consultant to Joint Strategic Planning and Assessments, June 26, 2006.

63 SIGIR interview with Marin Strmecki, Senior Advisor to Ambassador Khalilzad, January 21, 2008.

64 SIGIR interview with Colonel Kenneth Cox, Engineer Brigade Commander, June 24, 2006.

65 SIGIR interview with Andrew Rathmell, former Director of CPA Office of Planning and Analysis and consultant to Joint Strategic Planning and Assessments, June 26, 2006.


67 Plans were also drawn up to create Provincial Support Teams composed of the U.S. Embassy, PCO, and USAID staff, but only three deployed and a later assessment of their performance found them an insufficient vehicle. Inadequacies of the Provincial Support Teams are discussed in Unclassified Baghdad 4045, “Action Plan to Build Capacity and Sustainability within Iraq’s Provincial Governments,” from embassy Baghdad to SECSTATE, 010330Z October 2005. SIGIR interview with Celeste Ward, political aide to Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, and Colonel Kenneth Cox, Engineer Brigade Commander, June 24, 2006.


71 SIGIR conversations with Philip Zelikow, former Counselor, U.S. State Department, August and September 2008; and SIGIR interview with Celeste Ward, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations Capabilities, September 9, 2008. With the changing military footprint and eventual transition to Iraqi control, Khalilzad did not want to embed teams in brigades that would soon be withdrawn or repositioned. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, vetting comments to SIGIR, October 27, 2008.


SIGIR interview with Calvin Crane, Regional PAO Coordinator, August 12, 2007; and Condoleezza Rice, Remarks at the Inauguration of the Provincial Reconstruction Team," November 11, 2005.


SIGIR site visit to Mosul PRT and follow-up correspondence, Forward Operating Base Marez, June 22, 2006.

SIGIR interview with Andrew Rathmell, former Director of CPA Office of Planning and Analysis and consultant to Joint Strategic Planning and Assessments, June 26, 2006.

SIGIR interview with Rear Admiral Scott R. Van Buskirk, Director, Office of National Unity, Strategic Effects, June 20, 2006.


92 James Kunder, USAID Asst Administrator, Near East Bureau, Testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, March 9, 2006.


94 Combat Studies Institute interview with Major General Paul Eaton, former Commander of CMATT and OSC, August 3, 2006; and CPA Order Number 22, August 7, 2003.

95 SIGIR interview with General Paul Eaton, former CMATT Commander, May 20, 2008.

96 Robert Perito, USIP Senior Program Officer, Testimony before the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, October 18, 2007.


101 Clear-Hold-Build is slightly different than the oil-spot strategy, in that it advocates a broader emphasis on creating safe havens simultaneously across all areas of operation by emphasizing civilian security, rather than selecting only some regions for intervention. Public Broadcasting Service, “Interview with Philip Zelikow,” FRONTLINE, February 6, 2007.


107 For an elaboration of the conflict transformation approach, see Jock Covey, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Leonard R. Hawley, eds., The Quest for Viable Peace: International Intervention and Strategies for Conflict Transformation (Washington, DC: USIP, 2005).
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4 Dan Bisbee, Baghdad PRT, “Baghdad Governance,” 3rd ed., April 2007, 10. This manual was written as a primer to city politics for reconstruction personnel working in Baghdad, and is widely circulated among officials and contractors.


6 Sgt. Samson Barini, “Minutes from Meeting with the Water Sector at the Amanat,” Baghdad PRT Infrastructure Report, June 25, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad PRT member, June 25, 2006. A SIGIR inspection found similar problems at the Nassriya water treatment plant, where the local distribution system would not be able to withstand increased water pressure and would thus lead to major leakages when the water treatment became operational. SIGIR Inspection PA-07-116, “Nassriya Water Treatment Plant, Nassriya, Iraq,” April 28, 2008, 28-29.


12 “Groundhog Day” is a term that some military personnel use to describe “another day in Iraq.” SIGIR interview with Lieutenant Colonel Otto Busher, Baghdad PRT member, June 25, 2006.


