The first of these reports is Reconstruction Leaders' Perceptions of the Commander's Emergency Response Program in Iraq, released in April, 2012. Two other Special Reports planned for release in FY 2012 are The Human Toll of Reconstruction and Stabilization During Operation Iraqi Freedom and Measuring Reconstruction Effectiveness in the Rusafa Political District.
In April 2012, SIGIR released its first Special Report: Leaders' Perceptions of the Commander's Emergency Response
Program in Operation Iraqi Freedom. This report provides results of a survey SIGIR administered to former Army battalion commanders who
served in Iraq about their experiences with the Commander's Emergency Response Program. It also includes perceptions from Marine
Corps battalion commanders, US Army Corps of Engineers officers, Provincial Reconstruction Team leaders, and USAID personnel on
PRTs who also nominated, executed and monitored reconstruction activities in Iraq.
SIGIR sought information about the processes for project nomination, implementation, management, evaluation and results of CERP
projects. Specifically, SIGIR examined the extent to which commanders used CERP; the outcomes commanders tried to achieve with
CERP; the measures of effectiveness commanders used to assess projects; the effectiveness of coordination between commanders,
their higher headquarters, and other U.S. government agencies involved in reconstruction; and the severity of fraud and corruption in CERP projects.
In July 2012, SIGIR released its second Special Report: The Human Toll of Reconstruction or Stabilization during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
This report gathers together all available data regarding the human toll of U.S. reconstruction or stabilization efforts during
Operation Iraqi Freedom. SIGIR contacted the Department of Defense (DoD); the Departments of the Army, Air Force, and Navy; the
Department of State (DoS); the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID); the Department of Labor (DoL); the United States
Army Corps of Engineers (USACE); and several insurance carriers and private companies for casualty information. SIGIR focused on the
3,479 hostile deaths and not the 930 non-hostile deaths (those who died because of accident, suicide, or natural causes).
File Description | File Size | Date |
---|---|---|
The Human Toll of Reconstruction or Stabilization during Operation Iraqi Freedom | 636KB PDF | 7/27/2012 |
Front Cover (High Resolution) | 100KB JPG | 7/27/2012 |
SIGIR's research identified 1,303 relief and reconstruction projects valued at about $148 million
that various U.S. entities executed in Rusafa during Operation Iraqi Freedom. That number is
almost certainly low; we found that some project records were missing, especially for those
accomplished early in OIF. The number does not include projects that were Baghdad-wide in
scope but affected Rusafa. We identified about 228 Baghdad-wide projects totaling about $93
million.
We aggregated Rusafa projects into two categories; construction and non-construction. A
construction project was an enduring capital facility constructed or renovated for the Iraqi
Government, the Rusafa District Advisory Council, or the citizens of the Rusafa Political
District. This included government buildings, police stations, schools, civic facilities, roads, and
health facilities. A non-construction project was one that provided a good or service to the Iraqi
Government, the Rusafa District Advisory Committee, or the citizens of the Rusafa Political
District. Examples of non-construction projects included training, school supplies or equipment,
micro grants, security guards, and civic cleanup projects.
Some projects failed to fit neatly into either the construction or non-construction categor755ies.
Generators, for example, were often given to Iraqi organizations or institutions to meet shortterm
power needs and ranged in cost from $23,100 to $495,000. SIGIR classified generators
costing $100,000 or more as construction. Less expensive generators were categorized as nonconstruction
goods.
We categorized projects according to the ten reconstruction sectors identified in the Iraq Relief
and Reconstruction legislation.2 In some cases, CERP projects did not align with the
congressionally-mandated sectors. For example, battle-damage repair was an authorized use of
CERP funds but was not covered by the congressional sectors. In these cases, we used our
judgment to categorize the projects.
File Description | File Size | Date |
---|---|---|
Interagency Rebuilding Efforts in Iraq: A Case Study of the Rusafa Political District | 1,535KB PDF | 2/26/2013 |
Front Cover (High Resolution) | 128KB JPG | 2/26/2013 |