15 This was made explicit in articles 55 and 56 of the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) and CPA Order Number 71. In theory, these writs empowering local government moved Iraq further toward a decentralized federal republic in which the central government would nominate governors, whose appointment and tenure would be subject to the approval of provincial councils. The councils and the governor would manage ministerial outposts in each province headed by the directors general, thereby putting the resources of national ministries under the direction of local elected officials. Iraqi Governing Council, “Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period,” Articles 55-56, March 8, 2004; and CPA Order Number 71, “Local Governmental Powers,” April 6, 2004. SIGIR interview with Vijay Samaraweera, Senior Policy Advisor for Regional Government, RTI International, August 16, 2007.


35 SIGIR interview with John Jones, Diyala PRT member, August 9, 2007.

36 Mat Bouldin, Diyala PRT member, email to SIGIR, August 17, 2007.

37 SIGIR interview with John Jones, Diyala PRT member, August 9, 2007.

38 SIGIR interview with Robert Tillery, former National Coordination Team Chief of Staff, January 11, 2008.

39 Mat Bouldin, Diyala PRT member, email to SIGIR, August 17, 2007.

40 SIGIR site visit to the Northern Governors Conference, Baghdad, August 2007.

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1 USAID contracted with Bechtel in 2003 (IRRF 1) and again in 2004 (IRRF 2) to rebuild vast parts of Iraq’s electrical infrastructure. The Doura power plant’s number 5 and number 6 generators were the objects of two Bechtel job orders under the IRRF 1 and IRRF 2 contracts. The first, amounting to $90.8 million, called for the rehabilitation of the two generators. The second, amounting to an additional $80 million, called for the establishment of operations and maintenance training for personnel at the Ministry of Electricity. Work on the generators was scheduled for completion on April 30, 2004. Actual completion was delayed by almost two years, to April 2006. SIGIR Inspection PA 07-103, “Doura Power Stations 5 and 6, Baghdad, Iraq,” July 18, 2007, 3-4.


3 For instance, the pressure on working-level engineers was so extreme that not only were maintenance periods shortened due to demand, but improper procedures were used after blackouts to restart sensitive components. SIGIR interview with Al Herman, Senior Consultant for Electricity, February 28, 2008.


5 SIGIR defines sustainment “as the ability of the Iraqi government to support IRRF-funded projects and facilities for an extended period of time after U.S. financial, managerial, and technical assistance is terminated.” SIGIR Audit 05-022, “Managing Sustainment for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Programs,” October 24, 2005, i. SIGIR defines capacity development as “an activity or multiple activities that lead to the transfer of knowledge, skills, and abilities across a range of functions over a period of time.” SIGIR Audit 06-045, “Status of Ministerial Capacity Development in Iraq.” January 30, 2007, 3.

6 One Iraqi employed by the Coalition recalled experiences working for the former regime in which Ba’athist enforcers would identify missing inventory from state factories, and then mete out punishment by shooting employees at random. SIGIR interview with Babil PRT Iraqi employee, August 2008. Individual ministries during the Hussein era also maintained their own prison networks, designed to incarcerate suspected employees and enforce a culture of fear. SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, April 17, 2006.


12 SIGIR interview with Robert MacLeod, USAID Chief Technical Officer, January 20, 2006.
13 For example, a critical deterioration of the port equipment at Umm Qasr took place between the summer months of 2003, when the port was rehabilitated, and December 2003. Visits by USAID officials revealed that work on maintaining the equipment had been stalled by local managers who were waiting for Baghdad to initiate repairs. SIGIR interview with Robert MacLeod, USAID Chief Technical Officer, January 20, 2006.
16 James Stephenson, former USAID Mission Director, email to SIGIR, August 2, 2006.
17 SIGIR interview with Robert MacLeod, USAID Chief Technical Officer, January 20, 2006; and James Stephenson, former USAID Mission Director, email to SIGIR, August 2, 2006.
18 James Stephenson, former USAID Mission Director, email to SIGIR, August 2, 2006.
19 SIGIR interview with Andrew Natsios, former USAID Administrator, March 17, 2008.
21 SIGIR interview with Christopher Milligan, USAID Deputy Director of Iraq, February 9, 2006.
22 For example, SIGIR found that, three years after their graduation from Bechtel University, a handful of engineers were leading infrastructure reconstruction programs in Baghdad under the auspices of USAID’s second Local Governance Program. SIGIR interviews with members from RTI Baghdad and RTI Green Zone compounds, August and September 2007.
28 Nationwide electricity production in June of 2004, for example, was recorded at approximately 3,900 megawatts, slightly less than Iraq’s pre-war generation of 4,400 megawatts, and far below the CPA’s goal of 6,000 megawatts by summer. Daily crude export, meanwhile, was at 1.2 million barrels per day, almost half of its pre-war peak. Other services were also underperforming. The Brookings Institution, “Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq,” June 21, 2004, 20-21.
29 SIGIR interview with David Satterfield, former Deputy Chief of Mission, April 14, 2008.
32 Most of these tracking data are now held in PCO-GRD capacity development and subcontractor databases. Each database reports on twelve contract deliverables relevant to capacity development, as well as on various general requirements and award fee criteria. See PCO briefing, “Capacity Development and Sustainability Program,” March 2007.


35 SIGIR interview with Sheryl Lewis, PCO Capacity Development officer, December 1, 2007.


40 SIGIR interview with Daniel Speckhard, former IRMO Director and Deputy Chief of Mission, April 29, 2008.

41 SIGIR interview with Sheryl Lewis, PCO Capacity Development officer, December 1, 2007.

42 SIGIR interview with Daniel Speckhard, former IRMO Director and Deputy Chief of Mission, April 29, 2008.

43 SIGIR interview with Robert Tillery, former National Coordination Team Chief of Staff, January 11, 2008.

44 SIGIR interview with Robert Tillery, former National Coordination Team Chief of Staff, January 11, 2008.


46 Only the ministry of electricity, which had a long history of working simultaneously with different components of the U.S. mission, successfully integrated the Ministerial Assistance Team concept. SIGIR interview with Robert Tillery, former National Coordination Team Chief of Staff, January 11, 2008.


48 A SIGIR audit found that, in its first four months of operation, the task force was primarily occupied with cataloging the various capacity-development activities throughout the reconstruction program. It also found that individual relationships with ministries tended to define capacity-development efforts, rather than an overall strategy. SIGIR Audit 06-045, “Status of Ministerial Capacity Development in Iraq,” January 30, 2007, 12; SIGIR interview with Robert Tillery, former National Coordination Team Chief of Staff, January 11, 2008; and SIGIR interview with Sheryl Lewis, PCO Capacity Development officer, December 1, 2007.


52 SIGIR conversations with Rick Olson, former Office of Provincial Affairs official, Spring 2008.

53 SIGIR interview with Joseph Saloom, former IRMO Director, April 21, 2008.

54 Rick Olson, former Office of Provincial Affairs official, email to SIGIR, November 19, 2008.
• Endnotes •


56 SIGIR interview with Joseph Saloom, former IRMO Director, April 21, 2008.


59 SIGIR interview with Jeremiah S. Pam, former Treasury attaché, September 9, 2008.

60 SIGIR interview with Daniel Speckhard, former IRMO Director and Deputy Chief of Mission, April 29, 2008.


62 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, vetting comments to SIGIR, October 27, 2008.

63 SIGIR interviews with Joseph Saloom, former IRMO Director, December 2, 2007; and Jeremiah S. Pam, former Treasury attaché, September 9, 2008.

64 SIGIR interview with Muhannad Esheiker, Ministry of Planning fusion cell member, August 25, 2007.

65 Conflicting budget execution data exist. SIGIR January 2008 Quarterly Report cites a White House report putting this number at 24 percent, a Treasury Department report showing 15 percent, and a GAO report showing 4.4 percent. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 2008, 124.

66 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 2008, 142-144.


68 SIGIR interview with Henry Clarke, former director, Office of Provincial Affairs, August 17, 2007; and Mat Bouldin, Diyala PRT member, August 9, 2007.


70 SIGIR interview with David Satterfield, former Deputy Chief of Mission, April 14, 2008.


80 SIGIR interview with David Satterfield, former Deputy Chief of Mission, April 14, 2008.

81 SIGIR interview with Joseph Saloom, former IRMO Director, December 2, 2007.

82 SIGIR interview with Joseph Saloom, former IRMO Director, December 2, 2007.

83 SIGIR interview with Henry Clarke, former director, Office of Provincial Affairs, August 17, 2007.


87 Mat Bouldin, Diyala PRT member, email to SIGIR, August 17, 2007.


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3 Ron Redmond, “Iraq Displacement,” UN High Commissioner for Refugees Briefing Notes, November 3, 2006.


12 General (Ret.) Barry R. McCaffrey, Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, West Point, memorandum to Colonel Michael Meese, U.S. Military Academy Department of Social Sciences, “After Action Report - General Barry R. McCaffrey USA (Ret), Visit Iraq and Kuwait 9-16 March 2007.”


16 For then-Brigadier General William McCoy personally, the difference was immediate. Twice in the month after the Samarra bombing, his vehicle was hit by improvised explosive devices, each time as he was on his way to assess progress on a public health clinic. SIGIR interview with Major General William H. McCoy, former Commander, USACE-GRD, June 5, 2008.


20 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Iraq: No Let-up in the Humanitarian Crisis,” March 2008, 8; and SIGIR interview with Jon Bowersox, Senior Advisor for Health, November 1, 2006. GRD notes that “while there may have been a question over the timeliness of information, USACE-GRD reports from the period demonstrate that there was awareness of projects that were behind schedule. The security environment did impact the ability to access work sites, however Area and Resident Offices were located across Iraq and it is not correct to say that projects were centrally managed from Baghdad without some oversight in the field.” USACE-GRD vetting comments to SIGIR, November 5, 2008.

21 SIGIR interview with Mat Bouldin, Diyala PRT member, August 9, 2007.

22 SIGIR interview with George “Ged” Smith, Director of the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance, August 20, 2007.


25 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, former Commander of MNC-I, February 19, 2008. For a commentary on Maliki’s coming to power, see Ali A. Allawi, The Occupation of Iraq: Winning the War, Losing the Peace (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007), 443-54.


27 Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, vetting comments to SIGIR, October 27, 2008.


29 For an assessment of how the Joint Reconstruction Operations Center improved the integration of CERP projects with broader reconstruction activities, see SIGIR Audit 07-006, “Management of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq for Fiscal Year 2006,” April 26, 2007.


32 Senator Susan Collins, Chair, Statement before Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, August 2, 2006; and SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2006, 3.


35 GRD notes that “a critical factor that led to the rush was that the Ambassador had earlier implemented a review of IRRF that lasted over six months and held up a large number of awards and therefore causing a substantial backlog in work.” USACE-GRD written comments to SIGIR, November 5, 2008. Ambassador Khalilzad’s staff notes that, for his part, he “was not hammering on the obligation side. Quite the contrary, he was arguing for more analysis before funds were obligated on any projects and always questioning the validity of our assumptions on the benefits of our reconstruction program and priorities.” He consistently held up programming until he was confident that money was being spent well, and he even ignored those that told him he could not cancel projects and demanded that this be done in cases where cost overruns had become egregious or results inadequate.” Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, written comments to SIGIR, October 27, 2008.

40 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2006, 17.
42 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2006, 45.
51 SIGIR Audit 07-006, “Management of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq for Fiscal Year 2006,” April 26, 2007, 8. SWET is also variously known as SWET-F (adding fuel) or SWEAT (adding academics).
54 SIGIR interview with David Satterfield, former Deputy Chief of Mission, April 14, 2008.
55 More than 28 percent of obligated CERP funds—or $537 million of the $2.3 billion Congress appropriated—went to water projects. SIGIR Audit 08-006, “Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq Funds Many Large Scale Projects,” January 25, 2008, ii.
57 SIGIR interview with Heidi Silvey, USAID OTI Chief of Party, June 6 and July 1, 2006; and SIGIR interview with Megan Holleran, OTI Acting Chief of Party, June 19, 2006.
64 Dana Eyre, former USAID consultant, comments to SIGIR, October 5, 2008.
66 Public Broadcasting Service, "Interview with Philip Zelikow," FRONTLINE, February 6, 2007; and Dana Eyre, former USAID consultant, comments to SIGIR, October 5, 2008.
72 The exported goods included both foodstuff, such as rice, and agricultural technology, such as tractors. See also: Richard Steelman, “USAID Iraq Sectoral Consultation: Agriculture/Marshlands,” December 2, 2004.
86 SIGIR conversations with Terrence K. Kelly, former JSPA director, September, 2008.


93 SIGIR interview with Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, former commander of MNSTC-I, April 8, 2008.


102 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2006, 72.


114 SIGIR interview with James Santelle, former Rule of Law Coordinator and Resident Legal Advisor, July 22, 2008.
116 SIGIR interview with James Santelle, former Rule of Law Coordinator and Resident Legal Advisor, July 22, 2008.
117 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2006, 70.
119 SIGIR interview with James Santelle, former Rule of Law Coordinator and Resident Legal Advisor, July 22, 2008.
121 SIGIR interview with James Santelle, former Rule of Law Coordinator and Resident Legal Advisor, July 22, 2008.
123 SIGIR interview with former Iraqi judge and Coalition Rule of Law advisor, August 26, 2007. Three days after this interview, the Judge’s house was burned to the ground and he was taken to a safe house in the Green Zone. Wilson Myers, Baghdad PRT legal advisor, email to SIGIR, August 31, 2007.
125 SIGIR interview with James Santelle, former Rule of Law Coordinator and Resident Legal Advisor, July 22, 2008.
126 SIGIR interview with former Iraqi Judge and coalition Rule of Law advisor, August 26, 2007.
127 SIGIR interview with former Iraqi Judge and coalition Rule of Law advisor, August 26, 2007.

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139 Joseph A. Christoff, GAO International Affairs and Trade Director, Statement before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittees on the Middle East and South Asia and International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, July 18, 2007, 13-14.


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2 White House Press Release, “President’s Address to the Nation,” January 10, 2007.


9 The President also requested funding for an expansion of existing reconstruction programs in the Fiscal Year 2007 supplemental and regular Fiscal Year 2008 budget request Funding went to Iraqi Provincial Reconstruction Development Councils, USAID’s Local Governance and Community Action Programs, the Rule of Law Program, and various ongoing capacity development and sustainability initiatives. DoS, “The New Way Forward: Funding Iraq’s Transition to Self-Reliance and Stabilization in the President’s 2007 Supplemental and 2008 Requests,” February 2007.

11 SIGIR interviews with Colonel John R. Martin, Lieutenant General Peter Chiarelli, Colonel Michael Meese, Dr. Kirk Johnson, and Dr. Terrence K. Kelly. Early in 2007, General Casey reportedly said, “The longer we in the U.S. forces continue to bear the main burden of Iraq’s security, it lengthens the time that the government of Iraq has to take the hard decisions about reconciliation and dealing with the militias. And the other thing is that they can continue to blame us for all of Iraq’s problems, which are at base their problems.” Quoted in David E. Sanger, Michael R. Gordon, and John F. Burns, “Chaos Overran Iraq Plan in ’06, Bush Team Says,” New York Times, January 2, 2007.

12 Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency, FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5, December 2006.


16 SIGIR interview with Colonel Michael Meese, Economic and Reconstruction advisor to General David Petraeus, August 30, 2007.


19 USACE-GRD, comments to SIGIR, November 5, 2008.


21 SIGIR interview with Colonel John R. Martin, Senior Advisor to General David Petraeus; and Ylber Bajraktari, Commander’s Initiative Group, August 27, 2007.

22 SIGIR interview with Colonel John R. Martin, Senior Advisor to General David Petraeus; and Ylber Bajraktari, Commander’s Initiative Group, August 27, 2007.


26 SIGIR interview with Colonel Michael Meese, Economic and Reconstruction advisor to General David Petraeus, August 30, 2007; Michael Meese, Economic and Reconstruction advisor to General David Petraeus, memorandum for the Commanding General, MNC-I, “How to Think About Current Economic Activity in Iraq,” undated; and Michael Meese, Economic and Reconstruction advisor to General David Petraeus, memorandum for the Commanding General, MNC-I, “How to Think About Oil and Electricity in Iraq,” February 28, 2007.

27 The Joint Strategic Assessment Team was co-chaired by the State Department’s David Pierce, JSPA’s Chris Schnaubelt and Colonel H.R. McMaster, who had pioneered the successful retaking of Tal Afar. Other members included Steve Biddle, from the U.S. Council on Foreign Relations; Great Britain’s Andrew Rathmell and Toby Dodge; Australian David Kilcullen, on loan from the U.S. State Department; the U.K. Army’s Colonel Jim Richardson; and Colonel John R. Martin, late of the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College. SIGIR interview with Colonel John R. Martin, Senior Advisor to General David Petraeus; and Ylber Bajraktari, Commander’s Initiative Group, August 27, 2007.
28 SIGIR interview with Colonel Michael Meese, Economic and Reconstruction advisor to General David Petraeus, August 30, 2007.


30 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Timothy Carney, former Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq, April 5, 2008.

31 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Timothy Carney, former Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq, April 5, 2008.

32 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Timothy Carney, former Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq, April 5, 2008.


34 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Timothy Carney, former Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq, April 5, 2008.

35 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Timothy Carney, former Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq, April 5, 2008.

36 SIGIR Audit 07-005, “Fact Sheet on Sources and Uses of U.S. Funding Provided in Fiscal Year 2006 for Iraq Relief and Reconstruction,” July 27, 2007, Appendix B.


40 SIGIR interview with Colonel Michael Meese, Economic and Reconstruction advisor to General David Petraeus, August 30, 2007.


42 SIGIR interview with Sgt. Friedman, Ramadi Civil Affairs and ePRT, September 12, 2007.

43 SIGIR interview with David Atteberry, USAID officer, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.

44 SIGIR site visits to PRTs, 2006-07.


47 SIGIR interview with Mike Antoine, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.

48 SIGIR interview with David Atteberry, USAID officer, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.

49 SIGIR interview with Mike Antoine, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.


51 SIGIR interview with David Atteberry, USAID officer, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.

52 SIGIR interview with Timothy Zuniga-Brown, Team leader, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.

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54 SIGIR interview with Timothy Zuniga-Brown, Team leader, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.
56 SIGIR interview with David Atteberry, USAID officer, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.
57 Ginger Cruz, Deputy Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee, September 5, 2007. For background on the protest by bi-lingual, bi-cultural advisors (BBAs) on alliance with Sunni tribes, see SIGIR interview with Timothy Zuniga-Brown, Team leader, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.
58 SIGIR interview with Mike Antoine, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.
60 SIGIR interviews with David Atteberry, USAID officer, Rasheed ePRT; and Timothy Zuniga-Brown, Team leader, Rasheed ePRT, September 3, 2007.
72 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2007, 95.
76 SIGIR interview with David Leach, GRD Deputy Director; and Dennis Plochmeyer, GRD Senior Advisor, March 18, 2008.

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77 SIGIR interview with David Leach, GRD Deputy Director; and Dennis Plochmeyer, GRD Senior Advisor, March 18, 2008; and USACE-GRD, comments to SIGIR, November 5, 2008.


81 Correspondence between SIGIR, ITAO, Political and Economic Sections, and the office of the Deputy Chief of Mission, March 2008.


86 SIGIR interview with Colonel Michael Meese, Economic and Reconstruction advisor to General David Petraeus, August 30, 2007.

87 SIGIR interview with Christopher King, Senior Advisor to the Commission on Public Integrity, June 19, 2006.

88 SIGIR site visit, August-September, 2007.

89 SIGIR interview with James Kunder, USAID Acting Deputy Administrator, February 15, 2008.

90 SIGIR interview with General David Petraeus, Commander of MNF-I, March 2, 2008.

91 Problems in reporting chains on reconstruction projects were noted by a recent SIGIR audit. SIGIR Audit 09-007, “Improvements Needed in Reporting Status of Reconstruction Projects to Chief of Mission,” October 28, 2008, i-ii.

92 SIGIR interview with Ambassador Timothy Carney, former Coordinator for Economic Transition in Iraq, April 5, 2008.


95 SIGIR interview with Joel Sandefur, USAID Regional Legal Advisor, and a panel of staff from the USAID Community Stabilization Program, September 7, 2007.


98 SIGIR interview with Joel Sandefur, USAID Regional Legal Advisor, and a panel of staff from the USAID Community Stabilization Program, September 7, 2007.


100 SIGIR site visit, August-September, 2007.

101 SIGIR site visit, August-September, 2007.
103 SIGIR site visit, August-September, 2007.
104 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 2008, 50; and GAO Report 09-86R.
106 U.S. Embassy Baghdad memorandum, “Guidelines for Administration of the PRT/ePRT Quick Response
107 SIGIR site visit, August-September, 2007.
108 Stephen D. Andersson, Rule of Law Coordinator, Baghdad PRT, email to SIGIR, September 4, 2007; and SIGIR site visit, August-September, 2007.
109 The original procedures were to check the names against the Office of Foreign Assets Control “Specifically
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons” list. Stephen D. Andersson, Rule of Law Coordinator, Baghdad
PRT, email to SIGIR, September 4, 2007.
110 Stephen D. Andersson, Rule of Law Coordinator, Baghdad PRT, email to SIGIR, September 4, 2007; and
Certification Request,” undated. See “Instructions: In order to initiate vetting, complete the following infor-
mation, attach the requested documents, and make an appointment to submit fingerprints. Failure to provide
this information or any supporting documents will result in suspension of action and return of your case.”
112 SIGIR interview with Steve Connolly, QRF Coordinator for DAI, March 3, 2008.
113 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, 84.
114 An estimated 9 percent of IRRF 1 funds remained unobligated. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United
115 Expenditures by each of these contractors through the end of 2007 ranged from $932 million to $501 mil-
lion, respectively. SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, January 2008, 57-58.
118 SIGIR, Quarterly Reports to the United States Congress, The Human Toll, April, July, and October 2006,
and January and April 2007. A total of $30 million in funds was de-obligated from the Infrastructure Security
Program by the State Department in order to pay for refugee assistance, bringing the allocation down from the
original $247 million to $217 million. USACE-GRD vetting comments to SIGIR, November 5, 2008.
119 SIGIR Audit 09-004, “Iraq Reconstruction Project Terminations Represent a Range of Actions,” October
27, 2008, i, 5.
120 GAO Report 07-677, “Rebuilding Iraq: Integrated Strategic Plan Needed to Help Restore Iraq’s Oil and
127 SIGIR interview with Colonel Mark Martins, former MNF-I Staff Judge Advocate, July 24, 2008.
For a comprehensive account of the building and initial performance of the Baghdad Rule of Law complex, see MNF-I Staff Judge Advocate’s Office, “Report to the Ministerial Committee for Rule of Law and Detention on The Rule of Law Complex in Rusafa: June to December 2007,” January 2008.

SIGIR interview with Colonel Mark Martins, former MNF-I Staff Judge Advocate, July 24, 2008.

The State Department notes that these 5,000 guards are contracted to the Iraqi Facilities Protection Service, and that because their effectiveness is suspect an effort is underway to form either a federalized Judicial Protection Service under the employ of the Iraqi judiciary or have guards provided by the Ministry of the Interior. State Department, comments to SIGIR, October 28, 2008.


Prime Minister Gordon Brown, official correspondence to Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, official correspondence, July 29, 2007.


General David Petraeus, MNF-I Commander, Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services, September 10, 2007; and Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq, Testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Committee on Armed Services, September 10, 2007.


SIGIR interview with Jeremiah S. Pam, former Treasury Attaché, September 9, 2008.

Ambassador Ryan C. Crocker, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Iraq, Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, April 8, 2008.


SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, April 2008, 32.

SIGIR conversations with Terrence K. Kelly, former JSPA director, September 2008.


157 SIGIR interview with Iraqi team leader employed by a USAID program, August 2007.

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1 SIGIR interview with James Kunder, USAID Acting Deputy Administrator, February 15, 2008.

2 SIGIR interview with General (Ret.) Colin Powell, former Secretary of State, February 4, 2008.

3 Donald Rumsfeld, former Secretary of Defense, letter to Stuart Bowen, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, April 4, 2008.

4 Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, February 13, 2008.

5 NBC interview with Condoleezza Rice, Secretary of State, December 21, 2008.

6 SIGIR interview with Lt. General (Ret.) Ricardo Sanchez, former CJTF-7 Commander, October 26, 2007.


**Afterword**


8 For a review of the government’s reform efforts to date, see GAO Report 08-39, “Stabilization and Reconstruction: Actions Are Needed to Develop a Planning and Coordination Framework and Establish the Civilian Reserve Corps,” November 2007.


Annex A

1 The Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction was created by Congress in 2003 as the Office of the Inspector General of the Coalition Provisional Authority. The CPA-IG was created by the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of Iraq and Afghanistan (P.L. 108-106, Section 3001), enacted November 6, 2003, in order to provide for independent and objective conduct and supervision of audits and investigations relating to the programs and operations of the Coalition Provisional Authority. The Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (P.L. 108-375), enacted October 28, 2004, redesignated the CPA-IG as SIGIR.


Annex B


11 SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, Appendix N.


13 For a list of completed USAAA audits, see SIGIR, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, October 2008, Appendix N.


15 SIGIR, Quarterly Reports to the United States Congress, July 2007, Appendix L; and October 2008, Appendix M.


